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This theeis is a venture of a person in the reformed tradition
into thirteenth century scholastic theology, in particular, into the
Christology of Alexander of Hales (died 1245).
It is based especially on the Glossa on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard• The ouaestiones disputed before Alexander was a
Franciscan are also taken into consideration. The Susuaa
traditionally attributed to Alexander has not been used because it is
a compilation of various authors.
The main question of the thesis has been: what place does
Alexander give the humanity of Christ?
At only one place has Alexander's answer to this question
been found to be satisfactory and that is where he has followed in
the steps of Ansa Lai. Only when he treats of the doctrine of
satisfaction for the temporal punishment of original sin does he
give the humanity a necessary place, or, to put that another way,
does he go beyond what is, in effect, Adoptlonlst Ohristology. His
doctrine of Christ, by and large, leaves out of Christ's necessary
work, eternal satisfaction for original sin, satisfaction for
actual sins, forgiveness of guilt, and the sanctification of man.
There are four aspects of hie thinking involved in this
limited Christology. Y-.hefcher they are presuppositions, causes or
effects, is a matter for the history of theology.'
i) His presupposition of God as "One" in the neo-Platonic
tradition. This prevents Alexander's conceiving of God's full
involvement in creation. In his thinking on the uniting and on
the hypostatic union he keeps God and man "at arm's length", first
by distinguishing too much between Divine nature and Person, and
then in the hypostatic union by distinguishing between hypostasis
and person. The "One" is also seen as a presupposition in the
discussion of Christ's suffering and relation to sin, and in
Alexander's doctrine of predestination and "Poainus" where time and
eternity are not discussed in view of the incarnation.
ii) As a corollary man has a capacity for God. in Alexander's
understanding of Christ this is seen as something akin to
Apollinarianism, and elsewhere It Is seen In his view of Mary and
the saints, of grace, freewill, and merit, and in the doctrine of
the sacraments, particularly that of Penance.
ill) His doctrine of grace, in particular regard to forgiveness
and sanctifioation grace (or the Holy Spirit) takes the place of
Jeeus Christ. Grace Is viewed substantially and becomes "mediator"
by means of the doctrine of uncreated and created grace* Christ Is,
at beet, a channel of this grace.
iv) The doctrine of the priesthood and the sacraments. Here
a mediatorial role is also assumed. It appears that priest and
sacrament are man to God and God to man. Christ's power is forwarded
to the Church which appears to replace the Holy spirit. The
relationship of grace and the Holy Spirit is not definite.
These viewpoints contribute to a limited Christolo&y and
prevent an incarnation centred doctrine of Christ.
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This thesis is a study in the Christology of
Alexander of Hales. I chose Alexander as a subject simply
because I wanted to become acquainted with a theology not
of my own tradition and there is no better period to choose
for this purpose than the thirteenth century, the century
of the scholastic giants. Having chosen the period the
next question to be asked was "who could I study besides
Thomas Aquinas"? The fact that there were good new texts
available of Alexander's main works and the fact that he
was a man of some stature in his own day together with the
fact that most Protestants have never heard of him seemed
a good reason to discover the source of his great reputation.
There were problems about the text of the Summa in that
there were doubts as to its genuineness but I hoped that
these problems would be solved as I proceeded.
However, this was not to be so. Because of the
doubts about the genuineness of the Summa this thesis has
become a study in the Ghristology of Alexander which appears
in the Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Together
with this there are discussions of the views of the
Quaestiones at the end of each topic in this thesis.
Is this concentration on the Glossa and to a lesser
extent on the t^uaestiones, and the exclusion of the Summa,
justified? It would appear to be so in view of the title of
the thesis "The Ghristology of Alexander of Hales." If there
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is any considerable doubt about the genuineness of the Summa
as a work of Alexander then one cannot claim that it is his
Christology that is being expounded. And that doubt exists.
The Summa may be interesting for comparisons and certainly
is an important work in itself but that does not bring it
under the scope of this thesis.
Nevertheless, some remarks about the genuineness
and the controversy on this matter are necessary both to give
evidence for the Summa's exclusion from consideration in this
thesis and to state what the controversy is about. The
appearance of the magnificent new edition of the Summa in
1924 gave impetus to a controversy which involved quite a
considerable number of scholars. The reason for this was the
fact that the Summa appeared dependent upon several authors,
notably John of Hochelle, and the fact that certain discussions
in the Summa were obviously not from the pen of Alexander.
The suggestion was that possibly John of Rochelle was the
author or that the Summa was a compilation with the work of
John of Rochelle dominant. It could hardly be called the work
of Alexander. With the publishing of the second and third
volumes of the Summa in 1928 and 1930, without any comment
from the editors on the genuineness of the Summa, the controversy
received further stimulation. It now appeared that the
genuineness of the Summa as a work of Alexander could not be
sustained and this fact apparently was becoming accepted.
However, the editors were evidently biding their
time. In 1947 two articles appeared in Franciscan Studies by
V. Doucet, an editor of the new edition of the Summa.
These articles had already appeared on the continent and were
subsequently to appear in the Prolegomena of the Samoa,
which appeared in 1^48, on pages LIX to LXXX. This amazing
work of scholarship went to 370 foolscap, double columned
pages and V. Doucet, contrary to the usual practice, personally
took responsibility for the research and the conclusions of
the Prolegomena. In this work there was a discussion of the
text as it was restored in the first section and then the
second section considered the Summa historically. First, in
this section, came the article referred to above which
discussed the history of the problem of the authenticity of
the Summa, then the authors cited were listed, and after this
followed the most important section on the sources of the
Surama concluding with a listing of sources of the same period
as the Bumma. This section was significantly titled with the
question "are they sources or are they dependent*" Amongst
the most important sources and decisive for the argument were
two little known and now reprinted works of Alexander: the
Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and the .piaestiones.
Then the editor discussed the use of these sources, and
finally In three sections he considered the composition and
structure of the Summa I - III (volume IV on the sacraments
being accepted as the work of William of Middleton), the age
of these volumes, and finally the authenticity of these volumes.
1. V.Doucet, "The History of the Problem of the Authenticity
of the Summa", Franciscan Studies Vol.VII, 1^47, pp.26-41;
pp. 274-312.
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In the articles to which reference has already been
made V. Doucet came to the following conclusions: 1) The
Summa I-III was written before 1245 and therefore before the
death of Alexander. 2) John of Rochelle and (my underlining)
the Quaestiones were sources. 5) The work was a compilation,
possibly by more than one writer. 4) The question in book I
"De Missione Visibili" was an addition. 5) be Gorpore Humano
and De Coniuncto in Book II were additions. 6) Book IV
was by William of Miadleton (William had been assigned the
task of completing the Summa in a papal bull which
recognised Alexander as the author, a few years after the
death of Alexander). V. Doucet concluded here that the problem
of the Summa on the whole had not been solved - certainly he
repudiated those who had concluded that Alexander was not the
author on all too slim evidence - but that Alexander, if there
were others, surely was the chief compiler.
In his conclusion after the listing and consideration
of the Quaestiones Doucet concludes:
"Haec recensio quaestionum Halensis ultra modum sane
longioc evasit, quae tamen omnino exigebatur ad problema
Summae solvendum. Et re quippe vera paulo clarius iam
discernitur quid Alexander contulerit Summae: praeter
nomen suum gloriosum, ultra ducentas quaestiones, quasi
nucleus originalis Summae habendae sunt ac unde procul
dubio primum exorta est ipsa intentio cuiusdam Summae
compilandae. IJtique in praxi seu in exsecutione primae
intentionis plures alii fontes adiecti fuerunt aut immo
praeferuntur ipsis quaestionibus halesianis; sed et
huiusmodi quaestiones neglectas longe pauciores esse
deprehendimus quam hactenus putabatur. Plures enim
quaestiones de quibus legitur v.g. apud Henquinnet:
"Differt a Summa" vel'deest in Summa", verbotenus
econtra, saltern ex parte, in Summa reperiuntur. Tandem
inter fontes qui quandoque praeferuntur quaestionibus
halesianis, nonnuili utique habentur extranei, ut
Cancellarius et Altissiodorensis; saepius autem ubi
revera dimittitur Alexander, usu adhibetur Rupellensis
5
/Rochelle/ vel Guillelmus de Militona (quoad lib.IV)
aut imaio Commentarius quidam anonymus super Seritentias.
cuius auctor ipse est Alexander". 2
At the end of the discussion on the Commentary on
the Sentences Doucet concludes that there can be no doubt
that it is a work of Alexander and now not only the commentary
but also not a few chapters of the Sumraa which were
previously thought to be borrowed from elsewhere ought to be
x
restored to Alexander. As a general conclusion on the
sources as a whole Doucet states that the first three volumes
were compiled before 1245 largely from the writings of
Alexander and John of Kochelle. The greater part came from
Alexander. Other sources are supplementary. It is possible
to conclude that these two were the redactors but there aire
many difficulties in the way of this conclusion especially in
regard to Alexander who is cited as an extraneous author and
although many of the Quaestiones and his second volume of the
Sentences' commentary are used when there are parallel
questions in John and Alexander more often the former is
preferred. However, the re-establishment of the Commentary
showed that sections of the Summa previously attributed to
lL
Odo Higaldus are actually the sources of Odo's work.
At the conclusion of the section on the
authenticity of the Sumtaa as a work of Alexander and at the
end of the Prolegomena Doucet states after examining the
external and internal evidence; "Ipse Alexander quodammodo
2. Prolegomena pp. CCIII.
4. Ibid. pp. CCCVI-CCCVII.
5. Ibid. pp.CCX-CCXI
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Sumrnam fecit (critica externa). sed collaborantibus aliis
(critica internali item, ex propriis maxime scriptis, sed
etiara ex alienis. quare et authentica et halesiana
5
quodammodo Summa dici potest, noil autem simpliciter". ^
Perhaps he was "simpliciter" the author of Book II hut as
this is not Alexander's Ghristology that is not sufficient
on which to found a thesis entitled "The Christology of
Alexander of Hales".
It would perhaps be useful to list Doucet's
rejections of certain positions held by scholars who
affirmed the non-authenticity of the Sumuoa of Alexander
of
to see where V. Doucet has brought the discussionAthe question
of the bumaia. These are found in an "Epilogus". The critics
asserted that Alexander entered the Franciscans in the year
1231 and was regent at the latest till 1238. On the contrary
he entered the order about 1236 and was still teaching and
disputing in public 1240-1244. Why could he not also compile
the Summa? The critics asserted that no commentary of
Alexander remained. The commentary, on the contrary, not
only exists but is a principal source of the Summa. The
critics asserted that the juaestiones postquam fuit frater
were the work of John of Kochelle and Stephen de Poliniaco.
On the contrary they belong to Alexander and the "juaestiones
anteciaaa fuit frater11 are a principal source of the bumma.
The critics, following Hoger Bacon, asserted that the bumma
3. Ibid. p. CCCLXIX.
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was attributed to Alexander only out of reverence. This
assertion is false because the Summa is largely compiled
from the work of Alexander. The critics asserted that the
Summa was compiled about 1260 and queried the possibility of
the doctrine existing in Paris before 1250. On the contrary
it was written before the death of Alexander in 1245• The
fact that the sections be corpore humano arid be coniuncto
were written before 125? and not about 12?0 as asserted,
and therefore before William of Midaleton's death, make it
possible th&t they came from his pen since he was officially
given the task of completing the fcuama. The critics asserted
that the Summa for the most part came from the writings of
Odo Bigaldus, Albert the Great, Bonaventure etc. whereas the
contrary was true. The critics asserted that the Praelocutio
of Bonaventure in which he cited 'Alexander in Summa' did
not appear authentic and attempted to demonstrate this fact,
but on the contrary this Praelocutio is beyond doubt
authentic. This is where Doucet brought the controversy.
Because of the importance of the Commentary and the
^uaestiones the editors hastened to edit them so that the
true Alexander could be known, instead of proceeding at once
to the publishing of the fourth volume of the Sumrna on the
n
sacraments. '
In spite of the importance of this work by Doucet
in re-establishing the part of Alexander in the compilation
6. Ibid. p.CGCLXX. ?. Ibid.
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of the Sumiaa, the fact still remains that it is the work of
at least two men and that the Christological section proper,
which is Volume III, was probably not under the redaction of
Alexander and this renders it suspect as far as stating the
"Ghristology of Alexander of Hales" even though the Summa
might reflect the thinking of his school. Hence the Gumma
is omitted in the consideration of Alexander's Ghristology
in this thesis.
The Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard forms
the basis of this thesis. There are several reasons for
this. First I worked on the Glossa before the v^uaestiones
and received the ^uaestiones only after I had written an
outline of the Glossa's Christology. On consideration,
however, I came to the conclusion that the ^uaesfciones should
not be integrated for a second reason, namely, that it
revealed considerable differences from the Glossa and these
were best set put in separation so that the thinking of the
Glossa and the ^uaestiones could be readily comprehended.
A third reason for the lack of integration is the fact that
the Quaestiones and the Glossa quite often treat of different
topics which simply could not be integrated. The Glossa
forms the basis of the thesis, now, simply because, as far
as Ghristology is concerned, it has far more and in fact has
one large section which develops Ghristology and soteriology
quite thoroughly. The Quaestiones considered are also only
those disputed before Alexander was a brother because I do not
have an edition of those disputed after he was a brother and
as far as I know (at the end of 1963 and in mid-1965 in Melbourne
9
not yet in a .Franciscan Seminary if published) the latter
are not yet published. In any case for the most part, from
the list which Doucet gives in the Sumraa Prolegomena they
appear to be more in the philosophico-speculative area than
in the realm of Christology proper and except for one or two
questions, which are dealt with in any case in the other
works, they would have a Christological reference only in
a very general way.
The editors have also rendered a considerable
service in that they have investigated thoroughly evidence
for the biography of Alexander. This is a great improvement
on the usual few meagre lines on his biography that appear in
encyclopedias and histories of various kinds. The following
summary brings out the main points of Alexander's life
correcting one or two errors that have been commonly repeated.
Alexander was born about 1186 in the west of England.
He studied in Paris and in 1210 he became m.A. and somewhere
in the period 1210-1215 he transferred to the theological
faculty where he was successively "auditor, baccalareus, et
magister regens", the first two being held about the years
1212-1217, 1217-1220, and the appointment as "magister regens"
taking place about 1220 or 1221* It was during the twenties
that he probably wrote the Glossa. He was the first to use
the Sentences of Peter as a text in theology. From about the
years 1226-1229 he held ecclesiastical appointment in England
\
as canon at 6t. Pauls and prebendary of Holborn. He was
closely involved in the student disturbances at Paris 122^""
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1231 leaving the city with the students, and in August 1230,
with two others, was delegated to the Roman Curia in relation
to the negotiations and remained in Rome till May 1231. He
then journeyed to England where he is found as canon of
Lichfield and archdeacon of Coventry which offices were
conferred in recognition of his work with the Curia. He
returned to trrance in 1232 to his previous work but
evidently retained his ecclesiastical posts. At the age of
30, about 1236-37* Alexander entered the order of the
Franciscans becoming their best scholar and retaining his
regency until the end of his life. With several others
he expounded rules of the order in 1241-1242. Hot long after
attending the Council of Lyons the great Franciscan known as
Q
"doctor irrefragabilis" died. Of the two texts which are
used in this thesis the Glossa was written about the years
1223-1227. ^ it is considered quite definitely to be a
genuine work of Alexander. ^ The i^uaestiones disputed
before he was a brother in their new edition are 68 in number
and in the Prolegomena to the Summa are 120 in number because
under several of the topics there are often more than two
questions. In the Prolegomena they are listed and carefully
discussed (pp.OLI-CLXXII) and Doucet concludes that their
authenticity seems quit6 certain and doubts to the contrary
are not reasonably held. In the Prolegomena he dates the
disputation of these questions in the years 1226-1236. ^
8. Glossa, Vol.I,pp.56x-73x. 9» Ibid. p.H6x
10. Ibid. p.l26x. 11. p.CLII.
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and in the Prolegomena to the ^uaestiones they are dated
1220-1236. 12
As Robert S. Franks has pointed oat with regard to
the work of Christ, it is not merely the doctrine that is
specifically listed under the heading of the work of Christ
but also the doctrine concerned with law and grace which must
be considered in a consideration of the work of Christ. This
involves necessarily the problems of the sacraments and
1*5
merit. ^ Today in theology the involvement of all theology
in its centre in Christ is fairly generally accepted but this
is for the reason that theology today in all its aspects is
deliberately Christocentric. With Alexander as with other
scholastics this was not the case; theology was far more
departmental and one doctrine was and to a large extent
successfully (i.e. as far as their intention was concerned)
discussed without relation to another. However as with the
work of Christ, so with Christology one cannot possibly cover
Alexander's thinking by sole reference to that which is
placed under what I shall call the Christology proper. Those
doctrines such as law and grace, sacraments and merit,
although soteriologically oriented are of great significance
in a discussion of Christology because it is at the point of
soteriology that weaknesses in medieval, and in particular,
in Alexander's Christology appear. Anselm's great work
12. Ibid. p.36. 13- Robert S.Franks
A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ in its
Ecclesiastical Development. Vol.1, pp.6-7; p.xix in new edition.
Cur Deus Homo is famous in the history of soteriology but
its importance in the history of Christology is also very
great. The other possibility in the translation of Our
Deus Homo which is normally translated "why did God become
man" and so understood soteriologically, is "why the God-man"
and this is more Christological. Whatever the translation,
whatever the emphasis on Anselm's thinking, it is still very
important Christologically because in this work Anselm
emphasised the necessity of the humanity from God's side,
that is, the satisfier had to be both God and man, for only
man should have satisfied but only God had the power to
satisfy. This doctrine over against, for instance, the
"Christus Victor" theory of atonement, made "necessary"
the humanity of Christ; Christ's work was not merely a battle
going on over the head of man.
Anselm, at a time when docetic tendencies were strong,
re-asserted the humanity of Christ. This position Alexander
took over with the consequent "necessity" of Christ's
humanity, in spite of some considerable modifications to
Anselm's position. In Alexander's Christology, on the whole,
there is little doubt about his affirmation, and successful
affirmation of the divinity of Christ, although in his
discussion of the hypostatic union there may be some question
as to his success. However, in the Christology there is some
doubt as to his whole-hearted affirmation of the humanity of
Christ, and it is with this side of Christology, therefore
that this thesis is most interested. Although the Christology
itself can be criticised, it is in the soteriology and
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related, subjects that Alexanders weaknesses and presuppositions
are best revealed, or rather conclusively revealed. It should
be noted that in regard to the humanity of Christ, Alexander
takes up a position which is not far removed from that taken
up by the great part of Christian history although at times
he would appear to move away from tradition in that he does
not seem particularly interested in affirming the humanity cf
Christ as much as he does the divinity. This means that
criticism in this thesis of his actual Christological
statements in regard, for instance, to sin,as far as the
history of the church goes, is decidely a minority view.
However, more and more it is the view of contemporary theology
and one would hope and believe it is also Biblical.
The main interest of this thesis, therefore, is with
the doctrine of the humanity of Christ in Alexander's
Christology. This will involve investigation as to the
reality of the humanity, the scope of his work, its connection
with the Divinity and vice versa (i.e. the question, here, is:
did God become man, did the Word of God become flesh). These
questions will be raised in the Christology proper ir.
relation to Christ's knowledge and ignorance, sin, his birth,
his suffering, and the two wills; In the doctrine of
satisfaction and its limited application; and in the discussion
of the hypostatic union where God and man in Christ are viewed
in. somewhat uneasy relationship because the human creates a
difficulty.
The implications of this Ghristology will be further
investigated outside the realm of the Christology proper. The
implications are semi-Pelagian for if the humanity of
Ghrist is limited as it is, then the humanity is provided
elsewhere. This semi-Pelagianism is found in the doctrine
of the sacraments and in the doctrine of grace, free will,
and merit. Consequently these discussions form a major part
of the thesis. However, there is another way of compensating
for the lack of the humanity of Chr5 st and that is to be
found in the doctrine of grace. This discussion has already
been mentioned and it is the doctrine of grace which prevents
Alexander from being fully Pelagian in the discussion of
actual sins. But it is the doctrine of grace which also
draws attention to the limitation of the humanity of Christ
in regax*d to sanctification, in fact, to the almost total
exclusion of Christ. At this point Alexander with his
doctrine of uncreated and created grace moves very strongly
towards a non-Trinitarian position (which coincides nicely
with various types of Pelagianism).
This non-Trinitarian position, which is completely
or almost; completely unCuristological in that the humanity
of Ghrist is minimised to purely an exemplary function, is
revealed not only in the doctrine of grace but above all in
another "grace", the grace of predestination, which in the
Glossa is completely unChristologicai and non-Triritarian
as a consequence. For much of his thinking the humanity of
Christ plays no real part and therefore neither does true
Christology in much of Alexander's theology.
A basic problem for Alexander and this type of
theology would appear to be the problem of time and eternity,
or the finite and the infinite. The act of God in aaan becomes
extraordinarily difficult conceptually when one has the
philosophic presuppositions of Alexander. This is the view
of God arising from the tradition of Plato and Aristotle of
God as "One", the "unmoved mover", the Essence who is
unchangeable and indivisible, the "One" which is everything
man is not and thus by definition man and God have no real
relationship. God and man are considered separately in this
thinking. It is the medieval Christian theologian's task to
bring the21 together but with such presuppositions a true
account of the Biblical viewpoint is almost impossible to
come by. But the Bible is incarnational, or rather, Christian
than
theology begins, and cannot begin elsewhere, with the
incarnation, and thus with the Trinity, that is, with the God
who relates Himself to man, by becoming man in the Son and
revealing this to man in the Spirit, and yet the God who
remains God. It is the failure to work from this beginning
that creates exceptional difficulties in Alexander's thinking
generally. This is demonstrated very well in the discussion
on predestination and also in the chapter on the Dominus
Concept which forms the last chapter in the thesis.
How to approach the discussion of the Christology
proper which occupies pages 11 to 262 of volume three of the
Glossa was something of a problem. As it was already a
commentary a summary of this section would have appeared as
a commentary on a commentary. As any commentary tends to lack
systera this would have been doubly unsystematic and the
length of the summary would have meant that it would barely
be cofoprehensible as a whole. The danger in dividing the
section into various chapters as has been done lies in the
possibility of imposing a system or a pattern of thought that
does not exist in the text. However, in order to make the
Christology proper more understandable and because, in fact,
Alexander does on the whole treat the subject in what is
best called a chronological order it was decided to divide
the section into various chapters following more or less
i-
the chronological order of Alexander. This would be carried
out more strictly, possibly, than he had done, simply because
Alexander, like the apostle Paul, at times came upon a word
and went ahead of himself ana thus was taken out of the strict
chronology. This "tidying up" may detract from a comparison
of Peter Lombard and Alexander but it should not detract from
a study of Alexander's Christology which is the interest of
this thesis.
Book III which forms the main Ghristological
section contains three codices. These are A, L, and h. In
Books I and 11 these have also been the three codices used
and in those volumes there is a large measure of agreement
between them. Only Codex E contains somewhat puzzling
variations and additions and it cannot be dated as the other
codices to the 1220's. What has been done In the first volume
in the composition of the text is as follows:
AIL agreeing (even in errors) « original text
AL agreeing against K « original text
AS agreeing against L ■ original text
Lis agreeing against A » original text
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In the introduction to the first volume the editors conclude
that in AL they have the authentic text of Alexander, to a
less extent in E. Where the various codices differ these
differences are put at the bottom of the page, where the main
text appears, in the footnotes. In the second volume this
situation again prevails with E still undated and puzzling.
They conclude that the genuine text of Alexander's Glossa
should be sought only in AL.
In Book III A and L differ considerably from each
other although A and E provide much common text. L however
is a good codex and agrees substantially in sense with a but
very ofiien not in wording. Its dating and its general
agreement, they conclude, would lead one to believe that it
is a redaction of Alexander. E agrees often with A - again
providing additions - but rarely with L in its wording.
What the editors have done is to print texts A and E
together (AE), and L separately, so that two main texts are
provided. Then in the "footnote" (as it will be described
in the thesis) they have placed S when it has affinity with
AE; and as a separate text after L they have placed "E"
(as it will be described in the thesis) when it has affinity
with L. E again remains undated and a little puzzling. AE
and L provide genuine thinking of Alexander.
In Book IV there are five codices used: A, B,
E, P, and T. A is again the base of the text and is preferred
unless manifestly corrupt. T agrees generally with A
although it is not as good a codex; P has much in common
with T; E, with codex A, is the only codex to give the whole
Glossa and in this lies its merit or value. Here again are
the "same arbitrary variations, the same extraneous additions
although, more rarely" than in the previous three books. B
which was only an aid in the first three books becomes a
principal codex in Book IV. Again the dating as with the
first books is put at about 1223-27*
This then is an outline of the codices and an
explanation of how they are used. In Book III alone the
fact that more than one text is used is evident, bo then,
there will be references to "An", "L", "footnote" ("E" with
affinity to "A"), and "E" ("E" with affinity to "L"). This
information is found in the introductions to the various
volumes.
CHAPTER 1.
THE BACKGROUND TO THE I1ICAREAllOR
The first part of Book III of Alexander's Glossa
consists of an outline of the Christological section which
is to follow. The Christology has three main divisions.
The first division is about the assumption and continues
up to distinction V; the second division is about the union
of natures and occupies distinctions VI to XIV; the third
division is about the passion and concludes the section on
Christology at distinction XXII. * The first division has
five parts, namely, "de assumente", "de assumpto", "de eo ex
quo assumptio", "de dispositions assuapti", and "de eo de quo
p
assumitur". The division on the union of natures has two
ad
parts: "de iis quae pertinentAunionsa sive proprietatem
■Z
uniti", and "de donis collatis ipsi Christo in ipsa unione". v
The third division on the passion has three parts of which
the first is "de antecedentibus" to the passion, the second
is on the passion itself and its effects, ana the third is
a
on what follows the passion - "in triduo".
This first chapter will be concerned with the
background and the "beginnings" of the incaxnation. This
will include a section on the idea of the "fulness of time";
a section on the "reasons" for the incarnation ("reasons" used
in a loose sense); the third section will include Alexander's
1. para. P, p.l. P. pp«l"*3* 3• ^fP*3* 3,p.6.
affirmation of the incarnation as the work of the Trinity
and thus of Christ as the Son of God, and his affirmation of
Christ as the Son of Man; ana the fourth and final section
of this chapter will be concerned with the "congruence" of
creation for the incarnation.
In the first part of distinction I Alexander notes
seven uses of the idea, the "fulness of time"• The time of
the incarnation is so called because there was "abundantia
pacis" (Ps. 71.?), "propter charismaturn largitatem
affluentem" (Ezek.3^.26), "figurarum adimpletioneia", (Matt.
5.1?) , "proiaissaruia redditionem" (Dan.9*27) » "temporis
consumaationem" (ICor. 10.11), "misericordiae effusionem"
(Ps. 32.5)* "creaturarum adimpletionem" (Kph. 1.9-10), and
"pretii solutionem". ^ There is no comment on this list
of fulilments but in the next section the idea is connected
with justice in which there are two elements: "declinare a
malo" and "facere bonum'J Before the incarnation the better
part of justice, "adhaerere bono", was lacking but after the
incarnation there was a fulness as it brought in perfect
justice. These two aspects of justice form one of the
aspects of Alexander's thinking corresponding approximately
to the distinctions between law and grace, and between the
time of no merit and a time of merit. As later chapters
will demonstrate the quite clear distinction made here between
the time before and the time sifter the incarnation is not
altogether maintained. Another way of expressing this
5. d.1,1,p.11. 6. 2, p.11
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distinction is "quoad veritatem prophetarum" and "quoad
7
gratiam". '
"L", in discussing the fulness of time "in fine
saeculi", describes a fulness of nature which is according
to genus and species; the fulness of grace is seen in the
Head in the incarnation, in effect in the passion; a
fulness in the members and this will be in the consummation
of the age according to number; and the fulness of glory in
two ways - in the Head in the resurrection, and in the members
O
after the fulness of beatitude. Here is a process which
begins with nature and ends with glory. Grace is indispensable
in the process but there may be a hint of a capacity in
creation which needs completion or which can be completed.
(viz, the "congruence of creation" later in the chapter).
Alexander can list several "reasons" for the
incarnation. These are more in the way of expositions of
its meaning than "causes". It demonstrated the very great
love of the Father; it occurred lest the name of the Son be
transferred to the Father or the Holy Spirit; creation was
in the Word of God and therefore re-creation ought to be
through him; it was through "sapientia" that man fell and
therefore it was right that through "sapientia" it be
redeemed; since man was the image of God, only the Son,
the image of the Father, could be the instrument in reforming
man in that image; in redemption we are adopted as sons and
this could be done only through the Son by nature; in
7. Ibid. 8. 15(L), pp.15-16
redemption we are made co-heirs bat it is given only to the
Son to confer heredity. ^ Without any expansion by Alexander
of these reasons little comment is possible except to note
that these reasons affirm the love of God, there is a
suggestion of Christ's substitution for us (the restored
image), there is the suggestion of the establishment of
man's freedom (sons and co-heirs). It would appear also
that the incarnation provides a starting point for his
thinking rather than being enclosed within an alien system.
This is however only apparent.
In "E" in distinction I it is noted that the
Trinity "operates" the assumption but does not assume. 10
This may have something in common with the second reason for
the incarnation mentioned above where the Son is incarnate
lest his name be transferred to the Father or tie Holy Spirit.
"E" also points out that the incarnation takes place in
wisdom and not in goodness as "sapientia" is the formal cause
and "bonitas" is the final cause. /"Sapientia" is
appropriated to the Son and "bonitas" to the Holy Spirit./
Hence the preposition for "bonitas" in relation to the
incarnation is "propter" and not "in". 11
Considerably later in the Ghristology Alexander
also clearly understands the work of Christ as the work of
the Trinity and develops this understanding in regard to the
passion. In a paragraph without comment Alexander quotes
Augustine: "Cum dicimus Filium passum, dicimus Patrem et
9. 4,pp.12-13.
11. 36(E), p.22.
10. 29 (E), p.20
Pilium et Spiritual Sanctum operatum fuisse: et cum dicimus
reaiissioiiem peccatorum attribui Spiritu Sancto, intelligamus
12
Trinitateai hoc donurn inseparabiliter operari". 'i'he
working of the Trinity in Christ, together with reasons for
Christ's humanity (which will be discussed more fully below),
are brought out in a comment on the mortality of Christ.
"Ad omne /opus/ rectum agendum exigitur posse,
scire et velle. Ut ergo potenter liberaret, oportuit
Deurn liberatorem esse; et u; prudenter, oportuit
Pilium Dei esse, cui attribu^itur sapientia; unde
26 I ob 12s Sapientia percuasit superbma. Et ut
benigne liberaret, oportuit ipsum liberatorem esse
creaturam; et ut iuste liberaret, oportuit hominem
esse; et ut misericorditer, oportuit mortalem. esse." ^
The Holy Spirit is implicitly here as "bonitas" but his
absence does not affect the issue at point here. Hex*© is a
fairly rounded view of the incarnation. The work of the
incarnation is the work of God, the Trinity; it is done in
the unity of the Trinity, and it is done in justice, mercy,
and with regard to the freedom of man. Here, God is "love"
and the satisfaction made by Christ is seen as the working
out of that love right to death. Already the central reason
for the incarnation arises but before this is discussed the
remainder of Alexander's statements en the beginnings of
the incarnation will be given.
In distinction I both "L" and define various
terms used in relation to the incarnation. "Incarnatus"
refers to the Divine nature in the person of Christ; "missus"
refers to the person of the Trinity in relation to the flesh,
12. d. XIX, 14, p.213; Augustine, bermo 2 de symbolo. c.9.
13. 11« pp.212-13.
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and "factus" refers to the human nature of Christ. "L"
concludes by stating that "descenders" refers to the Divine
nature. "E" states that "missus" relates principally to
existence in the union, "incarnatus" to the "medium" and
"factus" to the "posterior". As far as the order of these
words is concerned it is stated in "L" that "per inteiligentiam"
the order is "missus", "incarnatus", "factus", but "per
14
tempus" they are simultaneous. It will be seen later
that the distinction between "incarnatus" and "missus"
becomes quite a problem in Alexander's Ghristology.
In distinctions XIX and XX there are snatches of
the recapitulation theory and in their limited way they help
to explain the "appropriateness", the order, and the
"necessity" of the incarnation. Pride was at its height
in the sin of the first man therefore the man who redeemed
had to do so in the greatest humility: "Hoc autem erat
15
contemnere vitam propriam effundendo sanguinem suum". ^
Anselm is quoted to demonstrate the appropriateness of the
work of Christ: obedience answers disobedience; from a
woman came the beginning of sin, from a woman came the
author of justification; the Devil used the fruit of a tree
to defeat man and in turn was defeated by the passion on the
tree. Original justice in Christ corresponds to the
19
original sin in Adam. ' (This is discussed further below,
p.2£0 There is the danger in the recapitulation theory of
14~I d.1, 21(L),pp.18-19; 33(E) ,pp.21-22.
15. d.XIX,2,p.209; also XX, 5, a)p.230. 16. 3,c)p.231;
Anselm, Cur Deus Homo I, c.3« 1V« ^-0 tP.235*
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seeing the work of Christ merely as part of an order outside
of him. However, it would appear that Alexander avoids this
sort of necessity here./The distinction between
"appropriateness" - "conveniens, oportet" - and "necessity"
is found in Anselm. Professor Mclntyre describes in his
book on Anselm this distinction:
"Boso resents the fact that these arguments are
drawn from the realm of the "appropriate" and do not
establish necessity. They assume that God has decided
to save the human race and are concerned only with the
manner in which that salvation may most fittingly be
accomplished. Boso presses his point home and insists
that St. Anselm expound his answer to the question,
why it was necessary that God should become man, suffer
and die, in order that mankind should be saved." 18
"Necessity" is the quality of such relationsas
are self-evident to, or accepted after proof as ti'ue by,
believers and unbelievers. "Fittingness", on the
contrary, can be applied only to such relations or
situations as are seen by believers to be the case."/ "
It is with Anselm that Alexander moves nearer to the real
cause of the incarnation as he sees it, and to the factor
which is dominant in his thinking on Christ, that is, the
necessity for satisfaction. A person such as an angel cannot
help man as angels are of another genus and man has therefore
to be the satisfier in the satisfaction made for man's
20
sin. Man fell, thus states Anselm, and so Alexander,
therefore man must rise again. This factor is brought out
in "L" when the fulness of Scripture is being discussed. In
the passion Scripture was fulfilled because it was the reason
why Christ came into the world to redeem mankind. The passion
was the fulness of Scripture as the "per quod", the incarnation
18. J.McIntyre, St.Anselm and His Critics, p.53. 1^.Ibid.p.59*
20. Anselm, Cur l)eus Homo 11:8,22. d.1,10,p. 14.
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was the "de quo". Thus the objective of the incarnation
was the passion (and its satisfaction). This theme becomes
dominant in Alexander's soteriology and satisfaction is seen
to be the only "necessary" reason for the incarnation of
Christ.
Distinction II continues the theme of the causes
of the incarnation but in a narrower form, that is, the
reason for the incarnation in a man as opposed to another
creature. The Anselmic answer again is given, namely, that
O
only man ought to satisfy, but only God could satisfy. ^
"L" and "E" enlarge upon this. The angels could have been
assumed but they were lacking in what could be repaix>ed
through the union and they fell through themselves so they
could not rise through another. ^ Others could not rise
24
through them as they did not descend through propagation.
25
The angels, in short, were not assumptible. y All this
adds up to the fact that an angel could satisfy for itself
but that satisfaction by it was not applicable to others
because there was no connection between angel and angel as
there was between man and man. This was their lack and why
they were not assumptible.
Earlier Christ's justice corresponding to Adam's
injustice was mentioned as part of a recapitulation theory.
However, Alexander expanded that discussion to show that this
correspondence was more than mere recapitulation but rather
21. 14( L) , p.15. See also d.V,28(L),pp.66-67; 49(e),p.72.
22. d.II,11,p.25. 23. 13(L),I,p.26.
24. 28(E),p.33. 25. 19(L),p.32; 28(E),p.33.
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that Christ's justice was greater than Adam's injustice and
hence beyond the power of man. Alexander does this when he
answers the question whether the sin of Adam was as great
as the prize by stating that in quantity (that is, in death)
they were equal, but that in intensity they were not. Our
death is the punishment for sin, the death of Christ was
26
"hostia pro peccato". Christ humbled himself
"secundum voluntatem" (death) and "secundum esse" (the
incarnation). Adam was proud "affectu and voluntate" only.^
This work of Christ, Alexander implies, was not done by mere
man.
This is evident when Alexander discusses the
"necessity" of the passion in the concept of Christ as
original justice as the response to original sin. Christ
took this role upon himself voluntarily as it was necessary
for redemption that there should be a man with original justice.
Yet there was no such pure man so it behoved that he should
pQ
be both God and man. Man should be just but could not be;
God could be just but ought not to be. So that justice and
power should combine it was necessary that God should be
29
"this" man - man justly, God in mercy. y Again Alexander is
very dependent on Anselm. Earlier Anselm had also been the
source to show why the Redeemer had to be Christ. The
offence to God was mortal and thus beyond the power of man to
recompense and so it behoved that the Redeemer be God.
26. d.XX,6,p.232. 27. (L),pp.240-241.
28. 10,p.235. 29. 23(L),p.241.
30. d.XIX,11,p.212; Anselm, esp.II,cc.6,7»
Another reason is also given for the death of
Christ, It is of a different kind to the previous reasons,
which were related to justice and satisfaction. This
reason concerns the liberation from the Devil, and the
violence concerned with this liberation. "Dicen dum quod
violentia non est ex parte tollentis, sed ex parte eius
qui tollitur; quoniam homo per pondus peccati tendebat
deorsum, sed Dominus earn per suam passionem sursum traxit".
No extended comment will be made here, for it will be made
later, but it should be noted that here sin is seen as
corruption, which approaches an ontological view of sin,
in which tte danger is the equation of being itself, creation,
with corruption.
The place of the Devil as the torturer of Christ
is raised in distinctions XIX and XX. Although the Devil
is mentioned several times his part does not appear to be
particularly central. The Devil is "torquens", sin is why
32
man "torquetur", and punishment is the instrument. ^ The
Devil does not justly torment man although man is tormented
justly and justly God permits it. Man was under punishment
33
by the decree of God. This view is also found in the
denial of the view that the price God paid to redeem man
was given to the Devil. The guard was the Devil; the master
34
was God the Father.' The power that the Devil had was only
the power of punishment, because all, by reason of original
31. d.XIX,12,p.213* 32. l,p.209.
33. d.XX,5,p.232; Anselm, I,c.7. 34. d.XIX,42(E),p.226.
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sin, but not of guilt, descended "ad limbum inferni",
and after the passion he was deprived also of this power. His
conquest of man after the passion was not from himself but
35
from man. It was the blood of Christ which bound the
36
Devil. Finally, Isidore is quoted, with no comment,
mentioning Christ as the bait for the Devil, and again,
on the same lines, also without comment, John of Damascus
37
is quoted. •"
Most of this is traditional thinking apparently
hardly worked into Alexander's Christology. Yet he could
well apply it to the idea of the corruption of man for the
ideas that the Devil had no right over man, that he did not
have the power over guilt, that no price was paid to him
(which indicates that Jesus did not come under the power of
the Devil), that man sinned from himself, all help to
distinguish man as man from man as sinner. If he is used
for nothing else the Devil is a useful device for maintaining
theologically - the idea that the price was not paid to the
Devil indicates this - that sin is real ana yet man is "very
good", a position which is fair better maintained by a good
doctrine of Christ. It would be wrong to make too much of the
quotations to the effect that Chx'ist was a bait except to
note that traditionally this view tended to be docetic.
The reasons for the incarnation raise the problem
of necessity, what sort of necessity was it; to which Christ
35. 3,p.210. 36. XX,4,p.231? Augustine,
37. XIX,10,p.212; Isidore c£ Seviiie, Be Trinnate, XIII,cc. 13-16
Sententiae,I,c.14,nn.12-14;
d.XX,9»pp.234-235; John of
Damascus, De Fide Orth.III.c.27
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was subjected? The problem of necessity arises first in
regard to the fact that Christ was under the law,
Alexander points out that this does not mean that Jesus
was under the necessity of fear but that he was under the
law of love ^ and his subjection to the law was voluntary,
not necessary. ^ Those under the Law decline evil from
40
fear but the Just decline evil from the love of God.
41
Christ's subjection to the law took place as man and he
was circumcised, being "made under the Law" because the effect
42
of circumcision was not superseded until the passion.
Thus there are two elements here present which are typically
Alexander's: the fact that Christ was not under necessity,
and the fact that Jesus was man to take man's place as
satisfier. The problem of necessity will again be taken up
but before this, in a glance back at the reasons for the
incarnation it should be noted that Alexander places the
cessation of circumcision at the passion which is described
as the "propria causa" ^ of its cessation (in contrast to
the incarnation as the "causa"). This is of significance in
Alexander's Christology for the pinpointing of the passion
(as distinct from the whole work of Christ) as the place of
satisfaction points to the severe limitation which is put
on Christ's role, namely, merely that of human satisfier for
original sin - he is given no role in regard to guilt and an
ambiguous one in regard to santification. Christ is seen








give satisfaction in the crucifixion - which is the only
"necessary" cause. The incarnation, by and large, is merely
44
the arena in which satisfaction takes place.
In distinction XVI the necessity of Christ's death
is discussed. According to Boethius there are four states
45
of mans innocence, sin, grace, and glory. ^ If Christ,
Alexander argues, assumed his human nature from the first
state, that is, from the state of innocence, he did not
experience death as there is no death in that state. If,
however, he assumed his human nature from the second state,
that is from the state of sin, "non fuit ei necessitas
46
moriendi". The solution to this problem is that Christ
47
took his "naturam de primo, poenalitatem de secundo".
For the first time there is a doubt raised here which will
be constantly raised in this thesis, whether Christ took
upon himself the sinful body of man. After all he assumed
44. The following quotation, in one statement, illustrates
the necessity of God and man in Christ, as weiastbe limitation
of Christ's work. "Cum enim corrupta tota humana natura
esset per peccatum primi parentis, non competebat satisfactio
nisi per em qui est principium eorura qui erant in corruptione,
et ipse quidem homo, sed principium incorrupturn. Ham si
aliorum principium esset, non satisfaceret. Nec Adam potuit
satisfacere quia de suo non potuit Deo dare aliquid maius
omni eo quod sub Deo est. Satisfactio autem ilia est maius
omni rationali creatura corrupta. Necesse est ergo ut sit
satisfactor ille principium illorum hominum ut Deus, et quod
solvat poenam in quantum homo. Licet ergo Dominus ex sua
misericordia in circumcisione abstulerit originale peccatum
quoad culpam et quoad reatua aeternae visionis Dei, qui
neeessario consequitur, non tainen ab illo reatu quoad temporalem
poenam absolvit. Propter quod necesse fait, cum homo
corruptus vel purus non corruptus non posset satisfacere, ut
Christus Deus et homo satisfaceret, ut sic rumphaea januae
paradisi tolleretur." Book IV,dist.I,30,d)p.3?.
45. Boethius, Oposc.V: De persona et duabus naturis.c.8.
46. l,a)p.l70;d.XVI,5(L),a)p.l72.
47. Ibid. d)p.!73.
Adam as he is, not as he was. The "new Adam" was the work
of the re-creation of God as the "old Adam" was the work of
the first creation. Christ was not the "new Adam" from some
created state of innocence; he was the "new Adam" bom into
the sin of man.
Alexander then goes more deeply into the meaning
of the "necessity of dying". Was Christ compelled and not
free? The answer to this question is found in both "A.E"
and "L" and states that there are four kinds of necessities
(following Aristotle): formal "ut caliaurn calefacere";
material "ut sumrae calidua fieri ignem"; efficient "ut"
violenter aoventia"; and final "ut si inhabitare est finis
doraus, ad hoc inhabitetur necesse est operiaentum habeat. Bt
hoc ultimo raodo fuit necessitas moriendi in Christo, scilicet
secundum ordinal, ionem ad finem; alias non". Thus Christ
took this necessity upon himself in his freedom. Christ was
thus necessary for man's salvation but did not die
necessarily, in this way Alexander demonstrates the freedom
of God in Christ's death, a freedom which he is anxious to
SO
maintain. ^ This is also seen in the answer to the question
whether Christ was immortal in the same way as Adam was in
61
the state of innocence. ^ : "fuit immortalis, non habens
causam necessitatis moriandi, peccatum in se scilicet; sed
fuit mortalis ex dispensations ad homines". And so, hei'e,
Alexander maintains, as before, that Christ suffered the
48. l,b)p.l7G;5(L),b)p.l?2. 49. Ibid.d)pp.172-173; also
l,d)p.!71. 30. cf.Book I dd.XXXV-XLI on prescience.
51. d.XVI,1,c)p.l71; 3(L),c)p.l?2. 32. footnote,p.171;
also 3(L),e)p.l73.
penalties of sin without sinning; in other words he was not
subject to the necessity of sin. A related topic raised in
distinction XVII concerns the actual death of Christ. Unless
eternal life had followed death neither the superior nor
the inferior reason would have informed Christ that he had
53
to die. Wot to have died would have been the good of
nature; to have died for the redemption of mankind was the
54
good of grace. ^ According to Anselm, Christ could have
avoided death if he had wished but as the world could be
redeemed only through his death, he preferred to suffer
55
death rather than the world should not be saved. John
of Damascus pointed out that Christ had a natural fear of
death. ^ Alexander is thus pointing out that Christ died
for others a death he chose freely to undergo; he was under
no necessity.
If the death of Christ was not necessary, neither
was the redemption of man by Christ. Alexander states, quoting
Anselm, that it is improper to use the word "necessity" in
relation to God's redemption of man, in the sense that God
had to save His handiwork from perishing. ^ In "L" the
comment is: "lit sic, licet quodam modo necessarium, tamen
simpliciter voluntarium". Christ, then, submitted himself
to man's necessity, that is, the necessity of redemption,
not out of compulsive necessity but in freedom. This
solution was found in slightly different form earlier where




and so he merited death. Alexander replies that there was
justice in relation to man whose nature he assumed (because
man was due the punishment which Christ in mercy underwent ^
and in relation to himself "quoniam reciplt in se necessitate®
moriendi ex'voluntate Patris'". Augustine then is quoted:
"Maxima caritas est in hac vita, quando pro ipsa contemnitur
vita". Thus Christ in love and voluntarily assumed man's
necessity.
There is also a suggestion that faith demands the
necessity of the passion. This is denied because faith is
not concerned with the possible or necessary but with "quod
sic est" nor does faith necessitate the passion although
6?
faith is not without the passion. Similarly, the faith
of the patriarchs did not necessitate the passion because their
faith depended upon it: "quod est veruia futurura". It is also
stated here that there is a necessity according to the power
of God in which it was not necessary that Christ should have
been incarnate; there is another necessity "secundum
sapientiam" by which it was necessary that Christ should have
been incarnate and suffer "secundum sapientia® ordinatissime
65
fiunt res". v This is very near the idea of final cause of
Arifetotle (see previous page). This cannot be interpreted in
the sense that God was under compulsion because of the
"ordinatissime" but must be interpreted in such a way that,
if there were to be "ordinatissime", Christ as wisdom was the
one to be incarnate and to suffer.
59. d.XIX,footnote, p.211. 60. 7»p.211: Augustine,
be natura et gratia. c.?0,n.84. 61. d.XX,26(L),p.243.
ST. 13,p. 237. 63. 16,pp.237-238.
Another way to maintain the non-necessity of
Christ's incarnation is found in the question whether man
could have been freed another way. This question is raised
in the discussion of the liberation from the power of the
Devil accomplished by the death of Christ by which redemption
takes place. Alexander states that man could have been freed
f,h.
another way but could not be redeemed another way when
redemption is understood as "rem suo iusto pretio et condigno
recuperare" ^5 (and not; merely as "liberation"). That meant
that for the debt of sin to be paid, satisfaction, that is,
the death of Christ, had to be made. If man had been
freed by another person, either an angel or a man, he would
have been servant of that being and he would not have been
restored to his former dignity. ^ Later a similar question
arises when it is asked whether it would have been possible
for God to assume a man, not of Adam's kind. Anselm is
again called upon and answers to the effect that if Christ
were not a man of Adam's kind then we would not have been
raised to the dignity which Adam would have had if he had
stood fast and such an assumption would not be a complete
restoration. What this means is that man would have been
freed from the Devil without satisfaction made, and thus not
freed from the debt of original sin which is temporal
punishment. Thus satisfaction implies the restoration of man
64, Anselm, Cur be us Homo, I, c.23. 63» d.XX,1,p.230.
66. Footnote, p.231; 14,p.236. 67« Anselm, op.cit.
I,c,5; d.XX,11,pp.233-236. 68. d.XII,3,p.l24;
Anselm,op.cit.11,8.
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to a state near to the state of innocence. Thus apart from
the "appropriateness" of the way God acted, and the "necessity"
of this action, by it man is restored to dignity which is
described in the comment of Augustine "non essemus participes
divinitatis eius, nisi ipse particeps esset nostrae
69
mortalitatis". Alexander hastens to explain that the
participation in Divinity is not on man's part, that is, on
the part of the human nature. ^ In "L" it is explained
that participation in God is to be understood in two ways:
either in Divinity "secundum se" or in Divinity existing in
our nature. Before the uniting of the two natures, there was
no possibility of liberation on man's part, although there
71
was on God's part; after the union both were possible. '
Here, then, the necessity of satisfaction begins to point
to the restored man, and a little less purely to the
satisfaction of God's justice. This aspect is rare in
Alexander.
In a similar fashion to the foregoing it is
suggested that if the patriarchs had been liberated in
another way they would have had equal glory in the vision of
God but not "in visione humanae naturae coniunctae divinae".''2
This quotation raises acutely the problem involved in the
idea of another way of liberation besides Christ. In regard
to the patriarchs Christ's lack of centrality becomes
particularly stark and wonders what the work of Christ really
69. d.XX,3»P«230; Augustine, Bnarr. in Ps.ll8.serm.lfo.n.6.
70. d.XX,3,e)p.231. 71. 17U) ,d,p.239.
72. 2,p.230.
was. To be sure, Alexander is warding off the danger of
making the incarnation "necessary" when he talks of another
way, in maintaining the freedom of God, but in so doing he
minimises the fact and the importance of the incarnation.
This is always possible in a theology which does not find
its only source of revelation in Christ and, indeed,for major
parts of Alexander's theology Christ is hardly a source at
all. (In the doctrine of Goa as one and the Trinity,
Alexander does not begin from the incarnation in any real
ox
sense. As long as one talks about the possibility of
another way of liberation one can be seen to be maintaining
the freedom of God in Christ; but to begin to speculate
on that other way, as Alexander does with the patriarchs,
is to move onto entirely new ground. )
Already in distinction II Alexander begins to
touch on the central problem of Christology, the union of
the two natures in one person. This early discussion
demonstrates that Christ was a man, not something between
God and man, not both God and man in one nature, and that
the possibility of God and man being in Christ lies in the
person of Christ. The centre of Christology is discussed
in chapter 2 of this thesis but it is as well to leave this
early discussion here in the discussion of Christ as Adamic
man and the Son of Mary, because it is where Alexander places
it (he is discussing, in distinction II, the "nature" assumed)
73* This is in the Glossa, Book I.
and without discussing to any extent the whys and the
wherefores of the central part of Christology, Alexander
attempts to make clear that Christ is man. This early
discussion is quite understandable in distinctions on the
"reasons" and "beginnings" of the incarnation.
Alexander rejects the suggestion that Christ, in
as far as he was man, was not "aliquid" but "aliquo modo
se habens". This possibility was suggested by Philippians
2;7 "In similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inventus ut
homo". ^ He also rejects the view that there was something
common to the Divine and human natures "unde cum divina
natura non sit ab alio et humana ab alio, nihil potest esse
75
commune ad haec". ,y This would appear to be anti-monophysitist.
In "L" the Eutychian form of monophysitism is certainly
rejected. ^ Again Alexander states that, although Christ
may not have been the same "homo" as Peter by reason of
being a "persona", he is by reason of being an "individuum"
which is "ille homo". Peter and Christ have something in
common "in eisdem principiis in specie, quia in anima et
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corpore." '' Thus Alexander maintains that Christ was not
a man apart from the incarnation, but as "that man" he is
not something other than Peter's humanity, nor a third between
God and man. Then he goes a little further in stating the
relationship in Christ. It is not founded in essential or
substantial unity but in the unity of the person:
74. dist.II,2,p.22. 75. 5.P.23. 76. 14(L),h)p.29.
77. 14(L),e)n)o),p.29.31.
"Convenientia in persona est minima ratio
conveniendi secundum modum exsistentiae non accidentalis,
sive convenientia non accidentalis. Est enim prima
convenientia in unitate essentia, secunda in unitate
substantiae, tertia in unitate personae. Prima dicitur
per "quod quid est", secunda per "quod est", tertia
per "quis". Prima est in definitions et definito;
secunda in genere et specie quideadem est substantia
generis et speciei; tertia est in individuo rationali.
Bed nec prima nec secunda est in Christo; relinquitur
tunc quid tertia." 78
What Alexander means by "persona" and personal union is
discussed further in distinction V and in chapter 2 of this
thesis. (Mere "substantia" apparently means "natura" in
that this "subiectum" speaks of "in natura" " and the "quod
est" is "in genere et specie, quia eadem est substantia
generis et speciei", which would mean that substantial unity
would be monophysite. (This is the usage of Chalcedon).
Substance is used in this sense several times (dist. VT,25(L),
e)p.82; dist.VII,5,91; see below). This is somewhat confusing
as Alexander also used the Boethian definition of person as
"an individual substance of rational nature" and equates
substance and hypostasis. There may be some connection between
the uses in that "substantia" for Boethius is generic, at
best, when related to God, and this use of substance as the
equivalent of nature is also generic. However, the Boethian
definition of substance covers the two natures; this
definition equates substance and nature.)
Christ's manhood is also seen by Alexander in
78. 14(L),i,p.30. 79. Ibid.
relation to Adam. Christ is materially descended from Adam
but not "concupiscentialiter" which means that he assumed the
punishments due to Adam but did not incur the sin involved
with them. let he did not have all the punishments because
those, such as sin and ignorance, obviously involved him in
OA
sin. There are four ways man can be made: from man and
woman, from man alone (Eve), from neither man nor ?/oman
Ol
(Adam), and from woman (Christ). (Anselm.) Alexander
makes the following comments on these various ways:
"Ut ergo monstraretur potestas et compleretur
ordo, hunc ultimum complevit. Et si initium mali
fuit per feminam quae tantum de viro est, convenit
ut reparatio fiat per virum qui tantum de femina est.
Et si mulier per quam ortum est malum facta sit de
virgin©, convenit ut vir per quern ortum est bonum
fiat de virgine." 82
Although, here, Alexander does demonstrate the
fact that Christ was real man yet not a sinner, it is the
recapitulation theory that is more in evidence here. There
is also the suggestion that Christ showed his power by
completing the order of the four ways of maicing a man.
Sometimes the recapitulation theory tends to go beyond the
idea of restoration or recreation to the idea that Christ
fits into a pattern in a way similar to that in which grace
completes nature. This view of Christ as part of a process
which is outside him arises every now and then in Alexander.
The implications of the fact that Christ was born
of the Virgin Mary, both in relation to Mary and to Christ,
are discussed because original sin is understood to be passed
80. 4,p.23. 81. Cur beus Homo.II,c.8. 82. 6,p.24.
on by the process of reproduction. This is the matter that
distinction III takes up* "Fomes" which is present in man
by original sin, according to Alexander, has two aspects,
namely, "secundum comparatur ad peccatua antecedens ex quo
corrupta est tota humana massa" and as such it is punishment
from God for sin, but "ut autem comparatur ad id quod post
est, ut scilicet apparens delectabile non observata lege
Dei", ("pronitas ad peccandum, sic fomes est, et sic causa
peccati." it is a cause of sin and from the Devil. For
those who are sanctified in the uterus "fomes" is a
punishment but only a "causa potens" as far as it is a cause
of sin, not a "causa operans". In Mary both these types of
causes were absent. In support of this Ambrosiaster and
1
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Augustine are quoted stating that Mary was without sin.
After Mary was sanctified in the uterus she had neither the
venial nor the mortal power to sin, and after the reception
of the Word, "fomes" was altogether extinguished in her*
The saints still retain a "fomes" which relates to venial
sins. ^ In "L" more or less the same position is taken up.^b
However, the discussion is longer and different at points.
There were three positions in relation to the punishment for
original sin. First in Adam there was no punishment, then in
Christ there was "poena naturae assumpta", and in Mary there
was the same punishment "et superadditur ignorantia plurium
scibilium; sed non ignorantia rerum faciendarum, quae
83. Bk.II,d.XXXII,l,a)p.305* 84. 111,1,p.34. Ambrosiaster,
In Epist. B. Bauli Horn. 8,3. Augustine, De Baptismo Barvulorum,
Lib.I,c.^,n.$?. 85. 2,p.35. 86. ll(L)p.39.
proprie dicitur poena peccati propinqua." There was no
"fomes" in Mary after the conception as there is before our
Baptism nor was it in her as "pronitas" which remains after
Baptism even in the saints in regard to venial sin. ^ There
is a threefold grade in "fomes". The first is according to
"intensio" which exists before Baptism; the second is
"materialis dispositio" which exists in the confirmed "cum
sic se habet appetitus, quod per adiunctum potest in
peccatum"; the third is "materia fomitis" which remains in
the confirmed: "remanet autem materiae possibilitas, privata
dispositions per quam materia est fomitis. Unde potest dici
in beata Virgins non esse fomitem nisi secundum possibilitatem
privatum ratione materiae: sed adhuc non est ilia puritas
OQ
quae fuit in Adam antequam peccavit." This last is probably
the same as that which Alexander describes as "substantia
fomitis". What this is is probably explained in regard to
concupiscence: "licet non in ea fomes, scilicet
concupiscentia carnis militans adversus spiritum; nihilominus
remansit concupiscentia, sed subiugata spiritui." Thus
Mary was as pure as man could be but she had the punishment
of nature which Christ also had and an ignorance which did
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not lead her into sin*y
If one accepts the idea that original sin is passed
on from generation to generation by the reproductive process,






eliminated but in the process Mary is practically sanctified
without Christ. In relation to Christology this position
throws doubt upon the maintenance of the position that Christ
became "sin for us". The sanctification of Mary raises the
question as to whether this would have been necessary as men
could be sanctified apart from Christ. As will be seen later,
(chapters 2,4,) Alexander's view of God militates against a
God in Christ who partakes in full and fallen humanity, a
view which perhaps not only coincides nicely with a doctrine
of Mary's sanctification but may also demand such a view of
Mary and man.
In regard to Christ himself Augustine is quoted
to the effect that "in semine" there are two elements, the
invisible substance and the invisible "ratio", the former
Christ gained from the flesh of Mary and the latter he
qi
received from above. y Alexander points out that Christ
did not receive Mary's invisible "ratio" which is the power
of propagation with desire. (It seems doubtful whether
he could have got this anyway from Mary.) In "L" it is
stated that, because there was no "fomes" in Alary, the
flesh of Christ was therefore not from Mary through
Q2
concupiscence which is the wound of sin. In this way
Alexander affirms the purity of Christ in two ways: because
he was not the product of man and woman his existence was
therefore not due to desire, and because Mary's flesh was
91. be Gen, ad litt.. X,cc.19-20,nn.34-35- 92. d.III,7,
PP.36-37T 93^ I2CL), I, f)p.41.
pure from concupiscence. Thus the invisible "ratio" and the
visible substance are accounted for. The fact that Christ
was completely pure, that is free from fallen human nature,
was the reason why he did not undergo decimation. ("Deciraatio
est futurae liberations per Christum oblatum ab originali
on
peccato praesignatio." ) Decimation relates to nature
•whereas circumcision which Christ did undergo relates to
the Person. ^ This topic again is discussed in where
the problem of why Christ had still to undergo circumcision,
which was also directed at sin, is elucidated. There it is
stated that circumcision was a voluntary submission to the
law to which Christ was still subject because the law had
not yet been "evacuated", whereas decimation was directed at
corrupt nature in regard to which there could be no "voluntas"
Mary was decimated because she was "materialiter" and
"concupiscentialiter" in the flesh of Abraham whereas Christ
was only materially according to the passive power (« visible
substance?) in the flesh of Abraham. ^
In all this there must arise some doubt as to the
full humanity of Christ and to the scope of his work. Christ
is not understood really to have assumed man's nature (sinful
nature), and, from Alexander's point of view, he obviously
could not as this would have involved him necessarily in sin.
In Alexander's terms, however, there was no need for Christ
to have assumed this corrupt nature because its restoration
was not involved in his coming as man as is made evident by
94. Footnote, p.36. 95» ?»d)p.37» 96. 25(£)b)pp
47-48. 97. Ibid. c)p.48.
the sanctification of Mary and the saints. Christ's task
was to render satisfaction for original sin, in particular
for the personal sin of 4.dam, which was answered by Christ's
voluntary submission to punishment which in turn thus
possibly cleared the way, as it were, for God's sanctifying
grace. This view of Christ is inadequate, for Christ was
not only "personally" at one with man (that is, Christ was
"a" man), he was also substantially carontologically at one
with man whereby he became "sin for us". In Christ, man's
nature is renewed or sanctified and for this to occur he
must have been of man's nature, not merely "a" man personally
but man naturally. Alexander, of course, does assert that
Christ was man by nature but what' he hesitates at is "the
nature of sin".
Thus, it would, appear, that Christ's manhood is
related in reality to satisfaction only, a manhood which is
personal to correspond to and to counteract Adam's personal
sin in which all men are involved. His satisfactory work is
the cause, if it is cause at all, of man's sanctification
only indirectly in so far as he may have removed the barrier
between man and grace. Grace works through the sacraments
to sanctification and at the end there is the grace of
perfection (which may be earned by the resurrection) which
is the final grace. (The separate working of grace is
discussed later). Thus, in relation to sanctification,
Mary, Christ, and Adam are generally at the same level (with
different quantities of grace admittedly) all dependent on
grace from above. To be sure, Christ did have the grace of
union but this is directed, by and large, it would appear
at satisfaction only (see chapter 3)* Christ is not seen
as the answer to man's corruption; his nature does not
sanctify man's (e.g. Mary's) nature and thus Christ's work
is greatly limited in scope.
But how could it be otherwise in the terms of
Alexander? Christ could not take our sinful nature,
therefore he could not be its remedy, its sanctification.
In Alexander's terms there appears to be no way round this
for he places the necessity of sin in man's nature. Christ
must have remained less than fallen man (or more than*) to
have remained sinless. He is forced into the purely passive
role of satisfaction (penal;, and his positive role of
sanctification is denied him by the fact that he could not
take man's sinful nature. Thus, in this theology, Christ's
life and resurrection have little part in regard to man's
present lot although they may have some place in regard to
future glory, (see chapter 5)» The incarnation is not seen
as part of the end in itself, but is only a means to the end,
Christ's satisfaction on the cross. (These assertions should
become evident the further the Christological discussion goes.
As long as sin is understood as a "state" in which
man exists instead of a (and the result of a ) broken
relationship between Cod and man, then a "new man" cannot
take man's part, indeed, he cannot really be man, for to be
man, in Alexander's thinking, is to be a sinner by definition
(which is correct if not taken absolutely). But if, on the
other hand, sin is understood to be the result of a broken
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relationship which causes the corruption, then the "new man"
can he a true man who is not a sinner because he has an
obedient relationship with God which eliminates corruption.
It was man, man with a sinful nature, that Christ became and
as such he could take man's part. The difference betw?een
him and other men at this point is the fact that he was
reconciled to God and was therefore without sin; man is not
reconciled to God and therefore he is a sinner. For the
rest Jesus is in the midst of sin, a man with alienated
men. For Alexander, this kind of view undermines a system
in which a substantial grace "expels" sin ana in which man
had something of his own - free will, created grace, virtues
- and if these are not present sin rolls in. (These views
should be evident as the discussion proceeds.) There is no
place for Christ In our "graceless" world; he is an outsider
and must remain so. The same viewpoint is seen in regard to
the relation of grace and evil in men where grace cannot
•
; \
stand besides evil. (See chapter on grace)
Distinction IV is mainly concerned with the
conception as it relates to the Holy Spirit and the Son.
Although goodness, wisdom, justice, and power, are
demonstrated in the assumption, they did Dot make the
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assumption. Because the whole Trinity was involved in the
assumption it is not conceded that Christ was conceived by
99
the Father because the Son is eternally generated by the Father.
98. d. IV,2,p.49 99. 3,p.49.
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This presumably rejects an idea that the Bon of God was
created. Nor can it be said, states Alexander, that Christ
came from love (which is appropriated to the Holy bpirit,)
because love is not the name of a power"1"^ nor the "ratio
principii" but is the "ratio vinculi". It is the Holy
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Spirit who is the power by whom the conception takes place.
The miraculous union of the Divine and the human natures is
not within the possibilities of created power end so it
must have been the uncreated power which is the Holy Bpirit.
This wnrk is appropriated to the Holy Spirit as goodness for
the first creation was good; since the sign of goodness is
much more apparent at recreation the work of the conception
will also be that of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the
conception is the work of the whole Trinity where the Father
is the one who says "fiat", the "factum" refers to the Bon,
and the "vidit Deus quod esset bonum" refers to the Holy
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Spirit. This formulation of Augustine belongs to the
creation but it is appropriated by Alexander in "L" and "K"
explicitly to the re-creation. The working of the Trinity
is again affirmed in a reference to Ambrose that in the name
"Christus" the Father is "ungens", the Son is "qui ungitur",
and the Holy Bpirit "ipsa unctio". in anotner paragraph
Alexander states, that in spite of the fact that the Holy
Spirit "begets" the man, nevertheless Christ cannot be described
100. 6,p«50; 16(L),p.52. 101. 3»p.49« 102. 16(L),
p.52; footnote, p.49. 103* 6,p.50. 104. 4,b)p.49;
24,b;(L),p.54; 26,a)(H),p.55} Augustine, De Civitate Dei, c.24.
105. 4,c)p.50; Ambrose, De Bpiritu Bancto, I,c,3.n»44.
"simpliciter" as the son of the Holy Spirit; "dici tamen
lOfi
potest filius eius per creationem."
On the basis of a statement by Ambrose that
everything is made either from substance or power, Alexander
states that in Christ the substance was either essential and
so the Son was from the Father, or material and so Christ was
from the mother. The power in Christ was from the Holy
Spirit. The Holy Spirit was the medial power between the
essence and the matter "quoniam Spiritus Sanctus complevit
hoc quod ipsa habuit incompletum quod de Spiritu Sancto
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concepit". ' This should not be understood in an Adoptionist
way in view of what Alexander states later and how he puts
it in "L": the essence is prior altogether and precedes;
the power is the medium and so the conception follows from
the Holy Spirit; lastly comes the matter and so Christ is
1 AO
born from the Virgin. Thus Alexander establishes the
conception as the work of the Trinity appropriated to the
Holy Spirit, and the fact that Christ was one person of the
Trinity.
At the beginning of the discussion of the central
section on Christology which is introduced by the question
"quaerit de proprietate eius quod assumitur et assumentis,
utrumque persona assumpsit personam" the part of the Trinity
again is mentioned. To the suggestion that the assumption
is common to the whole Trinity (by reason of the Son being
"God") Alexander replies "quod persona is commune secundum
106. 6,p.50. 107. 12,p.51» Be Spiritu Sancto. II,c.5»n.42.
108. 25(L),p.55.
rationem, et non secundum rem; sed divina natura commune
1 QQ
est secundum rem." J Here Alexander is stating the fact
that the Trinity as a whole did not take the place of the
Son, that is, the Trinity was not incarnate in the assumption.
Later he states that some authorities concede that the Father
assumed "sed Filio, et Filium sibi." However, in "L"
the statement "Pater assumit Filio carnem" is declared to
be "impropria". 111 There is no real contradiction in these
two positions because in a sense it is true that the Father
assumes, that is, the Trinity is at work in the assumption,
but this must be protected against a misinterpretation which
would have the Father replacing the Son or making the Father
and the Son interchangeable. In a later distinction it is
asked whether the Father could assume the same man as the
Son assumed. On the basis of a statement by Anselm that in
this case many persons would make one and the same person
which would not be possible, Alexander replies that the Father
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did not assume the same man.
Thus in distinctions IV and V the Divine origin of
Christ as the Son of God is amply set out. His human basis
is again stated but is not amplified as this was not the interest
of distinction. Christ's Divinity, it may be noted, appears
to be more assured by Alexander, than his humanity.
A suggestion that Alexander might have believed
that there was a certain congruence in creation for the
109. d. V,7,p.59. HO. 10,p.61. 111. 32(L),p.67.
112. d.XH.2.d.124: Anselm. De Incarn. Verbi.c.4.
incarnation was referred to in the discussion on the fulness
of time. In distinction I where the topic was discussed
Alexander showed further evidence of this belief. It arises
when it is asked why the cure in Christ was so long in coming
when a sickness existed from the sin of the first parents.
Alexander finds the answer in the fact that because the
"stimulus" of the sickness was at first small it was believed
that the natural law would be sufficient for salvation.
However, the sickness worsened with more sin and so the
written law came to the rescue. But "cum viderent possibile
non esse implere Legem, ut habetur in Actibus "Hoc est onus
quoa neaue nos. neque patres nostri" etc. quaesierunt
medicum; et cum desideratur, fuit plenitudo temporis ut
11*
mitteret Filium etc." ^ To be sure, Alexander does state
that God gave the natural law and the written law, and, after
the above quotation it is added that there came through the
prophets an increased desire that a cure should come, yet,
within creation, even fallen creation, Alexander seems to
assume a capacity or a "congruence" in man which man could
use with the natural and written law to prepare himself for
the One who was to come. Thus not only was there a fulness
which God brought about, thex^e also appears to be a fulness
which creation, even if it could not bring it about itself,
at least could contribute to. One must qualify this by
adding that Alexander does not see God's acts being caused
113. d.I, 16(L),p.l6.
by creation. He is still free to act as He wishes. (This
is particularly noticeable, for instance, in his discussion
of predestination). In "E" Peter Lombard is quoted to this
effect that fulness does not indicate necessity but rather
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God acted "sola voluntate". This attitude Alexander
consistently maintains in his Glossa but it does not
necessarily eliminate the possibility that there may be a
certain "congruence" in creation for the incarnation or
man*s reception of God.
Just after Alexander has discussed the reason for
the incarnation taking place in a man and not in an angel
(see above) in the same section in "L" he asserts that, at
least, there was a "possibility" for union on part of the
body in the "materia" although there was not the power
(potentia). This possibility for union or the problem of
the "how" of union which comes to grips with the central
thinking on the "congruence" of creation will now be
discussed. This topic is found in the second distinction,
particularly in "L". Alexander is commenting on the fact
that Peter had stated that Wisdom had assumed the soul, and,
through the soul the body. The soul is the medium of the
Divine to the body but, states Alexander, here there are two
media, namely, the spirit which is the "superior pars
rationis", and the soul which is the "inferior pars rationis".
The soul has three parts "spiritus", "ratio", and
"sensualitas" which can be called "collectio sensuum" (after
114. Glossa Lombardi in Gal.4.4; d.I,28(E),p.20.
115. d.II,13(L),IV,pp.27-28.
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Augustine). The terminology is a little difficult but
the general idea is obvious as is the case elsewhere in the
Glossa, namely, that man has a mediating role which implies
that he had a capacity for union. The same implication is
made when it is pointed out in an objection that at the death
of Christ the soul and the body were separated but the body
was not separated from the Divine and Alexander replies that
"anima erat medium secundum dignitatem vel naturam, sed non
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secundum tempus vel actus." ' Thus it would appear that
the Divine nature was united via the spiritual part of the
soul to the body, which had its connection to the soul via
the sensuality in such a way that the Divine and the body
were inseparable. "L" states the way of union of Divine
and the body clearly: "Si conveniens fuit coniunctum
extremorum per media, conveniebat uniri divinam et corporalem
naturam mediante spiritu, scilicet substantia creata
lift
corporali, et sensualitate quae estcorporalis."
The body with the soul, states Alexander, was
assumptible in two ways, namely, from "indigentia culpae
et poenae", that is, it had something to be cured, and because
of the "convenientia medii."
"Won fuit corpus assumptibile de indigentia culpae
et poenae, sed anima indigebat utroque modo; et
propter hoc, turn ratione convenientiae turn ratione
principalis indigentiae, fuit corpus cum anima
assumptibile. Assumptio autem ista fit per medium
secundum ordinem naturae, non temporis, quia non prius
assumpsit corpus, et post unionem." 119
lib. Augustine, De Spiritu at anima. c.37; 7,p.24.
117. d.II,8,p.25" 118. 13(10,II,p.27.
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Alexander appears here to maintain some capacity on the part
of the soul in its spiritual part to unite with Divinity; it
is "appropriate"; it is a "medium". If this were not so the
body would be equally placed in relation to God, if God were
the sole operator. But he is not; the body has to unite
through the soul and it is not stated that this method is
God's choosing; rather the soul appears to be in itself,
"appropriate". Alexander, however, is insistent that the
Divine and the boay are indeed united though one may doubt
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how closely when the problem of suffering is discussed.
Of course, at this point, Alexander, like probably the most
part of Christian tradition, is reflecting a philosophic
objection to the idea of eternity in time (and of course,
also, a theological problem), a problem which also arises
121
in the general relation of man and God. It is an
interesting fact that, not only in the areas traditionally
treated outside Christology such as in the doctrines of the
knowledge of God and Creation, but also in Christology
itself, Alexander operates within an eternity-time division,
a problem in which, if the incarnation does not resolve for
us, at least we assume a resolution. The overcoming of the
division must be a presupposition of theological thinking.
Certainly it is God who makes the resolution but since it
has been made we cannot go behind this fact and attempt
to find another resolution. For instance, when there is
doubt as to the uniting of the two extremes, the body and
120. below, ch.4. Distinctions XV and XVI. 121. e.g.
chapter on "Dominus".
.and the Divine in a person, and one does not altogether make
it an assumption of faith, then something must be posited
which can unite these extremes and that is the spiritual
part of the soul. Thus there grows up a doctrine which has
been called here the "congruence of creation".
It should be noted that, at the beginning of this
particular discussion on the body and soul, Alexander stated
that there was a possibility on the part of the body for
union but not the power (above p.52 ). In regard to the soul
the reader is referred to the second book of the Glossa but
nothing exactly corresponds to this matter. What Alexander
states in the section in which he makes reference to book II
is as follows:
"Ex parte vero animae, utrum remaneret potentia,
determinatur in secundo libro, ubi determinatur qualiter
perfectio ex parte animae quoad creationem in primis
diebus. Ibi enia ostenditur quod non sunt omnes animae
in una potentia quemadmodum omnia corpora. Kec est
ex parte animae primae possibilitas ad unionem
quemadmodum ex parte corporis." 122.
This adds little to the picture already given.
In distinctions XXI and XXII Alexander turns the
discussion to the problem of Christ "in triduo". In this he
raises the problems involved in the separation of the body and
soul of Christ at his death and the particular interest of the
latter part of this chapter, the "congruence" of man for the
incarnation is again implied. The general problem of the
body-soul psychology for Christology is also central here but
this will be discussed at more length in chapter 4.
122. d. II,13(L),IV,pp.27-28.
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Bernard of Clairvaux, John of Damascus, and Pope
the Orea-fc
Leo, are all quoted to the effect that, although body and
A
soul were separate at the death of Christ, the unity of the
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Pei'son remained, and the body of Christ was incorruptible. ^
It is then asked why the Divinity was inseparable from the
body and soul and yet the soul and body were separable. The
answer in regard to the inseparability Alexander finds in
the fact that there was a union through grace in "esse"
which was inseparable, even much more so than union through
124
gx*ace "quoad voluntatem" which is insoluble. However,
the soul and body were separable because this was a temporal
union; "ut per separationem temporalem uniretur ad unionem
inseparabilem." Alexander also asks whether the
Divinity "de sui natura" is separable from the body or the
soul just as the body or the soul is without grace separable
from Divinity. The answer to this is in the negative.;
1 OA
"quoniam summum bonum de sui natura nulli deest." The
body and the soul "in triduo" are not united ("uniturn") with
the Divinity although the unity ("unitivum" - i.e. "esse"
union) remains , and although the unity of the Divinity
with the soul and the union of the Divinity with the body
did make for diversity "rations alterius unitorum", there
was only one union by reason of the "unitivi, scilicet
12J. d.XXI,1,2,3,pp.245-246; Bernard, De Consideratione. V,
c.l0,n.22; John, De Fide Orth.. III.c.28; Leo. Lermo 68.C.1.
124. 4,a)p.246. 125* footnote, p.246.
126. 4, a ) p.246; cf. 15(L),b)e),pp.250,251. 127. 4,b)pp.246-247.
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hypostasis Verbi". bince there were these three "unions"
it is now asked "quae illarum sit ordinata ad aliam, et
quae duae ad tertiam?" The answer to this question is
"quod unio est quae animae et corporis, est propter illam
quae est corporis cum divinitate; et haec est propter
129
unionem animae ad divinitatem." J "L" states it thus:
"quod unio quae est animae ad divinitatem aignior est; aliae
150
ordinatae sunt ad illam". ^ This means that as long as
the union of the Divinity to the soul remained there was no
necessity for the other unions (i.e. temporal) to remain.
A similar position is taken up in regard to the
life of the body. It is argued that the body would have had
more life by the union of the Divinity to it (than, by
implication, through the soul). Alexander replies that the
soul was united to the body in the unity of nature but the
Divinity was not, so the life of the body resulted from
the conjunction of the one with another, but not from the
152
conjunction of the Divinity and the body. (This does
not seem to get any further than the question but the re¬
iteration of the position illustrates once again the soul's
mediatorial role.)
In defence of Alexander it must be stated that if
Ghrist was man it is evident that at death he still had to be
128. 4,c)p.247: cf. footnote, p.2A7. "Dicendum quod non
omnis unio est aliquorum in uno, sed ad unum; unde hie
facta est unio (God and soul) ad hypostasim unam, sed unio
Dei et hominis facta est in una hypostasis. Aliter tarnen
dictur omnis unio in uno; et sic dicit Damascenus quid anima
fuit unita divinitati in hypostasi, ut sit sensus: hypostasis
humanata habet animam." 129. 4.d)p.247» 130. 15(L),
f)p.251. 131. 4,d)p.2A7; 15(L),f)p.251. 132. b.pp.247-248.
like man, and, in medieval terms, this demands the separation
of soul and body at death. It is pointed out in "L" that
it was necessary for our salvation that the union of body and
soul in Christ should not remain for otherwise he could not
die. In other words, the reason for Christ's humanity
was satisfaction which could be achieved only in death and
so for the man to give that satisfaction Christ had to die in
the same way as men, namely, by the separation of body and
soul. Thus Alexander is maintaining the humanity of Christ.
Ho?/ever, this psychology, which will again be questioned,
can hardly bear the weight put upon it. If the union of
the body with the Divinity is by means of the soul, it would
appear that, with the separation of the body and soul at
death, the union of the body and Divinity would be very
difficult to maintain. To be sure, Alexander points out
that the unity is in the hypostasis of the Word, and not in
the one nature of man (body and soul), but it is still
difficult to see how the body is not separated from the
hypostasis when the soul separates from the body, if the soul
is the medium between the Divinity ana the bod.y. (Doubt still
arises from the statement "quod anima erat medium secundum
dignitatem vel naturam, sed non. secundum tempus et actum",
not only as to how the unity of Divinity and body remains
but especially here in the general implication that the soul
is somehow nearer to God by nature.)
133. d.XXI,ll(L),p.249 134. d.II,8,p.23.
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The foregoing discussion in which the soul is
seen as the medium between the body ana Divinity and
therefore the unity of the body and the Divinity is seen as,
in a sense, dependent on the soul (although Alexander by
asserting the "essential" unity of body and Divinity tries to
avoid this conclusion) implies that the soul, being of greater
dignity than the body or "nearer" to God, (there is no suggestion
that it is chosen by God so to act; it is higher by nature) is
"congruent" for the incarnation. This implication, as well
as the belief that man has some ability to please God,
should become clearer in the chapters to follow.
The Q.uaestiones and the "congruence of Creation".
On the "congruence" of human nature for the
incarnation the ^uaestiones has very much the same outlook
as the Glossa. It is cautious, as the Glossa is, but it
does maintain some sort of capacity. The human nature is
135
said "posse suscipere unionera". Human nature "et
ratione naturae et rations indigentiae congruit ad unionem"
for man is in the similitude and image of God. The
similitude relates to "potentia" and to "sapientia" "quia
in anima sunt rationes cognitivae et operativae omnium in
genere, ad similitudinem rationum in Deo, quae congitivae
et operativae", and to "bonitas" because grace is given to
men. Therefore the image as power, wisdom, and goodness is
appropriate for union. (This discussion was in the
context of the comparative suitability of angels and men in
135* 4.XV, De Incarnations, Disp.I, Memb.2,13,p.l98*
136. d.II,m.1,34,p.203.
regard to the incarnation. It somewhat expands the Glossa's
arguments). Although, in the context, this next conclusion
is probably an attempt to avoid something similar to an
infralapsarian view of the incarnation, it also maintains the
appropriateness of man uniting to God. The union completes
human nature.
"In philosophia naturali dicltur quomodo eleaenta
habeant concatenationem inter se /et/ cum superioribus
corporalibus; sic etiam in terra nascentibus est
quiddaia quod communem. naturam habet cum minerariis et
ceteris re nascentibus. Ergo conveniebat illaxa unionem
esse, sine qua omnes istae concatenationes essent
imperfectae; et ita oportuit unionem deitatis cum
creatura esse, et hoc cum creatura ilia cum qua magis
conveniret; et haec est humana natura. Ergo
utilitatem haberet incarnatio etiam non existente
passione." 137
This assertion is true, of course, only from the side of God
and in the context of His freedom.
Alexander further states that in contrast to the
spirit of an angel the soul in its inferior part is "unibilis"
to the body, and thus there is a greater "coapositio" in
the soul than in an angel. This composition is not repugnant
to the union but congruent with. it* "£e enim peccavit homo in
corpore et in anima, congruum fuit quod in utroque fieret
138
reparatio". The soul, this implies, is thus specially
congruent (the spirit of the angel would be "unitable" too
but it lacks the link to the body; because it can act as a
medium between the body and God. Again, in the Quaestiones
Alexander wants to deny the dependence of the union of the
body and God on the soul but in so doing he still asserts
137. m.4,A8,pp.208-209. 135. m.1,35,PP.203-204
a congruence in the soul: "Unita fuit deitas carni per
intellectual medium: non quod anima sit medium coniungens
hanc cum hac, sed medium secundum ordinis congruentiam.
Inter enim spirtualem increatam naturam et corporalem
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creatam, medium est spiritualis creata." '' The soul is
both a medium and above the body in "congruence", and thus
it is, by implication "nearer" God. This is made evident,
it would appear, by the statement that Che union of body and
soul is less close than the union of Divine and human nature
140
in spiritual forms, though not in material forms. By
this statement the spiritual side of man almost ceases to
be part of creation. Certainly such formulations and the
general idea of the "congruence of creation" through the
soul for the incarnation puts limits on the extent necessary
for man of the incarnation and the scope of the Person and
work of Christ.
Summary
In this first chapter, broadly, there are four main
topics: first, "reasons" for the incarnation are discussed;
second, the humanity of Christ is discussed; third,
Alexander affirms the working of Trinity in the incarnation;
fourth, the problem of what has been called the "congruence"
of creation for incarnation is discussed. It now remains to
summarise the main trends in these four topics.
139. m.3,42,p.206 140. Uisp.IV,m.3,9i,p.222
Alexander states that it was "appropriate" that
the Son. should become incarnate, as it was "appropriate"
that the Father and Spirit should have played their respective
roles. There are snatches also of the recapitulation theory
and the "appropriateness" of the various recapitulations.
These recapitulations, however, do not provide a "necessary"
cause for the incarnation and Alexander follows Anselm in
finding this cause in the theory of satisfaction in which it
is argued that only man should satisfy but only God could.
It should be pointed out that the theory of satisfaction, as
will become clearer as the thesis progresses, is modified
of
in two ways: first, it is a theory penal satisfaction, and
second it is limited to the satisfaction for the temporal
punishment of original sin which was Anselm's central but
not only concern. Alexander, however, limits Christ's
satisfaction to that and thus limits him in his "necessity"
to that. When Alexander discusses the matter of necessity
he does make one of his few hints at a broader (and more
Anselmic) view of satisfaction in that, in. discussing the
importance of the way taken by God in Christ and quoting
Augustine, he possibly points towardsI man's restoration by
Christ. This, however, is not at all central in his
thinking.
Alexander is most anxious not to compromise in any
way the freedom of God by talk about "necessity" and one way
he does this is to maintain the possibility of another way
of freeing man. The "necessity" which is involved is seen
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in terms of final cause, that is, in order that man should
be freed from the punishment of original sin it was necessary
that Christ should have come. In other words, the incarnation
was necessary for man, but was not a necessity laid upon God.
There was no necessity laid upon Christ. When Alexander
speaks of "another way" in discussing the patriarchs there
apart
seems to be implied another starting point from Christ,A.
and although, at this point, he is trying to maintain the
freedom of God, he does reveal a tendency which becomes
considerably more obvious at times, namely, the tendency
to know God apart from Jesus Christ.
The second topic is the matter of Christ's
humanity. When Alexander was discussing the possibility
of Christ being made under the necessity of sin there was
some doubt thrown on Christ's humanity being "like us in
all respects only without sin" because he was said to have
taken his human nature from the state of innocence and his
punishment from the state of guilt. This is, of course, a
way of trying to be true to the "without sin" but it does
raise doubts about whether it is an adequate way of being
true to "like us in all respects." The fact that Alexander
is not particularly concerned fco maintain this, however, is
seen when he comes to discuss the Virgin Mary and Christ.
Mary's proneness to sin is reduced to a minimum; Christ
did not receive his "invisible reason" from Joseph (or Mary)
but from God and so he was free from desire; he received
his visible and almost pure "visible substance" from Mary.
Here three questions are raised. The first is about his
humanity; did Christ really become one of us? The second
is: if Mary and the saints can be sanctified apart from
Christ what is Christ's role, if any, in sanctification?
The third is: is there a suggestion that corruptibility
is inevitably attached to matter, that is, is creation
"very good" for Alexander? This possibility had earlier
been raised when Alexander had briefly discussed the
liberation from the Devil by Christ. These questions
recur frequently in the thesis, in fact, the first question
may be described as the question.
The third topic is Alexander's affirmation of the
work of the Trinity in the incarnation. This is mentioned
as a major topic simply because it fades into the background
in the Ghristology, and one feels that if it had not been
allowed to do so, some aspects of Alexander's thinking would
have been more satisfactory. The incarnation, states Alexander,
was the work of the Trinity and took place in the power of
the Holy Spirit. The union of the two natures is here clearly
the work of God. In this kind of context the problem of the
personal union which arises in Alexander may have been
resolved, at least, to some extent. Further, in this context
the doctrine of the grace of union which Alexander sees as
the grace which makes Christ unique might be more easily
accepted. Without a determinedly Trinitarian background
doctrine of the grace of union may not be an adequate way of
stating Christ's uniqueness in view of Alexander's doctrine
of grace.
When he states that all things are made either by
substance or power and that substantially the Son was
essentially from the Father and Christ was materially from
the mother one finds, on the side of the Divinity, a strong
affirmation of the being of God in Christ, and apparently
a statement of the two natures doctrine. The Divinity seems
assured in this chapter but later there does rise some doubt
as to whether Alexander is insistent enough at all times on
the fact that the very being of God was in Christ in the Person
of the Son. The statement on the division of natures also
raises a question, mere the word substance seems to mean
nature, the essential refers to the Divine and the material
to the human, ilowevex*, the use of the "materia" might suggest
that in fact this is a Spirit-flesh distinction or even a
soul-body distinction. This suspicion gains weight when one
considers how Alexander understands the uniting of the Divine
to the body, and the role of the soul in this unity.
One finds hints of later problems when Alexander
describes the Spirit as the medial power between essence and
matter and some confirmation of the suspicion raised above that
essence and matter refer to the distinction of Spirit and
flesh rather than to the natures. The problem raised here,
however, is: does Alexander really escape Aaoptionism; or
to put tais another way (this is asked iacer of the grace of
union theory): does Alexander adequately affirm the uniqueness
of the incarnation by his description of the Spirit as the
medial power? Is not this description equally applicable
to the relation of God with any man? Should not the Spirit
as medial power he understood rather to refer to the relation
of Father and Son in the essence (after Augustine's way of
thinking) than between the essence and matter? Is not the
uniqueness of the incarnation found in the fact that the Son
was the mediator, that is, God was in Christ as Son and not
only as Spirit?
The final topic introduced by this chapter is the
matter of the capacity of man to know God. There was
possibly some hint of this capacity when the fulness of Lime
was mentioned and also in the recapitulation theory. Later,
however, man's capacity for God is assumed in the discussion
on the various laws which came to man to help him in his
sickness. In particular regard to Ghristology aian does
appear to be expedited with a capacity for union with God and
in this the soul is given a mediatorial role in some sense.
The capacity of man for God is a constant element of the
thinking of Alexander, and the assumption of an almost Divine
like nature of the soul is also well in evidence.
Thus this first chapter raises matters which become
themes of Alexander's Christology as the thesis will
demonstrate in its progress. It; would be useful, now, to
enumerate these themes. First, Alexander finds that
satisfaction for the temporal punishment due to original sin
was Christ's central and only necessary work. By and large
he limits Christ's work to this role of satisfaction, Becond,
there constantly arises doubts about the full humanity of
Christ inrelation both to man's finiteness and to his sin.
As a cor^ollary of this there is a suggestion that creation
as such is corrupt and thus Christ could not be part of it.
Third, there is quite evidently a capacity in man to know
God and to please God. This compensates, as it were, for the
lack of Christ's humanity and this capacity is paralleled
in the fact that the soul is seen to be almost Jjivine.
Creation's corruption and man's capacity in his soul for
God contribute to what can only be called an Apollinarian
view of Christ. This is seen especially in regard to his
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merit, passions, and in the matter of the two wills (where
they are not the human and Divine but the sensual and the
rational). Fourth, mam is sanctified by grace apart from
Christ, that is, man's sanctification has only an accidental
connection with Christ's humanity, not a necessary one.
Fifth, there is a suggestion of Adoptionism, that is, in
calling the Spirit medial power one has to ask how Christ
differs from other men. This problem will again arise with
the doctrine of the grace of the Head in which Christ's
role is merely that of a channel or source for sanctifying
grace. With Alexander's close identification of the Spirit
ana grace and with his substantial view of grace one wonders
whether in the grace of union, by which he affirms the
uniqueness of Christ's relation to God, Alexander finds an
adequate way of expressing that uniqueness or whether he is
merely restating the idea of the Spirit as medial power in
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another form. Sixth, Alexander ill this chapter does affirm
the role of the Trinity in the incarnation. There is some doubt
as to whether he maintains this as a constant basis of his
Christology and whether he affirms, particularly in the next
chapter, that in the Person of the Son, the being or essence
of God is present in humanity. Further, does he see the Son
in the Trinity as the only basis there could be for the
personal union? Except for the first and last of these points
Alexander's failing could be said to be a failure to give
proper place to the humanity of Christ. This is ultimately
due to his failure to base his theology and Christology in
the incarnation and in the doctrine of the Trinity. In fact,
that there are other presuppositions at work than these is
already evident in Alexander's suggestion that God could have
freed man another way. His failure to emphasise the
centrality of Christ's humanity and his failure to begin





This chapter could, broadly speaking, be said to
be dealing with the problems of the Councils of Hicaea and
Chalcedon. The fact that God was incarnate in Christ is
first discussed, that is, the way Alexander understands
the assumption of human nature by God. Then the union of
the two natures in Christ and how that union is to be
understood is discussed. As the discussions of these two
problems cannot, strictly speaking, be separated, and the
fact that what is said in relation to one has implications
for the other, the following discussion will not follow
with any real strictness the neat order "liicaea - Chalcedon".
As in the history of the church when theologians discussed
the matters involved in both councils right through the
period of the councils, so in this chapter the understanding
of both the doctrines of the assumption and the union as
stated by Alexander will be present throughout the chapter.
However, the emphasis of the first part of the chapter, as
in the Church's history, will be "Post Hicaea", the emphasis
of the latter part will be "Post Chalcedon".
"Post - Hicaea".
Alexander insists that it is not the Divine nature
that assumes. He admits that it might appear to be correct
to say that just as God is said to be incarnate, so too one
might say that the Divine nature was incarnate. However, he
goes on to say, although "DeusM and "Divine nature" are the
same "secundum rem% yet they differ "in modo inteiligendi".
"Deus' has "Divine nature" and so "Deus" is "conveniens" to
a Person but "Divine nature" itself "non dicit appropriate onem
vel coraparationem ad aliquara personam". 1 The "L"
equivalent explains this when it is stated "Datura autem
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dicit, sive essentia, ut in abs tract!one ". Divine
nature, Alexander is stating, is thus Goa as "One" in His
essence and as such He cannot be related to fche accidents of
the created world• God in Himself does not belong to this world.
Yet one cannot help feeling, at this point and
especially as the discussion of Ghristological doctrines
continuesj that in spite of Alexander's stated Trinitarian
basis there may be two ideas of "God" at work in his
thinking - the "One" and the "Trinity". When he states that
the Divine nature, that is, "all God" was not incarnate, one
can see his point, namely, that it was the Trinitarian God
in the incarnation - in fact, he may almost be saying that
"Divine nature" is "Trinity". (Certainly one would imagine
it against it jatripassi&nism and implied ideas of God becoming
man or created), nevertheless, the very fact that it was
the Word of God who was incarnate would seem to lead one to
state fairly clearly that the Divine nature, the very being
of God, was present on earth through the Word, that is, God
Himself was among men, or the Word which was God became flesh.
This would mean that the idea of God as "Divine nature is
1. d. V,2,p.58. 2. 22(L),p.6b
Trinity" is not defined by the idea of God as the "One". ^
If this is not so there must be some doubt thrown on the
authenticity of the man Jesus as the very Word of God. And
yet this doubt increases when Alexander distinguishes between
a
the Person and the Divine nature, or when he emphasises
the difference between assuming and uniting: "Per 'assumere'
designatur quod aliquid sit in quod unio fit; per 'unire*
vero designatur quod non in termino aliquo fiat unio, sed
solum potentia activa. Unde bene dicitur: 'persona
assumpsit naturam' et 'divina natura univit sibi humanam'" ^
or when he quotes John of Damascus: "Aliud est unitio et
aliud incarnatio; quoniam unitio solum demonstrat
copulationem, sed incarnatio dicit ad quern facta est copulatio,
sicut ignitio." This is quoted without comment in "AB"
but the context and the question in "L" before this same
statement, as to whether uniting and incarnation are the
same, make it evident that the interest is in the difference
rather than in the compleaientary nature of the union of
natures and the incarnation of the Word as is the case with
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John of Damascus, that is, through, in and by the Word
the union of God and man was made, in "L" the same general
point is made: "Item, dicit pro regula in libro
7
De hebdomaaibus ' :
"Assumens non est assumptum", uniens tamen est
unitum. Et ratio est, quia •assumere* respicit principia
compositionis quasi secunaum naturam, 'unire* vero
6£at?l^
praecedens unitionem, unitio unionem. Haec tamen omnia
simul tempore sunt; ergo, secundum quod assumitur
3. 23(L),p.63 perhaps makes this point, bee below p. 72.
4. viz. 16,c)p.63. 3« 12,p.61. 6.13»14,pp.61-62; 36(1),
p«68; De Fide Orth.,111,c.11. 7« Alanus ab Insulis, Kegulae
theol.. reR.101.
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corpus et anirna, uniuntur divinae naturae".
This point is valid enough; Alexander is avoiding any
suggestion that the Divine nature is made or becomes human
which incarnation or assumption may suggest but in defending
oneself against heresy, one should be careful also to
emphasise the point of the distinction, namely, that through
this assumption the Divine nature is united to the human.
To be sure, at the end of the above quotation this latter
point is made but this only emphasises the fact that he was
more interested in the distinction between assumption and
uniting. The above quotation would be more satisfactory if
one felt that the last statement was the object of the
quotation and this is not so. "L" provides the kind of
thing that would be expected (but not "AE"): "assumendo
coniunxit et coniungendo assumpsit coniuncta, ut terminus
sit assumptionis ipsa ooniunctio" ^ but even this is
qualified for the interest here is in avoiding Adoptionism
by stating that the humanity of Christ did not exist apart
from the assumption so that the human nature is seen as
participating in the union through the assumption. From
the Divine side the operative element is the Person, not the
nature. Possibly at this stage the distinction between
assumption and uniting would be valid if at the later stage
in distinction VI Alexander made clear that in the Person of
the Bon of God, God, the Divine nature came right into the
8. 35(L)»P-68. 9. 23(L),p.65
midst of humanity but there is a further doubt at this point
also. (This will become clear in the rest of the chapter).
/mother way of viewing the assumption or the
incarnation is in terms of the "mediator". Alexander,
however, does not thro?/ much light here because of his
heavy dependence on tradition. It is in distinction XIX
that he discusses Christ as "mediator" and, at considerable
length, Christ as "head". (This interesting section will be
discussed in chapter 3)«
Alexander states that mediation occurs in two ways
- substantially, in the diverse natures in which one "habet
conuaunem" with the Father, and the other "communes cum
homine"; accidentally, "consideratur secundum proprietates
Dei et hominis." There is a quotation from Ambrose in
which it is stated that the mediator as God is greater than
man, and as man less than God, and Augustine is quoted to
the effect that Christ is put in between the immortal and
the mortal "miser" so that from death the mortal might be
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made immortal. Isidore is quoted to the effect that
both natures are one person and that "manente incoiamutabili
essentia, assumpsit carnem, in qua irapassibilis patiet
12
immortalis mori /et/ aeternus temporalis possit ostendi".
Unfortunately Alexander does not enlarge on this statement.
Again Augustine is quoted, this time to the effect that Christ
is the way, and Alexander comments that it is as raan that he
lg
is the way. Another quotation from Augustine states that
10. d.XXX,15»P*213. 11* 17,p.214j Ambrose, refe/?ence not
foundj Augustine, he Oivitate Dei, 13,rm.l,2.
12. 18,p.214; Isidore, bententtae .1 .c.14,n.4. 13. 18,pp.214-
215; Augustine,op•cit.XI,*?." ~
the mediator has something "simile" to man and something
14
"simile" to God. Finally, states Alexander, there are
three ways of mediation - "quoad naturam", one of which is
a composition of both natures, another in which there is one
person of two natures; there is a third mediation in which
the human nature has the properties of God and man. In this
last way, states Alexander "verua est" ^ ("quod est
mediator secundum quod homo" )• In "L" the second type
of mediation is described as "una person pro duabus naturis,
mediatrix inter Deum et hominem." Thus it appears that
the first two types of mediation are eliminated because the
mediation means confusion or interchangeability. This is
stated in "E" where the medium is not a "natura media"
between the Divine and human but "quoad proprletates quae
erant in Ohristo homine. Habuit enim omnium scientiam et
plenit^adinem donorum sive virtutum, in quo cum Deo conveniebat;
et passibilitatea in anima secundum sensualitatem et in
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corpore, in quo cum hominibus conveniebat." 1 Thus Christ
as man is nob to he divinised or as God he is not to be humanised.
Because this topic is so heavily dej>endent on authorities it
is very difficult to make anything of it. There is not much
interest in the question "what was Christ mediator for?" The
interest seems to lie merely in the statement of the fact that
God was mediator between God and man and little help is given
to the discussion on the incarnation and union which
establishes Christ as God and man.
14. 19,p.215i Augustine, Confessions. X,c.42,n.67.
15. 20,p.215. 16. footnote, p.215.
17. 38(L),p.215. 18. 45(E),pp.226-227.
Back in distinction V, however, the centre of
Alexander's discussion on the assumption is found.
Previously the interest has centred on the Divine nature and
the assumption. How the place of the human nature is
discussed. The human nature which the Son of God assumes,
states Alexander, cannot refer to "essentia" because "'natura'
iq
respicit rem in fieri, et 'essentia' secundum esse." J
Alexander is making a point similar to the one made above
where essence is seen as a self-contained unit, as "One".
Human essence could not be assumed for this would indicate
that the human element had being apart from the incarnation
(Adoptionism) or that there were two separate entities in
the onion (Hestorianism). It may be noted that the terminology
is not the same here as above for, there, "essentia" and
(Divine) "natura" were equated which made it impossible for
Divine nature to assume. Thus by equating nature and essence
in God and stating that nature did not assume, and by
distinguishing between nature and essence in man so that man
as essence is not assumed some doubt may be had whether this
terminology and its use sufficiently guai'antees the affirmation
of the real involvement either of God or man in the incarnation.
However, as it is stated that essence does not apply to "rem
in fieri", essence cannot be seen as taking part in the
assumption. Yet, in some way, it must be affirmed that the
essence of man is involved for Christ to be man. The essence
must rest in the incarnation itself, that is, humanity in the
19. d.V,5»p.59.
man Christ Jesus. Perhaps, however, there is no more than a
different use of terminology here so that "essentia" is used
only in relation to the possibility of Adoptionism and
Hestorianism and their rejection, and for the rest "natura"
is the essence of man or real man, to take in both the idea
of "humanity" and "a man" which is the same usage the word
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nature has when it refers to the Divine nature in the union.
That Alexander is protecting himself against any
sort of Nestorianism or Adoptionism is also seen in the next
section where human nature is said not to be "homo". He
states that it is true that Divine nature is God because
in Him "quod est" and "quo est" are the same but in man they
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differ which means that "humanity" can be assumed or
united to Divine nature without first being individuated.
It is to be admitted that Alexander is correct when he implies
that the "union" of man and man (in particular of Christ and
man) and the union of the Persons of the Trinity (whereby
the Person of Christ is indissolubly linked with the nature,
a position which Alexander, in fact, does not make the most
of in relation to the incarnation) are not really comparable
yet in tradition they have been compared and Alexander's
division between "man" and "human nature" may raise doubts
as to whether Christ is a man like other human beings, that
is, is humanity or a man really hypostasised in the Person
of the Hon? Is Christ man? (viz. J£arl Barth: "if we allow
ourselves to say that He /the lord/ became flesh, we must
20. 9»p«59 indeed gives a list of the different uses of the
word "natura". 21. 6,p.59»
note that primarily and of itself "flesh" does not imply
a man, but human essence and existence, human kind and
nature, humanity, humanitas. that which makes a man man as
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opposed to God, angel, or animal." Likewise,it would
seem true that in the Person incarnate the divine nature is
primarily implied.) Perhaps, however, it would be fairer
to Alexander to presume that he is thinking, at this point,
more of what is assumed, to repudiate any idea of a prior
humanity, rather than of the actual union and the involvement
of humanity in it. (This question arises later.) He, at
least, is definitely stating that the humanity of Christ does
not exist apart from the incarnation. This is brought out
in "L" where he comments on the suggestion that the human
nature assumed was a person: "natura humana ponitur ibi
pro materia" which is body and soul, not for a person as an
"individuum" "cum sit in aliis hominibus in ratione formae
dicta, ut humanitas: et quia assumendo coniunxiter
2-5
coniungendo assumpsit v coniuncta, ut terminus sit
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assumptionis ipsa coniunctio." Thus Nestorianism or
Adoptionism is rejected but the question remains whether the
point of Adoptionism, i.e. Christ was a man, has been
sufficiently taken into account.
This quotation may weaken a former assertion that
the inter-relation of the union and assumption (that is, the
Divine Nature was fully involved in the incarnation through
the Son) is not brought out strongly by Alexander. However,
22. Church Dogmatics 1:2,p.149- 23 • Similar to Alanus ab
Insulis, Regulae theol.. reg.101. 24. d,V,23(L),p.65«
even here, the intent is to understand the relation in
regard to Christ's humanity. He leaves at one side the issue
of the Divine nature's involvement in the incarnation. The
statement that the "end of the assumption is the conjunction"
certainly would imply the activity of the Divine nature in
the incarnation but whether Alexander wishes by this to
affirm that the Divine nature is involved or whether he
still would be more interested in the distinction remains
tiiac
in doubt. On the whole, it would appear the distinction
"once removes" the Divine nature from the union as later
the Person is "once removed" in the hypostatic union,
(distinction VI) In other words, Alexander, here, has no
problem about the Person's involvement but he has about the
Divine nature's involvement, and contrariwise he has no
doubt about human nature's involvement, but has doubts
about man's (i.e. perhaps by implication sinful man's)
involvement in the union. In "E", assumption and union
are related again but again the interest, as above, lies in
the distinction.
Adoptionism is quite clearly refuted in
distinction VI when it is suggested that by the grace of
adoption Christ was made "that man". Alexander replies
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that it was not the grace of adoption but the grace of union. y
Alexander also refutes Nestorianism and its charge against
orthodoxy, namely, the suggestion there was no man involved
in the union. It is suggested that "iste homo" posits either
"person" or "human nature". If it is "person", it is argued,
25. d.VI,9,p«76» with footnote b)
then there must have been two persons and if it was "human
nature" then there was never a person made. Alexander replies
that "iste homo" posits "individuum quod est medium inter
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naturam et personam". He is nob saying, I think, that
Christ is a third being between man and God but that his
human nature is personal yet not personal apart from its
hypostasis in the Bon of God. However, his fear of
Adoptionism and Mestorianism (i.e. the "manness" involved in
these positions) prevents him from clearly stating this
position. Many of the fathers are quoted to maintain,
especially in "L" and "E", the traditional view of Christ
but there is no substantial addition to what has already
been stated. Adoptionism and Nestorianism are refuted. In
distinction X the question whether Christ was a man again
arises and so the problem of Hestorianism. This is raised
by Anselm*s statement that in Christ God is "persona" and
man is "persona". The answer to this problem is found in
"L" where Anselm's comment is referred to, and Alexander
states that if the "individuae hypostases" were separated
there would have been a personal man, but they were not in
the conjunction because in that there were the same individual
27
and collection of accidents. ' Another suggestion that the
"aliquid" of Christ as man was an "individua substantia"
28
and therefore a person is answered by the statement that
29
not every individuum is a person. Once again these
answers would hardly satisfy a Nestorian and his doubts.
26. 7fP*?6. 27. d.X,2,p.H4; Anselm De incarn, Verbi«c.6:
9(L),c)p.ll7. 28. 2,b)pp. 114-115; 9(L) ,b)p.H7. 297"!bid.
d)p.H7.
In the same distinction the problem of Adoptionism
again is raised. The statement of Hilary "Potestatis
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dignitas non amittitur, dura carnis humanitas adoptatur"^
might have suggested that the man in Christ was an adoptive
son. This possibility is denied by the statement of
Ambrose: "Volvi et revolvi Scripturas divinas, et Piliurn
31
Dei nunquam adoptivum inveni." Then it is asked why,
if Christ as man was a creature, he was not similarly called
adoptive as man. Alexander rejects this conclusion because
"adoptio respicit alterationem (Adoptivus enim est qui
quandoque non fuit filius et creatura respicit
generationem." ^ Augustine had stated, further, that it
was the same grace at work in making the faith of man and by
which Christ was made man. Alexander protects this against
an adoptionist interpretation by commenting that the grace
mentioned is the "virtus" of the Holy Spirit by which
Christ was conceived of the Virgin. ^ In "L" and "E" in
a statement of Peter Lombard, it is made clear that the
grace in Christ was not the grace of adoption but the grace
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of union. Prom the above it is evident that Alexander
has little of significance to add in relation to Adoptionism
beyond denying it. The answer that adoption relates to
alteration and generation to the creature does not answer,
however, the Adoptionist suspicion of monophysitism; in fact,
it may strengthen it. Adoptionism destroys the unity of
Christ but it is not answered by a hint that the human
30. 6| a)p.H5, Hilary, De Trin.. Lib.II,n.27. 31* The
quotation is attributed to Ambrose by Peter Lombard; footnote
p.115 and 14(L),p.ll8. 32. footnote, p.116. 33« 6,b)p.ll6.
34. 6,c)p.ll6; Augustine, De Praedest. sanctorum.c.lh.n.31.
35. 12(L),pp.117-118; 19(E),pp.115-120.
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nature is very similar to the Divine.
In distinction XI Alexander takes up an anti-
Arian position. The line from a medieval hymn, "potestate,
non natura, fit Creator creatura" alight suggest that Christ
was a creature. Alexander, in reply, allows that God was
man but that does not mean that the Creator was a creature
36
because "sic opponitur oppositio in eadem." In "E" it
is stated that the hymn is alright "in se" but it is generally
37
unacceptable due to its similarity to the Arian heresy. "
Arianisa is further attacked because it stated that the
38
Divine nature was a creature ^ and for stating that Christ
was a. creature absolutely just as he may be called Creator
absolutely. ^ (In sympathy with Arianism one would also
like to question this latter statement). Again, the description
of Christ as "divinum" is not conceded because "minus est
40
divinum quam Deus." In the footnote there is this
statement: "unde supra (dist.VII,15) noil conceditur 'homo
dorainicus*, ita nec hie 'divinum*•" ^ This guards against
"backdoor" Arianism which only apparently concedes deity to
Christ.
In distinction IX Alexander apparently moves in a
contrary direction to the foregoing. It is concerned with
"latria" and "dulia" in relation to Christ. "Latria" is
worship and "dulia" is something akin to honour and their
use in relation to Christ by Alexander throws some light on
36. dist.XI,1,p.120; also 8(L),p.l22; hymn in F.I.I/ione,
Hymni latini medii aevi, II,n.389* 37* 11(E),p.123*
381 3tP*121 and footnote. 39» 6,p.122. 40. 7»P»122.
41. footnote, p.122.
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his Christological position. Alexander finds the Biblical
basis for the distinction in Psalm 7:1 - "Domine« be us mens"
where "Dominus" is temporal and where "Deus" is eternal:
"Est ergo latria cultus Deo debitus; dulia vero est cultus
ap
creaturae debitus et creaturae exhibitus." In the former
"cognitio, dilectio, et sacrificii exhibitio" are required
ax
but for the latter the last of these requirements is omitted.
Much of the distinction is taken up with a discussion of
what "latria" and "dulia" are in themselves, and with the
love of God and the love of neighbour, and this is not
directly concerned with Christology.
The question arises, however, whether "caro
Christi" is to be adored by "latria" or "dulia". Alexander
replies "quod caro aliquando dicitur ipse homo; et sic caro
Christi est adoranda latria. Dicitur etiam caro pars
corporis; sed dupliciter potest considerari: aut enim ut
in se est, et sic hyperdulia adoranda est; vel proufc unitur
an
divinae naturae, et sic latria adoranda est." In "L"
the division between the man and God is more stark. When
"caro" is thought of as "corpus" Christ can be viewed in a
two fold way: "uniturn vel in se. Si sumatur ut homo,
adoratur hypostasis et latria. Similiter si sumatur ut
unitum, quia terminus est Pilius Dei in hac unione. In se
autem adoratur dulia, ilia scilicet specie qua dicitur
hyperdulia; non tamen adoratur, quia non ponitur ut terminus,
42. d.IX,1,p.104 43. 21(B),P.133 44. 3•pp.103-106.
sed honoratur ut materia redemptionis.The same division
is seen in the question whether "Creator" is to receive
"latria" or "dulia" or not. The answer is that as God he
should receive "latria" but the Bon of God is "Dominus" in
so far as he is man and so in this capacity should receive
"dulia". Christ is God from eternity, "Dominus" with time.
(Phil.2:9 is the basis of this). ^
Apart from the division thus implied between God
in himself and God in revelation, that is, apart from the
lack: of a Trinitarian basis for Christ as "Bominus" (see
also in a later chapter), the division which the use of
"latria" and "dulia" implies x'aises serious problems for
Christology. (Of course these matters are closely related).
It has to be admitted that the relation of man and God in
Christ has always been extraordinarily difficult to express,
nevertheless, Alexander's position does appear to be
inadequate. First, it offends against the biblical evidence
where Christ is seen as one person, to be sure, God and man,
but with complete cohesion and united wills in one purpose
and who is worshipped as Lord. (Phil.2:10) He cannot be
thought of as only man, "in se" (which is the only possibility
open to non-believers), oy a believer for his manhood is based
only in the Son of God, and God is known only by the man.
The Godness is revealed in the manness. We cannot go behind
this man, that is, by separating the man fi'om the God, to
"God". - "Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet
45. 12(L),p.!10. 46. 4,p.106; also 15(L),pp.110-111
now henceforth know we hi® no more." (2 Cor.5:16) To be
sure, one can say, "this is the man", for example, when
Christ prays in the garden of Gethsemene, but one then
cannot go on to say that this man at this point is not the
Son of God and is not to be worshipped, which the "latria-
dulia" distinction implies, far less to go on to- make a
principle of division from the fact that one can detect the
man. Secondly, as has been implied, this distinction is a
division and offends against the "without division" of
Chalcedon. Thirdly, this division does not take the
"communicatio idiomatum" (admittedly a doctrine not without
its difficulties) seriously enough - a doctrine which points
in a direction contrary to the division or the dividing out
of the human and the Divine.
Here, surprisingly perhaps (because at other times
Alexander appears to have monophysite tendencies), there is
a move towards Nestorianism. This tendency, however, also
coincides with the pre-suppositions of Alexander, for
Nestorianism (like monophysitism) throws doubt on the reality
of the incarnation which is the fact that God became man
in the person of Jesus Christ. The heresy raises doubts on
the incarnation of God because in it that man Jesus is not
seen to be made the complete man from God's side (because
God, by definition, is incapable of incarnation). Consequently
if one wishes to maintain the manness of Christ (with which
mostraonophysites are not particularly concerned) as the
Nestorian does, in some way one has to maintain a man who is
not at the same time the Person of Christ and hence some form
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of Nestorianism is necessary (or Ebionitism or Adoptioriism) .
This means that, in Jesus Christ, the human is not fully
"met by the Divine", or to put it another way, as it has
been put before, the Divine keeps the human "at arm's
length". This tendency derives from a docetic view of God
as the "One" or "Essence" who is unable to communicate with
man. This inability of such a God is demonstrated in relation
to the humanity of Christ when Alexander credits it, as has
been seen, with some "capacity" for uniting with the Divine
and as such is to be honoured as the "materia redemptionis".
(Monophysitism works also from a docetic standpoint but
unlike Uestorianism is happy, in effect, to eliminate man -
the latter to solve the problem makes two persons, the former
to solve it eliminates one of them.)
There may be another reason why Alexander is able
to make a division between the man and God in Christ and it
lies in the fact that his doctrine of the knowledge of God
is not indissolubly bound to the revelation of God in the Man
Jesus Christ. That means that even before he comes to the
doctrine of Christ there is a presupposed separation of God
from man. The purpose of the incarnation, for instance, is
limited almost entirely to the work of satisfaction (the only
necessary reason for the incarnation is penal satisfaction),
in short, Jesus Christ is regarded merely as a helper -
certainly a decisive one. He, that is, the God and man, is
not central to his thinking and it is thus that in Christ
it is the Son of God, the Divine, who is worshipped because
he is central and not God in the man Jesus. This could be
put another way. For Alexander's theology Jesus Christ is
not the complete revelation of God to man or of man to man,
rather he is the one who renders satisfaction to God.
There is little "manward" direction about Christ the man;
the manhood in Christ "looks back" to God and though this
whole action between man and God in Christ is necessary for
man's salvation, nevertheless, the man in Christ does not
come between us and Goa who is the object of our worship
with or without Christ. Thus a division in Christ is
possible for Alexander both because the Divine keeps the
human at "arm's length" and because the necessity of
satisfaction does not prevent us communicating with God
directly without the human mediation. This means, by
implication^that in Christ man can be distinguished from
God. Both these reasons for division presuppose a knowledge
of God outside Christ but incarnationatl theology, if it had
been adequate, could have acted as a corrective to these
docetic tendencies.
Something of the same problem as the "latria-dulia"
one arises in distinction X which begins by discussing Peter
quod
Lombard's enquiry "utrum Christus secundum homo sit persona."
Alexanders comment is:
"iiaec dictio "secundum" alicjuando notat unitatem
personae, ut 'Christus secundum quod homo dimittit
peccata.' Aliquando conditionem uivinae naturae, ut
'Christus secundum quod Deus est misericors.' Aliquando
notat causam efficientem, ut 'Christus secundum quod
Deus resurrexit.' (id est ex virtute divinitatis) 47
Aliquando causam materialem, ut 'Christus secundum quod
homo redemit nos.' (Id est humanitate sua fecit opera
nostrae redemptionis meritoria.) 48 Aliquando causam
formalem, ut 'Christus secundum quod est homo est
aliquid.' Aliquando notat conditionem humanae naturae,
ut 'Christus secundum quod homo mortuus est.'" 50
47. d.X,footnote, p.114. 48. Ibid. 50. I,p.ll4.
8?
It is true that the humanity and the Divinity must receive
sufficient recognition in any doctrine of Christ but some of
these divisions appear very doubtful, notably in regard to
the material cause and the human nature. To be sure a
material cause is not a sufficient cause and implies
efficient, formal and final causes in which Cod would be the
main agent; yet, in the above case the fourfold cause is
not applied to man's redemption as such. Alexander sees the
humanity especially at work: here in the material cause. It
would be wrong to claim that Alexander excludes the work of
God for it is in the framework of His work that the material
cause operates. Yet no part of Christ can be seen as human
for the most part, because Jesus Christ must always be
understood as God in Christ, that is, as he is, full man and
full God in the unity of the Person of the Son, in all his
works. That is how he worked. He is always God in man, and
a man in whom we see God, and in any aspect of Christ's work
God and man must be understood in their unity. The same
point applies to the last example of the quotation which
claims that to state that Christ as man is dead denotes the
condition of the human nature.
Similarly, there must also be some doubt as to
whether in regard to the efficient cause Alexander states the
position satisfactorily. Certainly the power of the
resurrection was of God but whether it can be put as simply
as the above is a matter of some doubt. A substantial
Biblical view is that the Son was raised by the Father, this
being the completion of the Son's obedience, and the man is
raised by virtue of the hypostatic union. This is basically
a Trinitarian problem but unless the Trinity is seen to be
at work in the resurrection (and elsewhere of course, in
Ghrist's life) there may be some doubt as to the second
fterson's unity with man in Christ, that is, God may appear
uo be working outside Jesus Christ. If this is so, there is
doubt on the achievement of salvation for God would not then
have taken man's side, (cf. Aneelm; only man should, only
God could) a position which Chalcedon's "without separation,
without division" would defend. It is inthe first application
of "secundum" that a more satisfactory statement is found.
There "secundum" denotes the personal unity as in the
sentence "Christus secundum quod homo dimittit peccata."
No suspicion of Nestorianism arises here.
Alexander is naturally anti-Arian, anti-Adoptionist,
and anti-Nestorian although some Nestorian tendencies perhaps
have been detected. He, of course, is also anti-Monophysite.
Here, also, he reveals his tendency to regard God as the
"One". In distinction V it is stated that all creatures
were created either "in se", "in sua specie", or "in sua
materia." The union of the human nature to the Divine nature
is creaturely, and therefore, it is suggested, it is of a
"genus" but of none of the above types. In reply Alexander
states that just as the composition of one substance to
another makes a substance not of the one kind or the other,
similarly the union of the Divine and human natures is not
reducible "ad aliquod genus rerum" because one of the
substances, namely, the Divine, is beyond all "genus". ^
51. d.V,15,p.62.
Thus the suggestion that there may be one nature (by
implication in a creaturely "genus") is rejected,
Monophydtism is again rejected in relation to the suffering
of Christ, Alexander states that it does not follow that
the Divine nature suffers when the Person receives the
"idiomata" of human nature because human nature is not
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united "in divinam naturam" but "in divinam personam," ^
(The subject of suffering arises in chapter 4) Further,
Peter Lombard had said that the Divine nature is not said
to be made flesh because it might be thought that nature
was changed into nature. Alexander in support of this writes:
"^uod secus est de Verbo et de divina natura, quoniam Verbum
concernens personam et humana natura non opponuntur: ideo
dicetur Verbum caro factum: sed divina natura et humana
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opponuntur: non dicetur ideo divinam naturam carnem factam."^
Two things should be noted in this rejection of
monophysitism: there is the fear of humanisation (not of
divinisation), and once again there is hesitation at asserting
the action of the Divine nature in the assumption - indeed
"human nature and Divine nature are opposed", a problem
which surely must also arise with the Person of the bon of
God. It should also be noted that when the "communicatio
idiomatuia" is mentioned, it is not to affirm it but to deny
it in the case of the suffering of the Divine nature. (In
distinction VII, however, Alexander states: "est autern unio
convenientia naturarum in personaet communicatio proprietatum
ad invicem." )^
52. 16,b)p.62. 53. 16,c)p.63. 54. d.VII,20(L),p.97«
The topic of distinction VIII as a "footnote" to
the above discussion shows the same tendencies. It deals
with the double "nativity" of Christ. The term "natus"
but not the term "incarnatus" speaks of a distinction in
Christ and so, states Alexander, it cannot be said that the
Divine nature is born as the Divine nature is said to be
incarnate. The rule (only found in the Surnma II:2,n.37)
is stated as follows: "Dihil significans proprietatem
creatam vel proprietatem personalem increatam dicitur de
divina essentia." ^5 And so it is false to say "divina
essentia est nata vel genita" because this changes the
essential into the personal. ^ Again the fact that there
was a "nunc" of time and a "nunc" of eternity in Christ does
not permit the expression, which Peter Lombard used, that
Christ was "bis natus" because Christ was born Bon of Man
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in time and Son of God in eternity. ■" The above distinction
sets out to assert the real distinction of the natures, and
to assert that in no way should the Divine nature be
humanised, nor should it have the stigma of createdness on
it.
Both these objectives are perfectly legitimate,
in fact, they are imperative in Christology and yet here, as
in distinction V and elsewhere in the work, Alexander's fear
is the humanisation of God which parallels a tendency in his
work not to attribute a full humanity to Christ. The
identification of Christ with mankind is not emphasised
(the interest is on the Divine side) and in fact appears only
55. d.VIII,1,p.102. 56. footnote p.102. 57- 2,p.102
in "L" and "E" to any extent; the monoj:>hysitism feared, it
should be noted, is not the traditional form of divinisation
(the Nestorian fear) but the contrary form of humanisation.
Once again there seems to be someidea of God as the "One" or
"essentia" lurking behind his thought, a "One" who is unable
to become involved in any real sense with man (a conclusion
which Alexander, of course, does not reach; the incarnation
is too powerful); in fact, even in Alexander, man, because
he has accidents, seems to be at a greater advantage. No
doubt the quite justified fear of Patripassianism (which,
however, can be taken to inordinate lengths) is associated
with these views and lends support to them. However, the
idea of God as the "changeless One" is probably more truly
the background of Alexander's thought.
In distinction VI Alexander comes to the "how"
of the hypostatic union and the relations of the natures,
and these matters are fully discussed. Of course
Nestorianism, Monophysi^ism, and also Nihilianism are also
discussed but now the interest lies more in a positive
statement about the union than in the refutation of heresies
although it is hard to distinguish the two. At the beginning
of the distinction a number of ways are suggested in which
Christ might have been two. (The danger here is Nestorianism.)
No comments are made on this list in "AE" but there are
comments in "L". There are two "quids" in Christ. If "quid"
is equivalent to "suppositum" (or "subiectum") two natures are
understood and therefore Christ can be described as two in
this way. If "quid" refers to essence Christ is not two in
this way as there are not many "entes" in Christ. „
5? * '
Again Christ is one "unitate increata" and one "imitate
creata" and so it is argued, two diverse unities. This
does not follow as two unities cannot be united in one
person. ^ One nature in God is one in essence, therefore,
it is argued, two natures in Christ should make two in
essence. Alexander replies that there were neither two
essences nor one essence in Christ because essence is "quo
res est" (nature is "ut quae fit") arid essence is not in
Christ in this way for there is a man God and a God man, one
"ens". 60 Another argument is that substantial forms differ
substantially, and as there are two substantial forms in
Christ, there then are two substantially different ("things"?,
"persons"?). This does not mean, however, that there are two
"masculine" ("persons"?) but, rather, that Christ as man
differs substantially from the Father, and as God he differs
substantially from the mother. Again, body and soul are
in one person but the body is not the soul and vice versa;
similarly Gtd is not man, nor is man Goa. There is, however,
a difference between these two unities in that soul and
body are In one nature, whereas in Christ two natures are
in one person. 62
These comments should give some idea of how
Alexander sees the unity in Christ: essences cannot exist
together; the soul and body analogy is unsuitable in that
58. d.VI,l,p.7^j 25(L),f)p.83. 58. Xbia.c;p.o2.
60. l,p.74; 25(L),d)p.82. 61. Ibid.e;p.82. 62. 27(L)
p.85.
the unity is too close. God and man are distinct but not
separated or divided as .Nestorianism saw them. (Above, when
the assumption was discussed a distinction was made between
the person of the Hon of God and the nature of God so that
"nature" then approximated to "essence". Wow in this
discussion on union the distinction is between nature and
essence, a distinction which was held in respect to the
humanity of Christ. Alexander, as it has been noted, is
aware of the change in the meaning of terms and therefore
perhaps one cannot argue too much from this change. However,
the direction is once again away from the "involvement" of
God with humanity.) A somewhat different idea arises in
distinction VII in regard to the idea that Christ may be
partly man and partly God. This is denied by way of a
quotation from Augustine who also denies the idea that Christ
was not totally God from the beginning but grew into Divinity.'
An allegorical interpretation by Hesychius that the tenth
part of the ephah refers to the humanity of Christ and a
quotation from John of Damascus that the hypostasis is
"ex humana et divina natura" suggest that perhaps the human
and the Divine are parts. In re|)ly, Alexander gives five
definitions of"part" and says that properly speaking the human
is not a part but if the word "part" is used it can be only as
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part of the definition "Christum esse Deurn et hominem".
Christ is also described as "totus" only in the sense that
nothing is outside him which should be inside and not in the
65« d.VII,?,p.92; Augustine, Contra <&iximunum« II,c.lO,n.2.
64. 11,pp.93-94; Hesychius, Glossa on Lev.6.20; John of
Damascus, De Fide Orth. 111*3•
sense that he is a composition of parts. Then a statement
by Peter(at dist.XXII,c.3) that "totus fait in sepulcro,
sed non totum" suggests a "part" outside. answer to
this is in "L": "'toturn* sumiter materialiter, id est partes
unitae, et sic dicitur Ghristus 1 totuin' ; vel formaliter,
compositio partium, et sic non." (This will have more
light thrown upon it in chapter four.) Christ's soul was not
dead and therefore the 'totum' of human nature was not in
the tomb although the Person was by reason of his continuing
unity to the body. ^7
The second topic of distinction VI is the matter
of the unity of Christ which is the implicate of the previous
topic. (The danger here is monophysitism) Alexander quotes
a list of unities which Bernard of Clairvaux has enumerated.
There is a collective unity as in a pile of rocks; a
constitutive unity as in one body with many limbs; the unity
of man and wife in one flesh; the natural unity of body and
soul in a man; a unity of power "qua homo virtutis non
instabilis semper sibi unus nititur inveniri"; a unity of
consent where there is a unity in heart through love; a
votive unity when the soul adhering to God is of one spirit;
a unity of dignity by which our filth is assumed into one
person by the Word. Alexander adds to this list a sacramental
unity in which, from a visible sign and invisible grace or
character, there is made one sacrament. no great light
seems to be thrown by these types of unities, although one
65. 12,94. 66. 24(L),b)p.98. 67. also d.VII,34(E),p.101.
63. De considerations« V,c.8,n.l8; 8,p.76.
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can see that the unity in Christ is not the same as the
unity of body and soul, of believers with God, and of the
believers in one body (the closer unities). It certainly
is not monophysite unity for though it may be true that
the Son of Man is Divine nature yet the Son of God is not
human nature because in the Son of God the "quod est" and
the "quo est" are the same but this is not so with the Son
of Man.^9 This is similar to what "L" states: that man
does not begin to be God by the fact that God begins to be
man, nor does God begin to be human nature. ^ Here, once
again, Alexander is defending the Godness of the Son of God
more than the humanity of Christ, in that Christ is quite
clearly of Divine nature but is it as clear that he is of
human nature? Although the comparison is not exact, and in
fact should be avoided, nevertheless, just as the Son of God
is of divine nature it is also necessary to maintain that the
Son of Man is of human nature. What Alexander is avoiding is
Nestorianism or Adoptionism but does he really save the
humanity of Christ?
Alexander's interest in maintaining the Godness of
the Son of God is seen again when it is suggested that the
man assumed is God or God is "that man" : "Dicendum quod
Deus non assumpsit 'aliquem hominem'; et tamen 'aliquis
homo' est assumptus, ut patet in rege capiente non liberum,
et tamen liber est assumptus. Dicendum (ergo) assumens
secundum rem non est assumptum, sed tamen secundum rationem
69. 2.4,p.75. 70. 23(L),24(L),p.81.
idem est." ^ Once again in the comments on Augustine's
statement "talis fuit susceptio ilia, ut faceret Be urn hominem
et hominem Deum" and the conclusion "ergo aliquis homo
factus est", although quite clearly Alexander is mainly
concerned with the refutation of Adoptionism or JNestorianism ,
yet in the comments it is also evident that he does not see
any danger of Mmophystism in the conclusion But wishes to
prevent any possibility of the idea of the createdness of
the Son of God. ^
In distinction VII the possibility that the union
may consist of three natures is raised. This would be
t
because there were three substances in Christ, namely, the
Divine nature, the spiritual and the bodily. Alexander
replies as follows: "quod substantia est nomen naturae,
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sed natura est nomen composition ex substantiis." '^ This
merely points out the different usages of the word "substance"
already noted. In the same distinction there are two
quotations from Alanus ab Insulis, the first to the effect
that in the union there was a diversity of substances in one
and that the property of the natures remained in the union,
the second is a long one on various types of unity which
of
includes refutation of Restorian and Eutychian types unity.
He defines the incarnation as follows: "noil fit una natura,
sed (uniuntur) in persona praeexsistenti alteri unitorum et
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manent naturae distinctae." ' Alexander also gives two
Aristotelian definitions of "unum": "ens indivisum" and so
71. 5»P»75* 72. 3»p.75; Augustine, De Trin.I.c.l5.n.28;
20(L),pp.80-81; 44(E),p.89. 73. d.VII,5,p.91.
74. pp.91-92; Alanus ab Insulis, Reg.theol.. reg.100:
also at VI,42(E),p.88.
Christ as man and as God would be "unum et unum" yet not
two; "ens indivisum et ab aliis divisum" and as such it
is the beginning of number and so "bene sequitur" that
Christ is "unum et unuin" and therefore two "sed primum
falsum est." ^ Further on in the distinction any suggestion
that the Divine nature is created is denied when it is stated
that when it unites it does not become the union which is a
created thing. ^ All this helps bo build up a picture of
the union without very much depth.
"Post-Chalcedon"
The centre of Christology is the problem of the
personal union. What or who is the person; how are the
human and Divine related to the personal? These are
questions which might be asked. Definitions of twoness and
oneness are not satisfactory until it is stated how two
"persons", i.e. man and the Bon of God are, in fact, one
person in Christ. Unless there is some resolution of this
problem one will always be swinging between Monophysitism
and Nestorianism. Distinction VI does try to come to terms
with this problem. However, earlier, there have been already
references to the personal union.
In distinction IV there is a reference to the fact
that Christ is "unus" from the "unitas personae humanatae"
and not, it would appear, one from the unity of nature or
75. 10,p.93; Aristotle, Metaph.IX.t.9 and t.2.
76. 13,p.94.
one from the unity of the Person of the Trinity which is
eternal. ^ (The union is of creation) In "L" this is
clarified when it is stated: "ex utraque natura est iste
homo; non natura vel persona, sed hypostasis Dei et
hominis." It is incidentally noted that the "ex" (at the
beginning of the sentence) is not univocal "nec concedendum
est quod genuit ex utraque vel ex altera." ^ At this early
stage there appears to be a distinction between person and
hypostasis and the suggestion that the hypostatic union is
"human" and therefore, in a sense at least, it is not from
eternity. This throws some doubt on the doctrine of the
Trinity and suggests once again that God cannot be involved
in His own creation.
In distinction VI this problem of the contrast of
person and the hypostasis again arises*. It is suggested that
there were two persons in Christ, one of eternal origin and
one individuated by his temporal origin in Mary and by his
properties, thus making a "individuitas hypostasis" which
is a person and therefore a person, it is argued, was
assumed. This suggestion is rejected by Alexander for
although there was a "individuitas hypostaseos" yet this is
not a person for "non omnis individuitas hypostaseos facit
personam, sed excellens proprietas." This is anti-
Nestorian but what is of especial interest here is the fact
that "person" is distinguished from "hypostasis" by its
"excellens proprietas". This distinction is again made later:
77. d.IV,8,p.51. 73. l4(L),p.52. 79. d.vl,3,pp.58-59
"Substantia in qua est,proprietas et sic dicitur hypostasis;
sed substantia in qua est proprietas excellens est persona".
The Son of God and the man assumed have the same collection
Q "1
of properties and these properties derive from the Son
Op
of God because "proprietas originis est dignior" and whatever
the Son of God has through nature the Son of Man has through
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grace. y The fact that the Son of Man's properties are founded
in the Son of God's does not take away his personality but
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founds it in a more worthy one. "et ita homo ille secundum
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divinae personae proprietatem est persona". x
(Later some idea of how Alexander views the
"coramunicatio idiomatum" is stated. He begins with the
rule "quidquid dicitur de Filio Dei, et de isto homine".
In "AE" the comment is: "quod ilia praedicta quae conveniunt
per gratiam, dicuntur de isto homine simpliciter, non taraen
de Filio Dei, ut praedestinatus, adoptivus; sed ilia praedicta
quae insunt per naturam, simpliciter conveniunt Filio Dei,
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ut passus, natus". In "L" it is pointed out that the rule
is appropriate to those properties predicated through nature.
Predicates through grace such as "adoptivus" ana "praedestinai:us"
are not appropriate to the Son of God because they are related
to created grace and are convenient to the Son of Man: those
related to uncreated grace such as "praedestinatio dicit ut
datio" are convenient to the Son of God. ^ In distinction V
Alexander points out that it does not follow that the Divine
80. 20,p.64. 01. Anselm, De Incarnations Verbi. cap.6.
82. 24(L),p*66. See also 47(E), pp.71-72. W.44(L),p.70.
84. d.V,47(E),c)p.72; 45(L),p.71. In distinction V, 14,p.62 in
a quotation from John of Damascus enhypostasia is present but
as Alexander does not appear to use it for this purpose and
because of Alexander's view of hypostasis very little can be
made of the Damascene's statement. 85* Ibid.(L). 86. d.X,2,
c)p.ll5. 37. 10(L),p.ll7.
nature suffers because the Person receives the "idiomata" of
cr
the human nature because human nature is not united "in
QO
divinam naturam" but "in divinam personam". This of
course avoids patripassion but Alexander has doubts also
about the Person suffering too.)
The doctrine of enhypostasia bases the humanity of
Christ in the Person of the Bon of God as the ground of the
union (although Alexander does this only in regard to
properties and frora the parenthesis above it is clear that
not all human properties are included which would suggest
that properties are not a very good basis for the personal
union - they suggest two persons not one person). Yet one
cannot be quite as happy about Alexander's distinction
between person and hypostasis nor about the possibly implied
absorption of the properties of the Bon of Man in the
excellent properties of the Bon of God. What is the
hypostasis in Alexander? Does hypostasis find its basis in
the Divine hypostasis? If this is so, as the doctrine of
enk/postasia maintains, why has a distinction been made
between the person and the hypostasis? Wo light is thrown
on this problem in distinction V and clarification is found
in distinction VI. All that can be noted at this point is
that, when it is suggested that by the fact of Christ's
birth frora Mary and by his peculiar properties, the hypostasised
individual was a person, Alexander did not actually answer
this by stating that the person was founded in the Person
88. d.V,16,b)p.62.
of the Son of God, bat stated rather that person and
hypostasis were different and that the latter was not a
person. This leaves open the question as to what the
hypostasis is and what the relation between the person and
the hypostasis is. It may be noted that "LM and "E" do not
make use of this distinction in distinction V. The suggestion
that the human element, that is, the body and soul with its
properties, is a "quaedam personalitas", and the conclusion
that because the Son of God assumed this, a person assumed
a person, are rejected in "L" because the "personalitasM
with its more excellent properties is not founded in man
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but in the Son of God. y In "E" person and hypostasis
appear to be regarded as interchangeable when the union and
assumption are discussed: "Assumptio propter reciprocationem
et actum, personae attribu&ur: unitio vero est naturae ad
naturam in persona sive hypostasi, et definitur sic; unio
est duarum naturarum in unarn conceptio. Item, assumptio
90
notat ordinem, unio non." y This separation of "L" and "E"
from "AE" does not apply in distinction VI where there is
the main discussion on the hypostatic union. With this
discussion the centre of Christology is reached and the
conclusion of the chapter which began with the assumption.
In distinction VI in relation to the hypostatic
union the problem of composition arises. Peter Lombard had
mentioned that the union was in one composite hypostasis of
the Son of God (following John of Damascus) but John had
89. 24(L),p.66 90. 51(E),p.73
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refuted the idea that there then would be one composed will
for the "idiomata" such as the creatable and uncreatable
would then be interchangeable and Christ's will would be
separated from the Father's will: "Reliquitur igitur dicere
solam hypostasim Ghristi compositam et coaraunem naturarum
et naturalium eius." ^ For John, in the Latin "hypostasis"
and "persona" appear interchangeable, and in the Greek
"hypostasis" is the word constantly used and occasionally
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the word "prosopon" to mean "person", y However, in
Alexander, "hypostasis" and "persona" are distinguished, for
example : "persona est hypostasis distincta per proprietatem
dignitatis; hypostasis est exastentia incommunicabilis ex
quibuscumque individuantibus, supposita essentia. Unde
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omnis persona est hypostasis, et non convert itur." (Thus
hypostasis is substance (exsistentia); person is substance
plus properties. This definition of hypostasis is from
Richard of St. Victor rather than from Boethius. The
comment of Alexander came after a quotation from Richard
of St. Victor to the effect that in God there are a plurality
of persons in one substance; in Christ a plurality of substances
94
in one person. Here Alexander follows Richard in the use
of "exsistentia" where Boethius had used "substantia" more
91. John of Damascus, De Fide Qrth.. c.14; d.VI,12,pp.77-78.
92. K.Rozemond, La Christologie de Saxnt Jean Damascene, makes
this clear. 93* 13»p»78. 94. Richard of St. Victor, De
Trinit..LV.c.25. In dist. IV,18,p.63 Richard's definition of
person with the substitution of "exsistentia" for "substantia"
had already appeared (without comment from Alexander). This
substitution was significant but does not appear to affect
Alexander much e.g. in 41(L),pp.69-70 the definition is seen
in Boethian terms of singularity, incommunicability, and
dignity.
or less as the equivalent of "hypostasis". (This usage
escapes the generic overtones of "substantia" which are found
in Boethius.) The fact that the "person" of Christ is the
"person" of the Godhead means for Alexander that the person
cannot be composed with anything else and therefore the
composition must be based in the hypostasis (whatever it is).
How does Alexander develop this? Twice Jerome is quoted to
the effect that Christ as Bon of God cannot be thought of
as changeable, temporal or able to suffer (passible). ^
These are the basic reasons Alexander has against the
composition in the person of the Son of God but in "AE"
there is no discussion of the statements. However in "L"
and "E" there is extensive comment on the idea of composition.
"Compositio ista intelligitur de hypostasi, non
de persona; et de hypostasi humanae naturae, quod est
composita divinae personae, id est in eamdem personam
unita. Nam compositum dicitur duplicetur; vel ex
aliis constitutum, vel alii uniturn praeexsistenti.
Divina autem persona simplex est... Est igitur
compositio praedicta ex parte humanae hypostasis.
Cum enim hypostasis sit persona et non convertitur,
quia persona est nomen dignitatis, ut patet per
definitionem: *Persona est hypostasis distincta per
proprietatem dignitatis*; 'hypostasis est exsistentia
incoiamunicabilis ex quibuscumque individuantibus
supposita essentiae." Persona namque plus se habefc ad
superexcellentem formam, hypostasis prout dicit
comparationem ad omnes proprietates aggregatas. Unde
Hieronymous..." 96
This seems to indicate that the composition (which presumably
is the union) is based on the human nature which would then
mean that the possibility of the incarnation lies in humanity
95* Jerome, Kpist.9«nn.10-12; ll,p.77«
96. d. VI,32(L),pp.84-85.
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and not in the Trinity, the creation being at the advantage
in that it can change. Yet that is not a deduction that
Alexander would want to make, at least, in "E". It is
stated there that because components are "prior" to the
composition it cannot be concluded that humanity is then
prior to the Person of ohrist since one is temporal and the
other is eternal. Therefore the composition is not from
humanity. The comment on this is: "non est hypostasis
composita ex humanitate simpiiciter, sed quoad hoc, quod
habet proprietates individuantes hypostasim humanam. Fuit
enim ante perfecta hypostasis et non ut possibilis ad
97
ulteriorem individuatatem." ' One still wants to know
where the "original" hypostasis came from, (.This is not
98
unsimilar to the question J.K.D.Kelly would ask of Kestorius.)
It is extraordinarily difficult to understand the
above argument. If there is a consistency in this intricate
argument this writer has not been able to find the clue but
in broad outline it does appear that Alexander sees Christ
in some way as three: a hypostasis, a person of which the
hypostasis is the basis, ana the human nature. What this
"hypostasis" is (apart from the person) is almost impossible
to define or conceive; it is not human for that would give
priority to the human; it is not Divine (and yet with the
added properties it is - or with composition made, the unity
is in the Person) because the Divine cannot be subject to
97. 48(E),pp.89-90.
Doctrines. p.317«
98. J.K.D.Kelly. Early Christian
composition; it may be something created at the incarnation
in which there can "be composition which implies change (this
one would tend to favour from the fact that union is stated
to be created - which creates difficulties in basing the
union in the Person of the Son of God by whom the humanity
is made real man i.e. the doctrine of enhypostasis); it may
be a somewhat clumsy device to get round the impossible
solution of the "tertium quid". There is indeed a very
serious problem here. If hypostasis plus properties make
up a person, then hypostasis plus human properties would
make up a person and the hypostasis plus Divine properties
would make up a person. The fact that the created nature
of the hypostasis would then apparently base the Son of
God (and the union, which Alexander nevertheless denies) in
the person of man would maxe for JNestorianism. Alexander,
however, avoids affirming two persons based on the one
hypostasis by stating (as has been seen earlier) that the
human properties are taken up by the "excellent properties"
of the Person of the Bon of God (i.e. the person of Christ
is the Person of the Bon of God). How one avoids stating,
then, that the man and the Bon are the one and the same is
difficult to see. Of course, Alexander does maintain certain
human properties are not to be attributed to the Bon of God
but then one is faced with more problems - once again a
Nestorianism, even if a pale copy, (because the hypostasis
remains created), and a pale "sort of" man with "left over"
properties but with some human ones apparently absorbed into
the Divine - otherwise why bother about the idea of "excellent
k
properties?"
In John of Damascus the composition of the Divine
and the human in the person of Christ did not involve a
change in the Divine; he maintained the "without confusion,
change, separation, or division" of Chalcedon. It was the
Person of the Boh of God who made the composition as well as
being the base of the humanity, that is, the union was the
work of God completely. Nevertheless the Godhead was protected,
in his teaching, against huraanisation. But by Alexander's
time it appears that "composition" has won out in its
implications of change so that the Person could not be composed
with the human as this inevitably would have involved
humanisation, making the uncreated created. The possibilities
are then Nestorianism, Adoptionism, and Monophysitism of
either kind, that is, divinisation or humanisation (which is
Alexander's bete noir). These, however, are not real
possibilities as they are heresies. As has been noted,
Alexander greatly fears humanisation, and -with this there is
also some doubt as to Christ's link with humanity in ganeral
(this will become even more marked as the discussion proceeds).
There is a strong emphasis on the fact that the person of
Christ is the Divine Person so that the human properties tend
to be absorbed iiCto the "more worthy" Divine properties. In
the discussion on the hypostasis, as a result of the fear of
composition in relation to the Divine Person there arises a
serious doubt whether the possibility of the union has been
placed in the Word of God. Alexander's solution appears to be
to pat forward a rather shadowy "hypostasis11 as the basis of
both the Son of God and the Son of Man. He does this basically
on Boethius' presupposition and definition of 'person-hypostasis"
and substance which must be separated from God.
Perhaps Alexander should be allowed to sum up
himself. He states that "esse" is "naturale, et morale, et
rationale." Christ as person is "morale"; as human nature
he is "naturale"; as essence he is "rationale". Christ is
one as man and God and as such he is "morale"; "naturale"
he is two as there are two natures; and "rationale" he is
not "quid" but "quale". ^ The parallel in "L" relates
"individuura" to "ratio", "suppositum" or "subiectum" to
human nature. In relation to "esse rationis" Christ is
"unus" and not "unum cum essentia qua est homo." 100 That
means that Christ had his being as man only in the event of
the incarnation. As is usual, Alexander is eager to
establish this fact (against Nestorianism or Adoptionism)
but he may lose sight of the fact that the "Word became
flesh", that is, man and humanity. Another parallel in "L"
puts it more satisfactorily: "Secundum esse rationale,
quaecumque adiciuntur hypostasi Filii Dei, quae est quasi
socies, individuantia sunt. Sic et humanitas et eius
accidentia sunt accidentalia hypostasis divinae." This
however, is not to be interpreted in an Adoptionist sense,
Alexander warns. This gives a definite place to the
humanity, and incidentally the use of "hypostasis" here is
99. d.VI,18,p.80. 100. 25(L),b)p.82. 101.38(L),p.87.
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apparently in the orthodox tradition. However, there is
the qualification that there is still a distinction between
the person as "morale" and essence as "rationale". In the
same section as the above quotation Alexander still makes the
threefold distinction about Christ, "naturale, morale,
rationale" and in relation to the person and essence which
correspond to the last two he states: "Persona res maris est,
quia dicit proprietatem dignitatem; personaliter loqui de
ipso, est loqui moraliter. Quando autem loquiraur secundum
essentiam quae est homo, cum sit communis forma rationis,
rationaliter loquimur." Yet another parallel passage is
found in distinction VII:
"ita quasi tria principia inveniuntur in
Christo: suppositum vel subiectum, substantia prima
et persona. Moraliter persona primum est in
sustinendo; naturaliter, subiectum, id est anima et
corpus: deitas namque non est in ratione subiecti;
secundum vero ritionem, substantia prima sive iste
homo; est nanCque medium per communicantem inter
praedicta duo." 102
This "substantia prima" here must be identical to Alexander's
hypostasis which indeed is elsewhere described as
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"substantia" ^ an identification which Boethius had made.
The fact that Christ can also be viewed "rationale" ("prima
substantia" or "iste homo") as well as morally-personally, indicates
that it is in this element that there is communication between
the Son of Uod and humanity, indeed, the word "medium" is
used. This quotation seems to sum up succinctly and
adequately Alexander's position and consequently also reveals
102. d.VII,25(L),p.98.
note 80).
103. dist.V,20,p.64. (bee above
its basic lack of orthodoxy. It is not enhypostatic in the
traditional sense of that doctrine. One cannot help feeling
that a type of Nestorianism is the result.
There must be doubts here in two ways: firstly,
how far did the Word take on our humanity, and become "sin
for us"; and secondly, did the humanity have any real basis
in the Divine condescension, that is, can Alexander really
say "the Word became flesh", man like man. If there is any
doubt on this basis, which is the Divine creativity, there
must be doubt in another way: whether full humanity in
Christ is established in a system which avoids Nestorianism
and Adoptionism which do attribute full humanity to Christ.
Further one wonders whether the "more excellent" properties
of the Son of God, which are also man's, are any more than
a "quasi" in relation to man, that is, to be regarded as
man's but not really his for it would appear (as will be
clearer) that the Person can have very little to do with
human nature in Alexander's system. Altogether, the
discussion of properties is quite inadequate in
establishing Christ's humanity. In this system, the humanity
may be only a humanity of convenience. This means that it
was required to act for and towards God in satisfaction for
original sin but it was not required to act for and towards
man in justification and sanctification for which end Christ
must be in every way man, except for his sin. It is
Alexander's failure to accept the "humanity of God" (that
is, God as Trinity in revelation, and the consequent full
humanity of Jesus Christ based in this creative revelation)
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which is really the weakness of his Christology. This fact
will become more evident in the following chapters.
Summary
One of the problems of Alexander's discussion of
the incarnation is the meaning of the word 'natura*. This
is seen particularly in the first part of the discussion,
"Post Nicaea". A summary of that part perhaps can best be
given by a discussion of the usages of 'natura*, particularly
in relation to 'essentia*. In understanding the discussion
a cursory account of the period 'Nicaea-post Nicaea' might
be of help.
The controversy of Nicaea revolved around the
homoousios but even after Nicaea there was doubt about the
meaning of ousia in spite of the fact that Arianisia was
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repudiated. According to J.D.N. Kelly ousia meant
substance, fundamental significance, being, essence, or
realiry. It was sometimes understood in a generic sense,
that is, it stood for the universal, the class to which a
number of individuals belonged. This was Aristotle's
secondary substance. Thus if one did not hold to the belief
in one God, Nicaea could be interpreted tritheistically.
However, sometimes the dominant meaning of ousia was
"individual'1, that is, it referred to a particular entity
regarded as the subject of qualities (a numeric sense).
104. J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, pp.243-244.
This was Aristotle's primary substance. And finally, ousia
could mean just matter or stuff (in stoic thinking). The
second understanding of ousia was very prominent in the
patristic period and was often, for all practical purposes,
the equivalent of hypostasis, i.e. 'object' or 'person' in
discussions of the Trinity. Thus in discussions it could
carry the idea of person (three ousiai) and also the idea of
substance or essence.
When physis was to come into use it often carried
with it the generic sense of ousia. However, physis did not
become prominent till later in the fourth century. At Hicaea
homoousio3 was certainly understood by many in a generic
sense and for others ousia may have been related to the idea
of one individual thing. Certainly befoi£ Wicaea in both
secular Greek and theology ousia was commonly used in a
generic sense and the probability is that it continued in
this sense in the homoousios. Nicaea, however, could not be
interpreted tritheistically simply because the presupposition
of both Arians and anti-Arians was one God. Therefore, it
would appear that the latter meaning of homoousios as
"identical in essence", that is, the numeric understanding,
was practically inevitable. At the Council of Sardica (343)
it was given a numeric understanding.
This numeric understanding of ousia (best translated
in Latin as essentia - Alexander's usage - but castomarily
translated substantia) persisted for a long time afterwards
and persisted probably beyond the time of Chalcedon. The word
physis (Latin, natura) which was frequently associated with it,
particularly in the latter part of the fourth century, never
seeded to gain a fixed meaning and even when approximated
to ousia it seemed to retain the generic sense.
The word appears to have gained prominence in the
latter part of the fourth century and became notorious at
least with Apollinarius. However, the Cappadocians and
bidymus (d.i>98) used ousia and physis apparently identically.
It seems unlikely that this usage was consciously generic
for Gregory of Nyssa then could well be accused of
tritheisia which would be grossly unfair, as this was far
from his intention.
The Alexandrian school, with which Apollinarius
had some affinity, used physis in another sense in which it
approximated to the meaning of hypostasis which had been
detached from ousia in Thus Cyril of Alexandria is
found using the word physis in much the same sense as
hypostasis in his Christological thinking. However, after
about 430 hypostasis was equated with prosopon whilst physis
referred to the divinity and the humanity of Christ (viz.
Theodoret of Cyrus). Thus by the time of Chalcedon physis
had a relationship with ousia without possessing ius more
precise meaning. In other words, it could be either humeric
or generic with the latter sense evidently predominating.
In the meantime, of course, Latin theology developed
a parallel vocabulary. Tertullian created unending problems
for subsequent Latin theology when, instead of translating
ousia with essentia, he translated it with substantia which
was the exact equivalent of hypostasis which was eventually
distinguished from ousia in Greek theology. Tertullian
understood substantia both numerically and generically.
Augustine and Leo's Tome later, however, referred to natures
as substances and thus did not seem to distinguish them.
(Augustine also used substantia to mean person,a usage which
Boethius followed approximately. Both usages are found in
Alexander). So it would appear that the Latins may have
approached Ghalcedon identifying substantia and natura,
whereas the Greeks distinguished, at least to some extent,
ousia and physis. The Definition of Chalcedon identified
prosopon and hypostasis (persona and hypostasis) and
distinguished them from physis (natura).
The different approaches of the Greeks and Latins
makes it difficult to come to a firm conclusion on the
precise meaning of the terms "of one subs ance" (with Godhead
and manhood) and "in two natures". Possibly the Latins
thought in generic terms and G.L.Prestige thinks that from
Cyril of Alexandria onwards the Greeks thought also in
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generic terms of homoousios. y One would imagine that
the "in two natures" would be susceptible to generic
understanding but, at least from the Greek side, it is
difficult to believe that homoouisios became simply generic.
One would suspect that, as at the Council of Nicaea, different
people put different interpretations on the terms. The
Latins identified the terms and Greeks like -John of Damacus
105• G.L.Prestige, God in Patristic-Thought, pp.263-269.
and Leontius of Byzantium latex' wei'e apparently equating
ousia and physis. There does not seem to be any reason why
either word should have been interpreted exclusively either
generically or numerically although the tendency of physis
(and natura) to be generic would mean that view would be
retained (as presumably the tendency of ousia to be numeric
would be retained). Boethius, whose work influenced later
scholars, declared that essentia (or natura) equalled ousia,
which is a usage Alexander takes over.
When one comes to Alexander of Hales we find that
he uses essentia as the equivalent of ousia in the numeric
sense; he uses natura as the equivalent of essentia but he
also uses it with the generic patristic meaning of physis
e.g. man is of human nature but he is not human essence,
that is, all humanity. He may even use natura like Cyril
when he sees it encompassing body and soul. This latter
usage is unimportant.
To review Alexander's usage in more detail. Twice
Alexander equates natura and essentia, the first time when
he is discussing the assumption and denies that nature
assumes, and the second time when he states that one cannot
say the Divine nature is "born" as it can be said to be
"incarnate". In the latter case he seems implicitly to
admit that one can say that the Divine nature is incarnate
which he denies in the first instance. However, the direction
in both cases is the same - away from any possibility that
God might be changed or created. It is right and proper
that he should avoid this possibility in order to maintain
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the integrity of God, the essence of God; that is one of
the intentions of Trinitarian theology. Yet there is another
reason for his hesitation at stating that the nature is
incarnate or the nature assumes the human nature and it is
seen in the fact that he distinguishes "between assuming and
uniting and is eager to bring out this difference. He does
not state what should be stated, that the very nature of
God is involved in the incarnation through the Person of the
Son. It is necessary to state that the nature of God is
united to the human nature in the Person in order to avoid
the humanisation of God or the absorption of human nature
in divine. However, Alexander need not have hesitated to
state that through the Person the nature and essence of God
is involved in man's history, that is, Goa came right into
\
history in the man Jesus. Alexander, here with a numeric
understanding of essentia and natura allows God as the "One",
infinite and immutable, to dominate his thinking. This is
seen particularly in his anti-fjionophysitism.
When the human nature, as opposed to the divine
nature, is discussed, a change takes place in the definition
of natura. Here essentia and natura are differentiated.
Essentia is "secundum esse" and "natura respicit rem in fieri".
This would correspond roughly to the difference between the
numeric and the generic views. He makes this distinction in
order to avoid Hestorianism and Adoptionism which might be
supported if one were to say that human essence were assumed,
that is, if something already created, already "there",
humanity, was brought into unity with the human nature, or
performed some independent role in the hypostatic union
after the fashion of Nestorianism. Alexander makes a
"break" between God .and Christ when he distinguishes between
nature and Person. Now he makes a "break" between Christ
and men or humanity by distinguishing between nature and
essence.
Of this he is fully aware and states clearly when
refuting the suggestion that divine nature was a person and
human nature was a person. His answer, referred to above,
will now be given in full as it is revealing. "In Deo idem
est 'quod est' et 'quo est'; unde haec vera: 'divina natura
est Deus'. bed in homine differt 'quod est' et 'quo est';
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unde human natura non est homo." Admittedly the
community between Christ and man (generic) is different
from the community of Christ and God (numeric) but the
formula of Chalcedon was not concerned to state this and in
fact came up with precisely the opposite conclusion to that
of Alexander immediately above. It was concerned to state
the involvement of both God and man to the full in Jesus
Christ. Later in the Glossa, as has been noted, Alexander
makes the same distinction to guard against Monophysitism.
Another interesting occurrence of natura is found
when Alexander both from the side of God and from the side
of man distinguishes between essence and nature: essence
is "quo res est" and nature is "ut quae fit". In other words
he uses the generic meaning of nature in both cases.
Previously in one case at least he had appeared willing to
understand nature as essence in the union if not to see them
106. d.V,6,p.59« He also gives a number of different uses of
"natura" without expanding on the various usages. 9»P-60.
in the uniting. In this case, however, when it is suggested
that because there are two natures there then are two
essences, he replies that there are neither two essences nor
one essence. If one said one or Uhe other the accusation
of either Nestorianisra or Monophysitisia could immediately
arise. Here he is not even prepared to state what he had
previously implied (although he had hesitated to state)
that the essence of God is found in the hypostatic union as
one of the two natures in the Person of the Son. One can
still see his presuppositions at work: Christ must be kept
at arm's length from humanity, and the essence of God must
not be too closely involved in Christ. In short behind his
lies the presupposition of God as the "One".
This most important presupposition is also seen at
work in other sections of the first part of the chapter,
notably in the discussion on latria and dulia, and in the
discussion on the question which Peter Lombard asxed
whether Christ as a man was a person. In both discussions
the "God" is separated from the "man".
Whatever Alexander opposes he fails to state what
the definition of Chalcedon set out to state, namely, that
Christ was "complete in Godhead and complete in manhood",
that he was "truly man and truly God". The "of one substance"
and "in two natures" are ways of adding force to this belief.
To be sure, in patristic thought ousia: substance (essence),
physis: natura, had different meanings and Alexander reflects
these meanings in his usage. But, and this is the significant
thing, the Definition of Chalcedon did not point out
differences, and most importantly, did not distinguish
between the relation of the divine nature to the divine
substance or essence and the relation cP the human
nature to the human substance or essence. This is true
whether or not there was a distinction between nature and
substance, and even if the Fathers, as seems likely, were
aware that the community of God and divine nature, and man
and human nature were different. What the Definition of
Chalcedon did do was to say that Christ was fully and really
God, and fully and really man. Both man and God, divinity
and humanity, the essences of both were involved in Jesus
J ' .
Christ. That Alexander fails to state this fully and
satisfactorily is due not only to difficulty in terminology
but also to a presupposition which, if present at Ghalcedon,
was suppressed, namely, God as the "incommunicable One".
Towards the end of his Treatise against Eutyches
and Mestorius Boethius (480-524) asked this question: "What
we have now to inquire is how it came to pass that two
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natures were combined into one substance." Unfortunately
the answer, which Boethius' position has not made clear, is
not given. And the answer would have been important in
view of his understanding of his definition of person as
"naturae rationabilis individua substantia." "Person cannot
in any case be applied to universale, but only to particulars
and individuals; for there is no person of a man if animal or
general: only the single persons of Cicero, Plato, or other
107* Boethius, The Theological Tractates, p.121.
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single individuals are termed persons." This does not
sound very near to the patristic understanding of the person
of Christ which was described as "of one substance" with the
Father. But Boethius' use of "substantia" removes his
definition of person from the patristic view of the person
of Christ. "Bince subsistences are present in universals
but acquire substance in particulars they rightly give the
name hypostasis to subsistences which acquired substance
through the medium of particulars. For to no one using his
eyes with any care will substance and subsistence appear
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identical." ' Thus a division is driven between the
universal subsistence and the hypostasis - one would think
directly opposite in intention to the Greek Fathers at least.
It is not altogether clear whether Boethius equates person
with hypostasis or substance with hypostasis; he seems to
vary somewhat. What is clear, however, is the fact that in
the way that Boethius sees individuality in the person or
the hypostasis, one will be inevitably forced to define
person in terms of that individuality and not in terms of
subsistence or relationship. (He seems, in fact, almost to
have come to a numeric understanding of "person" when,
actually, neither a numeric nor a generic understanding can
be had of "person". It appears that substance = nature has
possibly been confused with substance = person (both western
usages) so that the generic understanding of substance »
nature is transferred to the understanding of substance =
108. Ibid. p.85 109. Ibid.pp.87-89
person (an Augustinian usage). Beyond this there appears to
be more emphasis on the singular than on the genus with the
result that an almost numeric understanding is given to
substance = person. This understanding in the Greek and
Latin fathers had been previously given to the substance «
essence in which the three Persons of the Trinity participated.)
This will mean that the person of Christ will not be defined
in terms of the Trinity but in terms of himself, one might
almost say in terms of self-consciousness. Prom Boethius
then comes a concentration on this individuated substance,
as well as a possible distinction between person and
hypostasis (although, in Boethius, this does not appear to
be very important.)
With the concentration on the individuated
substance he was not able, apparently, to get beyond stating
the fact that there were two natures in one person. Por
instance: "Por how great and unprecedented a thing it is...
that the nature of liim who is God alone should come together
with human nature which was entirely different from God to
form from different natures by conjunction a single person."''*10
This sounds very much as if the person is the result of the
union. This impression is given support when he likens the
union to a crown of gold and gems. The crown consists in and
of the gold and the gems. Then in explanation of this he
states that Christ consists "in the two natures because both
continue, of the two because the one person of Christ is formed
by the union of the two continuing natures." 111 It seems
110. Ibid. pp.95-97 111. Ibid. pp.115,117.
almost contradictory when he says this person completes the
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number of the Trinity. So it is not without reason that
one would wish to ask the question of Boethius which was
given at the beginning of this particular section.
Before the development of this viewpoint is
discussed the patristic - the fourth century - view of
hypostasis-person should be given to put the discussion in
greater perspective. This will be done by means of three
quotations from historians of early Ohurch doctrine, all of
whom give substantially the same viewpoint. The Council of
Alexandria (362) understood hypostasis as "the separate
subsistence of the three Persons in the consubstantial
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Triad." The word person always distinguishes "status,
or character, or part or function" and the attention is not
fixed on the subject or agent. "It is always a person
looked at from some distinctive point of view, a person in
particular circumstances; that is, it conveys the notion
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much more of environment than of the subjective." In a
view of hypostasis "the emphasis lay not on content, but on
externally concrete independence; objectivity, that is to
say, in relation to other objects. Thus when the doctrine
of the Trinity finally came to be formulated as one ousia
in three hypostaseis, it implied that God, regarded from
the point of view of internal analysis, is one object, but
that, regarded from the point of view of external
presentation, He is three objects; His unity being
safeguarded by the doctrine that these three objects of
112. Ibid. 113- J.ft.D.Kelly, Doctrines of the Early
Church, p.254* 114. J.Bethune—Baker, An Introduction
to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, p.o^.
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presentation are not precisely similar, as the semi-Arians
were early willing to admit, but in a true sense, identically
one." Thus with the Boethian definition the middle ages
had to try to be true to this view of God which, in effect,
in one way, said precisely the opposite to that definition.
When one approaches the time of Alexander a significant
figure in view of his influence was Richard of St. Victor
(died 1173) in his Be Trinitate. In the definition of
person by Boethius Richard substituted the word "exsistentia"
for the word "substantia" for, he argued, nothing in God (as JEWson)
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could be conceived as a substance. This was because,
according to Boethius, substance could belong only to
individuals and not to genus or species. Thus Richard was
returning to a more patristic view of person by repudiating
the division which Boethius had made between subsistence and
substance, between genus and individual.
Duns Scotus (1266-1308) took up Richard's lead.
He accepted Richard's substitution of existence for
substance and defined person with Richard as "intellectualis
naturae incommunicabilis existentia" and said that through
this definition Richard expounded "vel corrigitur definitio
Boetii dicentis quod "Persona est rationalis naturae individua
substantia" "because then the soul could be called a person
and Deity also: "et etiam non conveniet proprie Deo, quia
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individuum non est nisi ubi est dividuum." ' Earlier Duns
Scotus had indicated his precise meaning and clearly
113* G.L.Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.169.
116. Dictionnaire de Theologle Gatholique. Vol.VII,col.411.
!!?• Synthesis Theolo^ica II. Bit.12.a.33.p.604.
distinguished his view from that of Boethius when he said
"persona nihil est nisi essentia cum proprietate
TO
incommunicabili." Thus the distinction between substance
and subsistence (or "personalitas" which buns uses as its
equivalent - a word Alexander uses) is minimal and in his
thought: "la subsistence est concue comme ne se distinguant
pas reellement de la nature concrete, a laquelle eile ajoute
simplement la negation de dependance vis-a-vis d'une
liq
realite". 7 Thus the union of natures can be founded in
the Person of the Trinity who is a person because he is
independent or incommunicable vis-a-vis the other Persons.
For this same reason the human nature is not a person because
it is dependent upon the Divine Person: "Dependentia naturae
creatae ad personam divinam, quae citra omnem imperfectionem,
dat subsistentiam naturae creatae carenti propria
personalitate et subsistentia, et ideo est dependens ad
alienam personalitatem, qua subsistit, perinde ac si
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propriam personalitateia haberet."
It is into this context, that is between Richard
of St. Victor and Duns Scotus, that Alexander (and
incidentally Thomas Aquinas comes. Alexander uses
certain language, indeed a great deal of language, found in
the Richard of 8t. Victor - Duns Scotus stream of thought,
he uses Richard's definition of person (and indeed adds
"supposita essentia"); he uses the word "personalitas"
118. Ibid.q.4,p.527. 119» Dictionnalre de Theolo^ie
Catholiaue, VII,col.411. 1207 "gumma Theoloftica". last
part of Vol.V. ^uaest. Fund. Art.1,p.3.
121. liictionsaijfre" de Theolo^le Gatholigue .Vol.VII.col.411.
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which Duns Scotus equated to "subsistentia", and like the
later Franciscan he finds the subsistence of man not in
man but in the Son of God (and thus uses the doctrine of
enhypostasia); he quotes, at least in passing, John of
Damascus' doctrine of enhypostasia; and he also, rather
unsatisfactorily, understands the human properties as being
founded in the more excellent properties of the Son of God.
When all this has been stated, however, it must
be said that, by and large, Alexander is more influenced by
Boethius' definition of person. He is able, so it would
appear, to combine this latter definition and the view of
Richard - Duns Scotus, by making a great deal of the distinction
between "persona" and "hypostasis", a distinction which can
be traced in the thought of Boethius. Thus he retains the
Boethian idea of "substantia" in the word "hypostasis".
This is seen when he states that "iste homo" is not based
in the nature or person but in the "hypostasis of God and
man"; again he is under Boethian influence when he states
that "composition is understood in relation to hypostasis,
not in relation to person" and he goes beyond Boethius (but
perhaps not his implication) when he states that composition
is understood "in relation to the hypostasis of the human
nature" - although he does not want to say what this appears
to say; and finally, when he speaks of the "substantia
prima" - (a significant Aristotelianism with a numeric
sense) - ("secundum rationem") as the "medium per
communicantem" between the "suppositum vel subiectum"
("naturaliter") and the "persona" ("moraliter").
When Alexander understands hypostasis or substance
in this way one coines back to Boethius' question posed at
the beginning of this section: "What we have now to inquire
is how it came to pass that two natures were combined into
one substance." This question takes one further back to
Hestorius and the doubt that J.JN.D.Kelly raises about that
theologian's view that the two natures were found in the
common "prosopon" of the historical Christ. Be questions
whether this view was "really adequate. All that it
in fact amounted to was the truism that Jesus Christ, the
historical figure, was a single object of presentation, a
concrete psychological unity. The real problem, however,
especially for one who set the independence and completeness
of the natures so much in the foreground, was to explain
what constituted His Person, the metaphysical subject of
His being, and this Nestorius's theory hardly touched."
This is an important problem to answer for basically
it involves the question "is man saved by grace alone or by
his own works?" If grace is not seen as the lone factor in
the incarnation then one seems impelled towards Arianism,
Pelagianism, and Adoptionism, as well as Hestorianism.
Alexander was working within inadequate concepts which forced
him into unsatisfactory solutions but he does, at least, avoid
stating that union is based in the capacity of humanity
although he comes close to doing so. He was nearer the point
when he came to the word "persona" itself, but even here, when
122. J.K.H.Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines. p.31?»
he unites the properties too closely, he coaes near to
M mophysitism. He had to bring the properties together for,
if he had admitted two sets of properties, then, according
to the Boethian definition of person as "an individual
substance of rational nature" he would have posited two
persons for there is nothing to exclude the possibility of
a common substance in the definition. This position would
be close to the actual position of Hestorius.
The Boethian definition, because it inevitably
tends to disassociate the historical Christ from the Trinity,
also tends to move towards the heresies already mentioned.
The doctrine of the Trinity is the basic doctrine of
Christianity and therefore also the basic doctrine for
Christology. This is so simply because it defends the
position that God is a God of grace, and that this God reveals
his grace in his Son Jesus Christ who, in this grace, assumed
humanity and so formed one person with two natures. Unless
one links the doctrine of the Person of Christ closely with
the doctrine of the Trinity, that is, unless one regards them
as inseparable and complementary, one moves away from the
concept of a God, full of grace and mercy. The Boethian
definition begins this separation, and Alexander in using
its presuppositions moves away from the concept of the God
of grace.
In this chapter criticism has been made of
Alexander's failure to state that in the Person of the bon
the very essence or nature of God came into our humanity,
that is, the failure to link the doctrine of the Trinity
12?
with Christology. Perhaps, however, there has not been
sufficient said of the iraxjortance of the distinction between
nature and person which Alexander does make. Although the
early church was at pains to state that Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, were of the one substance or essence (and this is why
one can say that in the Son the being of God was present in
our humanity), this does not mean that the Son was the
substance, or the Father or the Spirit was the substance.
This would have been a form of Sabellianism. It is in
regard to this error that the distinction of nature and
person is important. In Trinitarian theology the distinction
helps one avoid this error of Sabeilianism. (Presumably
"Jesus worship" in our modern era makes this error.)
In Ghristology the distinction protects one against
patripassianism and more importantly Monophysitism or apx>arent
Monophysitism. When one states that when God assumed human
nature in the Person of the Bon the natures of God and man
were united in an unique way, perhaps one is not saying
anything particularly intelligible because it is extraordinarily
hard to pinpoint the difference between nature and person.
But that way of saying it does seem to have some point if the
assumption is described in terms of nature, that is, divine
nature assumed human nature so that two natures were united
in an unique way. This has its problems. First, is "all"
God in Christ; that is, can ws say anything beyond his
person, for instance, on creation? Second, what makes the
union unique? Third, and in connection with the second
question, if it is the divine nature (or even if it is not)
how can one say that two natures are united in one nature
(or one "something") without apparently being Mon0physite?
To emphasise the distinction between nature and person,
difficult as it is to conceive when one gets down to
consider it in relation to the Person of Christ, seemingly is
a necessity, in order to avoid the above dilemmas. To make
such a distinction is the way of Chalcedon (which did not
explain it at all). The distinction enables one to state,
in a better way than if the distinction is not emphasised,
that Jesus Christ is one without stating that the two
natures became one. The doctrine of enhypostasia would then
appear to be necessary to avoid a modified Hestorianism
(the position evidently held by Nestorius himself)'
Alexander, for reasons already given, was unable to use this
doctrine•
At the Reformation and after, this dilemma arose
again between the Lutherans ("Monophysites") and the
Calvinists ("Nestorians"). One can sympathise with the
Lutherans when one reads the work of Alexander of Hales but
it has also to be admitted that Alexander has a considerable




GRACE AN1) JEbUb CHnlbT
i) The three graces and the fulness of grace.
Fairly early in the Christological discussion
Alexander touches on the grace in Christ. There were three
types of grace in Christ: one which is in every man through
presence, power, and essence; inhabiting grace; and the
grace of union. ^ In "L" it is stated that the grace of
union is "quodam modi naturalis rations inseparabilitatis"
which makes the union a reality. There was also a grace "ad
opus post unionem" which is that "qua nullum possit
2
admittere palatum." This could be the inhabiting grace
which was mentioned above in "AE".
It is in distinctions XII and XIII, that the first
major discussion of the grace in Jesus Christ is found. On
the question as to the greatest grace in Christ Alexander
replies "quod ad unionera Dei cum anima sequitur beatitudo;
et talis unio maxima gratia est, quoniam non potest
x
participare a quocumque." ^ However, in the footnote on
the same page, the grace of union is said to be greater
than "fruitio" or "beatitudo" because the latter is related
only to the soul, not to the body, and the former relates to
4
a pure creature whereas union does not. In "L" the graces
of "fruitio" and "beatitudo" are compared. It is stated that
there was a union of the soul to Divinity from which comes
1. d.IV,10,p.51. 2. 22(L),pp.53-^4. 3. d,XIII,1,p.124.
4. Footnote, p.124.
"fruitio" and by the merit of this union Christ had all the
"dotes". This he had in common with all saintly souls. There
was also a union of Divinity to the body which was "propria"
to Christ and this was the cause of "beatitudo" and so it is
called the highest grace. ^ There are inconsistencies here
and "L" appears to contradict "Aifi" and the footnote which
themselves do not seem to be in harmony. It is difficult to
come to any definite conclusion except that the footnote
appears to imply that the grace of union in Christ is the
greatest and unique with the graces of "beatitudo" and
"fruitio" the lesser whatever they relate to.
Distinction XIII contains a fuller discussion.
Following Augustine Alexander states that Christ's grace is
said to be universal, and not particular, "in toto", and
not in subdivisions. To understand grace universally is
not to see it in relation to one thing alone but in relation
to everything. This can be put another way: saints are
pre-eminent in one gift; Christ is pre-eminent in all gifts.
And in another way: all that the Son of God has through
nature the Son of Man has through grace and thus the fulness
received through nature was also received through grace.
So far, then, Christ's grace is seen as different in degree
but not in quality from the grace of other men, that is,
here is a perfect man but not necessarily Jesus Christ. The
next question suggests that because the grace of Christ was
creaturely, it was finite and therefore created "ad mensuram".
5. 9(L),pp.125-126. 6. d,XIII,1,pp.127-128; Augustine,
Glossa ordin. on John 5:34.
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In commenting Alexander states that there is a twofold
measure of grace: either according to the quantity of
substance or the quantity of virtue "quae est aninia Ohristi
finita secundum substantiam, infinita tamen secundum ea ad
quae est. Et similiter gratia quae est in eo secundum
divinam naturam est infinita." ^ This would be true of the
grace in God and the grace in any man (accepting Alexander's
way of viewing grace). It does not say anything in particular
on the union. The quantity of virtue, states Alexander, is
either according to "species" or "genus"; in Christ all
O
grace was general and so universal. Every creature has
grace in finitude and measure; "secundum substantiam
q
mensuram habuit"•
As yet, although Alexander affirms a great
difference between Christ and man, there is only a difference
in degree. All men, in Christ, will eventually have his
grace but not his uniqueness from which all their gx'ace
derives and which will always remain. Alexander, however,
is aware of this uniqueness and asserts it when he notes
the three types of grace in Christ: "gratia generalis",
"gratia inhabitans", and "gratia unionis". 10 These are the
same three graces which are mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter from an earlier part of the Glossa. By the
grace of union Christ is distinguished from other men. This
grace by its very name is unique.
The difference between the grace in Christ ana the
7. 2,p.128. 8. Footnote,p.128; 21(L),p.l35» 9« 21(L),
p.135» 10. 3»P»129* In "L" this is the first section.
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grace in other men is described in the comparison of the
grace and knowledge of Christ with a circle "quod nihil
est ibi principium, nihil finis" and the grace and knowledge
of other men to angular figures in which there is "aliquid
finis et aliquid principium." 11 Again the contrast between
Christ's grace and other grace is brought out when it is
denied that all graces and the grace of Christ are equal
except that they are divided and Christ's is united. Further,
it is stated, Christ had the grace which no men could have,
12
namely, the grace of union. In the footnote attached
to the end of that section yet another grace is added, namely,
the grace of human redemption "per quantitatem maximam"
ix
which no creature could ever have. ^ The parallel in "L"
seems to combine the grace of union and the grace of redemption
for after it has been stated that the sum total of man's
graces do not equal the grace of Christ there is added
"praeterea, Christus quamdam gratiam habuit, quam nullus
14
habuit, quae summa est gratia redemptionis." This would
indicate that the grace of redemption was the same as the
grace of union. This coincides with Alexander's position,
that is, the incarnation is the means to satisfaction with
which redemption would be equated. (There is no indication
that "redemption" has any broad meaning.) Of course, there
is the possibility that the grace of redemption could be yet
another grace besides the grace of union and this would not
he incompatible with Alexander's position which allows for
11. 6,pp.129-130.
14. 24(1),p.136.
12. 8,p.130. 13. Footnote,p.130.
many graces, bat it might leave the grace of union a little
up in the air, that is, it had no particular task as a grace
which would throw doubt on the value of the union as such -
of course presumably two different graces could operate in
the union and at satisfaction but the two are so closely
bound that this would present problems.
At this point it should be asked whether in fact
a qualitative distinction between Christ and other men can
best be made on the basis of "grace". Certainly Christ, it
is stated, had the grace of union which no other man has,
but the real distinction between Christ and other men is that
in Christ the second Person of the Trinity is present with
humanity without separation, division, confusion or change
in the one hypostasis which is the second Person himself
(and of course this is evidence of the "grace" of God). In
other men the Son is present through the Spirit, that is, in
Alexander's terms, by grace. In Alexander the implication
may be, if grace and the Spirit are approximately the same,
that the Son is present in Christ and men merely by the
Spirit, the difference being one of degree, not of kind.
This is certainly not the intention but the terminology
points that way. This problem comes out more clearly in the
Quaestiones•
That the union in Christ was unique and had a
unique task is affirmed by Alexander but in the affirmation
itself there is a severe limitation to the task of the union.
"Grace" operates, as it were, besides Christ. It is asked
"utrum de plenitudine Christi in eo quod homo accepimus."
It is argued "quod non, videtur, quoniara secundum quod homo
non potest dare gratiam." Alexander concludes "quod non ab
eo effective sumpsimus gratiam in eo quod homo est, sed in
eo quod Deus est solum." The fact that grace comes from
God alone cannot be denied but this answer is unsatisfactory
in that it does not answer the question as to the place and
importance of the humanity of Christ, and, as it stands,
eliminates any need for an incarnation positing, in effect,
1 f*
a docetic Christ. There is a more careful statement in
"L" which is in line with Alexander's general position:
"effective accipere ab aliquo est dupliciter; vel effective,
et sic solus Creator dat; vel miterialiter et quoaam modo
effective, et sic a Christo accepimus quia in humana natura
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redemit nos; et sic ab ipso accipimus tamquam materialiter."
Here it would appear that the grace of union is associated
with the grace of redemption and so Christ has a unique task,
but the task is restricted to that of redemption (which by
implication seems to relate to satisfaction) and effects
full justification and sanctification only indirectly. In
"E"'s parallel it is stated that Christ, as man, communicates
another grace as well as that of redemption, and that is the
1Q
grace of the sacraments. This latter may be an all-
inclusive grace or a grace related only to satisfaction.
This problem is discussed in the chapters on the sacraments,
in the discussion on the sacraments the limitation to Christ's
and work is seen more clearly. At this point the inference
15* d.XIII,7»P»130. 16. cf. discussion in this chapter on
Christ as "caput". 17. 23(L),p.l36. 18. 42(K),p.!41.
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would appear to be that the grace of God which works out¬
side the union is beyond the sphere of redemption which demands
the humanity of Christ. The "fulness" is received both through
the union of man and God and from God alone as the bon of
God. This fact is also made clear in the discussion of the
sacraments in regard to guilt and forgiveness. That grace
works outside the union is also implied in the question
whether the angels receive of the fulness of Christ. In "&}£"
the angels are said not to receive the "gratia in assistendo"
from Christ, but they do receive the "gratia in ministrando"
In "L" it is stated that they have a twofold grace: one they
have "quoad unitatem Trinitatis" which is not changed, and
another they have "ex conversatione nobiscum" which comes
20
to them through Christ. Grace thus works independently
of Christ except insofar as he brings redemption and then he
is the "helper" of grace. Grace, in short, is not completely
in Christ. He is, to a great extent, purely a medium of it
if anything.
One final element of the grace of Christ already
referred to by name is its fulness. It is argued that Christ
did not have faith and hope and therefore lacked all the
virtues (which are dependent on grace). There are various
"fulnesses": of number, perfection, sufficiency, and
consummation : "Christus autem non habuit fidem nec spem,
quoniam ipsa sunt ad consummationem et eorum quae nondum
Pi
habentur." Faith and hope speak of a "not yet", an
imperfection, as does fear, but Christ was "in via
19. 9,p.130. 20. 25(10,p.136. 21. 4,p.129.
comprehensor", a phrase which now occurs constantly in
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Alexander. This may arouse some doubt again on the full
humanity of Christ because the Bible does speak of - or at
the least implies - the faith of Christ, but when faith and
hope are seen as signs of imperfection Alexander has little
alternative but to reject them as Christ was "in via
comprehensor", that is, perfect and sinless man. Alexander's
error lies in the fact that for hxm perfection is associated
with timelessness or changelessness, and faith and hope,
speaking of time, a "not yet", are therefore imperfections.
But in that case nothing in time could be perfect, that is,
time and change themselves would be imperfection, in "E"
there is some kind of faith and hope admitted of Christ but
in faith it is "visio cum assensu" with the "per speculum"
omitted; in hope it is "adhaereritia ad summum cum
2g
exspectatione praemii futuri" omitted. ^ Possibly this
illustrates even more clearly the elimination of the element
of time and finitude from Christ, that human element necessary
to make his "grace" effective for us. Christ's fulness of
grace is also questioned in regard to his giving of grace
to men; if he could have given more than he did, it is
argued, he did not give grace "non ad mensuram" (John 3:34)
and if he could have given more he was finite. Alexander
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replies that the finiteness is in the receiver. what
place then, it must be asked, has his humanity? Once again
there is a Christ who is only Bon of God. This last
discussion parallels that on the knowledge of Christ (next
22. 20(L),pp.134-133. 23. 41(E)p.l41. 24. 5,p.129.
chapter) and the implications of a "perfect" Christ are
drawn out in that chapter.
ii) The grace of the Head.
In distinction XIX in "L" and "E", but not in
"AEM, another grace in Christ, previously unmentioned, is
discussed: the grace of the Head. This may have something
in common with the foregoing discussion in that there grace
was said to come from the Son of God only. The discussion
in "E* appears after the discussion of the "Mediator"
where "E" continues on from "AE". In "L" it is also placed
after the discussion on the "Mediator". However, at the
25
beginning of the "L" discussion, ^ the reader is referred
back to distinction XIII and distinction XVII where in the
former it is said that Christ had the fulness of Deity and
in the latter where Christ is said to be our Head in whom
are all the spiritual senses and from whom all these flow
to the members; and to distinction XIX (the one in which the
discussion of the Head appears) where the question is "de
capite et raembris secundum se acceptis". (In Peter Lombard's
work, to which these references are made, in distinction XIII,.
the only reference to Christ as Head like this is that Christ
is our Head "quo sunt omnes sensus" with no development in
regard to the members; Christ is merely mentioned as Head in
distinction XVII; and in XIX the question of Christ as Head
is not discussed although he is seen as Mediator.) Thus it
25. d.XIX,41(L),p.220.
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appears that this discussion, at the least, is not in its
right place (for instance, in the ^uaestiones and in the
Summa it appears under the discussion of the grace of Christ)
and indeed the author is aware of the fact for he refers the
reader back to previous distinctions and the immediately
preceding discussion. It is also a thorough cross reference
which is most unusual in the Glossa. Further, there is no
mention of the discussion in the fairly complete "division of
the text" at the beginning of Book III. All this would
indicate that this section is a conscious addition to the
work (i.e. as opposed to a variant reading or text.)
Further, there is only one other extended discussion of
Christ as Head in the rest of the Glossa and that is in Book
26
I although the concept is used in the sacramental
teaching of Book IV. This is all the more surprising for
this particular discussion is most extensive and far more
thorough than any presented in the Glossa on a particular
topic. One would expect the concept therefore to be more
pervasive in the work. Another fact is that the Lombard is
used as an authority almost to the exclusion of all others
which is not the custom Alexander follows elsewhere in the
Glossa's Christology. Finally this is one of the few elements
in the whole of the Christology which clearly relates to
sanctification and possibly to Christ's positive obedience
and satisfaction, and, although it is not necessarily
incompatible with the Glossa's soteriology and Christology
up to date, it does appear as a new element - and not,
26. d.XXXI,20,pp.307-308.
significantly, in distinction XIII on the grace in Christ.
The fact that it appears in both "L" and "E" (in different
forms) and that Alexander's sacramental theology tends to
coincide with this type of thinking (although not using the
"caput" concept to any great extent) would lead one to
conclude that it belongs to the thinking of Alexander
although it may be later at a time when he may have been moving
a new direction. That the concept was present in the
Alexandrine school, at least, can be concluded from the
discussion in the Quaestiones and the Sumnaa and the number
27
of writers who touched upon this subject. '
The first question asked is "quod est caput?"
Prom Peter's commentary on Ephesians comes this statement:
"Caput dedit. in quo sunt omnes sensus spirituales
Ecclesiae, scilicet dona gratiae" as a comment on "the
Church which is his body". (Eph. 1:22,23). Alexander
comments "sicut corpus habuit vitam in capite, ita
Ecclesia vitam spiritualem." Peter again is quoted in
commenting on Colossians 1:18: "He is the Head of the
Body, the Church." "'Sicut anima toturn corpus nostrum
animat et vivificat, sed in capite omnibus sensibus sentit,
iieoque capite omnia subiecta sunt ad operandum, illud
autem supra locatum ad consulendum: sic homo excellentius
assumptus' qui est Christus 'quasi personam sapientiae Dei
gerit, ut caput in quo sunt omnes sensus.'" Alexander then
comments: "Ergo dicitur caput ratione qua effluunt sensus
28
a capite ad membra Ecclesiae."
27. See footnote on d.XIX,41(L),p.220. 28. d.XIX,41(L),p.220
The next question is "an tribus personis conveniat
esse caput." It is suggested that, as Peter had stated,
because of the use of "caput" for the Trinity as the dead of
Christ, because the Divinity is the Head of our assumed
nature, and because Christ is one with the Father and the
Holy Spirit, "caput" could be applied to the three Persons.
However, Peter had pointed out that the uses of "caput" of
the Father as the Head of Christ, Christ as the Head of Man,
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and man as the head of woman, are different. The Father
as the Head of Christ, the Son of God, is Head by generation
the Father is the Head of Christ as the Son of Man by
creation as with other men, that is, he is the "principiuia"
of man; "Christus autem secundum quod homo est caput
aliorum hominum, id est principium comiaunleans in natura,
per quod effluunt spirituales sensus ad membra. Esse autem
"caput" differt ab eo quod est esse "principium", quia
caput est principium non separatum; principium separatum
51
esse potest." The explanations of the differences are
the comments of Alexander.
The next section distinguishes between the other
properties attributed to Christ: "templum" speaks of
Christ's Divine nature "secundum quod homo"; "caput";
"mediator" speaks of God and man in two natures; he is
"ostium"/or those partaking in the sacraments, into the
Church militant and triumphant; as "sacerdcd1 he gives the
sacraments to the Church; he is "pastor" in the conserving
of life through the food of the word of doctrine; he is
29. Peter, on Eph. 1:22. 30. Peter 0x1 1 Cor.ll:3»
31. 41(L),11,p.221.
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"redemptor" from the punishment of sin /this is equivalent
to "satisfier"/» he is "via" through grace; and he is
"salvator" through glory. The reason for this order is that
it begins in Divinity and ends in glory. The words
"Christus" and "Xesus" incorporate all these words. "Ghrist"
means anointed one, and denotes the anointing of the
humanity by the Trinity, that is, Christ's consecration in
the temple for our instruction in the flesh, to be the Way
and the Entrance to him in glory. This last denotes him
as "Jesus',' that is, Saviour. ^
The next question is "an ratione utriusque
naturae possit dici caput." The answer is from Peter's
commentary on Ephesians 1:22,23:
"Ab ipso factisunt secundum divinitatem, et
ita secundum divinitatem est caput, secundum quam
dedit ei esse caput, ilium ante omnia gignendo.
i^oprie autem est caput secundum humanitatem,
secundum quam coniungitur ei Eeclesia natura et
gratia. Nam in eo plenitudo gratiae fuit de cuius
plenitudine omnes accepimus, ut in 1 loan. 16;
nullumque maius donum praestare posset i)eus
hominibus, quam quod Verbum suuai per quod omnia
condidit, faceret illis caput, et illos tamquam
membra sibi coaptaret." 33
Then Alexander asks "an sit caput secundum
tropum quo sensus efflaunt a capite." Augustine is quoted
in support of the affirmative to the effect that all the
senses are in Ghrist. v Then it is asked why the uoly
Spirit, who quickens the body of the Church, from whom
flow the gifts, and from whom the Church has its unity, is
not called "caput". This contention is supported on the
32. Ill,pp.221-222. 33. Ibid,IV,pp.22-223
34-. Augustine, £pist.l8?.c.l3.n.4Q.
grounds that the quickener Is the mover and it is argued
that as the movement is prior to the senses that the refore
movement from the Head points to the Holy Spirit.
Alexander's reply will be given in full:
"Respondso ad primum: Filio Dei attribuitur
sapientia, Spiritui Saneto bonitas. /Bonitas/ est
ratio movencii, sapientia cognoscendi. Unde , cum
sensus sit vis cognoscitiva, appropriatur Filio
caput secundum modum effluendi sensum spiritualium a
capite; Spiritui Saricto secundum modum movendi. item,
Spiritus Sanctus uicitur caput tamquam principium
separatum, a quo fluunt /motus spirituales; Ghristus
vero tamquam principium unitum, a quo fluunt/ sensus
spirituales. - Sed hoc utroque modo caput secundum
duas naturas. Est enirn caput per fidem, non quae in
ipso sit, sed in membris est fides, in ipso visio;
et hoc secundum humanam naturam, in qua nobiscum
communicat. Est etiam caput per caritatem, quia in
ipso inanet plenitude caritatis, de qua non omnes
acceptimus. In quantum est principium et caput per
fidem, fluunt ab eo sensus spirituales; ut caput per
caritatem, effluunt ab eo motus spirituales. Et sic
fuit mediator in fide redemptoris et caritate
salvatoris." 35
This division appears also markedly in the
discussion of the sacraments. It need only be noted now
that justification and sanctification refer to love, that
is, the union really is not necessary for these, as they
are the work of the Holy Spirit.
In the next section it is said that Christ is
Head only of the good, and not of angels as he does not
communicate with them in nature. Peter Lombard is again
quoted to give the reason. Those divided from the unity of
peace may retain the sacrament as form "sed spiritu praeter
36
unitatem non vivit." ^
Then the question arises "an sit caput bonorum
35» 41(L),v.p.223. 36. 41(L),VI,p.224. Peter on Eph.4:4>
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secundum praeseritum iustitiara et praedestinationem." Again
Alexander's answer will be given in full:
"quod non ufcrcrumque, videtur per praemissam
auctoritateau Insuper, potest esse membrorum, sed
non est iara membrorua: praedestinatio enirn nihil
ponit in re. Item Gol.l:18: Ipse est caput corporis
Ecclesiae, Glossa: 'Virtute divinitatis et misericordiae
suae dono, omnes iustos illuminavit'; et ita est caput
secundum divinitatem. Ft 'secundum human itat em autem,
quia super fidem humanitatis est fundata Ecclesia.'
iJnde non est concedendum simpliciter quod sunt membra,
sed cum hac determinations : 'per praedestinationeai.' " 37
The matter of predestination and the division of the predestined
and the presently just will be discussed in the chapter on
predestination. For the moment it is necessary only to note
from this somewhat difficult answer that Christ's humanity
pertains to the faith of the Church and his divinity to the
illumination of the just but that not all members of the
Church, i.e. the presently just, are members of Christ's
body unless they are predestined (which takes place apart
from Christ - "enim nihil ponit in re"). And so both the
illumination of the presently just and their predestination
take place apart from the humanity of Christ, although the
former are illumined according to his Divinity.
The next question is "an sit caput praecede-ntium
Patrum." It is argued that it would appear unlikely that he
was in that, as the philosophers have said, the principal
member is the first formed. Howevei', Augustine is quoted to
show how Jacob who came after Esau was still head in dignity
and power, and in this way Christ was the Head of the
33
patriarchs. ^ Peter had also called Christ the "fundator
altissimus" although he was born from Mary.
37. 41(L),VII,p.224. 38. Augustine, De Cutechixandis
rudibus.c.3«n.b. 39« 41(L),VIII,pp.224-223; Peter Lombard
on Ps.61:4.
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That the Church began from Abel and not from Adam
is the next point that Alexander makes. This is so because
in Adam there was both the state of sin and the state of
grace. Therefore the city of the bad and the city of the
good were not distinguished from each other in him. The
state of good was in Abel and the state of bad was in Cain,
40
and from these two arose the distinctive cities.
Finally, Alexander states, the members cto not
confer something on the Head who is Christ. The way
Alexander explains this fact is of interest: "unumquodque
membrum habet aliquid de matex'ia et aliquid de foi'ma corporis.
Hatione eius quod habet de materia, confert ei aliud membrum;
in quantum habet de forma, e converso; et ideo aiembrum
confert membro. bed in spiritual! capite et membris nihil
est de materia, sed totum forma; et ideo non est ibi
41
collatio mutua." One wonders how the latter part of this
statement measures up to the claims and breadth of Colossians
1:15-18.
At the beginning of this particular discussion it
was maintained that the above viewpoints appeared to be a
new element in Alexander's soteriftlogy and Christology.
The newness lies in the fact that these viewpoints are not
found generally in Alexander's thought on Christ's life and
work, in which Christ is seen largely in terms of the one
who makes penal satisfaction. Here, however, Christ is seen
as the source of the spiritual senses and, in some sense,
40. 41(Lj,IX,p.225 41. 41(L),X,p.225«
also a source of the spiritual movements. In other words, it
might appear that Christ is given some kind of sanctifying
role which he is not given elsewhere in the Christology
proper, notably in the discussion on grace, except indirectly
in that he may be seen as the remover of the barrier which
stood between God and man, namely, God's requirement of
temporal satisfaction.
Before it is assumed that this section is part of
Alexander's Christology and an attempt is made to integrate
it - as it can be - with the rest of his thinking, there are
doubts whether this is really part of the Glossa's
Christology and soteriology.
Firstly, the only discussion of Christ as "caput"
appears in Book I where the discussion is on the phrase of
Peter Lombard "caput principium omnium". Here two things
are evident: i) As Head of the Church, that is, in his
two natures, Christ is not seen as the Head of creation, that
is, he is not the Mediator between God and man. (In fact a
relationship of being is implied between God and man.)
This element has its parallel in the discussion in Book III
which relates to the good and the bad, Abel and Adam. Jesus
Christ is not seen as the nev; Adam. ii) The suggestion of
a very close tie, an ontological one, between Jesus Christ
and the members, a tie in the common substance of the human
nature is loosenod almost completely by the modification that
this tie is "in idem voluntatem consensus" (which is the tie
of the Holy Spirit, or of man). This position is perfectly
42. Bk.I,d.XXXI,20,c)e;pp.307-308.
compatible with the general Christological and soteriological
position of Alexander, namely, that Christ suffered and
merited only. However, it does not appear to coincide with
the section under consideration in which the spiritual
senses, at least, are said to be communicated according to
the human nature, that is, beaause Christ took on the same
nature as man. In Book I, a statement by Peter Lombard (also
in Book III ^ ) makes it clear that Christ is joined to the
members by natux'e and by grace but does not necessarily
suggest communication of the senses. Peter's statement is
used in Book I to show that Christ was Head in dignity and
power but there is no more than this suggested. The "one
will of consent" gives no substitutionary place to Christ
which the doctrine of satisfaction does give.
Other uses of "caput" in the Glossa are sparse.
Adam is seen as "head" in the sense of "principium" of all
men - without the word "caput" being used, in Book II,d.XVI,
4,p.148, and in d.XVIII,1,p.157- He is described as the "caput"
of woman on pages 157 and 158 in the sense of the relation cC
a ruler to a subject. One further use of the word "caput"
is in the three "capita malorum omnium, ut diabolus cadens,
till o
et homo lapsus, et Antichristus." The "home lapsus"
involves all men and communicates evil to all men, but, as it
has been seen, Christ as Head does not have a similar
relationship to men. Adam as the "principiual,, of all men,
thus is not the equivalent (or the parallel) of Christ in his
43. Bk.III,dfXIX,41(L),IV,p.222. 44. Book II,d.XXII,3»p.l93
humanity as the Head of the Church, although in some sense
he is the equivalent to the Son of God as the principium
of being. Thus the word "caput" is rarely used by Alexander
and when it is used, except in the case of the "homo lapsus",
it is not used in the sense that there is a communication
from one to the other. Rather, all that is indicated is the
holding of something in cofamon or that one has more dignity
and power than the other.
Secondly, the whole of Alexander's Ghristology
has been in terms of satisfaction and to a lesser extent
merit (which is barely distinguished from it). Satisfaction
and merit are seen as things which may "earn" grace for man
but there is little to suggest that it flows from Christ to
man (apart from the grace of the satisfaction itself in the
sacraments). One of the extraordinary elements of this
"caput" section is that satisfaction has no real place and
Christ is mentioned only in passing as "Redemptor".
Redemption by satisfaction has been such an important element
in the soteriology that Alexander was able to state that the
incarnation took place really for satisfaction. Christ was
thus "full of grace" in order to make satisfaction. That was
the object of the incarnation. Here, however, a new eleraent
comes in, namely, that from the fulness of his grace the
spiritual senses flow out from Christ through his humanity,
and the spiritual movements flow out either through his
Divinity or humanity or by his Divinity only. One would have
thought that, if this end was in view, in an integrated
theology it would have been discussed in the reasons
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for the incarnation. The power of the keys may be a
similar concept bat this is not mentioned at all here.
Thirdly, when the resurrection is spoken of as
45
an "efficient cause of our resurrection" , it is a
quotation from Peter that is used (and therefore not
necessarily used with its apparent significance). It is
pointed out in "E" that as efficient cause the resurrection
46
is not "motus" but "exemplaris". Then again, the
resurrection is discussed in the same context as the passion
as the sign, figure, and cause of the destruction of sin,
and therefore presumably with the same intent, that is,
the direction is towards God and not towards man. Finally
48
the resurrection of Christ is said not to be meritorious.
These, in themselves (especially the last), except for the
specific denial that the resurrection is a "motus", do not
constitute a contradiction of the fact that Christ may be
the source of outflowing grace. However, the fact that the
resurrection is discussed without any reference to this
topic, which one would think was a suitable place to do so
especially in order to enlighten the reader as to what
Alexander means by cause, and the other fact that the matter
of outflowing grace in Christ has no reference to the
resurrection in spite of the proximity of the discussions,
would lead one to suppose that there has not been a proper
integration because one topic is a new subject.
Fourthly, a consideration of the doctrine of the
45. ,Bk.III,d.XX,15,p.237. 46. Footnote,p.237-
47. d.XIX,8,p.211; 21(L),pp.215-216. 48. 22(L),p.216.
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sacraments and of grace itself will make it clear that
grace does not flow simply from Christ to the members. In
the sacramental theology, the sacraments form the tie between
Christ and the members (certainly in regard to satisfaction).
There does not appear to be any necessary connection made
between "gratia gratum faciens" in the sacramental theology
and Christ and if there is (as outflowing grace) there is no
real part for the humanity of Christ. It is the grace of the
Son of God, not the grace of Jesus Christ. At best Jesus
Christ is seen as a medium.
Fifthly, the tie between Christ and the members is
not quite as simple as one might believe, not only because
the sacraments come between, but also because the priesthood
is the link between Christ and the ordinary member via the
sacraments. These intermediaries may not be completely
necessary but they sire very nearly so.
Finally, forgiveness of guilt and eternal
satisfaction are bestowed apart from Christ, not in Christ,
and thus his centrality as the bestower of grace is greatly
weakened.
However, if one does assume that the "caput"
section is a part of Alexander's Christology, it is not
altogether incompatible with this Christology as it lends
support to trends already noted. The Christology of Alexander
has hesitated at the sentence "the Word became flesh".
Christ cannot be understood to have participated in full
humanity because its corruption has been viewed almost as
necessary corruption, that is, corruption comes with time.
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Because of this presupposition, Christ as Head of the
Church, as man, is not presented as Christ as the Head of
humanity, not even of unfalien humanity. The concept of
Christ as "caput" is by no means the equivalent of the »
concept of Christ as the "new Adam". Perhaps one should
not expect this either of Alexander or of the Bible where,
however, the concept of Christ as Head of the Church does
imply the headship of all things (Eph.l:22,23). However,
there is the possibility that Alexander in viewing Christ
as Head may have understood this as a description of
Christ not .merely as satisfier but as the sanctifier, the
mediator, the new Creation and the like. Yet, iii Alexander's
work, Christ as Head is Head only of the members, the
Church, and as such his headship does not extend to all of
Adam's progeny because in Adam there were the two cities
or two states of good and bad. So the possibility arises
that, in fact, far from extending the scope of the humanity
of Christ, the "caput" concept limits it only to the good.
As satisfier Christ is the sufficient (even if not the
efficient) cause &r all men, but in this concept Christ is
limited to the good only. His humanity is thus limited to
"good" humanity, Christ cannot be described as becoming "sin
for us", and the implication of this is that either sinful
man must save himself to some extent or that salvation is
achieved apart from Jesus Christ.
When this tendency occurs there must be a
corresponding tendency in man, that is, if God does not
come to man, man must go to God. This tendency is seen in
the concept of the soul to which is attributed some kind of
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capacity for uniting with the Divine, but at this point it
is seen in the fact that Christ is Head only of the good,
and that Abel was the first member of the Church, it is only
the "good" that partake of the benefits of Christ and Christ
has apparently little to give to the "bad". Thus, to be
saved, man must be good which by implication he is apart
from Christ. (Predestination brings in a further element
entirely divorced from Christ and with little connection
with present grace.) Man's salvation lies, then, to a
considerable extent, in man, and not completely in Christ.
This fact can also be seen in the ideas of the perfection
of Mary and of the possibility of the perfection of the
saints. Christ is by no means unique in this thinking; he
is seen as a helper and in the case of Mary he is almost
unnecessary. With the saints he is the source of grace
which men use but he is not the substitute; "grace" is the
important factor. This tendency belongs to Alexander's
theology with or without the "caput" section. The "caput"
section transfers the gifts of grace from being simply the
gifts of the bpirit to a derivation from the grace In Christ
but the end effect is the same: Christ is left behind, he
is not the substitute, he does not die and rise for man,
he is not man's justification and sanctification, he only
brings the grace to enable man to achieve them. His humanity,
in short, is not man's humanity. The doctrine of satisfaction
expounded in Alexander certainly puts a limit to the
possibilities but with the scope of satisfaction so limited
in Alexander's theology - to the temporal punishment for
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original sin - it is possible also to have, without too much
strain, a doctrine of outflowing grace from Christ. This
was the combination in Peter Lombard. Yet, it does appear
that Alexander has previously avoided this combination. In
the doctrine of satisfaction Alexander at least understands
Christ's work to be sufficient for all (and so he avoided
implying that salvation is just as much man's work as is the
case when it is limited to the good) in that he sees Christ
taking all men's humanity. This is true however limited his
doctrine here may be. Again, in his use of the concept
"caput" in Book I where it is stated that the bond between
Christ and the Church is in the same will of consent,
(although this is unsatisfactory; the bond is far more than
this; it is Christ taking on our sinful humanity and making
it anew) he does lessen the impression that inflowing grace
flows of necessity into the good more or less as they wish,
a grace which Christ as Head of the Church brings to those who
are "good", who are in the fold of Abel etc., that is, in
Book I perhaps there is a greater distinction between Christ
and the "good" than in this section.
There is one final point to be made and it is about
the fact that there appears to be some confusion as to Christ's
place in relation to the "spirituales motus" and "spirituales
sensus". In V e), (top of page 142 )* especially, there is
some doubt as to whether both flow out from Christ or just
the spiritual senses flow out from him. The first part of fcioe
answer seems to indicate that the spiritual movements come
from the Holy Spirit whereas in the second part of the answer
there is this: "ut caput per caritatem. effluunt ah eo /Christ/
motus spirituales." The real question, however, is
whether the spiritual movements come to man (if they do come
from Christ) according to the human nature, as it is explicitly
stated in relation to the spiritual senses, or only from
Christ as Son of God. The latter would appear to he the case.
This discussion raises four problems. Firstly, if
indeed the spiritual senses (faith) and the spiritual movements
(love) are divided between Christ and the Holy Spirit, then
the person and work of Christ are greatly restricted and the
important elements'of man's justification and sanctification
are left purely to the Holy Spirit. This then puts a question
mark against the Gospel as good news for then man is uncertain
of his justification and sanctification. (This seems
generally to be the solution of the sacramental theology
which, of course, raises questions as to the soundness of
Alexander's Trinitarian thinking.)
Secondly even if the senses and movements are not
separated so that instead both do relate to Christ or,
indeed, if only faith is related to Christ, then in either
both faith and love or in faith only, the Holy Spirit is
replaced by the Son of God, (or, on the other hand, it is
the Spirit which is incarnate). This would mean either
that the spiritual senses (and movements) flow from Christ
as man to man by the very fact of the common humanity (which
is
is practically to say "every manAhis own Christ") or that the
capacity to accept the senses (and movements) is given to man,
a capacity formerly residing in the Holy Spirit. This latter
is Pelagianism; the former is a kind of pantheism. Either
way God's freedom is impaired and there can be no concept,
really, of Divine election. Once again the doctrine of the
Trinity suffers greatly.
Thirdly, if the spiritual senses only and not the
spiritual movements are communicated by the human nature of
Christ (accepting for the moment the way of putting it - as
under point two), the faith which results is not "saving
knowledge"., the kind of point made very strongly in the
ScotH^ Confession. This faith, in Alexander, is related to
the "true" ^ and the intellectual and is a deeper form of
the knowledge which the philosophers have: "Ad auctoritatem
Philosophi respondeo quod duplex est cognitio per
intellectual; una habet ortum a sensu, et de hac loquitur
Philosophus: alia est per inspirationem et sine sensu,
quae est fidei, et sic habet nomen." Although the
terminology here is apparently in contradiction to that which
Alexander uses in the "caput" section (namely the "sine
sensu" of faith) so that faith and the senses operate on
different planes, it is evident that the "spiritual senses"
of the "caput" section are approximately equivalent to the
inspiration "sine sensu" (non-philosophic knowledge) mentioned
above. It must also be pointed out that the spiritual senses
have a relation to faith, hope and love, but only so far as
their "habilitation", ^1 which is not their "movement" or
49. e.g.Bk.I,d.XXXVI,ll,p.361. 30. Ibid.d.III,3,i)p.39
51. Bk.IV,a.VT,15»e)pp.121-122.
"act". It is somewhat unsound to give any particular
definition of faith for Alexander as the definitions or types
of faith vary considerably, but generally it could be described
as intellectual, as concerned with the articles of faith,
and it seems closest to the meaning "assent" or "believing
that". ^ In short it does not have the content of meaning
which faith has in Paul, Luther or Calvin. The knowledge
so gained differs from that gained through philosophy only
in the method of gaining the knowledge (probably more can be
gained through faith) as the knowledge from painting and the
knowledge from physics differ from each other. That means
that "saving knowledge" lies outside Christ if "intellectual"
faith is the only thing communicated through the human nature
of Christ. Intellectual assent is based in the double nature
of Christ, but not the love, which, in Alexander, leads to
merit, sanctification, and justification. This position
would not be far removed from Alexander's general position
in which Christ makes satisfaction for original sin and the
Spirit (or grace) moves.
Fourthly, and perhaps most seriously, there is the
question as to how much connection Christ has with our
humanity as "caput", and whether, indeed, he does communicate
through his humanity. Suspicion is raised by the following
statement: "Sed in spirituali capite et membris nihil est de
gx
materia, sed totum forma." This suspicion is aroused not
only in regard to the spiritual movements and love, but also
52. Bk.III,ds. XXII-XXIV.pp.262-295. 52. Bk.lII,d.XIX(L),41,
X,p.225.
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in regard to the spiritual senses and faith. Is the
communication of the spiritual senses based on our common
humanity with Christ and established by and in him, or is it
based on "goodness" or on "consent"? Why does Christ need to
be of our humanity if the good, as seems to be implied,
already exists apart from him? Against this kind of position
it must be stated that our goodness depends upon the goodness
of Christ and finds its basis in Christ alone. With or
without sin Christ is man for this end. But when ns in is
present, Christ's humanity is doubly necessary for man's
possession of faith and love, that is, not only is Christ the
actively obedient man in whom there is the "new creation", he
is also the passively obedient man in whom our "old man
perishes."
To sum up. The "caput" section does appear to show
the influence of a different tradition from that expressed
in the satisfaction theory. This different tradition may be
distinguished as the Abelardian. Peter Lombard had already
brought together the Anselmic and the Abelardian traditions^
so that it is nothing new to put the two side by side,
albeit a greatly qualified Anselmic tradition. The use of
the Abelardian "moral influence" tradition certainly
coincides with the Christological tendencies or presuppositions
of Alexander, that is, of a God as "essence" behind Christ
and men with God-inclined souls, apart from Christ. let the
doctrine of satisfaction, certainly in its Anselmic form,
5^. R.Seeberg, Textbook of the History of Doctrines,Vol.2.p.74.
moves in a contrary direction to these tendencies, although,
because it is so restricted in Alexander's theology, there
is no need for a clash and the two theories can become
complementary.
The "caput" section may be seen as an attempt
to balance the lack of interest in sanctification in the
satisfaction theory (at least in Alexander's thought), but
the attempt is somewhat lacking. It does not have the
universal scope which the doctrine of satisfaction has
because it applies to the good and the Ghurch alone, which
is not inclusive of our humanity, Adamic humanity - the
idea that he is Head of Adamic humanity is specifically
denied; Christ is head of Abelic humanity, the "previously"
good. This teaching does not present a full view of the
fact that the Word became flesh. It minimises the offence
of sin, and therefore it limits God's reply to sin in
Jesus Christ. Further, because Christ is seen as merely
Spirit or grace filled at this point, and not as Bon of Man
and Son of God, the substitutionary element in Christ's
humanity is lacking. Yet it is only as the Bon of Goa is
the basis of the Bon of Man, or the man is hypostasised in
the Bon of God?that the place of the humanity of Christ is
peculiar and substitutionary. The fact that, in Alexander's
doctrine of Christ as Head, the humanity plays no essentially
different role from the preacher through whose words the Word
of God is conveyed to the hearer makes one wonder whether
it is indeed the Son of God who is the basis of the union in
this discussion. Further one must ask whether the doctrine
of grace, certainly the view of grace as held in the "caput"
section, is sufficient to maintain the uniqueness of the
union, and indeed, whether it may work against a
satisfactory Christology. And even if it is the Son of
God and Son of «*ian who is understood to he at work, the
power which is attributed to Christ in confering grace is
hardly human even if it is attributed to the humanity,
here, in short, the humanity is of minor importance.
Alexander's doctrine of the sacraments generally takes
this position except that the "body of Christ" in the bread
and the wine and not Christ immediately is the source of
love and grace. In this, too, his humanity is unimportant.
Anselm in his teaching may not have emphasised
the relation of Christ to sanetification and justification
although, by implication, they followed on to satisfaction,
but the right emphasis is not found in the Abelardian
tradition, 'fhe two theories are ultimately incompatible for
one presupposes man's sin, the other man's potential
goodness; the one "necessitates" Christ's humanity, the
other does not. Peter Lombard attempted to hold the two
together; Alexander in his doctrine of Christ proper, I
believe, did not, and left many questions unanswered. The
only way the two elements, satisfaction and sanctification,
were brought together and are brought together, was in
Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, in whom sin is
judged, and good is triumphant.
The Quaestiones
In the doctrine of the grace of Christ in the
quaestiones there is a difference from the Glossa, at least,
from the text in the Glossa which is considered the main
text ("AE"). The "L" text of the Glossa with its "caput"
section coincides more closely with the views of the
quaestiones not only where the latter has comments on the
grace of Christ but also elsewhere where the grace of Christ
as Head is an accepted doctrine.
According to the quaestiones there was a threefold
grace in Christ: as a "quidam homo singularis"; as "caput
Ecclesiae"; and that by which "divina natura unita est cum
humana in eo." Other names for the first and the last
obviously would be inhabiting grace and the grace of union.
(Compare this with the general grace, the inhabiting grace,
and the grace of union of the Glossa, the first obviously
being the grace which had been defined earlier as "una qua
inest cuilibet creaturae, scilicet per praesentiam, x^otentiam
et essentiam." ^) Each of these graces in Christ as the Holy
Spirit who is given to Christ "non ad mensuram" (John 3:34)»
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is "gratia increata", and as a gift is "gratia creata". '
The relation of these graces particularly that of the Head
to that of union is important. It had been suggested that
the fulness of grace in Christ was due to the fact that he
was the Head of the Church because of a statement attributed
(wrongly) to Augustine ^ "datus est ei spiritus non ad
raensuram, de cuius plenitudine accepimus," ^ and this grace
55- Q.XII,I)e Praedest. Christi, memb.2,17,p.l53. 36. Book
III,d.XIII,3,p.129; d.IV,10,p.51- 37- Q.XII,memb.2,22,p.l56
Q.XLIII,De Plenitudine Gratiae Ohristi, Disp.I,riemb.I.13,p«735
58. Peter Lombard on Eph. 1:22-23. 59- ^.XEIXI,memb.l,13,
p.734.
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is described as "gratiam secundum quam est caput Bcclesiae
60
et ab hac influit sensus et aotus super membra." The
comment on the suggestion is: "dico quod gratia quae est
data 'non ad mensuram', est gratia quae est caput nostrum
in ratione fluentis, et non recipientis. /daman, gratia,
uaionis simul fuit cum hac prout est recipiens, /licet/
ratione differant haec et ilia, quia uniens est sirnul cum
unito: sed gratia secundum quod est caput, dicitur secundum
61
quod iam unitum est." Both graces, therefore, are "sine
mensura", that of the Head "ut de qua sine measure ipse dat
nobis, et ilia/grace of union/ ut de qua recipere sine
6?
mensura potest ipse." Inhabiting grace is that by which
Christ is the bon of the Trinity, and the grace of union is
that by which "iste homo per gratiam unionis est Fiiius
Patrrs per naturam." ^
The grace of union made it possible, as has been
seen, that Christ could make satisfaction for the sin of
Adam in regard to temporal punishment. This is the unique
grace, or the grace which makes Christ unique. However, one would
conclude from, what is immediately above, that the grace of
Christ as the Head of the Church is apparently the same grace,
except that it faces Christ: towards men and not towards uod.
Does this grace (which is the grace of sanctification - or
the grace of virtues as the Huaest:iones will term it in
discussing the sacraments - and the grace by which guilt is
remitted) convey the same uniqueness to the humanity of
61. Ibid.19,p.736. 62. 20,p.736. 63. Memb.4,2^,p.?40
Christ as the grace of union has done, or is said to have
done? Are the recipients of this grace dependent on the
humanity of Christ as a substitute, as they are in the
satisfaction for original sin? It would appear not. The
remission of punishment, states the ^uaestiones is dependent
on two things, the mercy of God .and the satisfaction made by
Christ: "^uoad remissionem culpae, accepimus de plenitudine
eius secundum quod Eeus: quoad remissionem posnae , in
quantum Deus et homo. Unie poena eius universalis
64
satisfactoria fuit." Thus Christ's humanity is
unnecessary in the grace of sanctification (which relates to
guilt) and further more that humanity is not related to
Adam's kind; it is merely a "humanity" which does not
involve all men. Christ is Head of those who were before
him and thoee who come after "secundum humanitatem" before
he was a man "quia non est caput dependens nisi a fide
humanitatis, et non ab humanitate eius." Thus he is Head
to them and to us according to his human nature "in quantum
est creditum et sub ratione crediti." ^5 ^he humanity of
Christ is purely incidental here; Christ could have been
anything else but man for that belief - unlike the doctrine
of satisfaction; it does not really matter whether he was
man - "caput fuit quoad hoc, quod fuit creditus homo, non
quoad temporale." There is point in this, of course, in
that Christ's humanity does apply to all time, that is, all
men are sanctified in him, but that is not what is being said.
64. Disp.Ii,Memb.1,37»P«7^3• 65* Memb.3»4-b,p.746
66. Ibid. p.747*
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Faith, like love, conies from grace and these go from Christ
into those who preceded him and who come after by the
spiritual senses and movements. ^ Yet, this is not "ab
humanitate"; it is from the fulness of grace in Christ;
this grace which remits guilt is from Christ as God, not
from him as the God-man. This becomes clear when it is
pointed out that those who follow the life and death of
Christ in time gain an extra effect, namely sacramental
68
grace (i.e. from satisfaction). Why does this extra grace
come to man? The reason is found in the humanity of Christ
which does make a difference. It is unique; there is a time
without ana a time with this humanity, but this is not true
of the grace which flows from the Head as the grace of
sanetification; the humanity does not make any difference
to it. The satisfaction of Christ was for humanity; the
grace from the Head as sanctificatioc was for those who
believed - not for humanity; it was for the "good" before
and after Christ i.e. the "engraced". If the humanity of
Christ bore the same relation to men for both satisfaction
and sanctification, then the satisfaction would also have
apjjlied, e.g. to circumcision, before Christ in exactly the
same way as sanctification applied to faith before Christ.
In fact the Quaestiories does try to relate both the grace
of the sacraments (satisfaction) and the grace of virtues
(sanctification) to those who preceded Christ. The grace of
67. Ibid. 68. Ibid.pp.7^7-7^8. See chapter on "Sacraments
in General". Sacramental grace derives from the satisfaction
made by the God-man.
the Head includes both the grace of the sacraments and the
grace of virtues. However, the distinction of graces
speaks of a significant difference between the graces, the
one conveying the benefit of the substitutionary satisfaction
made by the God-man, the other not relating to the man at
Y
all except as a channel.
"Ooncedo quod per gratiam sacramentorum et
virtutum recepimus de ista gratia. Sed tunc primo
fuit completio fidei, quando futurum transiit in
praesens, quia etiam tunc fuit Veritas donuni; /sed/
gratia fidei prius non fuit in tanta plenitudine quam
est nunc. Similiter est /de/ gratia in sacranontis.
Unde propitiatio haec fuit in fide ad tollendam culpam,
in sanguine ad tollendam poenam. IIli tamen qui
praecesserunt. de utroque ,/acceperunt, scilicet de
sanguine/ et de fide, quantum ad remissionem poenae."'
Here, the "greater fulness" of the grace of faith makes no
basic difference in the effect of faith, as the blood does.
Faith is in man; the blood is Christ's. It should be noted
that sanctifying grace and grace which remits guilt are the
same grace, differing from the strictly sacramental grace
which is directed at temporal punishment. In the discussion
on the sacrament these graces are more clearly distinguished
than rhey are here.
There is one more revealing statement. The
implication of what has already been discussed is that the
grace of the Head can become the possession of the Church
of which Christ as Head in such a way that the Church is
practically put on a level with Christ. It should be
remembered also that the grace of the Head is hax^dly different
69. In the discussion of the sacraments the Glossa evidently
intends by grace the inclusive grace which would be equivalent
to the above grace of the Head; the ^uaestiones distinguishes
between the grace of virtues working apart from the sacraments
and sacramental grace which is in the sacraments. Here, it
appears that perhaps the grace of union (of sacraments
approximately) and inhabiting grace (of virtues) are brought
together under the grace of the Head. ?0. Memb.5,54,p.749»
apparently frum the grace of union. It is asked whether
men receive from Christ's fulness "ad mensuram" or no!;.
The answer states that just as in the soul each member does
not have fulness of operation so it is with the indiviuuai
members of the Church; yet the whole body has full
operabiiity:
"similiter in capita Christo est plenitude ••
donoruia, et similiter in toto corpore Ecclesiae; non
tamen in quo libet membro. Undo omnibus omnia dantur
propter plenitudinem effluentem quae est in toto
corpore... Ista ergo plenitudo, quae est in toto
corpore Ecclesiae, dicitur 'sine mensura' in comparatione
ad membra, 'in mansura' autem in comparatione ad
Christum, caput suum." 71
•The one difference between Christ and the Church is that
Christ received grace without measure but this seems merely
a difference in degree not in kind. No doubt, a distinction
between Christ and the Church is intended in relation to
sanctification but there does not appear to be any
substitutionary role here assigned to Christ. Again in
relation to sanctification it is grace which sanctifies
both the Church and Christ.
If the grace of the Head is created and is passed
onto the members they would then be brought into the same
relation to the Father as Christ the man by this grace. This
would be a reasonably satisfactory position unaer the
categories by which Alexander is operating (i.e. grace),
that is, men would be made heirs by adoption and dependent
on the humanity of Christ for that adoption through the unique
71. Memb.4,51,pp.743-749.
grace of union. But the close relation of the grace of
union to the grace of the Head and the fact that the latter
is "created" as well as the former would actually make it
appear that the whole Church not only becomes a son by
adoption but a son by nature - if the grace of union is
accepted as asserting the sonship by nature of Christ. This
that
suggestion is given further credence by the factAthe Church
gives grace "without measure" to its members. This would
mean that the Church does not find its sanctification in
Christ but in grace. However, what actually seems to be
case is that the Spirit or grace in effect takes the place
of the Son of God in the incarnation and it is man himself
who has to sanctify himself. What this means is that grace
or the Spirit is seen as an "alter Christus" in as far as
Christ is the Son of God. The fact that the concept of the
grace of the Head does not imply sanctification in Christ at
all, in short, that the concept is not incarnational (unless
one wants to identify the mystical body with Christ which is
not entirely out of the question) is proved by the use of
the concept of outflowing grace, by the non-necessity of
the man Jesus for the remission of guilt, by the fact that
this grace is attributed to the Spirit, and by the fact that
Christ's life and resurrection have no real part to play
in man's sanctification or his "second" justification (that
is from all sin). Of course all these could be seen as part
of the incarnation by the fact that the Church becomes the
extension of the incarnation. To sum up. Because there is
no substitution by Christ (because Christ's humanity has no
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real basis in the grace of union, it being identified with
the grace of the Head) there is no sanctification of man in
him either. Christ did not take on the humanity of man for
sanctification.
These affirmations are supported by Alexander's
limited view of Christ's incarnation, as has already been
seen, and the limited view of his passibility (chapter 4);
there is doubt here also as to his full humanity. It would
appear that the incarnation and Christ's passibility apply
only to "engraced" man. Further to this, the doctrine of
satisfaction is lacking in the universal element (although,
of course it is there potentially) which is supplied, it
would appear, in fact, by the sacraments. In the ^uaestiones
the tendency to restrict satisfaction to the good is more
marked than in the Glossa. In the ^uaestiones the doctrine
of the grace of the Head is introduced as a major factor and,
as a result, the doctrine of satisfaction which emphasises
the humanity of Christ tends to take a less important place.
This can be expected for, as has already been stated, the
two views are ultimately incompatible, not complementary.
as they stand, especially in the i^uaestiones, t.he aoctrine
of satisfaction and the doctrine of sanctification hold
different views of Christ and man. The former emphasises
the humanity and Divinity together with the sin of man, the
latter the Divinity without the humanity together with the
potential goodness of man.
The doctrine of outflowing grace, or infused
grace (as the chapter on grace will further demonstrate) is a
71a. Above p. 156.
substitute for incarnational theology or plays havoc with it.
The mediation between God and man under these terms is made
by uncreated grace which becomes an "alter Christus" and
becomes created within man by man's aid. The mediation is
not made by the fulness of Godhead and the fulness of
humanity in Christ, the noly Spirit then bringing man into
participation in that mediation by faith. Possibly, a little
unkindly perhaps, it may be said that grace is the "demi-God"
or the emanation which mediates between the Unmoved Mover and
man with his divine inclined soul. This view of grace can
exist only most uneasily beside the Anselmic view of
satisfaction. If that view does not see grace as an
emanation, at least the concept has a similar background to
the theories of emanation and the divinely inclined soul of
man.
One final point. If the grace of union is the
same as the grace of the Head (even with different effects)
then it has not been demonstrated that there is a difference
in kind between the grace in Christ (as there is in the
Glossa where the grace of the Head is generally absent) and
the grace in man. This must bring into consideration again
in
the whole prelimary discussion of the doctrine of satisfaction,
iii.) The grace of predestination.
One other topic may be touched upon. Its brevity
alone is significant. Peter Lombard is quoted to the effect
that the Son of God is not predestined as the Word of God
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because that would indicate that he was with beginning.
72
What is predestined has a beginning and is made in time.
Later Alexander states that predestination is appropriate
73
to the Person of Christ as man. 'v Similarly Augustine
had called Christ "dominicus homo" but had retracted this
because "dominicus" is a possessive name and indicates that
74
human nature is the possession of God which is not true. '
These comments and the comment in the "L" parallel "plus
75
enim est esse be urn quam possideri" are possibly not
as Trinitarian as they might be as there may be some doubt
thrown on the relation of God in revelation to God in
Himself and, in Christology, if it is argued that Christ is
not predestined in the Son of God (the Trinitarian basis)
what is his uniqueness as the Son of Man? However
predestination will be more fully discussed in a later
chapter where the significance of the doctrine at'predestination
for Christology is discussed.
Summary
Scholars have seen in the work of Augustine a
decisive transformation in the conception of grace for the
West. Reinhold Seeberg describes his view in contrast to an
earlier view as follows: "He has in view primarily, not the
establishment of personal communion, but a creative act.
Grace is effectual as the almighty, creative will, which
r?£*
infuses into man a new subsistence, the moral will."
72. Peter Lombard, on Roms.l:4;Glossa,Bk.III,d.VII,2,pp.90-91;
16(L),p.,95» 73* 4-,91. 74. Aurustine. >uaes t. 36.2.Retract.
1,19,8; 15,p*95» 75* 28(L),p.99. 76. R.Seeberg, Textbook
of the History of Doctrines.Vol.1.p.341.
Perhaps he may he reading into the thought of Augustine a
little too much later substantialistthinking but what is of
significance was that a figure of Augustine's importance
should have seen grace as "something" detached from God,
yet not constantly, as later, unrelated to Jesus Christ.
However, Augustine is not the only "culprit". Professor
Torrance has detected a similar move in the Apostolic
Fathers. He says, for instance, of 1 Clement: "the
general meaning of charis in this Epistle appears to be
that of enabling power granted to those who are worthy.
This is the commonest usage in the whole of the literature
of this period; its frequency indicates fairly well the
measure of the change of emphasis from the personal character
77
of charis to that of imparted dynamic quality." '' Then,
later, commenting on the work of Ignatius Professor Torrance
makes a statement which could equally well be made of
Alexander: "this principle /love/ is imparted to the
Christian and works within him as a power such that it
practically becomes identified with his own nature." ^
The detachment of grace from the idea of personal
communion is the decisive element which distinguishes
medieval thinking from Biblical thinking and indeed the
thinking of the Greek fathers. It would seem that the almost
inevitable result of this detachment is the concentration on
the working of grace in man himself and only a determinstic
view of grace as irresistible is the one sure way of avoiding
77. T.F.Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic
Fathers.p.34. 78* Ibid.p.70.
some form of Pelagianism. Reinold beeberg comments on the
view of Bonaventure (1221-1274) who was a Franciscan, a
pupil of Alexander's, and whose views often coincided with
his teacher's: "Bonaventura... represents the impartation
of grace as having for its end to make men capable of merit....,
which can be attained however only through the free will...
Under this practical view of the matter, despite all
emphasizing of the agency of grace, the personal agency of
79
man himself constantly presses to the front." ' J Bernard of
Clairvaux, (1090-1153) whose thought will be mentioned later
on the chapter on grace, apparently kept the balance and
indeed understood merit and free will only in terms of grace,
and succeeded where Bonaventure and Alexander, who used his
works, failed. It would seem that Bernard was an exception
in an age which had presuppositions which pushed theologians
towards Pelagianism of some kind.
Alexander's doctrine of grace, free will, and
merit, is given more detailed treatment in a chapter devoted
to those matters. However, it would be useful to sketch
his view of grace here as the background to his view of
grace in Christ. Alexander, in general, believes that there
are three "graces": "gratia gratis data", "gratia gratum
faciens", and "gratia perfectionis". The last is given only
at the end. The second might be called "saving grace", and
the first might be loosely called "prevenient grace". This
"gratia gratis data" at times may even be called "man in
79. Op.cifc.Vol.11,p.120.
creation" for it is sometimes associated with man's
"naturalia". This fact is revealing because it demonstrates
how "grace" can be conceived almost as part of creation.
However, it is "gratia gratum faciens" which is the most
important grace. It, like the first grace, can have different
effects, but it is still the one grace. The first thing that
should be noticed about it is the fact that it is detached
from Christ and has no necessary relation to him; at best,
it is "in" him. Grace is now attached to the Holy Spirit
but the view of the Holy Spirit is hardly personal; he
could be as well described as "it". This is well demonstrated
in the thinking on the sacraments where grace, or power, is
very "substantial". However, one need not go to the
sacramental thinking for confirmation of this viewpoint; it
is quite clear that grace is often viewed as a substance, or
very nearly such, which can be "infused". This detached-
substantial view of grace is given particular confirmation
in the newly developing doctrine of "uncreated" and "created"
grace. (Indeed some scholars would attribute the development
of this view to Alexander himself.) "Uncreated" grace is
the Holy Spirit; "created" grace is to be found in man's
soul. This is as far as one can go in several directions.
First, grace is quite obviously "something" in the soul
(it is substantial); it is well away from the idea of
personal communion. Second, it is even detached to some
extent from God - there is separation made by the "uncreated"
and "created"; this is a move beyond Augustine. Third, and
as a corrollary of this, one would think that it was
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extraordinarily difficult to distinguish this grace from
the work of man himself; the very word "created", although
it may not mean quite what it appears to, indicates this
fact. Certainly, the concept of created grace impels one to
concentrate on man himself, and this, in itself, is unbiblical.
It should be noted that C.iloeller and Q.Philips of the
University of Louvain understand the doctrine of created
OA
grace in a way contrary to that stated immediately above.
They understand it as an attempt to make grace effective in
all the workings of man, in fact, to insure that the free
will of man is not given the credit for something that only
grace can effect (i.e. it is the secret working of the
Spirit). This may well be true, and in a way Alexander could
be described as a "theologian of grace", but one feels that
this solution, when he presupposes a detached-substantial
grace, merely transfers the interplay of grace and free will
from the relation of God and man's soul, to a relation within
the soul of man himself, between created grace and free wills
"and the last state of that man becomes worse than the first."
It is in this context that one should understand
the grace of union. This grace appears very similar, in its
effects at least, to "gratia gratum faciens" and one wonders
whether it is an adequate way of affirtaing Christ's
Ol
uniqueness. This doubt is particularly strong when one
80. C.Moeller and G.Philips, The Theoioay of jrace«pp.!6ff.
81. e.g. At one point it is suggested that the grace of union is
either "gratia gratis data" or "gratia gratum faciens". it is
argued: if the union entails the latter this would lead to
virtue which would make some act of merit and therefore "per
gratiam illam meruit uniri vel fieri Pilius Dei." Alexander
answers this form of Adoptionism as follows: ".^uod haec gratia est
gratum faciens, sed tamen non est virtus; quoniam virtus dicit
94-95.
remembers that Alexander holds a substantial^view of grace
and, if this is so, the distinction between Christ and other
men would appear to be only one of degree. On the other
hand there is the fact that grace in Alexander does have
different effects and to say that Christ has the grace of
union or the grace of redemption may be merely a way of
stating that only Christ could satisfy, that only he is the
Son of God by nature and that man and God are one uniquely
in him. Nevertheless Christ is said to have "had" the grace
of union. As grace is to be identified with the Holy Spirit
does grace sufficiently distinguish Christ from other men?
The incarnation, to be sure, is the work of grace, but is it
not made in the Son rather than in the Spirit so that what
Jesus "has" is not grace but the Father? If it is grace that
effects the union, in terms of Alexander's understanding of
grace, where is really the place of the Son? The man Jesus
is grace filled; all men eventually will be grace filled.
These questions are not pressing and perhaps are
not pertinent until one comes to the relation of the grace
of union to the grace of the Head. The latter has to be
related, in some way, to the grace of union simply because
they were both in Christ. In regard to satisfaction, the
grace of union performs a unique role but with the grace of
the Head there are problems - apart from the question whether
love and faith or only faith derive from Christ. The first
problem is the fact that Christ appears to be only a channel
of grace, that is, he is not substitutionary. Secondly, and
related to this, if he is not a channel, he is still only
1?4
a source and unique only in the sense that he is the first
of a series. Men can make use of grace in the same way as
Christ did, e.g. in the sacraments, 'io avoia determinism
Alexander posits the independent working a the free will,
and because, according to Alexander, this grace comes only
to the good, grace, in effect ceases to be grace; it
becomes something of which man can make use.
Grace has been detached from Jesus Christ; in
fact he has become subject to it and he is limited in his
scope to the good. The fact that the ^uaestiones relates the
grace of the Head to the grace of the union undermines the
uniqueness associated with the grace of union and makes it-
difficult to establish any sort of uniqueness with the
presuppositions that Alexander holds in his doctrine of grace.
Alexander has travelled far from the early church;
grace has been systematised and substantialisea particularly
under the influence of Aristotleiian categories. This
tendency becomes more marked after Alexander. (Karl Heim
has detected in the gumma of Alexander an Aristotelian
causal pattern in the doctrine of grace, Hven if his analysis
is perhaps too neat, at least, he has considerable backing for
QO
his views in the Summa. ) Grace has become almost
completely detached from Christ and given over to a "substantial"
Holy Spirit; it has even become earthed in created grace.
His view is far from the Greek fathers, whose synergism,
unlike the semi-Peiagianism of an Alexander, did not point to
82. K.Heim, Das Wesen der Gnade und ihr Verhaltnis zu den
naturalichen Functioned des lAenschen bei Alexander Halensis.
grace in man, but pointed to man being taken up by grace
into God in personal communion. This becomes evident in
quotations from two great fathers. "The Son of God became
Son of Man so that the sons of men, that is, of Adam, might
become sons of God ... partakers of the life of God ... Thus
He is Son of God by nature, and we by grace." "We are
made partakers of the divine nature and are aaid to be sons
of God, nay we are actually called divine, not only because
we are exalted by grace to supernatural glory, but also
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because we have God dwelling in us."
Even though the Greek fathers may have had a less
than biblical view of grace this evidently did not have the
effect of concentrating man on himself. Grace was still
something that drew man to God. Thus the Greek synergism
would appear to be of different derivation from later
medieval Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism which concentrated
on man and his merits and was helped in this by the idea of
created grace. Here God was in the background as a helper.
Greek synergism did not leave God in the background; here,
free man was brought into full communion with him. That
was how they saw the working of grace. This is evident in a
quotation from Macarius the Great ( ca. 390), the emphasis
and tone of which is far removed from the semi-Pelagianism
of Alexander. Although grace is not mentioned it is obvious
that this closely parallels the thinking of Athanasius and
83. Athanasius, l)e Incarn. et con. Ar. 8, quoted J.11.1) .Kelly,
Early Christian Doctrines, p.33? ♦ 80-.Cyril of Alexandria,
In loh. l,9»quoted Kelly, p.33?»
Cyril who were speaking of grace:
"And it is not the case, as some, misled by-
false doctrines, say, that man is totally dead and
utterly unable to do anything good. For even a
child, although it is not able to accomplish anything,
nor to walk upon its feet to its mother, yet rolls
upon the ground and calls and cries because it yearns
for its mother. And this moves the mother's heart to
pity, ana she is pleased that her child, with struggle
and with outcry, seeks to come to her. And although
the child cannot come to her, yet the mother, in view
of this great yearning of the child, goes ,to it,
constrained by love for the child, takes it up and
cherishes and feeds it with great love: this does also
the man-loving God for the soul that approaches and
yearns for him." 85
Between this kind of thinking and the thinking of Alexander
comes Augustine (with the western tradition behind him).
Augustine, with a neo-Platonic view of sin,according to
"i QC
Seeberg, affecting his view of grace , sees grace as
something moving the will of man to bring about merits. After
him the pattern is grace: merits rather than that found in
the Greek fathers of grace ; God. His view of grace is
deterministic or nearly so in its thorough going
predestinationism, and when those who followed him,
possessing a view of grace similar to this, reacted against
determinism as Alexander does, they could find the freedom in
one place alone, in man's soul, for that is where grace pointed.
The thought of Aristotle leTbat itself to this enterprise.
This detached-substantial view of grace and the medieval view
of man led to an inevitable minimising of the place of Christ
and creates doubts as to the adequacy of the doctrine of the
grace of union in maintaining the uniqueness of Christ.
85. Macarius, Jaca. h. 46.5. quoted Seeberg, Voi.l,pp.294—295
86. Ibid. p.341.
CHAPTER 4
THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST
i) The knowledae and ignorance of Christ
In distinction XIII two subjects closely related
to the doctrine of grace and the union of two natures are
discussed, namely, the knowledge and ignorance of Christ.
The problem of the knowledge of Christ tends to receive
raonophysite solutions, either by the elimination of a
human knowledge, or by the elimination of the Divine
knowledge (kenoticism). Alexander's tendency as will be
seen, and as would be expected, is the former.
It is stated in this distinction that knowledge
in Christ as man and knowledge in Christ as God differed
because there was a diversity of natures. There were five
"knowledges" in Christ; the Divine knowledge coinciding
with the Divine nature, and four human "knowledges". These
are the knowledge of the secrets of the incarnation by the
grace of union; the knowledge of those things pertaining
to beatitude by the grace of comprehension because he was a
"comprehensor in via", that is, Christ was a partaker of
glory on earth; the knowledge of those things made for him
through an integrity of nature which he received from Adam;
the knowledge of "natura poenalie' which he had and by
which, through experience, he knew what he did not know
previously. ^ This last knowledge underlines the true
1. d. XIII,10,ppil31-rl32.
humanity, our humanity, which some of the other Knowledges
do not.
In several ways Alexander is anxious to protect
the Divine Knowledge of Christ. In reply to the Destorians
who, according to Alexander, said that Christ was a mere man,
with the aid of quotations from John of Damascus, Alexander
states that Christ not only had "naturalia" and inhabiting
2
grace, but he also had the grace of union. Thus his
knowledge went beyond that of the natural abilities or that
of the grace all Christians have. Pope Leo is quoted to the
effect that in no way was Christ, the boy, dissimilar to
other boys. It is then suggested that because of this Christ
grew in knowledge but Alexander denies this. Further it is
suggested that Christ should have had immediate perfection in
his body just as he did in his soul. "L" adds to this
discussion. It states that growing in knowledge for people
apart from Christ is the result of sin and would not have
been in Christ even if he had not been a "comprehensor" and
4
even if he did not have the grace of union. This answer
relates to the first suggestion in "AE". To the second and
unanswered suggestion in "AE" which in "L" is related to the
defects of the body and not merely to its growth, the answer
is: "Christus venit ut solveret poenalitates pro nobis, quae
solum sunt ex parte corporis; et ideo dotes corporis non
habuit. Sed corpus fuit divinitate mediante anima vel virtute
2. 28(L),p.l38; see also 11,p.132; John of Damascus, De Fide
Qrth.III.22. 3. 12,p.132; Leo.Sermo 3^,3. 4. 29U) ,p.l38.
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intellectuali et ideo anima quoad intellectual et
5
affectum plenitudinem scientiae et virtutis recepit." y
The implication that the soul of Christ was almost non-human
one would wish to question.
The question of the knowledge of Christ is also
taken up in regard to ignorance. Anselm is quoted to refute
the suggestion that Christ was ignorant because he was mortal.^
As part of Christ's knowledge it is also suggested that he would
have known evil. In the comment in "Aii" it is stated that
evil is known ("cognoscitur") either through experience or
through "per absentiam sui oppositi." In the latter way
7
Christ had cognition of evil. ' This cannot be what
Alexander meant. As is often the case "L" is clearer.
"Dupliciter malum, sive culpae, sive poenae; vel per
experientiam, vel per suum oppositum. Ghristus autem malum
culpae per suum oppositum cognovit; malum autem poenae
O
utroque modo." In other words Christ was not guilty of
himself, although he knew sin's punishment by experience.
Further on it is stated that learning through experience
did not preclude a foreknowledge of suffering by Christ, and
such knowledge was not opposed to ignorance but rather to
inexperience, that is, he had not experienced suffering in
fact. This is in explanation of Hebrews 5:8, 2 Corinthians
5:21, Peter Lombard's comment "didicit per experientiam",
and Anselm's comment "quod per scientiam ignoravit, experimento
5» 30(L),p.l38. 6. 13,pp.132-133; Anselm, Cur Deus Homo.
ll,c,13. 7. 13,p.133. 8. 31(10,pp.138-139.
didicit." ^ This knowledge of the experience of suffering
did not remain in the state of comprehension as it is
proper only to a "viator". And so manao venerit perfect urn
**
1Q
est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est. ( 1 Gor. 13:10)
Distinction XIV also treats of the matter of the
knowledge of Christ. Much of the same ground is covered but
there is also a comparison between Christ's knowledge and
the knowledge of God. It is again stated that Christ
11
increased in knowledge by experience. This differs from
the "habitus" of "donum gratis datum" (presumably the
"naturalia") by which Christ knows everything because the
knowledge from experience is "ex multiplici dispositione
12
praecedente" and the other is made "subito". questions
relating to Christ and the angels are also raised; they did
not teach him and it seems that he did not teach them as rnan.1^
as
Augustine is quotedAstating that Christ knew everything at
14
the same time and it is argued that since he was a
"comprehensor" he knew everything at one glance. ^ A
different question is raised, but with similar implications
to those in distinction XIII, as to whether Christ's
knowledge was deliberative or elective both of which could
indicate a limitation in Christ. John of Damascus provides
the starting point for the answer: "In anima Christi non
inquimus consilium vel electionem. Non enim habuit
9. 39(b),p.139; see also 16,p.133; Anselm, Cur be us Homo,I.
c.9. 10. 17,p.134; 37(b),p.140. lldJtIV,2,p,142.
12. 3,p.143. 13. 6,7,p.143; see also d.XIII,38,39(b),
pp.140-141. 14. d.XIV,4,p,143; Augustine, Confessions,
XII,c.13. 13. 11,p. 14-5.
ignorantiam, etsi ignorantis naturae haec erat, seel tamen
secundum hypostasim unitam Beo Verbo habuit omnium cognitionem
non gratia, sed, ut dictum est, propter earn quae secundum
1 £>
hypostasim unitionem." In "L" this is taken as a denial
that Christ had deliberative knowledge but there is a comment
only on elective knowledge, that is, the knowledge which
separates good and evil: "Electio fuit in eo, non est ut in
via, sed ut in termino. Et Bamascenus loquitur secundum quod
17
electio sumitur ut in via," ' In "AE" the reply states that
deliberative knowledge is twcPlold: "prout est in termino"
and so it was in Christ, and "prout est in via ad terminum"
18
and so it was not in Christ. This is more or less the
same as saying that Christ was "comprehensor in via".
Thus it would appear, combining the thought of "L"
and "AE", that as man Christ did not grow in knowledge, nor
does it seem that he had to make real experimental decisions,
or make the choice between good and evil. This seems to
remove real choice and it has to be said that, although
Christ did choose good or was obedient, that does not mean
that his choice was not a real one. In other words, to use
Alexander's terminology, the choice had to be "in via" not
merely "in termino". The latter phrase may not be intended
to do so but it does seem to imply that for Christ as man
the choice was imposed from outside and did not derive from
himself at the moment of decision. Christ in fact, could not
sin because of what he was, or because he was obedient "in
16. John of Bamascus, Be Eide Orth.II.c.22. 17. 21(L),b)c)
pp.148-149. 18. 8,p.144.
via", and not because of some outside pattern. Certainly
Alexander is trying to state in static terms the dynamic
"has been tested every way only without sin " (.deb.4:15)
and his discussion does have a certain eschatological
dimension, yet the terms in which he expresses this dynamic
element, that is, in static terms and in the categories of
time and timelessness, of finitude and the infinite, lend
an air of unreality to the real deliberations, the real
elections Christ had to make. He finds it hard to accept
the fact that Christ became "sin for us". (2 Cor. 5:21).
Arising out of the use of phrase "naturae
ignorantis" of John of Damascus there came a suggestion that
the soul of Christ was ignorant. The reply to this
suggestion is: "non sequitur de natura animae, sed natura
humana; non tamen de ea ut in se consideratur." Again
the possibility of human limitations to Christ's knowledge
has been removed. The phrase "non gratia" (that Christ had
ail cognition) in John also raised a problem but the grace,
in solution of this problem, is taken to refer to general or
20
adoptive grace, not to the grace of union. But once
again, it must be asked, if this grace is to do away with
any characteristic of human knowledge, of finitude, how
similar was Christ to man? In making certain of the Divinity
of Christ in this way, is not Alexander in danger of losing the
humanity? This is almost the reverse of kenoticism.
15. 21(L),cL)p.l49. 20. Footnote ,p. 144: 21(L) ,e)p.l49
It is also asked whether Christ had "liiapidissimam
scientiam" which, it is argued, would seem likely as his
knowledge had no inter-mixture with its opposite, ignorance.
Alexander comments that "perspicuitas scientiae" is either
"impermixta" with its opposite and this is either its
"privatio" which is ignorance or "negatio" which is
21
"nescientia"• In "L" "limpidissimum" is defined as follows
"limpidissimum dicitur non habet de suo contrario sibi
permixtum. Sed hoc potest esse quatuor modis quia
impermixtum potest dicere remotionem oppositi quod est
neecientia, vel quod est ignorantia, vel impermixtionem
passibilitatis ex parte recepturi, vel (in) permixtionem
unitionis ex parte receptivae potentiae." In the state of
innocence for Adam and the angels there was no ignorance, in
the state of glory there will be no passibility or ignorance,
but some "nescientia" will exist till judgement day. flone of
these three, states Alexander, were in the knowledge of
Christ "permixta tamen erat secundum quoa unita erat
« 22
principio sciendi, scilicet extra. Although there may be
a suggestion in the footnote of pp.133-134 that Christ had
"nescientia" (and perhaps this is the implication of the
comment from "A£"), yet the general tenor of these arguments
is the same as before: Christ as man had full and perfect
knowledge, a knowledge of which it might be asked whether it
had the mark of finitude. Christ knew everything at the same
time and all at the one glance and with the utmost clarity.
21. 12,p.145; footnote, pp.153-134- 22. 20(L),p.l48
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In a similar vein there is a comment in distinction
XVI on the contemplation of God by Ghrist. It is noted that
there was a contemplation in the identity of nature and so
Christ did perfectly contemplate God as the Son of God; in
the identity of person and so Christ, the man, contemplated
God perfectly; there is a contemplation of Goa by a person
in the identity of a "specialis natura" and so a pure man in
paradise perfectly contemplates God; there is a contemplation
in its own nature, not through identity but through glory only,
23
and so only the angels contemplate God perfectly. ^ The
possibility that Christ's contemplation did not pertain to
the state of glory because it was "in via" is denied because
24
his contemplation was not "de via".
The argument here is somewhat like the fundamentalist
argument on the Bible: it is the Word of God therefore it is
infallible in all respects and in all things. This is not to
judge the Bible on its own ground. Similarly to argue:
Christ is the Son of God, therefore he knows all things is
not to argue from God in Christ as revealed in Scriptures
but is to argue from a preconceived idea of a God who cannot
take the form of a servant although he was in the form of God;
it is a God who cannot have anything to do with finitude or
its marks.
In spite of all this, there is an attempt by
Alexander to state the human limitations of knowledge in
Ghrist - although a statement that the soul of Christ "ita
23. d.XVI,3,pp.171-172. 24. 9(L),p.l73; similarly 10(B),p.174
tot scit, quot ipse Be us vel Filius Dei" through grace and
2S
not by nature y does cast doubt even upon the following
attempt. Hugo of St. Victor had made a similar statement
when he said the soul of Christ was "aeque sapiens non tamer
aequalis in sapientia." Alexander's comment on this is as
follows: "ad quod sciendum quod 'aeque' dictur sapiens,
quoniam tot scit; sed non 'aequalis' dicitur, quia Deus
clarius et liiapiaius scit quam anima Christi, quoniam
'Filius Dei habet per naturam hoc quod anima Christi habet
p£1
per gratiam". In the footnote it is explained that the
"•aeque' sapiens" refers to the number of things known
27
according to theoretical knowledge. "L" explains why there
is not "aequalis scientia". ('Sapientia' and 'scientia* are
used interchangeably here). "Aequalis enim /respicit/ non
numerum scitorum, sed modum scientiae et unitatem scientiae."
28
Thus what is known is equal but not the knower or the knowing.
A similar distinction is made when it is asked whether the
soul of Christ had knowledge of creation. The soul of Christ,
it is answered, had a "cognitiva" knowledge of everything
29
but it did not have an "operativa" knowledge of everything.^
There is the suggestion raised in a footnote that such
knowledge would not be knowable by a pure creature, but
there is the answer: "Unde contulit animae Christi quantum
potuit purae creaturae conferre" as Christ had the fulness
30
of knowledge "sine mensura". ^ In kenoticism this is the
sort of language used of the Divine knowledge in Christ;
25. d.XIV,5iP«143. 26. 10,pp.144-145; Hugo of bt.Victor,
Be sacram. Christ, fidei.II.p.l.c.6. 27- footnote, a)p.l45.
28. 17(L),p.l47. 29. 13,pp.145-146; 22(L),p.l49.
30. footnote, c;pp.145-146.
here it is meant to refer to his human knowledge. As the
one does not go far enough in asserting the Divinity, the
other has gone too far in denying the humanness. It does
seem to remove Christ a great deal from the human and sinful
situation in which man lives.
In regard to both "voluntas" and "potentia" a
similar distinction is made between the cognitive ana the
operative so that Christ's soul is said not to have had the
operative "voluntas" nor did he receive omnipotence as he
31
received omniscience (omniscience does not posit causality.)
In both of these aspects Alexander's solution seems more
compatible with Christ's humanity simply because the operative
element is absent. In regard to knowledge, however, the
cognitive element appears to be the essence of the knowledge
and the cognitive-operative distinction has its limitations
except as a way of affirming that the soul of Christ was not
equal in knowledge to the knowledge of God.
The problem of the knowledge of Christ is always
a most difficult subject and criticism of a point of view is
far easier than a positive affirmation about it. There are,
however, several problems in the foregoing discussion.
Firstly, the possibility that Christ was limited in his human
knowledge is not admitted in spite of Pope Leo's statement
that the boy Christ was in no way different from other boys.
Allied with this, is the hint that any growth, even of the
body, is a sign of corruption. This position of Alexander
31. 14,p.146.
cannot be regarded as satisfactory and raises doubts as to
the real humanity of Christ. Ignorance is equated with
imperfection and yet it is part of finitude to be lacking
in full knowledge; it is a part of humanity and it was
Adam's sin not to accept this limitation. Behind this
position of Alexander, besides the attempt to maintain the
Divinity of Christ, there lies the idea that the movement of
time and change are corrupt or at least incompatible with
God who is timeless and changeless. A negative theology too
rigorously applied may limit the concept of God and makes
incarnational theology difficult at best. The second problem
is that the body but not the soul of Christ had experimental
knowledge of punishment. There was no sign of "corruption"
in the soul of Christ at all. (A side question here is, if
the soul could not suffer penalties which the body had to
for man, why was Christ's body not also exempted as that was
equally Divine, equally human ) The serious problem is the
possibility that, if Christ's soul did not suffer, - temptations,
the anguish of Gethsemane, surely belong to the rational part
of the soul - then Chrxst was not tested as we are, in fact,
he was not really man as far as his soul was concerned. Again,
behind this thinking is the idea that merely to step into this
corrupt world is to be corrupt. (This is seen, for instance,
in the result of original sin; to be born is to incur "fomes"
£
which is pronness to sin and a cause of sin, a "macula" which
is "carentia debitae iustitiae." ^ ) This kind of concept
32. Bk.II,d.XXXII,I,p.3Q5.
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approaches actual dualism rather than Christian dualism which
maintains that evil is not part of creation as such and
therefore the finite is not imperfect as such. The problems
involved in the division of soul and body (or a similar
division) are discussed especially in the following sections
of this chapter. The third problem which is closely connected
with the second, is the fact that Christ is said to have
"evacuated" his knowledge of the experience of his suffering
when he left this world. This raises two questions: i) can
it be claimed then that he was more than just the appearance
of man, not really taking humanity up into himself. Wot only
in regard to the experience of suffering must one ask this
question but also one must ask whether Christ's elective and
deliberative knowledge being "in termino" really involved the
taking of our humanity into his or is the humanity so removed
from ours as to be irrelevant or even not humanity at all? ;
ii) a related question is: what of the eternal intercession
and advocacy of Christ on our behalf? Can he intercede if
he has "forgotten", that is, if he is no longer one of us or
if he is "in termino" and not "in via"? (cf. Heb. 4:4-16)
The biblical position would appear to be that our humanity,
finite humanity, is taken up in Christ to the Father for ever
and that it is by this that humanity is justified and sanctified.
(Perhaps it is significant that, according to Alexander, once
Christ has performed his task of satisfaction he can then
discard his humanity i.e. grace does the rest.) The
humanness of humanity, that is, finite knowledge and experience,
is not something to be left behind. This position, again,
involves great difficulties but some concession has to be made
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towards it or a purely monophysite position is taken up.
iC/is-\£j .
There have been two errors made by Alexander here.
If he noted these he would not have solved his problems but he
would have been prevented in going too far towards the
deification of Christ's humanity. First, he has not worked .
within the formula of Chalcedon but rather has been very much
nearer to an Apollinarian position. For instance, what he
means by "anima" is rarely clear but here as elsewhere the
"without division, separation,change, or confusion" should
operate. "Anima Christi" and "Christus" are used
xx xn
interchangeably ^ , and as "anima" is creaturely the result
then should be that when one reads "anima Christi" then it
35
can be taken to mean Christ with certainly a human reference.
But then the "anima Christi" cannot be simply identified with
"God" as seems almost to be the case. The soul of Christ is
i
related to "God" - or the Father - in the Son, that is, in
the Person in whom the humanity is hypostasised and ih whom a
real twoness, that is, of full man and full God, is possible.
This means that in the soul there is also full God and full
man. This leads to the second and more fundamental error
that Alexander has made, the fact that he does not work
within the Trinitarian framework so that the God he sees in
the union is not only the second Person but God in toto
(i.e. God in three persons or God in himself). To ally this
conception with the idea of God as the One who cannot become
flesh, the God defined in terms of omnipotence and omniscience
33. Bk.III,d.XIV,21(L),p.l48; II,p.145. 34. 15,pp.146-147.
35« cf. 14,p.146.
apart from Christ, and not in terms of the Son who became
the servant, means that the humanity of Christ understood in
the context of a God so conceived must tend to become absorbed
into the Divinity to have any contact at all. Alexander
has not adhered to a distinction which he had made previously
(to ensure the honour of God, it should be noted, not to
state the possibility within God of the incarnation i.e. for
the same reason as he equates the terms here) that "God"
refers both to "nature" and to "Person" but this must not
aiean the simple equation of "nature" and "Person" (an
equation which he tended to make however when he moved from
the uniting to the union). Here, in this discussion, "God"
has been thought of interchangeably as "nature" and "Person".
This "nature" of God is defined in terms of the One, and not
in terms of the self-expressing Creator God. Thus the
"humanity of God" becomes very nearly conceptually impossible.
In spite of this Alexander andagreat part of the history of
Christian doctrine have steadfastly tried to maintain, within
these terms, the incarnation of the Son of God, and, it must
be admitted, have succeeded to such an extent in taking it
seriously that the theology of the twentieth century can cut
directly across the same presuppositions and yet maintain that
it is perfectly orthodox, simply because, like its predecessors,
it had to take the incarnation seriously.
ii) Passibilit.y.
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In distinction XV Alexander is on solidly
traditional ground in regard to the passion of Christ.
According to John of Damascus, who is quoted without comment,
Christ assumed "omnes naturales et indetractihiles passiones",
taking upon himself all those things which are of man "praeter
36
peccatum" which comes from the Devil and not from God.
But this is as far as Alexander or tradition goes and the
reason for this is simple when one considers various
definitions of "passiones": "Passio est mot us irrationalis
anirnae suspicionem boni et mali," ^ or "Motus... secundum...
38
quod immoderate et praeter naturam, passiones sunt," ^ or
the comment of "L" on this, quoting Aristotle, "passiones
39
involuntariae sunt," 'J and so Alexander can state simply
"Christus non habuit passiones" as a comment on Dionysius'
statement: "Qui enim sunt veritatis amatores, a passions
hO
recedunt materialium." Consequently, having described
"passiones" as irrational, immoderate, and involuntary so
that the word approaches the meaning of the modern English
word passion as commonly used, and although it is also in
Latin applied to Christ's suffering (as the "Passion of
Christ" in modern English), it can be applied to Christ
only with utmost caution.
The fact that the idea of passion spills over into
the idea of suffering means that the latter is tarred with the
same brush which raises considerable problems, quotations
36. d.XV,2,p.131; John of Damascus, De Eide 0rth.lli.c.2Q.
37* 3»P«152; John of Damascus, Ibid.II,c.22. 33. 11,p.134;
fleraesius, De datura riominis.c.16. 39» 32(L),p.l61;
Aristotle, Ethica Dicom.II,c.3» 40. 8,p.133; Dionysius,
Bpist.lQ (ad loan.Evan?,. J
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from Seneca John of Damascus , and Hilary particularly
demonstrate the interchangeability of meaning. For instance
in Hilary:
"Gum haec passionum genera infirmitatem carnis
afficiant, Deus, cura Verbum caro factum est, non potuit
a se demutabilis esse patiendo. Verbum enim, quoniam
caro factum est, licet passioni se subciiderit, non
tamen demutatum est passibilitate patiendi. Ham pati
potuit, passibile esse non potuit; quoniam passibilitas
naturae infirmae significatio est, passio autem est
eorum quae sunt iilata perpessio." 43
Hilary obviously is referring to Christ's suffering but
equally obviously the meaning "passion" is included in the
thinking on suffering. The fact that Alexander sees fit to
quote this where he is discussing "passions" is evidence that
he did not see any difference in meaning between the words
"passion" and "suffering". However, as the quotation from
Hilary makes evident, Christ did suffer in some way, a fact
which obviously could not be avoided in a biblically based
cross-centred Christology. It is true that Christ did not
suffer for himself, that is, for his own faults, as is
beautifully stated by Ambrose in a quotation used by Alexander:
"Confidenter tristitaam nomino, qui crucem praedico. Ut homo
habuit tristitiam, quam meo suscepit affectu: mihi
compatitur, mihi tristis est, mihi dolet. Hrgo pro me et in
me doluit, qui pro se nihil habuit quod doleret. Doles
igitur, Domine Iesu, mea vulnera, non tua; quia tu non pro
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te, sed pro me doles." The fact that the cause of Christ's
41. 14,pp.135-156; Seneca, De Constantia sapientis.c.3.
42. 16,p.156; John of Damascus, De Fide Orth. lil.c.26.
43. 20,p. 157; Hilary, De S.ynodis,n.49 . 44. Ambrose,
De Trinitate. Lib.II,c.753; 30(L),p.l60.
suffering lay outside himself nobody could or would deny.
Christ suffered for others. This fact Peter Lombard also
expressed when he said "cravit pro nobis et totura fecit, et
non pro se, quoniam non timore mortis, sed causa nostras
45
salutis cravit." y However, it is one thing to state that
Christ suffered on our behalf and it is another thing to talk
about Christ's "propassions", or to throw doubt on the extent
of Christ's suffering.
The basis of the idea of propassion and similar
ideas is found in the traditional objection to passion (in
the modern sense) so that Christ is said not to have suffered
passion (which implies culpability) but only from its repults.
This we see in the following quotation:
"Nota quod est infirmitas movens illecebras, ut
voluptatem. Est etiam infirmitas movens angustias
culpabiles. Est etiam infirmitas movens angustias
poenales et non cuipabiles; et talis dividitur in
passionem et propassionem. Prima autem non erat in
Christo; secunda autem erat in.Christo. Unde
propassio in Christo erat, quoniam ilia surgit in
nobis volentibus. Passio est autem ilia rnclinatio.,
quae est inordinatio, ad consensual." 46
The first distinction between an infirmity which is culpable
and an infirmity which leads to punishment and non¬
culpability is compatible with the position of Ambrose, as
stated, and is perfectly acceptable, but the division within
the non-culpable infirmities (the penal infirmities) between
passion and propassion is more questionable. It has been
admitted that passion in the modern sense is unacceptable
45. Peter Lombard Glossa on Heb.5:7; 21,p.15?.
46. 5,p.152.
in relation to Christ but the problem lies in the fact that
the Latin word "passio" covers both the meaning "passion"
and the meaning "suffering". Thus Christ is said not to
have suffered but to have "prosuffered". Further, if the
word "passio" does mean only passion, there must be some
doubt as to whether the concept "propassio" needs to be used
because, according to the quotation, "passio" is non culpable
that is, no sin arises, only an inclination. If this
"passio" is excluded it may be wondered whether Christ was
"tempted like as we are, except without sin."
However, it is the element of suffering in "passio"
that is now of interest and this is probably more decisive
in the understanding of Christology in regard to the humanity
of Christ. It is in the marginal notes of Codex ,!A" that the
clearest statements appear but these are in the same tenor as
the other parts: "Nihil repentinum ex parte superioris
rationis; ex parte vero sensualitatis aliquid fuit subitum,
47
et hoc modo propassio." This was the answer to the
suggestion that there could have been nothing sudden or
unforeseen in Christ. In the same section there is this
note after the answer to the question whether Christ could
have suffered in the superior part of the reason or not: "In
Christo ratio superior ut ratio, prout ordinatur ad corpus,
passibilis fuit et patiebatur; non autem prout uniebatur
48
divinitati." This distinction between the superior
(Godward) and the inferior (bodyward) part of reason is also
47- 54,e)p.l69. 48. 54,g)p.l70
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found in another statement commenting on a passage attributed
49
to Jerome in which propassion was seen as a venial sin.
It was stated that this passion was not in Christ, "est
autem passio secundum integram naturam sensualitatis et haec
fuit in Christo." ^ The distinction within the soul is
described most clearly when Alexander replies to the
queotion whether Christ was "passibilis... secundum corpus"
in which answer the place of the soul in this regard is
discussed:
"potest sumi anima ut anima, et sic dicit
comparationem ad corpus cui unita est; vel anima ut
spiritus in quantum coniuncta est divinitati. Primo
modo passibilis est, secundo modo non, scilicet
secundum rationem. Praeterea 'pati' dicit actum,
•passibilis' dicit naturam; inde, cum natura patiendi
non sit in Deo, non potest dici passibilis tamen
dicitur 'passus' propter coniunctionem in quantum
homo." 51
The distinction of act and nature is expressed in another
way in Codex "A" in the solution to the question whether
Christ suffered according to the superior part of reason or
not: "Concedo quod secundum quod comprehensor nullam
52
sustinuit passionem, sed in quantum viator fuit." y Thus
there have been several ways of expressing the Godward and
the bodyward elements in Christ. The relation of these
various statements is not clear but if the main distinctions
or points are listed the pattern becomes clear, a) In the
superior part of the reason there is no suffering but there
is in the sensuality; b) in the superior part of the reason
^9. 9»pp.153-54. Footnote 2,p.154: "Glossa ordin. in h.l. ap.
Lyranum; non legitur ap.Hieronyraum." 50. 31(1),b)p.161.
51. 38(L),p.l63. 52. 54(A),g)p.170.
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as reason united to divinity there is no suffering but the
superior part of reason as reason in relation to the body
was sufferable and suffered; c) when it is suggested
that propassion is venial it is stated that suffering existed
in the sensuality ( cf. a) ); d) the soul as soul in its
relation to the body, to which it is united, is sufferable
but the soul as spirit, that is, according to reason, is
not (this is similar to but not the same as b) ) ; e)
Christ "suffered" in act but he was not subject to suffering
by nature, i.e. he was not "sufferable"; f) he did not
suffer in the superior part of reason as a "comprehensor" but
did as a "viator". This last could be applied to ail the
preceding points.
The problem here is very similar to the problem of
the knowledge of Christ. Once again the Divine man seems to
have been unable to have much contact with the mariness, in
this case, the suffering of man. In all these contrasts there
is essentially an Apollinarian viewpoint expressed and even a
hint of doceticism, namely, that Christ appeared to be man
(in act) but was not actually man (not sufferable). The
accusation of Apollinarianism is surely not extravagant for
there seems to be nothing human at all in the spiritual part
of the soul (the Godward element), an accusation which might
be supported by the fact that Alexander maintains there was
something which suffered in Christ, the inferior part of the
53• See p.2L7Ebelow. The same kind of divisions are made in
relation to merit. In that discussion it does appear that the
body and God have a very similar relation to the soul in Christ.
Thus, is the soul the mediator?
reason related to the body, the sensuality. If the spiritual
part of the soul was not liable to suffering, then it seems
wrong to admit suffering of any description in Christ, who
was, after all, totally the full man and full God. If,
however, any part of Christ was not subject to suffering and
the other part was, then there appears to be an Apollinarian
division in Christ. One can see the dangers that Alexander
is guarding against and the point he is making. The dangers
are the possibility of sin being attributed to Christ and of
patripassianism. (In the rejection of suffering, however, as
seen in the quotation on the bottom of page Alexander has
the same presupposition as the patripassianists, namely, that
"God" (either as "Father" or "all" God) was in the incarnation.
Alexander concludes, however, going further, that anti-
patripassianism requires that Christ as "God" was not
"passibilis".) The point Alexander is making is that Christ
was buffeted by suffering and passions and yet withstood
their temptations. Nevertheless, the way of expressing this
point is inadequate for Christ was not only buffeted from
without or bodily but also from within or in the superior
(Godward) part of the soul, to use the language of Alexander;
he was not only buffeted in a part of his soul but he was also
buffeted totally by temptation and suffering, that is, he took
them upon himself, he was a man of men. There can be no doubt
that he consented to suffering and so used the total mind.
It would be truer to the biblical picture possibly, in drawing
upon the daring words of Paul that Christ became "sin for us",
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to reverse Alexander's position to state that Christ was
"passibilis", that is, fallen or by nature subject to
suffering and passion, but that he did not fall in "act".
Christ took original sin upon himself. Such was the
condescension of the Father in the Son to man. Yet Christ
did not incur guilt himself; through his obedience to God
Christ did not sin himself.
Alexander could not have possibly said this because
to partake of full manhood, to partake of finitude, to
partake of change and corruption, in themselves tend to
corruption, to sin. Under such terms a full incarnation
would be impossible - God and man could have no point of
contact in the Son because creation by its present nature
excludes God. If sin is creation's breaking away from God,
and God is seen as the "One" unable to come into contact with
accidents and not as the Trinity who makes the "nevertheless"
in the Son, who is obedient amidst disobedience, then it
would appear that creation itself is sinful. If belonging
to creation is sinful inevitably, so too would the Son (of
the "One") have been if he became sufferable, that is, if he
became really part of cx-eation by becoming man. However,
finitude, change, creation of themselves, that is, as part of
God's creation, are not sinful; only the disobedience of the
finite and the changing is, and this disobedience the Son of
Man overcame by his own obedience to the Father in the finite.
The circle of sin was thus broken. To put it another way. The
Reconciler does not by his incarnation partake of the separation
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of creation; rather separated creation is reconciled by the
Reconciler only because he has crossed the gap between God and
separated creation. Alexander does not begin completely from
this fact of the "Word made flesh" to state the possibilities
of God in suffering, but rather from a God apart from Christ*
Hence his Apollinarian or even docetic position arises.
This is essentially Alexander's position for all
practical purposes. The affirmation "and behold it was very
good" affirmed in Christ, is not taken with complete
seriousness. A practical dualism is the result. The fact
that all men are sinners begins to become an assertion of the
sinfulness of creation.
This sinfulness in Alexander's view, however, does
not necessarily exclude some element of goodness; it means
merely that there is nothing perfectly good. Consequently
there is a complementary position which arises in part out
of the belief in the incompatibility of Creator and creation
because of the Creator's inability to make contact, and that
is for the creation to make contact. Creation makes contact
by the superior part of reason which is the "Divine" part.
In man it is subject to sin but has an ability for God and
can be purified; in Christ the soul practically becomes
Divine - at worst an Apollinarian view, at best a liutychean
view of the soul. Creation's ability to make contact in a
more obviously human form than in Christ as presented by
Alexander is found in the concepts of the free will and created
grace. These doctrines are discussed in a separate chapter.
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Before this particular discussion is "brought to a
close the way Alexander sees fear, grief, and sadness, the
concrete "passions" in Christ should he investigated as this
hears on the problem. As passion they are excluded but there
is also, therefore, a tendency to exclude the human.
At the beginning of distinction XV Alexander states
that if "timor" and "dolor" were in Christ "secundum aliquam
54
vim animae" it was in the "vim sensibilera." ^ Then there arises
the problem of the relationship of fear to the body. Fear,
says Alexander, is not in the soul through the body but
something is made in the body from fear "ut pallor et
55
huiusmodi." This is not particularly significant but of
more significance is the statement which follows a little
later: "Est unus timor in quo non compatitur corpus, et
alius in quo compatitur corpus /scilicet timor materialis et
56
timor rei novicae y /; ut timqce Deurn timox*e filiali vel
timore obedientiae, non patitur secundum corpus; sed quando
timet gladium vel aliquid terribile extrinsecum, tunc
compatitur corpus." ^7 (Potest taraen dici facilius quod
timor non sentitur per corpus, licet, passionem efficiat
in corpore." ) The parallel passage in "L" points out that
the body does not suffer in filial fear because filial fear
59
exists "in patria." 'J If one looks for a sign of humanity
in this fear then this search would apparently be in vain for
it has little if anything to do with sinful humanity and would
54. I,p.l50. 55. Ibid. 56. Footnote,p.150. 57. 1,
pp.150-151. 53. Footnote,p.151. 59. 22(L),p.l58.
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be better classed as a virtue, certainly not as a "passion".
Natural fear or the fear of material punishment (as it is
in "l") gets nearer to humanity but still it has little to do
with our sinful humanity and its problems.
The problem of fear is again discussed at some
length later in the distinction. Several fears are listed:
natural fear by which the soul does not wish to separate from
the body; reverential fear which is "secundum rationem" and
will remain in paradise; initial fear which is the doubt as
to whether one can satisfy for one's sin or not; servile
fear which is the fear of eternal punishment; worldly fear
in which we fear the loss of worldly goods; human fear in
which we fear wounds and the like; sensual fear which is
twofold: that common to men and animals, or that in man only
and this is twofold also: "aut est ut fuit ille quern habuit
ante peccatum, aut est ut est corruptae naturae per peccatum.
Primo modo dicitur timor irrationalis impetus ex terribili
apprehenso; secundo modo est timor propassio." And so Jerome
said "subitus motus cui non consentitur propassio est;
accedente autem consensu, passio est, et tunc more in domo."^1
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•This passage attributed to Jerome has been referred to before
and raised a difficulty, which is referred to in "L", because
the propassion of this passage is described as venial and
therefore was not in Christ at all. (The usage appears to be
different from what Alexander on other occasions has in mind.)
60. See chapter on grace. 61. 9»PP-153-1!?4-. 62. See page 19^
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Then in this same section of "b" in which the various fears
are also listed the following comment is made: "Est autem
passio secundum integrara naturam sensualitatis, et haec fuit
in Ghristo. Timor reverentiae fuit in Christo secundum
superiorem £>artea rationis. Timor naturalis fuit in eo
secundum inferiorem naturam; timor mundanus, humanus, vel
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initialis, vel servilis, non." Reverential fear is
obviously the same or almost the same as filial fear;
certainly it is in the same category. Natural fear, here the
fear of death, does come nearer our sinful humanity but it is
in the inferior part of the reason or the soul and as such
could not be the fear which gripped the whole Christ in the
garden of Gethsemane or particularly in the cry of dereliction.
It is not the fear that humanity has and Christ had and this
is made abundantly clear in the statement "Christus autera amore
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natural! mori timuit; appetitur autem rationali voluit raori.
One feels that there is something of a suggestion of a fraud
in this statement; Christ would have escaped from the real
fear of death and the fear of separation from God. To be sure,
it cannot be said that Christ did not have a certainty but it was
a certainty held against uncertainty. In Christ the assurance
and the fear were held together, the "No" and "Yes" of God
were held together, at the same level and in the total man.
element
It was the obedience, not the rational which was decisive.
A
Alexander does not see it this way; the "No" is in the
63» 31(L),b)p.161. 64. 31(b),a)p.161; see also 12,p.l53»
background, inferior to the "Yes", and is not part of the
total Christ. Yet it is only when man sees Christ taking
God's "Ho" upon himself, in its full force, in all its
aspects, that man is also certain of God's "Yes" to him.
A Christ who had only reverential fear in his whole person
makes one ask whether the Eternal has taken our time to
Himself. In Alexander's view of Christ the Eternal merely
exists along side our time in an Apollinarian way.
The reason for Alexander's position on fear is
stated clearly: "Christus non habuit timorem, quoniam non
habuit causam timoris, id est peccatum; et quoniam non ex
necessitate, ut nos, sed ipse quia voluit, timuit; et
quoniam non timorem habuit passionem, sed propassionera; et
quoniam non eo fine quo nos. Et sic patet qualiter per otanes
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causas timoris removetur timor ab ipso." y For the same
reason "ira cum perturbatione" could not be present ;
"ira per zelum" as act but not as "passio" could have been
in Christ "tristitia" and "dolor" could have been only
in the inferior part of reason or as a propassion
and it is explained that Christ was sad not for his own
condition but for the corruption of our infirmity (Peter
70Lombard). ' Thus Alexander effectively excludes any
possibility of conceiving Christ as a sinner but he also
limits drastically the possibility of conceiving his co-
humanity with us, that is, as one who accepted the
65. 10,p.154. 66. 3,p.151; 28(L),a)p.l59. 67. 6,pp.152-
153} 28(L),b)c)pp.159-160. 68. 4,pp.151-152. 69. 26(L),
p.159. 70. 17,p.156; Glossa in Ps.30.
consequences of our sin, its inevitable corruption. Behind
this failure once again lie the twin presuppositions: the
idea of God as the "One" and immutable; and the idea that
the temporal and changing as such are corrupt, that is, are
evidence of passion. His presupposition that passions (as
sin) are impossible in Christ must be accepted, but his
extension of the meaning of "passio" to include suffering
or the results of sin, and, in fact, "humanity" or
"temporality" is not acceptable. In the company of much
theology he has excluded one Greek element of gods with
passions and defended himself against Patripassianism only
to include another basically Greek element of God as
immutable, and immutability as the "good" which excludes
far more than passions.
There are finally two matters raised on the subject
of the defects or passions in relation to Christ and these
are important to demonstrate that "passio" does mean
"suffering" and also to demonstrate what has already been
stated on the limited Christology of Alexander. The question
arises as to why Christ assumed defects. Peter Lombard's
answer had been that Christ thus showed a true humanity,
fulfilled the work for which he had come, and had given us
hope. Alexander states that the first reason refers to the
"naturam susceptam", the second "ad medicamentum vulneris",
and the third "ad spem meriti. Plures non possunt esse
gradus; vel ratione naturae sumptae, vel liberando a malo,
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the second reason "scilicet eolutionem poenae".
Obviously the defects include the suffering of Christ and
so "passio" must be understood to mean both "passion" and
"suffering", 'ihis presupposition leads, as has been seen,
to a limitation of the humanity of Christ; and the "act
ostensioneia verae humanitatis" is lacking in that a full
bodied view of Christ, who rendered not only passive obedience
but also active obedience, is not ful]ydeveloped, The person
and work of Christ is limited practically to satisfaction
(that is, to passive obedience; for his defects were "ad
spem merit!", that is, they are merely an example of what
can be done. Consequently, from this direction there is no
movement towards a broader and fuller view of the humanity of
Christ to combat any Apollinarian tendencies, Satisfaction
in Alexander demands only "a man", not a man who renews our
sinful humanity by including in himself the whole of sinful
humanity. To Alexander satisfaction is basically a
transaction just between Christ and God to make amends for
original sin. Man's restoration from sin hardly finds a
place in Alexander's view of Christ.
iii) The two wills
In distinction XVII the matter of the two wills in
Christ is discussed. Significantly, it is not the human will
and the Divine will, but the sensual will and the rational will.
72. 4?(K),p.lfe5
Peter Lombard is claimed to have said "spiritus movetur
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sursum, caro autem d6orsum." " Alexander comments that
sometimes the sensual will wishes some thing, but the reason
will not; sometimes the sensual will wishessome thing and the
reason wills to wish that; sometimes the sensual will wishes
something and the reason wills its opposite. Augustine is
74
quoted to have said "omnia pacif'icata in Ghristo", and
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therefore in him the flesh does not will against the spirit. ^
At this point there are these bare comments and there are no
solutions given. The footnote (L), going on from where "An"
left off, states, however, that the sensual will in ohrist
was not contrary to the rational. ^ And in "L": "motu
sensualitatis nihil voluit quin ratio voluerit ipsam hoc
veile; nec sequitur contrarietas in voluntatibus, nisi sit
ex parte volitorum et iudicis, id est materiae et primi
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mcventis." '' This movement in Christ was meritorious because
all his movements were under reason and so every movement -was
ordained. The Divine will, as stated in another section,
according to John of Damascus, permitted Christ to suffer what
was "propria" naturally, for instance, in the death of Christ
where both as God and as man Christ handed himself" over to
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death. There is no comment on the quotation from John
in "Ab" but in "L" after the quotation it is suggested that
Christ's prayer, "Pater, si possibile est", was not in the
sensual. The reply is: "Xsta conditio (the prayer) /cadit/
73* Not found in Peter. 74* Probably Alanus ab Insulis,
Sententiae, n.23» 75* 4,p.l75* 7b* Footnote,p.175•
77* 161X7,p.179. 78. 3,p.175. 79. 6,p.176; John of
Damascus, De Fide Orth.IIi,c.18.
&ub ratione in quantum ratio gerit personam sensualitatis ut
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eius advocatus." Thus Christ's prayer was subjected to
the superior reason and the prayer itself (as indicated
Q1
elsewhere ) was not from the higher rational mar. The
discussion, it should be noted, is transferred from the
problem of the Divine and human wills (as it is in John of
Damascus) to a problem of the rational and sensual wills.
Alexander further states that these wills, two according to
number, are so ordered that one is subject to the other in
Christ, but in us one always tends downwards, the other tends
Qp
upwards. Then again, Alexander states, if it is admitted
that there was a sensual movement in Christ it was either
ordered or not. If it was ordered he did not repel it; if
it was not ordered he did not approve it. The solution to
this is that Christ ax>proved the movement arising but did not
approve it proceeding. The sensual movement was ordained
"quondam debitus erat, et quoniara indicativus suae
hunanitatis, et quoniam rectus." ^
The division of Christ into rational and sensual
parts has already been discussed in section ii) of this
chapter. It is significant (and it maintains an assertion
that has been made in this chapter that Alexander is
Apollinarian) that the wills discussed are not the Divine and
human wills but the rational and sensual wills. Here, however,
an aspect which was hardly touched upon in section ii) must now
be raised. In Alexander's terms, is it really possible that
80. 18(L),p.l79. 81. d.XV,31(b),a)p,161. 82. d.XVII,10,
p.177. 83. 11,p.177.
Christ could have had a sensual part? If it is wrong for
him to have had passion in his rational part, then it would
appear to be wrong for him to have had something at least like
it in his sensual part, for that was as much a part of the
Son of God or the Son of Man as the rational. Can there be
any suggestion at all of "caro autem deorsum?" If this was so
then in Alexander's terms God can have nothing to do with the
fleshly or sensual at all. Alexander states that Christ had
this "surge" which is described as a downward trend, and which
is controlled by the rational - but this must mean that the
downward trend, that is, the move towards sin, was also part
of the Son of God which would appear to be an impossibility.
The footnote "et ita voluntas sensualitatis in ipso non fuit
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contraria voluntate rationis" is an attempt to get around
the problem but, in fact, it just points up the fact that
there is a suggestion that the sensuality, unlike other
parts of Christ, needed controlling. The idea of an upward and
downward trend may have something to it if it was a matter of
the Divine and human wills, and even then it would be very
doubtful, but to have it as a division within the Son of God
(or the Son of Man) of itself practically admits a sinful
tendency In Christ in his sensuality, to be sure, controlled, yet
not as categorical as the "yet without sin" of debrews. In
Alexander Christ's sinlessness is maintained because the
temptation and the power of sin are minimised. It is accepted
84. Footnote, p.175*
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that Christ is in some way man - Chalcedon had stated that -
but the God in Christ is not understood to be capable of
union, and humanity (in Christ), qua humanity and over
against a God who hesitated at incarnation, was prone to sin.
Consequently this humanity and this God are to be Kept apart
in the sensual and the rational. However, this is not the
view of the Bible where Christ's sinlessness Is an amazing
•in spite of'. There the Word is not "almost man"; he is
man and yet sinless.
Alexander does not understand the division into the
rational and sensual to be within the Son of God or within the
Son of Man; the division is between the "man" element and the
"God" element in Christ. The dualism in which the flesh
tends downwards and the spirit upwards pushes Alexander very
near to Apollinarianism. The division of Christ in this way
and the use of the division at this point are evidexxce of the
fact that Alexander, in spite of the incarnation, draws back
from the idea of the bon of God stepping into a sinful world.
It should be noted that the problem of the bon of God coming
into the world, as it is found in Alexander, arises only when
it Is believed that the flesh bears downwards, that is, if the
temporal and the changing are thought to be corrupt as such;
if this is held not to be so, that in Christ it is seen that
this need not be so, then the problem of the Lncarxxation at
this point is resolved for dualis a is rejected.
In this distinction Alexander has been discussing
two wills. There have been two usages already - the Divine
will and the human will (to which John of Damascus refers) and
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the rational will and the sensual will. However, Alexander
is quite aware of the different usages of the word "voluntas"
for he lists a number. a) Christ has one will for himself
and another for the members; b) the will for himself was
either natural as the Son of God or natural as the Son of
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Man (the human declined death, the Divine wished to die);
c) the natural human will was either natural in itself or
"ex ordine ad divinam naturam" and so "the spirit is willing
but the flesh is weak"; d) the natural will in itself was
either rational or sensual; e) the rational element was
also twofold as it was moved either by the sensual or the
Divine; f) there is a will of man (of the "ratio")
in itself, and another of the same as it is united to the
Divine.®'' Of these only the second (b) has anything really
to do with the doctrine of two natures in the one Person in
Christ and consequently with the early Church's debate on the
wills of Christ. It is not the distinction with which
Alexander has been concerned.
iv) Humbling, and exaltation.
The tension between mutability and immutability,
time and eternity, in Alexander as applied to his thinking on
Christ is seen again in his discussion of the incarnation and
QO
resurrection. Following the thinking of Anselm and Peter
Lombard, Alexander quotes another statement of Peter Lombard
85. 20(L),p.l80. 86. Ibid; 29(H),p.189. 87. 9,pp.176-
177; 20(L),p.l80; 29(H),p.189. 38. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo,
I,c.8; Peter Lombard, Glossa on Phi1.2.9. ~
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on the exaltation of Christ in the resurrection: "divina
natura dicitur exaltata per ostensionem, quoniam coepit sciri
quod erat; sicut in assumptione carnis exinanita, quoniam
89
apparuit quod non erat." J Thus it might seem that the
Son's coming was only an appearance. This same element is
seen again in Alexander's answer to the question why the
Divine nature was said not to be humbled in the union, just
as the human was said to be exalted: "Dicendum quod in ilia
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unions non mutatur divina in aliqua, sed humana."
If Alexander is saying that God did not change into
man (on one interpretation of this passage) then by inference
he is also saying that in the exaltation the human nature must
have become something very near God, in other words, here is a
form of monophysitism. But if, on the other hand, Alexander
is not saying that God did not change, but rather is saying
that He was not humbled, then he also seems to be saying that
the Word did not become flesh yet all the same the human
nature was exalted to be with God. Alexander would not admit
a difference between "changed" and "humbled" but if he does not
then the incarnation, in his terms, is an impossibility and
man's exaltation, which depends absolutely upon the humbling of
the Bon of God, is also an impossibility. In "L" the answer
is different but no less unsatisfactory: "dicendum aliud quod
unio, quae erat medium inter divinam et humanam naturam, tantum
transmutavit humanam. Non enim alterurn illorum extremorum erat
89* 3»p.l90; Peter, loc.cit. 90. 3»b)p.l91
transmutabile•" ^ This attempts to avoid the inference
that either the Divine nature or the human nature changed but
Alexander seems to arrive at a "tertium quid" which still is
hardly human. If anything the possibility of union appears
to lie in the humanity. Alexander's position seems to be in
flat contradiction to Philippians 2.5-11 upon which Peter
was commenting.
To be fair to Alexander, he is trying to be true
to the humiliation and the exaltation of Christ and in so
doing to protect the Deity of Christ - a very difficult
problem. However, he is attempting to do this with apparently
the unbiblical presupposition of God as the "immutable One"
and not with the Trinitarian presupposition that God in the
Son humbled himself in the incarnation, a humbling which was
founded in the nature of the Trinity itself.
The tendency towards what must be called docetic
Christology in Alexander is seen again in the question as to
whether the soul was made "impassibilis" or not after
Christ's death. The answer is: "Dicendum quod post
separations in ipsius a corpora facta 6st impassibilis, quoniam
ipsa coniuncta corpori, habuit propassionem a corpore; sed
cum separata est et coniuncta divinitati, ex ilia parte facta
92
est impassibilis." J Christ's soul thus passed through the
world subject only to propassion and at death escaped its
taint. There is a significant footnote to the parallel
91. 25(L),c)p.200 92. 5,P.192.
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passage in "L" in which it is argued that the souls of the
3aints are impassible at death and therefore the soul of
Christ was "multo fortius." ^ Here again appears the
strong implication, already mentioned, that, if God cannot
become man, then man becomes something very near to God -
or at least a part of man does - partaking of the immutability
of God almost by right. Christ's soul is also understood
to be of the same type, a Divine soul. The implications of
this position have already been sufficiently discussed.
v) "In triduo".
In distinction XXII the doubts as to whether
Alexander carries out the "very God, very man" of the early
Church consistently in his thinking on all the life and
actions of Christ again arise in relation to Christ's death
and descent into hell. Alexander again appears to understand
Christ in such a way that one part, the soul, is more Godlike,
the other part, the body, is more human.
It is suggested that "in triduo", because he was
a priest and, as such, man, and because he was "rationalis
rations creata", Christ was a man in that period. However,
Alexander comments that Christ was by habit, not by act, a
priest "in triduo," and he was a priest in act only in the
94
passion and when the sacraments flowed from his side
93. Footnote, p.200. 94. d.XXII,1,2,a)pp.232-253
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(which he gave only as God, not as man). Further,
although the Son of God had a rational soul conjoined to
himself "in triduo" he was not thereby a man "quoniam oportuit
ad hoc quod esse homo, ut haberet animam rationalem tamquam
principium; sed sic habuit Filius Dei animam sibi
96
coniunctam in triduo."
Now Alexander turns to the place of the soul and the
"in inferno." After the warning of Augustine that "ne ita
divinitatem astruamus hominis, ut veritatem corporis
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auferamus," •" and that, because God is everywhere, it does
not mean that man is everywhere, Alexander seeks to explain
what is meant by Christ's ubiquity. As Creator he is
everywhere, as man he was in a particular place, and as a
creature conjoined to the Creator "in pluribus locis simul
98
esse potest." ? That is how it can be said that Christ was
in many places and, by implication, "in inferno". Peter
Lombard, however, had stated that Christ according to his
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soul only was "in inferno" . To justify this use of
"Christ" (in contrast to distinction VII where it had been
stated that "Christ" was the name of the two natures)
Alexander states that "Christ" sometimes means "personam
unitivam et sic in his singulis", and sometimes means
"unitum ex divina et humana natura", It would appear,
then, that Christ did not go into hell as full man (only as
soul) just as also in the tomb he was not full man (only body).
95. 15(L),a)p.257. 96. 2,b)p.253. 97. 5,a)p.254;
Augustine, Epist. 187|C.3»n.lO. 98. 5»b)p.254; cf. Bk.I,
d.XXXVII,3,pp.364-365. 99. d.XXII,2,Col.803 of Migne
edition. 100. 8,p.255«
The former position then raises the problem whether Christ
"apud inferos" could be called "redemptor" which in
distinction XIX is applied to him in his human nature.
Alexander responds "quod 'redemptor' dicitur vel usu, vel
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potestate, vel exhibitions motus humilitatis vel obedientiae."
"L" has a clearer answer (but the one which must have been
intended in "AE"): "'redemptor' dicitur vel habitu vel
actu, ut ibi dicitur /that is, "redemptor" in his nature/;
vel usu potestatis, exhibitions motus obedientiae vel
102
hurailitatis. Fuit ergo ibi redemptor usu potestatis."
In a similar way it is asked whether Christ was
"Jesus" during the three days* It appears that he could
not have been as he was not man, and "Jesus" is the name
"hominis individui." The various texts give different answers
to this. "AB" states tnat "Jesus" was either "nomen vocis"
or "nomen rei". As the latter he was "nomen" in habit or
"nomen" in act. Of these, in the first way, "Jesus" was
103
"nomen ipsius in triduo"; in the second way he was not.
"L" states that "Jesus" was "in triduo" in act because he was
1 OA
Saviour. "E" in the footnote states that "Jesus" as
"vox" was not "in triduo" but as "res": "Women secundum
vocem inditum fuit individuo homini. Fuit autem persona ilia
in triduo salvator actu." There is a plain contradiction,
it seems, between "AE" in the one hand and "L" and "E" on the
other. In spite of this, there can be no doubt that, according
101. 10,pp.255-236. 102. 22(L),p.259. 103. 12,p.256
104. 23(L),p.259» 105- Footnote, p.256.
to Alexander, Christ was dead only bodily during the three
days whatever the relation of Divinity and soul to this dead
body, and that in hell the body was absent.
When Alexander denies that Christ as "homo'1 was
"in triduo" he is maintaining that the body was really dead
but that the Divinity and the soul did not die with it. As
it is pointed out in distinction XXI, this does not mean that
the body escaped from the union for this union brought about
salvation; the Divinity remained inseparable from the body
in spite of one being alive and the other dead. (This is
what "L" and "E" were trying to maintain immediately above.)
Yet it would appear that this link was somewhat tenuous as
the Divinity and the soul went into hell without the body.
Thus, through a division of labour, as it were, the "dead
and buried" and the "descended into hell" are accomplished
but one wonders at what cost. Two questions must be asked:
first, was it really the Son of God too, that was "dead and
buried"; did the Son of God really take our punishment upon
his own shoulders and suffer our corruption? Second, was
Christ man in hell; if hell could be redeemed by power and
not by act and habit did this redemption have anything to do
with man or with Christ's work for man? If Christ went into
hell, as the Creed states, it was surely to overcome the powers
as man and for man. What Professor George hendry has said of
the Christ us Victor theory in part can be applied to this
thinking: "the theory conceives of the work of Christ in an
extremely objective manner as a transformation of the human
situation, but it gives no direct bearing on the (subjective)
human condition. The battle takes place over man's head;
he is, at most, a spectator of it, but he is not involved in
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it." In Alexander's thinking the battle might be said to
be taking place "under man's feet." Another pair of questions
should be asked, questions which have been asked of Alexander's
Christology all along: does the Word become flesh in
anything more than in an Apollinarian way; and, is there
not posited in the soul a possibility for God which thus
renders unnecessary a full incarnation?
vi) The merit of Christ.
In distinction XVIII the problem of merit is
discussed at length. As merit, in some sense, must indicate
an unachieved goal, it is evident that because Christ is a
"comprehensor" (a "comprehensor" is one who is in the state
of glory, who has arrived at the goal and consequently is
perfect) and immutable as the Son of God, both of which
indicate that no achievement was necessary (or possible)
some considerable difficulties must arise. Essentially
this, too, is the problem of eternity and time. The lines
for the solution have already been laid in the distinction
within the soul of Christ. Alexander now develops this
thinking in relation to merit.
The first problem raised is as follows: Christ as
far as his soul was concerned was in a state of comprehension
106. G.s>.Hendry, The Gospel of the Incarnation. Philadelphia,
1953,p.123.
which meant "fruebatur." Joy is however the result of merit,
not simultaneous to it. (This implies that at one time
Jesus was not a "comprehensor".) In reply Alexander states
that some have said that this apparent contradiction was
possible for Christ because he was both a "viator" and a
"co ;ipre hensor" in the soul and so he could have merited and
V 1
enjoyed God at the same tine. However, Alexander's main
answer is as follows:
"Dicendum quod in Ghristo sunt duae substantias,
scilicet anima et corpus. Sed anirnam est accipere
secundum inteilectivam partem vel secundum sensitivam.
Secundum autem inteilectivam dupliciter; aut enim in
comparatione ad cLivinam naturam, cui adiungitur aiediante
ratione, id est superiori parte; aut in comparatione
ad corpus cui adiungitur mediante sensualitate. Prirao
modo autem comprehensor erat Christus; secundo modo 107
viator, et sic meruit, quoniam ibi fuerunt propassiones."
This quotation summarises much of what has been stated in
earlier distinctions (See above in this chapter ii) ). It
brings out the "Godlikeness" of the soul which can be seen
in either an apollinarian way or as an element in man with
a capacity for God.
A particular instance of the problem of merit is the
fact that as a "comprehensor" Christ had perfect love which,
as such, could not gain merit. Alexander finds the solution
in the fact that merit was not in Christ as a "comprehensor"
but as a "viator". It is also objected that because Christ
had the highest love the prize had already been won for
1 AO
"quanta est caritas, tantum est praemium." Although
107* d.XVIII,2,p.190. 108. Alanus ab Insulis, Kc^ulae
theol. reg.90-91*
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Alexander admits that this is so he still answers
"nihilominus supra condignum praemiatur, quoniam merit urn
est temporale et praemium aeternum; ideo supra condignum
109
praemiatur, conferens aeternum pro temporali." y Thus
Christ could bring about some advance as a "viator", temporally
by merit, although as a "comprehensor" he did not bring about
any advance. This rnattGr of "more" involved in merit is
raised twice again. The phrase "virtus in infirmitate
perficitur" (2 Cor. 12:9) is interpreted as meaning "perfecta
ostanditur". ("non quod prius non esset perfecta."
In "L" it is explained that "plus" does not mean "maius" and
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the merits increased only "secundum numerum." Again,
beatitude, it is suggested, cannot be mixed with misery
("miseria") and therefore after the misery of the cross
Christ was more blessed than before. Alexander replies that
beatitude does not refer to the temporal state as felicity
does and thus, although it can be said that Christ was
"felicior", he was not, however "beatior"•
Christ is said to have merited by conserving what
he had, but in this, neither by acquiring what he did not have,
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nor by increasing what he had. in the same section
Alexander, following Alanus ab Insulis, gives several definitions
of "mereri." "Aut enim dicitur idem quod de non debito facere
debitum. Vel dicitur uti virtute meritoria. Vel dicitur de
debito habitus facere debitum usus; vel sicut bancti merentur
109. 4,a)p.l91. 110. 4,b)p.l91. 111. Footnote,p.191
112. 30(L),p.201; also 6,p.192. 11?. 7,pp.192-193.
114. 15,p.196.
nobis impetrando aliquid per preces ex meritis." Christ
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merited in the second and third ways. In "L" prior to all
these there is added another merit - "de congruo impetrare."
(This is probably a different type of merit - from "gratia
data gratis - and is not strictly speaking merit in the
medieval sense, i.e. a something done for which something
is owed) In "L" the last merit - prayers of the saints -
is omitted and in relation to the third definition "actus"
lift
replaces "usus." Thus Christ did not go from good or
bad to better but from good to "more goods".
If it is asserted that Christ merited then how did
he? Christ, it is said, merited from the beginning of his
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conception because he had the use of virtue. ' This would
imply, it is objected, that he had the use of free will from
the beginning of his conception which would not be possible
because "esse" is prior to "movere". In reply to this
objection Alexander states "ab instanti potest dicere
terminum extra sumptum, et sic vera est; vel terminum
intra sumptum, et sic falsa est. Unde dico quod anima in
lift
aliqua sui operations est sicut extra tempus." As this
stands, it appears that this is "soul" Christology going to
extraordinary lengths for what would be described as "man"
\
is not man at all. Christ, however, must be man to fulfil
his work. Up to this point Alexander has always maintained
this in some way. That this is not the original wording or
115. 15»PP 196-197; Alanus ab Insulis, Reg.Theol. reg.106.
116. 24(L),p.l99. 117. 12,pp.l95-T5bT^ 118. 13 *p.196
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that Alexander or a redactor saw the ambiguity of this
position is evident from both the "E" footnote and the
parallel in "L". In "E" it is maintained that there was a
119
movement of the free will in the uterus before birth, and
"L", after stating the same position as "AE", adds, "vel ut
proprius dicatur, agere poterat, quia quaedam actio animae
120
est praeter tempus." This is very much the same position
as "AE" but the qualification of "E" and the different wording
of "L" do indicate that probably free-willing ("movere") did not
take place outside the conception but only the "esse" was
existent. If this is so the first interpretation of the "AE"
statement, namely, that Alexander was placing both "esse" and
"movere" before time in the soul was not what was intended.
To place "esse" before time is to be expected - but merit had
still to take place in time.
Christ, however, is made out to be so unlike men of
this world that there is the possibility that he did not merit
at all, in other words he was not at all involved really in
the decisions of the world. For instance, it is suggested
that if the man in Christ were not united to the Word he could
have sinned. This, however, Alexander replies, was not possible
because the flesh itself was confirmed and that confirmation
would reamin. It would have been possible for the man to sin
121
only if he were never united to the Word. It was by the
122
grace of God and not by nature that he could not sin.
119. Footnote, p,196.n 120. 37(L),p.204. 121. d.XIII,6,
p.125; 14(L),p.l26.
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In "E" it is suggested that there was nothing praiseworthy
in not sinning necessarily. The reply to this is that
Christ was "liberate a se iustus" and so he deserved
praise: "naai si humana natura habeat hoc a Deo, hihilominus
125
a se habet, quia Deus et homo est una persona." At
another place it is again suggested that as Christ had the
grace of union which was "quodam modo" natural it might appear
that he was unable to merit because he would have done so
124
necessarily. This raises the problem what the grace of
union was. It does seem to be very like "gratia gratum
faciens" although Alexander replies to suggestions that Christ
did not merit by stating that he could not sin by a grace
after union. To the suggestions raised here Alexander replied
that Christ did not have the merit "condigni" but the merit
"congruitatis". * ^ The merit "condigni" is that to which
something is owed because the meriter has gone beyond that
which is required. The merit "congruitatis" is that in
which man has done something fitting before God. This is
the merit of "gratia gratis data" incidentally but the grace
of union and a grace after union could not possibly be
thought by Alexander to be such a grace* It would be too
lowly. Here Alexander means, one would imagine, merely
that Christ cannot "add" anything to his perfection which the
merit "condigni" would indicate. Merit "congruitatis" would be
entirely fitting for Christ. (One wonders how itoould be
123. 13(B),b)p.127. 124. d.IV,22(L),p.53-54
125. 21(L),p.53.
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transferred to other men, however, as the equivalent of
merit "condigni".) In these cases Alexander does make
an attempt to maintain Christ's humanity for, in Alexander's
terms, merit is a part of the human life.
In his doctrine of the merit of Christ, as in the
doctrine of his knowledge, his passibility and the two wills,
Alexander has made what would appear to be an unwarranted
distinction between the rational ana the sensual (or the
superior part of reason and the inferior part of reason) in
Christ, between Christ as "comprehensor" and "viator", and
between Christ in his immutability and Christ in his accidental
aspects. It is unwarranted for three reasons; i) As it has
been stated before, Christ cannot be so divided because it is
ultimately Apoilinarian. ii) The distinction means that the
whole Christ did not merit because the soul in its superior
part had no real part to play and so men's souls are thereby
not made whole entirely by Christ "for what is not assumed is
not healed." This view leads to iii) There is a difficulty
in seeing where the grace of God is at work uniquely in
Christ as man, that is, by the grace of union. For how can
God, as Alexander sees the situation and accepting the idea
that Christ had to merit, by grace working in the Godwards
part of the soul, effect the working of merit which is in the
sensual part of the soul? (Following the Anselmic requirement
chat only God could, only man should gain merit.) If the
answer is that there was one soul in Christ and therefore
by this God and man are united in one person this is a most
peculiar Christology for then the union is based in the
human soul - and nowhere does Alexander really attempt to
affirm this. The answer which is given, that the union is
personal, seems to become a fiction when the actual workings of
merit are described. In fact, at this point, Alexander would
appear to be not very far from Adoptionism in that Christ is
seen as man given a particular task to carry out by God, but
having done this job, he is then discarded for all intents
and purposes. His only real difference from other men lies
in his sinlessness, a state which presumably many will
eventually reach.
But Christ is far more than a sinless man who merits
he is the one through whom creation is reconciled to God by
his obedience as man to God, an obedience which was possible
only because God made a new creation In Christ in whom God
and man were reconciled. It is only within this framework
that merits and satisfaction have their place, namely, not
as something which earns rewards from God, but rather as a
way of describing God's grace towards man in the obedience
of Christ. Bin is more than a heinous offence seen as a
substance (or lack of substance) which can be removed by
satisfaction of punishment or merit (which could be made
by a pure man "engraced" by God to parallel Adam's sin);
sin, rather, results in a separation between God and man
which only God could bridge to bring man into obaaience again.
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The fact that the merits of Christ are the unique working
of God's grace in the person of Jesus Christ is not
emphasised enough by Alexander. The fact that grace also
works apart from Christ in this thinking further detracts from
Christ's uniqueness and brings him more to the level of man -
that is in his bodily aspect. Christ does not take our place
completely because Christ the man who is body is not
unequivocally God and man.
Behind this thinking is not basically the concept
I
of God as Trinity, but God as the one immutable being.
This presupposition prevents the development of a full and
proper Christology because, under these terms, God cannot
at all be conceived as incarnate; he stays above the vrorld
in the superior part of the soul of Christ, which is the
immutable timeless part of Our Lord. The doctrine of grace
is the attempt to overcome the impasse of God's immutability
but this attempt is unsatisfactory because it minimises Christ
as God and man. Further it implies, certainly in the substantial
terms that it is expressed, a form of semi-Pelagianism for if
an immutable God cannot be incarnate, man must reach to God -
assisted by created grace - and the instrument of this reaching
is the superior part of the soul. If one's doctrine of Christ
is such that God is not fully incarnate (a tendency towards
doceticism) or that Christ is not fully man (A ollinarianism),
both of which tendencies are in Alexander, or Christ is seen
as only man (Adoptionisui), then a form of Pelagianism must be
the result. Either way, that is, if God has not come to man in
Christ, or man has not come to God in Christ, man has to get
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to God. That conclusion is Pelagian.
In this chapter a grave doubt has been raised as
to the adequacy of Alexander's view of Christ's humanity.
This has been raised mainly because of a distinction between
the body and soul or of a distinction between the superior
part of the soul and the inferior part of the soul by
which Alexander detects a "Godward" part of Christ and a
"manward" part of Christ. The doubt as to his view of
Christ's humanity has not been resolved for Alexander fails
to maintain Christ's full humanity and his unique humanity.
This has been pointed out frequently in this chapter and there
is no further need for exposition of this point.
puaestiones
On the problem of suffering the ^uaestiones is
pi^obably clearer than, and adds something to, the Glossa.
It states that Christ assumed a soul with passibility because
1 Pfi
redemption was obtained through the passion. This means
that as satisfaction was to be made in the God-man for
greater satisfaction it had to be in both the body and the
soul. Thus on the part of the soul there was the will to
suffer, on the part of the body there was the suffering.
Unless there was the union of the soul to God it could not be
said that God wished to suffer, and unless the body was united




to God, it could not be said that God suffered. ' Further,
there was a similarity between the suffering in the soul of
Christ and that in demons, and there was dissimilarity.
Christ's soul as created spirit had passability "sicut habet
vertibilitatem in quantum est creatura", and besides this,
from the union of soul and body, it had compassibility whence
Peter Lombard on 1 Cor. 2:8 said the body suffered and died,
the soul did not die but "oonsufferad", and the Deity neither
suffered nor died. But there was dissimilarity. Although the
soul of Christ had coapassibility, it did not have the
necessity of suffering from guilt: "ex culpa contracts in se
sicut parvuli, sed ex culpa contractu in alio." Unlike the
demons Christ did not suffer by a necessity derived from
ipo
guilty acts. Thus Christ's suffering was not due to his
own guilt but there is some doubt as to whether he suffered
as much as all men, or for all men. For instance, the damned
were passible in both the superior and inferior parts of
129
reason; y <\dam was passible adcording to every portion of
reason because in the superior part "fuit receptibilis formarum
130
intelligibiliu®, quae passioncs dicuntur." As far as he
was "receptibilis passionum" he was "compassibilis" in the
superior part of reason "id est receptiva mediante corpore:
sed tantum ex ilia parte qua coniungitur commutabili, non
autera ex part superioris partis qua cticitur illuminari a
131
Deo." Thus Christ's suffering does not apply to the
127« .<,.XV,l)isp.II,Memb.2,33,p.20b« 128. ^.XVX,Disp.II,Memb.
1,38,pp. 241-242. 129. Disp.I,iviemb.3,31»p.236.
130. 28,pp.235-236. 131. 30,p.236.
damned (which seems the relevant group) although it is
similar to Adam's. In regard to "propassiones" the
i^uaestiones states that if it is understood as a sudden
movement which was not foreseen in any way, then this was
not in Christ. If it is seen as a sudden movement which
was not seen in the inferior part of reason, then Christ
1-52
had propassion. ^ Again, as in the Glossa, the division
between the superior and inferior parts of the soul is made
but perhaps with a shade more emphasis on the fact that the
Bon of God did participate, if at a distance, in human
suffering.
There is an addition to the Glossa in that another
view of passibility is found. The superior part of reason
i
as "datura", that is, as the power of the soul to unite to
the body, in Christ was "compassibilis" as "ratio" which
"apprendit cum elections et deliberations" "disposita fuit
ad passibilitatem quae est gaudium". Thus insofar as "ratio"
is united to the deity, it is not "compassibilis" with the
grief of death "sed necessitatem habet ad gaudium. Aliter
enim non congrue satisfaceret Christus, nisi esset in eo
sumraum gaudium de summa poenalitate." ^3 Qnce again there
must be doubt as to the satisfying value of this joy because
it is a joy which is found in a part of the reason which was
not assailed by the woes of man. How could Christ make
satisfaction for all men if he did not suffer what all men,
including the damned, suffer?
152. Disp.III,Memb.l,66,p.2^4. 133* Disp.II,wiemb.3,^8,p.246
CHAPTER 5
THE BFffBCTb OF TJtih PAb^lUR AflD THE kJM&URrEOTIOA :
MERIT ARB bATIbPAO'I'lUR
In Alexander's thought the satisfaction made by
Christ relates to the temporal punishment for original sin
and only to that. The quotation which follows gives some idea
of the "division of labour" in the removal of sin.
Satisfaction : (temporal) punishment for original sin; Passion
and Baptism : guilt of original sin; glory : removal of the
remainder of sin (i.e. actual sin) and corruption. This
division is perhaps neater than all of Alexander's thinking
but it does give a correct general outline of the place of
satisfaction (and therefore of the place of the whole
"necessary" life and work of Christ).
"'^uandoque causa simul est cum effectu, quandoque
effectus sequitur. Passio Christi cum Baptismo deievit
culpara, remittendo scilicet originals cum poena prima
respondents ei secundum quid; sea poenae particulares
et secundae manent usque ad statum gloriae, et quoad
hoc causa non est coniuncta cum effectu. Unde potest
poni triplex gradus: in passione causa non erat
coniuncta cum effectu; in Baptismo coniuncta quoad,
communis; in gloria sequitur effectus utriusque."
It is important to note before proceeding that there
is another way that Alexander sees Christ's work and that is
see it as "merit". "Merit" in Alexander appears to have an
ambiguous meaning. It could mean what Christ merited for us
by his satisfaction for original sin, that is, satisfaction
1. d.XV,23(L),p.!58
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relates particularly to Christ's work in regard to God,
merit relates to the same work in regard to man, both merit
and satisfaction then being different ways of viewing the
same thing. (This would be Anselm's meaning.) However,
merit could also relate not to satisfaction for original sin,
but to satisfaction for actual sins (which are also post-
Baptismal). This may well be what Alexander has in mind when
Christ's merits are compared with other men's and when other
men's meritsare also mentioned in the discussion. Thus
Christ's merits then are not the unique merit of satisfaction.
More probably, however, when Alexander writes of the "merit"
of Christ he refers to both the unique merit of satisfaction
and the merit all men can earn. That Alexander does use "merit"
in this broad sense would appear to be confirmed by the fact
that nowhere does he define a "merit" relating to original sin,
and a "merit" relating to post-Baptismal actual sins. The
distinction can be found, rather, in the distinction between
those sins for which only Christ could make satisfaction (original
sin) and those sins for which all men can satisfy (actual
sins). Thus with this usage of the wox'd "merit" Alexander,
in effect, does not distinguish between Christ as the unique
man, Bon of God and Bon of Man, and Christ as a great man
among many men. This leads to some confusion as it might
be thought, because of this loose usage of the word "merit",
that all ni6n can merit or make satisfaction for original
sin. This implication definitely cannot be made in
Alexander's thought in which Anseim's position on the
satisfaction for the punishment of original sin, in as far as
only God could satisfy, only man should, is clearly taken.
The peculiarity of Christ's merit, according to
Alexander, is seen in its comparison with the merit of the
martyrs: "Christus voluntarie subiit mortem et non merito
peccati, merito tamen obedientiae ; alii autem merito
2
peccati." In this way Christ could gain a surplus of
merit, not needed for himself. This is a manward aspect of
Christ's obedience (as opposed to the Godward aspect of
satisfaction). In both merit and satisfaction, however,
sanctifying grace works apart from Christ; he is still
only a helper. This view of the obedience of Christ (if it
is "active") is lacking because the merit is not sanctifying.
"Grace" is the necessary sanctifying element. Even if the
merit of Christ were unambiguously unique in its relation to
actual sins the sanctification of man takes place, according
to Alexander, outside Christ.
Not only the broad use of "merit" but also the
equation of merit and satisfaction can be seen in the
question "what did Christ merit apart from what he already
had?" Principally, replies Alexander, he merited for us
through his passion but he also merited for himself. In
this latter case he merited "accelerationem gloriosiae
resurrectionis", "declarationem nominis", and "iudiciarum
potestatem." For man he merited "gratiam patiendi pro
Christo", "sufficientem satisfactionem pro peccatis" (this
is sufficient "ex sua parte" but not "ex nostra parte") and
lastly Christ merited for man "quod figurata est nostra vita
2. d.XVIII,41(L),p.205s also 18,p.198
in eius passions", this prefigure*&ent of our lives being in
the death, resurrection, ascension, and sitting at the right
hand of God the Father by Christ. ^ (This last casts Christ
in an exemplary role) •
In this case satisfaction and merit are practically-
equivalent in Alexander's thought. Christ "merits"
"sufficient satisfaction" for sins. Does "sins" mean original
sin only (and actual sins before Baptism) or both original
and actual sins (before and after Baptism.)? Alexander does
not tell us here, however, a distinction has to be made between
satisfaction related to original sin and actual sin before
Baptism on the one hand, and merit related to actual sins after
Baptism on the other hand. The satisfaction "ex sua parte"
and "ex nostra parte" might relate to original sin's
punishment, and Baptism, or possibly to original sin's
punishment, and man's need to make satisfaction himself for
actual sin. On the other hand they could refer to the need
for man to accept (apart from Baptism) what is given and in
particular in regard to his own (actual) sin to make some
satisfaction himself which would appear to be required (this
comes out in the chapters on the sacraments). Further,
Alexander makes a connection between Christ's worx (as removing
a barrier?) and the bestowal of the grace of suffering. (In
this case it probably is the connection of various aspects of
Christ's sufferings with various graces in the various
sacraments - "sacramental grace" - which doctrine is expounded
3. 17,pp.197-198.
particularly in the Quaestiones.) Hever, in the Glossa, is
there a clear exposition of the connection of Christ's work and
the bestowal of grace (which in the Glossa would also,
apparently, be sanctifying grace). One feels that it is there,
but there is no statement such as "the work of Christ in
satisfaction leads to the bestowing of grace which removes
guilt and sanctifies". The "grace of suffering for Christ"
is not necessarily sanctifying grace but it could be. The
connection of Christ and grace could be, eithar that Christ
enables grace to come, or that grace comes, after satisfaction,
from Christ. This latter position Alexander apparently does
not generally hold, and the former position, that is, Christ's
satisfaction seen as the necessary prelude to grace from the
Holy Spirit (removing the barrier to it) is not consistently
maintained.
What other effects have and how effective are,
Christ's merits? Man is freed, states Alexander, from the
Devil "attrahente nos ad limburn inferni" but not from his
a.
flagellations. Again, Christ merited sufficiently and
efficiently for glory for us but free will can contradict this.^
Does this latter statement Include grace - as the result of
merit or transferred In the merit - or does it mean merely
that Christ merited sufficiently and effectively for sins
only? The latter, on the basis of Alexander's general thought,
would appear to be the case. Of course "free will" inserts
another ambiguous element. It involves more than the simple
4. I,p.l89. 5* Footnote, p.195
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rejection of grace (see the chapter of Grace, Merit and
Freewill.) Here again, in both references immediately
above, both original and actual sins apparently are included
in the references.
In another question the limits put upon Christ's
life and work are again evident. In this question the idea
of eternal life is not satisfactorily integrated into Christ's
life and work. According to Alexander the question whether
the death of Christ or eternal life is the greater is
determined by the way one looks at them: "ex parte eius cui
datur" the gift of eternal life is greater; "ex parte eius
£>
quod datur" the gift of Christ is the greater. The answer
in the parallel passage in "L" is clearer:
"(hoc) raaius illo esse dicitur dupiiciter: vel
comparatione dati ad datum, et sic Filiurn Dei raori
maius est quia vita aeterna est per Filium humanatum
cum sit creatum. Vel comparatione ad ilium cui datur,
et sic minus, quia mors Christ! est propter hoc. bic
enim mors non sumitur ut concreta cum Filio Dei, sed
potius ut in abstractions; prius autem cum Filio Dei
coneernebatur, qui maius est quam vita aeterna." 7
Here eternal life is seen as something distinct from Christ's
work (as is the working of grace) - this is less true of "L"
- although the death is seen as contributing something to
eternal life. In other words Christ's work (as the bon of
Man as well as the Son of God inseparably connected in the
one Person) is, in reality, limited to his death and this death
which makes satisfaction is the only ultimately necessary reason
for the incarnation. If Christology were completely central in
Alexander's theology this question would never have been asked
6. 11,p.195. 7- 47(L),p.206
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A
as one then could never look upon the death of Christ as a
mere means or aid to eternal life. It was an inseparable
part of the work of Christ in whom there is eternal life.
His death is our death and so the threshold of eternal life.
How can one separate Christ's death from eternal life for the
believer? For him they go integrally together. And yet this
separation, as in the separation of satisfaction and grace,
Alexander makes.
Another effect of the work of Christ is opening
"ianua paradisi". Bede had stated "per Baptismum aperta
est ianua." Alexander's comment on this is: "per Baptismum
aperta est causaliter, per passionem tamquam per praemium,
O
per ascensionem tamquam per effectum." The meaning of the
first two parts should be evident - Baptism makes effective
in men's lives the satisfaction of Christ - but unfortunately
the meaning of the third is not and the topic is not developed.
In "L" it is stated that the "virtus" in the Law in itself was
sufficient to open the door of paradise but there was an
external impediment which was removed by Christ as "general
man" who made satisfaction for punishment. ^ Lixe the freeing
from the Devil the opening of the door of paradise is mentioned
several times but it2> significance as an integral part of the
theology is difficult to ascertain in Alexander's thinking. Is
he saying that in opening the door of paradise the barrier to
grace, is removed, the door being opened when satisfaction is
made ?
8. 21,p.199; Bede, Glossa on Luke 3-21. 40(L),p.205
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There are here], finally, several points to note
in regard to the relation of Christ and men. The fact that
Christ's merit was sufficient on his part hut not on our
part ^ (and free will can contradict) points to a semi-
Pelagian doctrine of merit which will be discussed elsewhere.
But here there are indications of this position. Martyrs,
according to Alexander, by their extra suffering earn a
special glory. 11 The object of man's suffering is to conform
to the passion of Christ which man does voluntarily and so
12
merits the crown of gold. Here man's merits are mentioned
in the context of Christ's merits thus demonstrating the fact
that Christ's are not the merits of the Son of Man and the Son
of God but of a man full of grace. Again, according to
13
Alexander,children come to glory without merit. ^ Christ
merited sufficiently and efficiently for all unless free will
contradicts that merit and so by the merit of Christ in
14
Baptism children are made worthy of eternal life. Here the
semi-Pelagian note (except for the semi-Pelagian view of
Baptism) is excluded. It is a semi-Pelagian note because the
part of the free will is more than contradiction. In regard
to children, however, there is a happy paradox in Alexander's
thinking. Here the theology is far more a "theology of grace".
In distinction XIX there are one or two fairly
significant references to the sacraments which indicate the
limited scope of Christ's satisfaction. It is asxed, if God
punished man with mortality and "curentia visionis Dei", why
10. 17,pp.197-198. 11. 20,pp.193-199. 12. Footnote,p.198.
13* 12,pp.195-196. 14. Footnote, p.195- 15* Hee chapter
on Grace,Freewill and Merit.
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the Lord should free man from the lack of the vision of God
but not from mortality. The answer is quite surprising in
the context of Christ's satisfaction and resurrection, for
Augustine is called upon in the statement "quod si sacramenta
Fcclesiae immortalitatem conferrent, oranem spem in ilia, et
nullam in beatitudine." ^ (Alexander's paraphrase), if
Alexander meant to use this here (and it would appear that he
did because the part of the Sentences he comments on is on
"poena" in distinction XIX) it is revealing in two ways. First,
the sacraments by implication are placed between the benefits
of Christ and man, that is, they form an extension of the
incarnation. Second, the hope is not placed in Christ but in
beatitude which may mean that Christ and beatitude are two
different things or that Christ's past and future are so divided
that man can come between; that is semi-Pelagianism. It
should be noted that in Augustine this implied division does
not exist because what would be actually annulled, according
to Augustine, is not hope but faith which is "expectation of
things unseen". The context in Augustine makes clear that
it is faith in Christ which leads us on to those things unseen
and this is a truly eschatological outlook - from faith through
faith to Christ. In Augustine it is Christ all the way; in
Alexander this is not so, nor could it be. Christ the Son of
Man and the bon of God is, as it were, left behind. This
fact is perfectly compatible with his soteriology where the
work of Christ is seen mainly as having a backward reference,
that is, to satisfy for past sin. It will be seen that grace
16. d.XIX,3»p*210; Augustine, Ue civitate Dei. bk.XIII,c.4.
and the sacraments provide the forward elements.
Alexander makes another reference to a "sacrament"
in this soterkiLogical section. This is to circumcision and
in the discussion of this the place of Christ is clarified.
The discussion is raised by Peter Lombard's statement: "Et
a poena redemit... relaxando debitum... a temporali nos
r
penitus liberavit." It is asked how the patriarchs were
"debitores poenae" when they were freed from original guilt
by circumcision. The answer to this is that original guilt
was deleted but punishment could not be except in the way
previously stated. (Obviously that punishment would be
deleted by Christ's satisfaction.) Then the question arises
as to how the patriarchs had grace and merited eternal life,
and so had the vision of God, but were obliged to undergo
the punishment of "carentia". The answer to this is that the
actual sins of the patriarchs led to actual punishment which
personal grace could bear, but the "poena generis" from
"generalis culpa" remained and this punishment could be removed
only by the "homo generalis." "Kt sic exigebatur adhuc alia
17
gratia per Salvatorem." ' Here again Christ is not completely
central but his place is seen quite clearly - to bring "alia
gratia" - that is, Christ was one of many ways (certainly a
necessary element) to man's beatitude. He was a help.
Further, the sharp distinction between original and actual
sin (= general and personal) which emerges so strongly in the
doctrine of the sacraments is also demonstrated here. The fact
17. 34(L),p.218.
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that Christ satisfies for general sin still leaves the
whole field of actual sin and over this Christ has little
necessary influence. His reference is essentially backwards
to original sin. Lastly, it should be noted that the guilt
of original sin is forgiven but the punishment for it is
still necessary. Thus guilt is also forgiven apart from
Christ and this teaching is also seen in Alexander's doctrine
of the sacraments.
An unsatisfactory element of Alexander's soteriology
is related to the resurrection and this is seen when he comes
to discuss what the passion and resurrection signify, figure,
and cause. The question is raised as to the relation of the
death and resurrection of Christ to the destruction of sin and
the newness of the life of man. "L" gives a fuller answer
than "AE" but the two are in line with one another: "Mors Christi
est causa destructionis peccati et signum et figura; sed
novitatis vitae non est figura et signum, licet sit causa. E
contra resurrectio novitatis vitae est causa, signum et figura;
1 ft
destructionis peccati solum causa." (It should be noted
that the death of Christ satisfied for original sin, not for
19all actual sins. ? This will come out more clearly in the
OA
discussion on the sacraments. )
At this point the death and resurrection of Christ
appear to be given the same relation to man, that is, they
appear, at the least, to "earn" the destruction of sm and the
rising to newness of life. However, in a footnote, it is stated
18. 21(L),pp.213-216; also 8* pp.211-212. 19. e.g. 24(L),
p.216. 20. See also footnote above, pp.31
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that because Christ in his resurrection was not in a position
to merit as he was not then aortal, the relation could not
be the same and "ergo eius resurrectio non fuit causa
21
nostrae resurrectionis meritoria". This view is repeated
in "L" where it is stated that Christ did not merit our
22
resurrection "quia in statu patriae". One would think that
this was an authentic position of Alexander. In the next
distinction there is again a drastic modification of the view
that Christ's resurrection was the cause of man's resurrection.
In a discussion of the necessity of the passion and resurrection
where Peter Lombard had stated that the resurrection of Christ
"est causa efficiens nostrae resurrectionis" it is suggested
in "AE" that, because our resurrection is necessary for our
salvation, Christ's passion and resurrection were necessary.
Alexander would deny any such necessity but in "AE" there is
no reply nor any comment on the idea of cause. However in the
"35" footnote there is this answer: "Efficiens dicitur
multipliciter: quae est unde est motus vel esse priao, et
25
sic non est; vel exemplaris". ^ Thus once again the
resurrection as "cause" in any sort of modern sense is
repudiated.
There does appear to be some hesitancy here. This
may be due to the fact that Peter had stated that the
resurrection was the cause of our resurrection and Alexander
was trying to make this statement compatible with his thinking
in which Christ's work is more limited. However, the fact
21. Footnote, d.XIX,p.212. 22. 22(L),p.216. 23. d.XX,
15,p.237» footnote p.237.
that it really is not a cause is seen by the three
qualifications which appear, admittedly not in "AE", in "L"
immediately after the statement that Christ's resurrection
was the cause of our resurrection, and in "E" as deliberate
qualifications, one of which was not a direct answer but
was obviously stated to guard against misinterpretation.
"AE" at times and almost certainly in one case seems
incomplete•
Even if these statements were not present a
similar conclusion, that is, that "cause" (at least in
translation) is hardly the right word for the resurrection
of Christ as it relates to our resurrection, would have to
be reached from the rest of Alexander's thinking on the
subject. He argues that the incarnation was "necessary" for
satisfaction; the passions of Christ gained merit which can
be passed onto men, but because merit is associated with the
suffering of Christ, the resurrection because it was "in
patria" could not be meritorious. Further, satisfaction for
original sin is the dominant element of Alexander's soteriology
the resurrection, as distinct from the death, is rarely
mentioned. Again, since the concept of Christ's general
humanity or the idea that our humanity is included in Christ's
is barely present in Alexander's Christology, Christ's
resurrection can hardly be seen as the cause of man's
resurrection in the sense that man is raised with Christ. It
could be causal of man's resurrection only as something that
merited man's resurrection. The resurrection of man would then
be something quite apart from Christ's resurrection and not
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included in it. Lastly, as Christ's resurrection was "in
patria" it could hardly be related to man's resurrection from
a "viator" to a "comprehensor" - as Christ's resurrection did
not merit.
There is another possibility. Christ's resurrection
may have been understood as a cause in the way the incarnation
was seen as a cause, namely, as th6 area in which the
satisfaction took place. The resurrection would be seen
somehow as the completion of the process and as such a cause.
However, it would add nothing to Christ's work and would not
be necessary in the way the incarnation was. There is no
suggestion of this view in Alexander in any case. Then, the
resurrection as an example, and therefore as a cause in some
sense, may act as an assurance of man's resurrection and show
him the possibilities opened to him in Baptism and through
grace but, again, as such, it would hardly be necessary.
What these last paragraphs have been seeking to
discover is a position in which Christ's resurrection is seen
as relevant to man now, as satisfaction is relevant to man
now because the punishment for original sin has been removed.
If the resurrection is not relevant to man's "now", it is not
part of the finished work of Christ for us, and part of our
dying and rising. If our new life, now, is not based in
Christ's rising, then it must be based elsewhere (e.g. in
grace, free will, and their virtues). Indeed Alexander appears
to see our resurrection only at the last "in patria" as in some
sense a reward (earned by Christ's resurrection) for our life in
this world, and does not see us already raised in Christ, not
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even in a way similar to the way he sees satisfaction applied to
man for the beginning of his justification. Alexander sees
satisfaction having effect now but the effect of resurrection
is delayed till the end after man has gained justification.
Meanwhile it appears that man's present "resurrection" is
based in grace, the sacraments, and free will, borne instances
from other volumes should make this point clear.
On Romans 4:23: "Mortuus est propter delicta
nostra, et resurrectio propter iustificationem; in
quo datur intelligi quod passio in remissionem peccatorum
fuit, et resurrectio propter introitum gloriae.
Baptismus... virtutem habet a resurrections quoad
effectum introitus ianuae paradisi." 24
"Est alia res circumcisionis, scilicet ablatio ab
omni corruptions; et haec iterum non est impleta in
Baptismo, sed in ipsa resurrectionis Christi." 23
"Baptismus aperuit ianuam quantum ad causam ex parte
baptizati; passio quoad pretium et deietionem poenae
originalis peccati quae fuit carentia visionis Dei;
sed resurrectio quoad perfectionem gloriae in secunda
stola." 26
All these place the resurrection's effect at the end of the
road in glory where all corruption is removed. 1'here is one
statement which does appear to go beyond this for it states
that "remissio vero quantum ad debitum aeternae mortalitatis
fit in Baptismo virtute resurrectionis." let here the
resurrection has no present effect as Christ's passion has;
it is a promise of a future reward if all goes well, (.although
the debt i.e. the punishment as required by God - is removed).
This is much the same position as the previous quotations
especially the first of the three. As a promise the
resurrection cannot be much more than the assurance (or example)
that immortality is man's if he makes satisfaction for actual
24. Bk.IV ,d.H,3»p.42. 25. d.lil,17,e)p.64 . 26 . 24,e)p.69.
27. d.IV,17,c)p.87.
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sins as Christ has done for original sin (unless Baptism
effects this process forthwith which it does not). In short
it is difficult to see the resurrection as causal in any real
and consistent sense and therefore this part of Christ's work
is not necessary for man's salvation.
The doctrine of satisfaction and the doctrine of
merit, however, with all their limitations, form the more
satisfactory elements of the Christology of Alexander. The
doctrine of satisfaction is based firmly in the work of the
Trinity and in the love of God so that Christ is seen as truly
God and truly man; only God could satisfy, only man should.
The humanity of Christ is assured. Again, the freedom of the
grace of God is maintained and there is no necessity that God
should redeem man; the choice and "necessity" reside in the
wisdom of God. Satisfaction is necessary only for man.
Further, there is no suggestion that Christ placated God
purely as man; he was fulfilling the will of the Father
who was at work. This is "voluntary" work; there is no
suggestion that Christ was submitting to the will of a
28
tyrant. Christ "recepit in se necessitatem moriendi."
This is the God-man at work.
Yet when this has been said there must be
reservations. The doctrine of satisfaction apparently is not
integrated into his Christology. There is one place where
his Christology would have found a kindred element, and that
is where Alexander states that violence is caused in the
28. Bk.Ill,d.XIX,7,p.211.
incarnation by the fact that the weight of man's sin tends
29
downwards bat the "Dominas" through his passion tends upwards.
This downward trend is the corruption of man and it is
for this reason that in Alexander's Christology the Word
is not permitted to become fully flesh (another reason, of
course, is his view of God which, however, corresponds to the
view of the corruption of man); God tends to stand at arm's
length. The doctrine of satisfaction is worked into this view
of the incarnation under the discussion of the passions or
defects assumed by Christ which discussion lacks the doctrine
of satisfaction's Trinitarian basis. However,when the actual
discussion of satisfaction takes place it is stated, following
Anselm, that only God could satisfy, only man should. There
is no doubt of God's part here; the Word does - must - become
flesh; the Trinitarian basis is stated, that is, the possibility
of God to assume flesh is affirmed. And in these sections
there is a different view of sin; it is an offence, or
injustice; it is pride; it is not essentially "corruption"
except in the above instance. It is man or mankind acting
against God; it is man's attitude rather than his nature.
In the Christology and in the discussion of the passions of
Christ a view, which, in this instance, depends greatly on
John of Damascus, is held in which it is stated that God is
immutable and mutability indicates sinfulness. (Alexander
goes far further than John in his Christology which is very
much more Chalcedonian and acceptable; but he inherits John's
and traditions fear of passions, mutability, and the idea that
29. 12,p.213. 30. cf. Bk.II,d.XL,f)p.382: "fomes est
declinans deorsum a natura corrupta*" Men have "fomes";
Christ did not.
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the Son of God might have been a servant.) Alexander, at
times, is verydose to saying that the "esse" (i.e. the
nature of man as "creature") of man is to be a sinner. In
such a situation a real incarnation would be impossible.
(The Virgin is purged ofj'fomes" to aiake it possible.)
What Alexander tends to do is to confuse corruption
as a fact of man's situation with corruption as a necessity
of man's situation, that is, as part of his creatureliness.
The possible, if not probable reason, for this is the fact
that he has a view of God as the "immutable One" which nicely
coincides with the fact that man, who is subject to time and
changeable, is a sinner, but does not coincide with the fact
that creation is redeemed in time by the Son of God, and is
"very good". The fact that man's present state is corrupt
does not necessarily mean that it will always be that way;
in fact the present state of sin is the less real being
neither created nor eternal; the new present creation in
Christ is the "ultimate reality". The doctrine of satisfaction
says precisely this for it is the satisfaction by Christ, God
and man, which bears away the fact of sin, the fact of
corruption. That this might occur God had to become man because
the fact of sin is the pride, the injustice, the disobedience,
and the consequent guilt of man, which must be eliminated and
replaced by man. Elimination is especially associated with
satisfaction (in a narrower sense) and the crossjl replacement
is especially associated with the life and resurrection of
Christ replacing the corruption. Only God, however, has power
to do this. Satisfaction (in a wider sense) then means that
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God came right into the midst of our humanity to eliminate
sin and guilt and to sanctify man (the latter two, in
Alexander, are not attributed to the work; of Christ.) There
is no question in the doctrine of satisfaction whether the
Son of God did or did not come into our humanity because
satisfaction presupposes the incarnation, the doctrine takes
it for a fact. Anselm, in this doctrine, "saved" the humanity
of Christ, and Alexander to some extent follows this line.
But satisfaction in Alexander is restricted to
the temporal punishment for original and actual sins and this
does not include all actual sins nor necessarily any actual
sins. To this extent Alexander's Christological tendency
towards doeeticism influences his soteriology. For eternal
punishment of original sin, guilt, actual sins, and
sanetification the humanity of Christ is not seen as a
necessity. This is demonstrated by Alexander's failure to
emphasise the resurrection and by his essentially cross
centred theology. The resurrection is not seen as a
necessary part of Christ's work although it may contribute
something rather indirectly to the salvation of man.
Likewise, the life of Christ is neglected and the merits of
Christ are not, in fact, necessary although they do merit
grace. The result of this is that sanetification can hardly
be regarded as part of Christ's work and it must be found
elsewhere. This sanctification also leads to Justification
which is not achieved in Christ.
The real source of this limited view of the atonement
cannot be sought out in this thesis but there are at least
two traditions which could contribute - that of the
penitential system, and that of the philosophical view of
the immutable God. The Church's instinct on atonement
originally lead to the full doctrine of Christ at Chalcedon
(that is, by implication, both God and man, fully, were
necessary for man's salvation), but it is possibly not so
true that the limited view of atonement led to a limited view
of Christ by the time of Alexander. Perhaps the views of
atonement and God may have coincided in such a way that a
limited Christology gave theological sanction to a limited
view of the atonement in the penitential system. This in
turn encouraged a limited Christology. By this stage, however,
unlike, for example, in the work of John of Damascus,
Christology is not bound up with soteriaLogy. Alexander's
Christology is a matter of repeating traditional positions
and refuting traditional heresies. In this context the
Aneelmic doctrine of satisfaction can be seen as a check
both on docetic Christology and on Pelagian views of
atonement. It certainly so acts in the theology of Alexander.
juaestiones
The question of satisfaction is naturally taken up
in the Quaestiones. There is interest, firstly, in the
greatness of the satisfaction in the question "an passio
Christi fuerit ntixima poena". It is stated that the
punishment which Christ underwent for man was the greatest
"in genera poenae satisfactoriae." Because it was voluntary
it was also satisfactory, and it is the voluntary nature
which makes it the greatest punishment "in genere
satisfactionis." (The fact that satisfaction is voluntary
means that it is something not required by God and not
owed to him, which means, further, that its effect (or merit)
can be applied elsewhere, in this instance in the elimination
of (satisfaction for) original sin.) However, "in genere
poenae" Christ's punishment was not the greatest punishment
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and that is to be separated from the Deity. '
Later the question is asked "an passio Christi
satisfactoria pro omni poena." In the response to this
question it is stated that there are two things in
satisfactory punishment, the "voluntas" and the "poena",
and that it was not right that the punishment of Christ
should be greater than that for which he made satisfaction.
"Fuit enirn in Christo separatio aniraae a carne, et compassio
separationis, et praeterea dolor pro pecdato human! generis,
sine quo non esset satisfactura etiam cum aliis duobus, sicut
patet in vera contrition©." And although the punishment of
Christ was not greater than that for which he made
satisfaction "tamen voluntas Christi excellebat poenam
originalis peccati, quae fuit in separatione a Deo." This
"voluntas" was satisfactory because it was the result of the
conjunction of the human and Divine natures and thus was the
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most noble. ^ T'he satisfaction made by Christ was sufficient
as far as causality for the deletion of all punishments was
31. tj.XVI,Disp.IV,Memb.1,92,pp.266-26?. 32. Memb.5,107,
p.273.
concerned but not all were deleted in the present because
death, concupiscence, ignorance and infirmity remained to
help in the gaining of merit. ^
In the question on the resurrection in the
i^uaestiones there appears to be a different view to that
held above and that in the Glossa. Christ is said to have
died on behalf of human nature but, because he was not
involved in personal guilt he did not suffer "dissolubilitas",
which is.defined as the dissolution of the soul from the
body. This meant that concupiscence was diminished but
not removed in the present so that it could help in the
gaining of merit. Dissolubility was the punishment for
concupiscence. In all the descendants of A.dam except some
who had the fulness of grace dissolubility came through
concupiscence. In the satisfaction made by Christ there was
full satisfaction according to justice "licet non assumpsit
dissolubilitatem, quia secundum iustitiam non fuit omnino
tollenda concupiscentia, sed tantum pi'onitas concupiscentiae.
Haec autem tollitur, quia ipse, in quo fuit plenitudo
gratiae, venit ad impartiendam gratiarn, per quam tollitur
concupiscentiae superfluitas." ^ Here three things are
evident, firstly Christ's passion did not have causality as
far as concupiscence was concerned; secondly Christ did not
suffer the separation of the soul from the body; thirdly it
is grace which effects the elimination of concupiscence and
33. 108,p.273-274. 34. vi.hXIII,Disp.II,Memb.1,61,p.1271-72
35. 64,pp.1273-74.
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this grace is not peculiarly attached to Christ (cf. Christ
as Head) and in fact can prevent the dissolubility of the
saints and is used by man or in man, apart from Christ, to
bear away the excess of concupiscence.
From these facts it as evident that the scope of
Christ's satisfaction is restricted further than in the
previous question in limiting the universality of the passion,
and thus the docetic tendency also increases. Christ did not
suffer, it is implied, the separation from God which at
least the damned suffered - and are not all men damned except
Christ step in? - and which is evidenced in the cry "My
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" This implication
demonstrates the further fact that sin is not taken
particularly seriously because the presupposition is that man
does not sin to the point of alienation. Christ, in the
question on the resurrection, is said not even to have suffered
dissolubility which, in spite of the assertion to the opposite,
must throw doubts on whether he died at all. In fact it appears
that grace would have been sufficient to have cured the wound
without the God and man. This v?hole discussion of the incarnation
and the previous one on the passibility of Christ must raise
doubts as to the universality of the satisfaction of Christ,
in spite of assertions to the contrary. Firstly, it would
appear that he died, and could die, for the good only. Of
course it may be assumed that all men are good, but that
surely is not the position of either the Glossa or the
Quaestiones. No doubt it would be argued that the damned
could avail themselves of the satisfaction of Christ but what
good would that be to them if they could not avail themselves
of the grace of the Holy Spirit whereby they made themselves
good? Than they must be damned because they remained guilty.
With the separation of sacramental grace and the grace of
virtues, which will be seen later in the doctrine of the
sacraments of the Quaestiones, the work of Ghrist in
satisfaction (channelled through the sacraments; becomes
even remoter to the hard-hearted. Secondly, and the first
point depends on this because there the argument that the
punishment of Ghrist brings about results of a different
kind from his punishment is not accepted, if Christ's
punishment is not of the same kind as a descendant of
Adam receives how can what is not assumed be healed? Was
Christ then of the same nature as man, fallen iaan, or was he
of another nature, unfalien man, and if he was the latter is h
not irrelevant to man's present situation? The Anselmic
argument must be taken seriously; only man should satisfy;
only God can. The satisfaction is for sinning man. If it is
stated that Christ's will to suffer made the satisfaction,
could not this argument eventually eliminate any need for the
incarnation at all? Is not this basically a docetic argument?
If God did not become incarnate at the level of man'
existence then man will have to cure himself. This may
eventually be the answer both of the Glossa and the ^uaestione
bub especially of the latter for in availing themselves of
grace, men cure themselves partly and avail themselves of the
work of Christ. It is man's use of grace which is the
in
prelimary to any possibility of his availing himself in any
A
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real sense of the satisfaction made by Christ. And it is
grace which reconciles man to God, it is grace which
overcomes his concupiscence; without reconciliation he is
damned and obviously he can be practically reconciled with
God without Christ because Alexander informs us that there
are men who are not dissoluble because they are full of
grace, just like Christ.
The resurrection receives more attention in the
Quaestiones than in the Glossa. There is a separate question
devoted to it but in spite of this it finds a relatively
unimportant place in the Christology. Peter in his Glossa on
Psalm 29:6 had said that Christ's resurrection was the cause
of man's resurrection and that it was also the figure of man's
resurrection in the soul. On this the comment is that there
were three days between the passion and the resurrection
which figured the resurrection of those living in the three
times. These are the period before the law, the period
under the law, and the period after the law, the time of grace.
The resurrection did not take place quickly so that it might
be realized that the resurrection prefigured all three periods
and so that the passion did not have effect only in the period
that followed it. ^ It should be noted that here the
resurrection is only a prefigurement and the delay relates
causally to the passion and not to the resurrection.
The question is then raised as to the significance
of the statement that Christ was the cause of man's
resurrection in that Christ's resurrection is not "ab
incineratione" whereas man's resurrection is. (This is related
36. Q.LXIII,De Hesurrectione ,Disp.II,iiflemb.2,74,p.1277*
to the idea that Christ did not merit in the resurrection.)
The fact that there should have been a proportion between
the cause and the effect raises doubts as to whether
Christ's resurrection could have been a cause. The answer
is that it is not necessarily so that the cause and the
effect should be proportionate because the cause, in this
case, was of greater dignity than the effect. The reason
for the lack of proportion is that men are descended from
Adam according to bodily substance and "seminalem
rationem"; this latter leads to dissolubility for concup¬
iscence. This latter Christ did not have, hence he rose
only in relation to the bodily substance, not from
dissolubility. ^
The next question asks whether Christ was the cause
of the resurrection of the soul and body or of the body
only. The reply is that there is a double resurrection of
the soul: from guilt and from punishment and the soul rises
from the latter through Christ's resurrection. Hence, when
his resurrection is said to be the cause of man's
resurrection in the soul in the present "intelligendum est
a morte illius poenae, qua obligati essent oianes nisi
Ghristus venisset." It is then suggested, not
surprisingly, that, since the passion liberated from punishment,
the resurrection was superfluous and it is asked how it can
be said that Christ rose for our justification (Roms.4.25)
The answer reveals very well why in the thought of Alexander
37. Memb.2,84,p.l277; 63,pp.1272-75. 38. Memb.3,79,p.l279
39. 80,p.1279. 3. 80,p.1279.
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the resurrection of Christ plays very little part in man's
resurrection because the conferring of grace and the
dimission of guilt take place outside Christ.
"Ibi fuit detentio in morte, et ab ilia fuit
liberatio per mortem. In iustificatione autem plus
est quam liberatio a morte, quia est dimissio culpae,
et collatio gratiae et virtutUm; similiter in secunda
iustificatione est liberatio a poena, et collatio
gloriae cum virtutibus, id est cum dotibus.
Resurrectio autem Christi est principium illius secundae
iustificationis, quia gloriosa immutatio in corpobe
Christi, et plena felicitas animae Christi habentis
dotes animae et corporis, est causa felicitas
animarum nostrarum quantum ad dotes corporis nostri.
Unde, praeter illarn iustificationem quae est a morte
poenae, est resurrectio Christi causa iustificationis
nostrae quoad completionem animarum in dotibus corporis.
Item, aliquo modo est causa, id est figura,
resurrectionis animae per gratiam; non quoa simpliciter
sit causa, sed quoad quid, secundum quod est figura
illius scilicet, secundum quod dicitur 4 act Rom.,25:
Mortuus est propter delicta nostra etc. Passio enim
eius mediants fide passionis est causa diiaissionis
peccatorum; resurrectio autem eius mediants fide
resurrectionis est causa iustificationis. Credentibus
enim resurrectionem prodest ad iustifactionem; 40
credentibus passionem prodest ad peccatorum dimissionem."
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The "dotes" are clarity, subtlety, agility, and impassibility.
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They are the ornament of the soul.
It should be noted in regard to this long quotation,
that the relation of the passion to sin is far more direct
than the relation of the resurrection to justification. The
resurrection can be only a figure of justification; it is not
causal; it is grace which effects justification. These
relations may be the same in one area, however, because the
dimission of sin could equally well include guilt and of
that the passion does not cause its dimission, for it is God
40. Memb.3,81,pp.1279-80. 41. ^.LX.VI,De botibus Gloriosi
Corporis, Disp.I,Memb.3,10,p.1320. 42. Memb.2,9»p«1319^
alone who remits guilt. Christ's resurrection as a cause of
man's rising, of his sanctification and justification, is, by
and large, merely a figure, or an example in the theology of
the Glossa and the quaestiones. Alexander could not say, in
the Biblical sense, that we have risen with Christ - faith
in the fact of the resurrection is a purely accidental
relationship requiring no 8on of Man - as the answer to the
question on Christ as a "cause" of the resurrection of the
good and the bad illustrates. The very division already makes
this clear, that is, the good are considered apart from Christ.
Christ is an "exemplum" of the resurrection of both. With
both groups there is a similarity in that neither will lack
their bodies. Christ, however, will not have the "ignobilitas"
and the"infirmitas" of the bad. "Boni autem, in hoc quod
abundant a malis in virtute et nobilitate, habent
resurrectionem Christi exemplum; unde magis et resurrectio
Christi exemplum resurrectionis bonorum quam malorum." ^
Summary
According to Alexander, Christ's necessary work was
to undergo the temporal punishment due to man for original
sin. In this he gained merit for man. The fact that, in
Alexander, he gained merit for man for other things besides
that relating to temporal punishment for original sin, in
apparently a way similar to (and not distinguished from)
A3. Q.LXIII,Disp.II.Memb.A,8A,pp.1281-32.
the way he gained merit for the satisfaction of'the
punishment for original sin, does not mean that Christ's
work was necessary outside that area. It is clear that aLl
men, with the aid of grace, can merit (or satisfy) in these
matters especially in regard to actual sin. Further, the
"bestowal of grace is not attributed to Christ as part of his
necessary work. In this connection, that is, in relation to
man's rising again to sanctification, the resurrection is
given a very small part to play. Again, "beatitude" and
"eternal life" are considered apart from Christ; guilt for
original sin and actual sins is forgiven by grace apart from
him. In all this work apart from Christ, Christ may be given
some place in removing a barrier to the bestowal of grace, and
in opening the door of paradise. The relation of these matters
to Christ, and their implications, however, remain quite
uncertain.
Since the Quaestiones has given attention to the
matter more than the Glossa one perhaps should look forward
for a moment to the matter of the sufficient and the
efficacious work of Christ, a problem in post-Reformation
%
theology. Certainly, in relation both to guilt and grace,
Christ, according to Alexander, is not even sufficient, let
alone efficacious. It would appear that in regard to the
temporal satisfaction for original sin he is understood to be
certainly sufficient (except possibly in the doctrine of the
Head and in the Quaestiones), and not quite so certainly
efficacious. This latter uncertainty is due to the prominent
place of Baptism and the part man plays. Jb would appear that
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Baptism ia another "moment" in the progress and adds efficacy
to the sufficient work of Christ. Man, also, seems to be
able to accept or reject satisfaction in Baptism, and
therefore he adds efficacy to the sufficiency of Christ.
Of course man can also merit, and Christ's sufficiency,
according to the ^uaestiones, did not eliminate all
punishments in order that man could merit.
These views are somewhat different from the post-
Reformation thinking on the matter. In this "God" was both
sufficient and efficient; Christ was only sufficient. In
other words, Christ made sufficient satisfaction for all men
but that was not necessarily efficacious for all men, that
is, it was not necessarily applied (but it could be) to all
men by God in his wisdom. The holders of this kind of
position and Alexander may have had something in common in
that both attributed to Christ's work of satisfaction a
sufficiency but reserved to God on the one hand, or grace
and Baptism on the other hand, the application of this
sufficiency. When it comes to the matter of the sufficiency
of all the punishments of Christ, in the ^uaestiones this
sufficiency is never "tested" (except for original sin's
punishment) as it is man who is efficacious in grace and
merit, so it is a rather pointless sufficiency. In post-
Reformation theologians the sufficiency is "tested" when
God predestines man to salvation. Having been brought up in
the strict predestinarian tradition the post-Reformation
theologians could not establish an efficacy in man.
However, in Pietism a return was made to the medieval position,
as the stern predestinarian (Deist?) God was rejected.
CHAPTER 6.
bACRAMERIS IR GENERAL
The following discussion of the sacraments is by
no means complete. It is aimed only at stating their position
generally in regard to Christology and much of what follows
will therefore be selective. For that reason, Confirmation,
Matrimony and Extreme Unction will not be treated separately
because they add little in the understanding of Christology.
At the beginning of Book IV Alexander outlines the
discussion of the previous three books and then states:
"In hoc quarto libro, quia nondum est in iis
sufficientia ad salutem, agit de sacramentis et gratiis
sacramentorurn: quae gratiae aacramentorum non respiciunt
solum quo! immediate influit a Deo, sed quod per
Mediatore ; et de beatitudine et poena opposita.
Tangitur primum per hoc quod dicitur in principio
auctoritatis, per quod dicit: Vade et lavare septies
in Iordane; secundum autem tangitur per hoc quod
dicitur: Recipiet sanitatem caro tua etc." 1
This statement will be referred to again, but at this point
what is demonstrated is the fact that Christ's work is not
seen as complete in itself, but as being moved towards
completion by the sacraments. Thus the sacraments add
something to Christ's work. The fact of this addition is
also seen in the comparison of Baptism and preaching.
Alexander states that the work of preaching and the work of
Baptism are not similar because the latter is a sacrament
of necessity but this is not true of preaching. A similar
understanding of the Eucharist is held for by virtue of the
words said transubstantiation is made from the institution of
2
the Lord. Preaching thus lacks something which Baptism
1. Bk.IV,Introitus, 3, p.2. 2. d.VI,5,d)p.ll3.
and the Eucharist have and this cannot be the setting forth
of Christ. By implication then* these sacraments contain
something beyond the finished work of Christ conveyed to man
through preaching.
At the beginning of the first distinction Alexander
defines the sacraments. The word Msacramentum" refers to
several things:
"Large more Christi et resurrectio saoramenta
dicuntur, ut ad Rom.6.4: Consepulti in Baptismo etc.
St dicuntur propter hoc sacramenta, quia 'sacra
signata sive secreta'; vel effective dicuntur
sacramenta, quia ex virtute mortis et resumectionis
habeant sacramenta virtutem. - Stricte dicuntur quae
fuerunt Veteris Legis, ut agnus paschalis et sanguis
vitulae rufae et alia. Et dicuntur 1signa futurorum'
et transeunt; unde minus proprie. Bunt enim
prognostica et imperfecta; et non efficiebant quod
figurabant. - Strictissime, sacraraenta Novae Legis,
quae efficiunt quod figurant; quae sunt signa et causa
gratiae invisibilis". 3
It is the sign, not the signified, which is properly the
4
sacrament. The broad use of the word sacrament is also
brought out when Alexander gives three definitions of "sacraraent"
It can be defined Msacramentum est sacrae rei signum" and so is
common to all signs signifying a sacred thing. "Proprie",
however, sacraments of the Old Law which used to signify those
of the Lew Law fall under this definition. The definition
"sacranientum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma" applied
both to the sacraments of the New Law and the Old Law "sed
illis mediate, istis autem immediate." The third definition
is "sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae
Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imagined gerat et
3» d.I,l,p*9* 4. 4,p.10.
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causa exsistat." (Peter Lombard). The first definition is
"coittiaunissiina", the second is "communis", and the third
"propria" to the sacraments of the ftew Law which are a sign
and a cause. ^ Thus the distinctiveness of the iMew Testament
sacrament is that the sign effects what it signifies.
The sacraments thus "cause" grace but not without
qualification of the concept of cause. "Deus sanctificat ut
causa efficiens prima; gratia ut causa efficiens proxima et
necessaria, quia semper est coniuncta haec causa cum causato;
sacramenturn ut causa materialis in qua gratia, et non
necessaria". The distinction of grace and sacrament is
seen in another context where it is suggested that the sacrament
is the sign and cause of our salvation (that is, it is
meritorious). Alexander answers that the good life is the
meritorious cause of salvation, that the sacraments are not
meritorious, and merit exists only through grace "sed sunt
causa materialis in qua, ut vasa medicinalia, gratia ut
7
medicina". ' A similar view is expressed in another codex;
"sacramentum non est efficiens causa gratiae, sed Deus. fton
Q
enim est causa in quantum exit a Deo, sed est concausa".
This view of the sacrament as a "not necessary" cause appears
to contradict the view previously stated that Baptism (and
probably the Eucharist) is a "sacrament of necessity without
which no one is saved." This maybe the difference between
theory ("not necessary") and practice ("necessary") or possibly
5. 5iP»H» 6. 7»P*15» 7- 6,e)p.l3« 3. footnote,p.13
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the necessity refers to a different matter from these quotations
immediately above. Where the sacrament is stated to be "not
necessary" the discussion is on sanctification; where Baptism
is stated to be necessary it may refer (but this is not stated)
to the application of the satisfaction made by Christ through
Baptism. This kind of division is seen when it is stated that
Penance is not necessary for the "dimissionem culpae, sed ut
Q
non imputetur ad poenam". J Alexander also states that he
does not wish to say that grace is not in the sacraments but
only that it could be otherwise conferred. 10 For all intents
and purposes then, the sacraments would appear to be
necessary (especially in relation to sin) although God and His
grace are recognised as free. The close connection of gi'ace and
the sacraments is also maintained in reply to the suggestion
that the sacraments do not effect what they figure, namely,
the remission of sin: "Sacramenta .Novae Legis efficiunt quod
figurant quantum in se est, sed impedimentum potest esse ex
11
parte eius qui suscipit, ut de solis illuminatione accidit."
This is an "ex opere operato" view which would lead to the
practical necessity or at least desirability of the sacraments
and their consequent elevation above the freedom of God.
Certainly they would be seen as a "concausa", although they
may not have an absolute necessity. This parallels the
discussion of the necessity of the death of Christ: another
way was conceivable but not really practicable. The parallel
might point up the importance of the sacrament.
9. d.XXII,3,p.384. 10. d.I,13,p.21. 11. d.IV,l,c)p.73.
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That the grace of the sacraments is aimed at both
sin and towards sanctification would seem evident from the first
quotation of this chapter given above which refers to the
washing and cleansing of Naaman. Thus "sacramental grace"
would be aimed both at sin and the good life. Dr. Kilian
Lynch, however, has seen here a distinction of graces, the
first, which is aimed at sin, is called "sacramental grace"
and the second the "grace of virtues". Unlike the virtues
"the sacraments... as such do not exist for meriting or the
attainment of reward, but rather constitute an aid against the
difference (Latin "differentiam") of sin or the defects arising
12
from sin." This distinction is found in a section referred
to earlier where it is asked "utrum... requiratur unicuique
fideli adulto integritas sacramentorurn, sicut integritas
virtutum." The answer is in the negative; the virtues lead
to merit and eternal life, but the sacraments are done away
13
with as they are in part. v What is to be questioned is
not the fact that this distinction is made here, but whether
this quotation (from the doctrine of Penance) can be said to
be true of Alexander's general practice in the Glossa or the
most typical of his views, and whether this section should be
used in such a way - and not statements where Alexander lays
down general principles. That the distinction between a grace
"ex parte" against the defects of sin and a grace not "ex parte"
leading to sanctification ("gratia gratum faciens") is valid
is not disputed. What is is the assertion that in the Glossa
12. "Franciscan Studies", Vol.XIX,1959»P*368. 13« d.XXII,
3,p.384.
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they are two graces and that the former is clearly
"sacramental grace". It would appear that the grace of the
sacraments in the Glossa includes the remedy for particular
sins or the defects of sin, and the grace which remits guilt
and leads to merit ("gratia gratum faciens"). In fact both
14
aspects are included under "gratia gratum faciens". The
fact that the former has particular effects in some of the
he
sacraments does not seem to a source of concern to Alexander
15
who has stated that "gratia gratum faciens" is not "ex parte".
Indeed "gratia gratum faciens" even appears to effect particular
virtues in particular sacraments. This may be made possible
both in regard to sins and to merit by a distinction between
the cause (not "ex parte") and the caused ("ex parte").
Kilian Lynch does not dispute the fact that the grace of
virtues is found in the sacraments but this, he maintains,
is not sacramental grace "as such". tSy contention is that,
in the Glossa, Alexander makes no such rigid distinction
between "graces", and, in fact, sees the sacraments* second
task, which is, as it were, on the reverse side of the coin
to the first task of remitting sin, to be the conferring of
sanctifying grace. This fact has already been made clear by
Alexander's general statement on the contents of the fourth
book (see first page of this chapter), and in the relation of
the good life of merit to the sacrament where the sacrament
is the medicine bottle of the grace which leads to merit.
(See above note 7» of this chapter). There is no reason to
14. d.VI,15,e)p.l22. 15. Bk.III,d.XXXV,9,pp.438-39 and
d.XXXVI,16,pp.450-51.
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believe, further, that the grace which could be conferred
another way is only the grace of virtues.
Dr. Xilian Lynch is again somewhat arbitrary in
selecting distinction VIII, n.7* P«137 as of particular
importance "towards the elucidation of his entire theory
16
of sacramental grace". This distinction discusses the
Eucharist in particular and the particular question is
"quare haec duo sacramenta quoad formam instituit proximo
ad passionem, scilicet Baptismum et Eucharistiam:
Eucharistiam ante, et Baptismum post." Alexander's reply
is given in full:
"haec duo sacramenta sunt principalium virtutuqj
significativa: fidei quae est ianua salutis, et
caritatis quae est complementurn virtutum. Ut ergo
notaretur principalis virtus aut dignitas eorum,
coniuncta sunt passioni, a qua omnia sacramenta habent
virtutem. Quod enim Baptismus / a passione / habeat
virtutem, habetur in tertio libro, distinctions XIX,
cap. Peccata quooue etc., ubi dicitur de Baptismo
quod "per ipsius poenam, quam sustinuit in cruce, omnis
poena temporalis pro peccato debita in Baptismo relaxatur,
ut nulla exigitur". Similiter ibidem de Poenitentia
dicitur: "In Poenitentia vero minoratur: non enim
sufficeret ilia qua poenitentes ligat Scclesia, nisi
Ghristi poena cooperaretur". In Eucharistia similiter
datur virtus, quia quantum est de caritate passionis,
maior fit unio per caritatem membrorum corporis mystici
ad caput. Passio autem sua pro fratribus dat nobis
confirmationem ampliorem in Ecclesia cum fratribus ad
patiendum pro eis. Similiter eius unio per caritatem
ad Ecclesiam dat in Matrimonio effectum unionis ampliorem
sponsi ad sponsam per consensual, in iis qui digni sunt
iuncti matrimonio. Quia vero perfecta obedientia et
discreta fuit in eo respectu patris in passione, collata
est ei auctoritas et potestas, quam contulit praelatis
rations discretae obedientiae quoad auctoritatem
discernendi inter lepx'am et lepram respectu subditorum
et potestatem ligandi fuit contra poenam concupiscentiae,
ex qua accidur.it venialia, et ut tolleretur infirmitas
corporis: est enim effectiva incorruptionis ex parte
corporis". 17
16. Op.cit. p.357. 17. d.VIII,7»b)pp.137-138.
Kilian Lynch wants to maintain that sacramental grace from
particular virtues of the passion is applied in the sacraments
1 ft
to the reparation of the particular wounds of sin and
this is the task of the sacraments. He certainly provides
evidence for this view hut admits that the application is
developed most only in regard to Baptism and Penance although
maintaining that that is sufficient with the others to see
19
that Alexander's sacramental theology has cohesion and unity. '
One would expect this view to be supported by Baptism and
Penance as they are primarily aimed at original and actual sin
at which the passion of Christ was aimed in satisfaction and
merit. The connection of Christ's humanity - or passion - to
the other sacraments is, in the Glossa at least, at best vague.
Even if one accepts that Alexander here has a worked out a
theory of the sacraments in regard to sin the fact still
remains that this aspect is not the whole story of his view
of grace and the sacraments. In fact, Alexander is far from
clear as to the working of grace in the sacraments or their
particular functions. There is cex'tainly no cut and dried
theory of "sacramental grace". Even this "most important"
quotation hardly supports beyond all doubt the idea that
sacramental grace in the Glossa is applicable only in relation
to sin. It would be less arbitrary to begin the discussion
of Alexander's theory of the sacraments from the position where
Alexander begins - in the statement of general principles at
the beginning.
18. Op.cit. pp.364-65* 19. Ibid. p.364
26?
The first task of the sacraments is to eliminate
sin and its effects. The seven sacraments are figured in
the seven washings of Naaman. The source of the washings is
20
in the virtue of the passion. There are seven infections
to be washed away. Original sin is washed away by Baptism
which, because it has more grace, succeeds circumcision. It
destroys original and actual sin as far as guilt and
punishment, if received worthily. Actual sins are washed away
by Penance which is repeatable because man fails ofteia.
Extreme Unction is aimed at venial sin. Orders are given
because of the difficulty "discernendi". Because of the
difficulty in progressing in good Confirmation is given;
Matrimony helps to resist concupiscence and the Eucharist is
21
given because of the difficulty in withstanding temptation.
Even here the distinction between the washing away of sin
(in which guilt is included - that is, "gratia gratum faciens")
and sanctification is not altogether clear. Later, however,
Alexander refers to this sevenfold division of the sacraments
"ratione peccati originalis, actualis mortalis et venialis,
et ratione poenarum" and then states "accipi potest divisio
sacramentorum secundum quod quaedam sacramenta habilitant ad
usus virtutum, turn cardinalium, turn theologicarum". Baptism
habilitates to the use of faith, Confirmation to fortitude,
Eucharist to love, Penance to "iustitia", Matrimony to
22
temperance, Orders to prudence, and Extreme unction to hope.
20. Introit, 9»p«5« 21. Introit, 12,pp.6~7»
22. d.Ill,2,p.47.
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(One should remember here the distinction made above - note 7
- between the sacraments, grace and the good life, the latter
not being included in the sacrament.) Having stated the reasons
for this appropriation Alexander then proceeds to give the
reason for the order of discussion of the sacraments in the
Glossa. First, there is the conferring of spiritual life,
just as at first in nature man lived by natural life. This
is made through a Baptism which is worthily received.
Secondly, there is conservation in grace which is given in
Confirmation. Thirdly, there is the augmenting in grace which
is made in the Eucharist. Then there are four sacraments
which repair grace since the grace conferred is still
destructible. Penance corresponds to Baptism repairing the
grace given in Baptism destroyed by sin; Extreme Unction
corresponds to Confirmation; Orders and Matrimony which ward
off adversaries and temptation correspond to the Eucharist.
Orders are given as an aid and an augment of grace against
temptations of the spirit, and Matrimony is against the
23
temptations of the flesh. ^ This statement can hardly be
considered to be referring only to the so-called "sacramental
grace". Earlier the two basks of the sacraments are placed
side by side where the sacraments are seen as medicines.
Baptism is a curative medicine, totally and simultaneously
purging both from guilt /"gratia gratum faciens"/ and
punishment and not successively and little by little as in
23. d.Ill,4,pp.49-30.
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the contrition and satisfaction of Penance. Conserving
medicine is at work in Confirmation giving "robur spirituale";
ameliorative medicine is in the Orders in which grace is
increased in those who receive worthily; Matrimony contains
a preservative medicine; and Extreme Unction is "mitigiva".
The Eucharist is conserving, ameliorative and "confortativa"
- conserving in diminishing venial sins, ameliorative because
24
grace is increased, and "confortativa" as food of the soul.
Earlier Alexander has stated that there are two affects of the
sacraments in the grace of operation and the grace of
25
cognition. ^ Later in the discussion on Baptism, the grace
of operation is said to be the work of the Holy Spirit and they
alone have the Spirit who have sanetification of life.
/
This is by no means complete evidence but it is
sufficient to demonstrate that m'hen Alexander speaks of grace
and the sacraments he is not merely referring to the
destruction of sin although this may be the primary and
particular task, s^uite plainly Alexander sees the sacraments
conferring "gratia gratura faciens". One of the distinguishing
features of the New Law sacrament as distinct from the Old Law
sacrament is the fact that those of the Old Law did not have
the ability "facere bonum". "Unde sacramenta Veteris Legis
faciebant solum cleclinare a malo, non facere bonum". ^ (This
however is not a rigid distinction, at least, between the Old
and the New Law). The reason for this above discussion is the
24. d•II,1,pp.40-41. 25. d.I,16,p.22. 26. d.IV,6,p.78
27.' Bk.I. d.I,5,p.8. See also Bk.IV,d.I,3,g)p.l6.
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fact that if "gratia gratum faciens" is not the sacramental
grace "as such" then Alexander in the Glossa has removed
this grace further from Christ than it would be if it were
attached to the sacraments, which, at least, are founded on
Christ as God and man and which have their virtue from the
passion of Christ. This still does not make the doctrine
of sanctifying grace satisfactory however; Christ is either
merely the occasion of its occurrence or its source only.
Before discussing Kilian Lynch's view of the
Alexander's doctrine of the sacraments there should be some
reference to the sacraments of the Old Law and what they
conveyed, and of the Lew Law and the establishment of the
sacraments for these reveal the limitations of Alexander's
Christology.
Previously ( p. 31 footnote of the Chrisuology) in
an extended quotation it was stated clearly what Christ added
to what could be obtained in circumcision. God in his mercy
in circumcision "abstulerit originale peccatum quoad culpam
et quoad reatum aeternae carentiae visionis Dei", out man
was not yet absolved from temporal punishment. This Christ
28
did by his satisfaction and so opened the door of paradise.
Baptism deletes the punishment of original sin which is
"carentia visionis Dei" which was not deleted in circumcision.
In Baptism "fomes" was diminished more than in circumcision. ^
Universal incorruption, however, is signified only in Baptism
and not caused because all sacramental grace is given according
28. d.I,30,d)p.37. 29. 17,p.23.
271
to part "quoad causandum" and thus universal incorruption is
given neither by virtue of circumcision nor by virtue of
Baptism. These have particular effects. "Soli autem
Christo convenit, qui habet plenitudinem gratiarum,
universalem incorruptionem dare". (This "sanctifying"
element in Christ is modified by the idea that he is a
channel).
A variation of, or perhaps another way of expressing,
the fact that through circumcision guilt and the "reatus
aeternae carentiae" were eliminated but not the "reatus
temporalis carentiae", is seen in another codex which expresses
clearly the difference between the Old and the hew sacraments:
"Dicendum quod est quaedam curatio secundum
satisfactionem personalem, vel secundum satisfactionem
naturae. Primo modo erant / sacraments of the Old Law /
ilia curativa, quantum in fide tamen; secundo modo sola
sacramenta liovae negis, quae virtutem sortiuntur ab ipsa
morte Christi". 31
This is not the same distinction as that made between the
eternal and temporal "reatus" for original sin as an answer
relating to actual sins and Baptism demonstrates: "est reatus
quoa^carentiam aeternae visionis Dei. Cum ergo remittitur
originals peccatum, diiaittitur reatus aeternae carentiae, non
temporalis. Et est exeiaplum in contritions de poena aeterna
xo
et temporali". In both original and actual sins there is a
30. 31,p»33* There is threefold punishment, the "carentia
visionis Dei et haec retorquetur ad cognitivam vim animae",
and there is "foraes peccati quae retorquetur ad vim motivam",
and the debt of dying. The passion deletes the first, "fomes"
is diminished by virtue of the passion and Baptismj "remissio
vero quantum ad debit urn aeternae mortalitatis fit in Baptisrao
virtute resurrectionis". d.IV.17,c)pp.86-87« 31• Codex "B",
footnote,p.41. 32. d.I,21,c)p.27•
temporal satisfaction necessary, that for original sin being
the satisfaction of nature made by Christ, that for actual sin
being personal satisfaction. In both original and actual sins
the guilt and the "reatus aeternae carentiae" are beyond man.
In these cases and in the raattar of personal satisfaction of
actual sin Christ has no necessary part to play although he
does contribute to the latter.
There is another difference between the sacraments
of the Old Law and the New Law, a difference which is less
rigidly defined, and that is the fact that the Old Law
sacraments were carnal, the New Law sacraments are spiritual.
This division is implied in the statement "non imprimitur in
33
circumcisione character spiritualis sed carnalis". This has
a parallel in the contrast between the ability to good and the
inability to do gooa or the presence of grace and the lack; of
it, or of love and fear. It is suggested for instance that
the sacraments of the Old Law justify. As part of the reply
Alexander says Miustificare dicitur duplicitur: vel quoad
'declinare a malo', vel quoad hoc *et facere bonum1; et idem
est ac si dicatur: iustificure dicitur quoad plenaa iustitiam
/quae est in apertione paradisi ^ / vel non plenam. Primo
modo non justificabant / the Old Law sacraments /, sed secundo
35
modo". " That the distinction between carnal and spiritual is
not rigid can be seen from the following quotation which yet
demonstrates very clearly the difference between the Old Law
and the New Law. The question is whether grace is given in
circumcision:
33. d.I,29,f)p.34. 34. Codex "P", footnote,p.l6. 35.d.I»3,
g)p.l6.
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"Gratia duplicem habet effectum. Unas effectus
est gratiae quoad remissionera culpae, alius quod non
faciendum malum : uterque est respectu mali. Quoad
bonum est unus effectus conferre vitam spiritualem aninae;
alius est habitare potentiam ad opus; tertius, bonum opus
elicere a potentia. Dicimus ergo tuod in circumcisione
spirituali quae fuit sacramenti in Yeteri Lege,
conferebatur gratia quae est in remissione culpae et ad
non faciendum malum; sed nullus de aliis tribus
/ effectibus / sequentibus. quod patet ex hoc quod
dicit Augustinus in libro Contra Adimantum / c.17, n»2/,
quod haec est differentia inter Veterem et Novam Legem,
quod in ilia fuit timor, in ista vero fuit amor
principium. quia ergo ex amore est conferre vitam et
habilitare potentiam et opus meritorium elicere, non
facere vero malum provenit ex tlmore, gratia prima
tollit culpam, gratia cum timore facit cessare a malo.
Ex parte amoris primo confert vitam. Inde gratia cum
timore dat gratiam quoad primos effectus, non quoad
alios sequentes". 36
It should be noted incidentally that this grace is identified
with the working of the sacraments, that is, it can be called
a "sacramental grace". "Gratia gratum faciens" is also
capable of parts as far as the effects are concerned with
guilt on one side and the doing of good on the other. The
various aspects of grace will be clarified in the chapter
on "grace". In this quotation however Alexander is again
stating that the Old Law sacraments enable one to decline
from evil but not to do good, (bee also the chapter on the
Old Law and the Mew Law.)
A final factor in the relation of the Old and the New
Law is the fact that although the sacraments are "properly"
of the New Law nevertheless their working or task is somewhat
loosely connected to Christ. In other words there is a
process going on between God and man in which man (and the
36. d.I,18,f)pp.24-25
274
sacraments) has a definite part and the satisfaction rendered
by Christ is merely an aid on the way - to be sure, a
necessary aid. This is seen in the following question and
answer. It is asked why it was that before the law faith
alone was sufficient to salvation, then with the Law faith
with circumcision, and then faith with Baptism. The answer
is "quod morbus tunc erat recens, et oportuit leviorem
adhiberi medicinam, ne aegrotus respueret. Et propter hoc
in Lege naturali sufficiebat fidesj in Lege Veteri
requirebatur fides cum circumcisions, quae habet poenam;
sed in Bova Lege, quit fuit lex suavitatis, adicitur fidei
37
sacramenturn sine poena, scilicet Baptismus". '
The on-going process, in the following case against
sin, is seen in another way on the question of the institution
of the sacraments, which is found in the discussion on
Matrimony. A.11 sacraments were in some way instituted in the
38
Bew Law yet there were "sacraments" in both nature and
under the Law. Only Confirmation and Extreme Unction are
appropriated to the Law of grace for Confirmation signifies
"robur gratiae" and Extreme Unction signifies the full grace
which is to be had in the reception "utriusque stolae. i^uae
duo sunt consecuta per redemptionem in Bova Lege". Thus
"viatores" are strengthened by the Holy Spirit not invisibly
but visibly through the sacraments. The other five sacraments,
however, were necessary in the Old Law, circumcision to delete
37. 23,c)p.29. 38. d.XXVI,2,c)p.446.
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original sin; Penance as a remedy for actual sin; marriage
to remedy the punishment of original sin which is
concupiscence warring against the members; the paschal lamb
in memory of the liberation from Egypt; Orders for these and
for the offices in the tabernacle and the temple; "in
quibus significatur Ecclesia militans hie, in qua sunt
officia constitute ordinata ad sacramentum Eucharistiae". ^J
If these were more pointedly aimed at the revelation in Christ
(in fact sin here seems the determining factor) this kind of
statement might be more acceptable but the fact is that the
whole process is continued under the New Law, notably in
regard to the Orders. Christ's task is to add to them.
(If the sacraments were aimed entirely at sin - as the idea
of "sacramental grace" suggests - this view would lend support
to a strong in.fralapsarian view of Christ:.) Two sacraments,
indeed, were instituted in paradise originally, Penance and
Matrimony, one to preserve from evil, the other for the
multiplying of the good and as a sign of the union of the
ilq
members of the church triumphant. Christ's relation
to these last two sacraments, as instituted, is loose. Because
sins increased after the Fall sacraments were established to
41
combat them. With no pointing to the Slew Creation these
views tend to eliminate Christ from creation and all its
aspects.
One must, however, make a modification to this because
it would be wrong to state without more ado that Alexander
59» 5,d)pp.44Q-449. 40. 3,f)p.449. 41. g)pp.449-450
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saw Christ as a "mere" help. He was a decisive help,
although a help only. This is seen clearly in Alexander's
reply to the question as to why Baptism replaced circumcision,
and the Eucharist replaced the paschal lamb whereas the others
remained: "haec duo sacramenta per se significant
redemptionem per passionem Christi, in qua est virtus omnis
42
sacramenti". Christ is given an honoured place in
spite of the "process" sacramental theology which leads and
will lead to his practical dethronement in a debased theology
to which the Reformers objected. The Old Law sacraments
are not properly sacraments so that Alexander can state
that the sacraments "non fuerunt instituta ante adventum
45
Christ, ut tunc esset plena consumptio morbi". ^ He
also states "non est ex institutions significans; non enim
ad hoc instituta. (^uamvis enim per earn comprehendi possit,
non fuit instituta a Domino; omnia enim sacramenta ab eo
44
sunt". This last statement, of course, cannot be
understood in a Reformed sense as has been sufficiently seen
and will be seen particularly in regard to Penance, Orders,
and Grace. Kilian Lynch maintains that Alexander goes further
than this in the Glossa by restricting the idea of "sacramental
grace" to that aimed at sin. Certainly, as had just been
seen, and is seen elsewhere, Alexander oftentimes understands
the sacraments (and perhaps predominantly) to be aimed at sin,
and in fact does use the term "gratia sacramentalis"
42. 4,p.450. 43. d.XI,2,p.41. 44. d.X,b,D>p.l2.
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primarily in this way. y Kilian Lynch allows that
"gratia gratum faciens" is at work in the sacraments but
does not call it "sacramental grace". This reading is not
supported by the evidence. When Alexander refers to "gratia"
or "grace of the sacraments" there is no reason to suppose
he used it only in regard to sin. Sacramental grace for
Alexander is also the grace to do good, "gratia gratum
faciens". In the discussion on Matrimony he could not be
clearer* "alia sacramenta, quantum est de se, conferunt
gratium spiritualem vel augmenturn gratiae, dico autem
gratiae gratum facientis, si digne suscipiantur; hoc autem
sacramentum non confert gratiaa gratum facientem, etiam digne
46
suscipienti"• Here sacramental grace "as such" is
"gratia gratum faciens". (Kilian Lynch, further, argues with
47
some cogency that this grace is also present in Matrimony. '
Kilian Lynch, I believe, interprets Alexander too tidily.
Alexander does not have that tidiness. In Alexander Christ's
work is satisfaction for sin and logically when the sacrament
are said to have their virtue from Christ's passion, then,
presumably, that would indicate that they were aimed at sin.
But so great is the emphasis in the Glossa on sanctifying
grace in the sacraments that one must conclude that
Alexander in some way saw it as a result of the life and
work of Christ. To be sure, it would be only an indirect
result because Christ only removes the barrier and institutes
45. d.I,31,p.38. 46. d.XXVI,2,p.445• 47. Franciscan
Studies, "The Theory of Alexander of Hales on the Efficacy of
the Sacrament of Matrimony"; Vol.XI,1951»Pp./69-130/.
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the sacraments but by being so closely associated with
Christ and his death in the sacraments, this grace comes
nearer to being Christocentric than a grace which operates
outside the sacraments (even if Christ, the man, is the channel
of that grace for as such he is not unique of. Christ as
Head.) Alexander's sacramental theology in the Glossa may
eventually detract from Christ's uniqueness but insofar as
Alexander connects the sacraments to Christ and grace to the
sacraments - and possibly the coming of grace to the event
of Christ - it tends to place the emphasis here on Christ,
the man necessary for us.
Once this is said, however, there are drawbacks in
Alexander's sacramental theology. Sacraments are a sign and
cause of a grace loosely connected, in part at least,
with Christ; Christ's peculiar work is limited strictly to
satisfaction and forgiveness takes place apart from him;
Christ is seen not as Alpha and Omega but only as a
decisive aid in a process which begins in nature; the
sacraments appear to add something to Christ (or to continue
something); there is a suggestion that man takes a hand in
the process. These elements will now be investigated in the
consideration of some of the sacraments individually.
CHAPTER 7
BAPTISM
In the following pages the teaching of the Glossa
on Baptism, the Eucharist, Penance, and Orders, as it relates
to Christology will be discussed. This will mean that the
sacraments themselves will not be discussed as fully as they
deserve, a task which would he of considerable interest as
the doctrine of the sacraments was still in a very fluid
state at the time as Alexander himself evidences all through
his sacramental work and particularly in relation to the
sacraments of Penance and Matrimony. Because the following
will not give a full and balanced view of the sacraments,
that does not mean that this discussion in relation to
Christology will necessarily be inaccurate for although
Alexander is not as consistent as one would wish (that is,
he is not as easy to pin down), nevertheless, the main lines
in relation to Christology are fairly clear.
It has already been stated that the sacraments have
their "virtus" from the passion of Christ. This is, in
called
particular, in relation to sin. The passion wasathe "pretium
et deletionem poenae originalis peccati, quae fuit carentia
visionis Dei" for opening the door of paradise and Baptism
1
opened the door "quantum ad causam ex parte baptizati".
This causality in Baptism did not exist "nisi ex passione
2
iam existente". Baptism has a special effect of grace,
1. d.III,24,e)p.69. 2. f)p.69»
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that is, "gratiam 'ad bene operandum'", "praeter hoc quod
circumcisio confert et passio Christi", "quam etiam habuit
ante passionem Christi; iste autem effectus non habebatur
x
ex virtute circumcisionis". ^ Thus the causality of the
sacrament is from the passion in opening the door of paradise
and after Christ in giving the grace to do well. Baptism has
its two parts : from the death of Christ, and from grace.
In Baptism there is a threefold "potestas :
"auctoritatis, excelientiae et ministerii". The authority
is from God to demit guilt and is "a se et per se"; the
excellence was of Christ Mut sine clave media remitteret
peccata, scilicet quoad poenam, sicut aliquis aperit ostium
digito". This is not "a se, sed per se". The ministry is
"puri hominis, cui conferuntur claves et Ordo sacerdotalis;
JL
et ista nec a se nec per se". Guilt and forgiveness
are thus reserved to God alone apart from Jesus Christ and
some sort of power is conveyed to the priestly order. Bo
the work of God, Christ, and the priest is divided in the
sacraments; (and the division between Christ and the priest
is greater than is possibly evident here although even here
the human role of Christ seems to be taken over by the keys
in the priestly order; the priest, however, can never replace
Christ, the man, in satisfaction;) a fourth element, the
grace to do well, maybe hidden behind the third power but is
not explicit.
3. d.I,30,e)p.37 4. d.V,5,p.l00.
There are a number of effects of Baptism, Guilt
and forgiveness belong to God alone. The following quotation
which has already been used in part succinctly states the
effects in regard to punishment.
"Est enim poena quae est carentia visionis Dei,
et haec retorquetur ad cognitivam vim animae. Est
iterum poena al ipsius fomitis peccati, quae
retorquetur ad vim motivam. Est tertia poena ipsius
corporis coniuncti cum anima, scilicet debitum
moriendi. Prima poena deletur virtute passionis et
ipsius Baptismi; remissio vero quantum ad debiturn
aeternae mortalitatis fit in Baptismo virtute
resurrectionis". 5
The matter of the resurrection has already been discussed
(See above pp. 239 ff) but here it should be noted that
the passion of Christ and Baptism have two effects, the
first in relation to the cognitive ("carentia"), the second
in relation to the motive ("fomes"), the latter relating to
the ability to do well. As Baptism is "typus mortis
Christi" it has its closest relation to the first
effect, namely the cognitive, because the death of Christ
was the price paid for the punishment which was "carentia
visionis Dei" and this "retorquetur ad cognitivara vim
animae". Thus the impression of "character" (which relates
*7 8
to the cognition ' ) "proprie...dicitur Baptismus".
"Character. Hie est enim specialis effeetus sacramenti". ^
Character is impressed in some sacraments but not all. It is:
"signum spirituals in anima indeleoile...cuius
duae sunt principales proprittates, scilicet quod sit
discretivus et quod sit indelbbilis. Maxime autem
convenit hoc signum imprimi in illo sacramento quod
est typus principalis redemptionis factae per
5. d.IV,17,c)pp.86-87• 6. d.lll,24,f)p.69. 7. d,IV,8,p.78
8. d.111,6,f)p.53. 9. d.IV,14,b)p.84.
sanguinem Christi. Et propter hoc convenit ut in
Baptismo imprimatur character, quia in eo primo
fit discretio fidelis ab infideli". 10
"Character est figura intelligibilis, configurans
trinitatem creatam increatae, facta per verbum
sacramentale fidei Trinitatis, ad discernendum
fidelem in statu suo". 11
Thus character as concerned with faith and the cognitive effect
(which has its "carentia visionis Dei" removed in Baptisra)
relates to the belief in the suffering Christ and the
Trinity. This impression of character is the work: of God
and is not received by man simply when he takes the sacrament
which may have been an interpretation put upon a sentence
of Peter Lombard in distinction VI when he maintained that
the worthy reception of Baptism was the beginning of salvation.
The beginning is with God, maintains Alexander, in the
spiritual character "facta per aquara sanetificatam
12
invocations Trinitatis". It is not, however, quite as
simple as this statement makes it appear. Alexander, in fact,
is not excluding the part of man, he is merely making
sure that the beginning is with God in the impression of
character. This becomes evident in a section already briefly
referred to in which Alexander had stated "proprie tainen
15
character dicitur Baptismus". ^ The question essentially
is "what is Baptism?" He begins the answer by quoting John
of Damascus; "Per Baptisma primitias Sancti Spiritus
accipimus, et principium alterius vitae: fit enim nobis
regeneratio, sigillum, custodia et illuminatio". "Regeneration"
Alexander comments, refers to the water having regenerative
10. d.VI,2,g)pp.107-108. 11. i)pp.108-109. 12. d.IV,7,p.77
13. d.III,7,f)p.53.
power from the word and the touch of the flesh; "sigillum"
refers to character; "illuminatio" and "custodla" to grace.
"Gratia enim habet affectum illuminandi in bono et
custodiendi a malo". Thus Baptism sometimes refers to the
water sanctified by the worn, sometimes to character,
sometimes to grace. By the water the faithful are discerned
from the unfaithful, by character it is said that no one can
lose his Baptism. When John 1:33 states "Super queia vlderis
Spiritum descendentem et manentem, hie est qui baptizat" the
Baptism of grace in which guilt and punishment are washed
away is understood. Then Alexander states that character
"properly" is Baptism but
"non character simpliciter, sed secundum quod
recipit rationem signi ab aqua sanctificata per verbum.
Est ergo aqua sanctificata per verbum, sacramentum
secundum quod dicitur 'invisibilis gratiae visibilis
forma'; sed/Character autem est sacramentum non in
quantum accedens non recipit gratiam 14 / character
in quantum recipit rationem signi, sed non in quantum
recipit rationem causandi si digne suscipiatur. ^uod
autem indigne accedens non recepit gratiam, non est ex
parte characteris, sed propter defectum suscipientis,
qui proponit abicere eius gratiam". 13
Thus not only is there a distinction between the action of
baptising and the bestowing as the distinction between sign
and caused (character) but also between this cause and the
worthy reception in which grace is received. it is
somewhat difficult to see here whether it is grace that causes
character or not although it does appear to accompany character
14. Codex "P",footnote,p.53« 15. d.III,6,f)pp.52-53; John
of Damascus. De Fide Urth.IV.c.9. 16. See d.I,6,p.14. :
"Sicut aqua Baptismi visibilis est secundum se, et est primo
signum characteris, character autem signum remissionis peccati.
Est ergo remissio peccati signatum tantum; character, ut
illud quod est medium, est signans et signatum: aqua tantum
signum"•
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on worthy reception of the sacrament. Later, however, it
seems clear that God the Father operates through uncreated
character, namely, the Son, to impress character, and he
operates through the Holy Spirit who is uncreated grace to
impress grace which leads to merit. So man is conformed to
the uncreated character, the image of God, in the Son, and
to uncreated grace in the Holy Spirit. "Et sicut cognitio
communior est quam virtus, nam extenditur ad bonos et malos,
ita character, qui est ad cognoseendum, communior est quam
17
gratia, quae determinatur tanturn in bonis". '
Thus it would appear as indicated above by the footnote
from page 283included in the text (note 14), that, although
character is the special effect of Baptism, and appropriate
to it, being indelible, it is not the whole of Baptism for
there is also the work of grace against guilt and punishment
which requires worthy reception by the good. This has been
TO
stated clearly before as part of Baptism. The section
referred to above also makes it clear that this grace leads
iq
to merit. y Thus it all depends what one includes under
"Baptism" as to what its effects are. This is clear when
Baptism is compared with martyrdom: "sicut ergo
Baptismus non efficit gratiam, sed disponit ad earn; ita
martyrium non efficit augmentum, sed ad ipsum disponit: in
hoc nobilius quia non potest suscipi sine gratia; quod
20
potest Baptismum". Here "Baptism" is used, as the
17. d.VI,2,h)p.l08. 18. d.IV,17,c)pp.86-8?. See above p
19. d.VI,2,h)p.l08. 20. d.IV,9,d)pp.79-80.
context shows, to indicate the Baptism of water. This
obviously cannot be preceded by grace as it is the first
sacrament. It is the "beginning of salvation". Grace,
however, does most definitely have a part in Baptism both in
relation to guilt and punishment (the reception of which is
outwith the impression of character) and to the doing of good.
There is, as stated earlier, both a cognitive and motive
effect in Baptism.
A broad view of the sacrament is seen when the use
of the various sacramentals is discussed. First, the power of
the devil is expelled; then there is the habilitation of the
spiritual senses for faith, hope, and love; there is the
habilitation of "gratia gratis data" preparing the person to
receive the work of God. "Post habilitatem gratiae gratis
datae ad affectum, sequitur infusio gratiae gratum facientis
remittentis culpam et poenam; quod significatur in Baptismo".
22
It would appear the impressed character is included under
this operation somewhere. The narrow view of Baptism is not
upheld by this statement for it includes under Baptism
"gratia gratum faciens" remitting guilt and punishment which
is signified in Baptism. However the tendency towards the
narrower view seems to be confirmed by the next statement
(actually it is a limitation on the effect of grace only,
not on grace, as such); "Bed quia Baptismus, quantum est de
se, non significat gratiam ut ordinat ad opus meritorium,
sequitur inunctio chrismatis in vertice ad designandum
22. d.VI,15,e)pp.121-122.
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infusionem gratiae ordinantis in bonum dataa in Baptismate:
non quod conferatur ipsa inunctione chrismatis, sed quod
chrisma figurat earn". ^ (This brings out the distinction
between the "sacramental grace" and "grace of virtues" but
no more than as aspects of the one grace. Guilt is still
associated with punishment.) However, the very name "gratia
gratum faniens", the fact that it is the grace which leads
to merit, and the fact that it cannot be given in part (as
a cause if not in effect), means that with Baptism the grace
to do good is given. The last quotation really is an
admission of the fact; all it is pointing out is what has
already been noted, namely, that Baptism, as the type of
Christ's passion, is not mainly concerned with the grace to
do good. It maybe noted that the impression of character
does not include, in itself, "sacramental grace" (grace
against sin). And all grace for its effect depends on worthy
reception.
The view that the grace to do well is part of Baptism
is confirmed elsewhere. It is hinted at in the answer to
the question as to whether people who take the sacrament
insincerely "put on" Christ.
"Respondemus quod non. Ron enim induunt nisi
quoad habitum characteris, in quo habitu non habetur
Christus; sed in habitu gratiae, quae est res
sacramenti. Est tamen alterum 'habere Christum' et
'habere Spiritum Sanctum'. Illi enim soli habent
Spiritum Sanctum, qui habent vitae sancticationem.
Habere autem Christum dicitur secundum quid et
simpliciter: quorum unum pertinet ad cognitionem,
reliquum ad affectum, ut patet in discretions
characteris et infusione gratiae. Discretio characteris
ad cognitionem, infusion gratiae ad informationem
affectus". 24
25. Ibid. 24. d.IV,8,p.78.
Here "habit of character" appears to relate only to
the action of Baptism whereas the grace of "putting on"
Christ refers to the "act" of character or something similar,
that is, to Baptism sincerely received. However, it is
difficult to reach a conclusion as to whether this grace is
what is "proprie dicitur Baptismus" and how it is connected
to the grace of the Holy Spirit in sanctification of life.
(Is it something like "sacramental grace?") This quotation
together with the previous quotation (above page 283 from
Glossa page 53) would indicate that in the first part of
Baptism there is the action as sign, the grace causing
spiritual character (or the impression of character), and
the reception of the person partaking. This all relates to
the cognitive which relates to Christ. (But does it include
the remission of punishment and guilt?) The second part of
Baptism is the grace of the Holy Spirit which includes the
grace to do well and the fact that it is included in the
quotation immediately above indicates that this grace is also
present with Baptism. ^
The effects of Baptism which Alexander enumerates
and discusses make it evident that Baptism is or can be seen
in a very broad way and to limit it to the impression of
character or even to that and the reception of forgiveness for
guilt and satisfaction for punishment is not really warranted
25* On page 108 of the Glossa (above page ,284* footnote 17)
"grace" is used only in relation to the Holy Spirit, not in
relation to character. The confusion may be due to the fact
that the grace of character is "gratia gratis data" which
is a disposing grace and the grace of the Holy Spirit is La
(and one would think impossible once "gratia gratum faciens"
has entered in). For the contrite adult there are many effects
"augmentum virtutis ad agendum, debilitatio
fomitis, impressio character is, communitas supernae
societatis, immunitas exterioris satisfactions,
remissio venialis post contritionem et ante Baptismum
commissi, robub ad resistendum, plena remissio,
absolutio ab obligatione quo prius homo tenebatur
baptizari. In parvulo vero plena remissio originalis
peccati, collatio virtutum / quibus / est in habitu
potens, non operans, debilitatio fomitis, impressio
characteris, remissio venialis si aliquod in ilia
aetate contrahitur, incorporatio Christo". 26
John of Damascus had numbered five effects: "unus est remissio
peccati, alter regeneratio, tertius sigillum, quartus
27
custodia, quintus illuminatio". ' It is then queried
whether the last four "qui ad bonum pertinent" have the same
or^different cause in Baptism. A.lexander replies that the
water disposes to regeneration through the regenerative
virtue "quam contulit ei tactu suae carnis qui venit ad
regenerandura, scilicet Christus". In regard to "sigillum"
the water disposes to spiritual impression by the invocation
of the Trinity. "Custodia" is from evil and to good "ad quam
disponit sanetificatio aquae". Illumination is to good "ad
"gratia gratum faciens", a grace in which giver and receiver
take part. This distinction is doubtful for two reasons,
first, because the cognitive relates to faith, which is a
theological virtue, it is as such from "gratia gratum faciens"
(the possibility that the faith is unformed faith, that is,
from "gratia gratis data" is eliminated by the fact that Christ
is "put on" in it and that it has all the marks of formed
faith), and secondly, that this grace in its reception depends
on the recipient (Glossa p.53) would indicate that "gratia
gratis data" has already preceded. This latter objection is
not absolute because in a sense there is always a preceding
"gratia gratis data" going back to the "naturalia" of man,
that is, to man as created. What one can conclude, which is
already the conclusion of the general discussion on the
sacraments, is that one is never sure how Alexander is using
the word "gratia". He knows its various effects but what
effects he intends - and being "gratia gratum faciens" whether
he really can limit the effects is doubtful - is often not
clear. 26. d.IV,19,p.88. 27- De Fide Orth. IV,c. 9;
d.IV,20,a)p.88.
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quam lux spiritualis in transparentia aquae". Regeneration
pertains to the substance of the soul of the receiver,
"sigillum", refers to him as the image of the Trinity,
illumination pertains to his cognitive element, "custodia"
to his motive element. Regeneration is appropriated to the
Father, illumination to the Son, and "custodia" to the Holy
pft
Spirit. "Sigillatio" is appropriate to the whole Trinity.
Finally, the three major elements of Baptism, the
cognitive,the motivating, ana the part of the recipient, are
all present in the section which follows the one just referred
to. Once again there is the same order - the cognitive is
first, but grace (the motivating) is also there, and two of
the effects depend to a great extent on the recipient. John
of Damascus is quoted: "Peccatorua remissio omnibus similiter
per Baptisiaa datur; gratia autem Spiritus secundum
OQ
proportioned fidei et praepurgationis". ' Alexander's
reply is in answer to questions, raised by this statement,
as to whether the effects in the recipients are the same.
This answer will be given in full because, not only are the
effects of grace seen more clearly, but the preceding of
faith in the recipient and the recipient's part are also
demonstrated.
"Respondsmus quod gratia piares habet effectus:
unus contra malum culpae; alterum contra malum poenae
quod est fomes; fcertium quoad ordinem in bonum respectu
meriti. Quantum ad primum aequalitas est: omnium enira
peccatorum fit similis remiesio. Hon enim lux spiritualis
secum conpatitur aliquam partem tenebrarum. quantum
autem ad alia duo, licet sit aequalis effectue quantum
28. 20,b)pp.88-89. 29. De Fide Orth. IV,c.9; d.IV,21,a)
pp. 89-90.
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est de virtute sacramenti, non tamen quantum est de
conditions suscipientis. Unde secundum fidei
proportionem maiorem aut minorem, datur aliquando maior
gratia aut minor. Praeterea, secundum quod facta fuit
purgatio maior aut minor a peccato: qui enim plus fuerint
purgati per contritionem a peccato, maiorem reeipiunt
in Baptismo gratiam ad merendum. Et ideo dicitur in
auctoritate Ioannis: "Secundum proportionem fidei
aut praepurgationis". JO
The general lines of Alexander's Baptismal teaching are clear.
Baptism goes beyond the impression of character and the
elimination of the "carentia visionis Dei" to involve the
grace which is against the "malum culpae", "malum poenae quod
est fomes", and "in bcnum respectu meriti". The "carentia"
is eliminated by virtue of -the passion's satisfaction, the
•Tomes" by virtue of the passion and Baptism, the
forgiveness of guilt (and eternal satisfaction) were present
already in circumcision from God, and through Baptism
(instituted in the descent of the Holy Spirit at Christ's
Baptism) comes the grace to do good - which is associated with
the grace of forgiveness. Christ's passion is irrelevant with
regard to guilt, necessary and causal in. regard to "carentia"
(temporal punishment), and with Baptism diminishes "fomes"
(which is the result of temporal punishment for which
satisfaction is made). However, Christ and his Baptism is
merely the dividing point between the time of no grace to do
good, and the time of the grace to do good, (that is, he may
be, at most, a channel of grace). However as he in some way
"earns" the grace ("gratia gratum faciens") diminishing "fomes",
JO. d)pp.90-91.
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he may also be understood to "earn" the grace to do good
indirectly because that is "gratia gratum faciens" which is
not "ex parte" and therefore accompanies the grace against
"fomes". This latter is also an indirect result, not a
direct result, of Christ's work because it derives from the
Holy Spirit (even with Christ as a channel of grace;. Christ
is the channel of grace - or spiritual power - in bestowing
this power upon the priestly orders.
When this association with Christ of grace (of
forgiveness and for merit) is noted the division between the
work of Christ (cognitive) and the work of the Holy Spirit
should be noted also. The Holy Spirit does not convey the
satisfaction and sanctification already achieved in Christ
to men, but, instead, he is seen as an "alter Christus"
whose work relates to grace (especially that of sanctification)
in which Christ as full man ard full Qod has no necessary
part to play except to contribute the satisfaction for original
sin which accompanies the work of grace. (He may as a member
of the Trinity but that is apart from the Son of Man.)
Christ makes his satisfaction, eliminates the "carentia
visionis Dei", and thus his positive work is limited to the
cognitive (as stated in the "Caput" section of the ChrLstology
proper this is not "saving knowledge"). The somewhat uncertain
doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Glossa is better discussed
under "Orders".
Then beyond the work of Christ there appears to an
additional power in Baptism. Baptism added to the passion,
diminishes "fomes"; it opens the door "quantum ad causam
ex parte "baptizati" (in terms referred to before, it adds
the efficient to the sufficient cause in Christ); and there
is a "potestas ministerii" distinct from Christ although
originating in him. In all these the sacrament provides
the anhypostatic element (Christ's consubstantiality with | n
mankind) in satisfaction. This is related to the above
question on the Holy Spirit, spiritual power ancl the
Orders which will be discussed under the Orders.
Finally, and this also raises the question as to
whether there is really a doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the
Glossa, the Holy Spirit has the same relation to the believer
as Christ; He is "alter Christus", that is, both Christ
and the Holy Spirit in their work are seen as "objective"
(uncreated) and the subjective element (which is traditionally
described as the work of the Holy Spirit) is in man himself
or in "created grace". The very term "created grace" speaks
of semi-Pelagianisra even without consideration of the free
will which is man's alone. Created grace resides in the soul
and with free will leads to merit. Thus Christ's person and
work is limited by his absence in forgiveness, by the power
of the sacraments, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and by




Perhaps the best starting point for a discussion of
the Eucharist is a comparison which is made between it and
Baptism in the first distinction where the definition
"Sacramentum proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae
Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat
et causa existat" A is discussed. It has been objected
that, although there is a sign in Baptism, yet there is not
a visible form. Alexander replies that water, visible
"secundum se", is firstly a sign of character, which in
turn is a sign of the remission of sin. The latter is the
signified only, character is both sign and the signified,
and the water is sign only. And so character is said to be
visible "in quantum habet rationea signi ab aqua ipsa".
Alexander then adds: "Eadern obiectio ae Corpore Ghris'ti: ibi
panis, et corpus Ohristi, et corpus iaysticum. Panis enim et
?
corpus Christi sacramentum est". Thus the breaa is the
pure sign, the body of Christ the signified and the sign, and
the mystical body is the signified only. The sacrament, in
itself, is the bread and the body of Christ, Dut the definition
of a sacrament and Alexander's usage in his doctrine of Baptism
where the water and character are the sacrament properly but
not all that the sacrament involves, mame it clear that the
whole point about a i\;ew Testament sacrament is that it is not
1. d.I,5,p.ll. 2. 6,f)p.l4.
only a sign but also a cause - in Baptism a cause of the
remission of sin, and of grace to do good, and in the
Eucharist already it would seem in some way a cause of the
mystical body. (The narrower idea of sacrament "secundum se"
and "proprie" probably derives from the meaning of the word
sacrament as "sign".,) But, as with Baptism, where there is
something more than the character, namely the satisfaction
made by Christ in his passion, so also there is something
more in the Eucharist than the bread and the body of Christ,
the sign. In the section where Alexander states the fact that
all sacraments have their virtue from the passion of Christ he
makes this comment on the Eucharist: "In Bucharistia
similiter datur virtus, quia quantum est de caritate
passionis, maior fit unio per caritatem membrorum corporis
mystici ad caput". ^ Love or the love of Christ is what
is ultimately signified. It is not so much the passion which
is the virtue (as in satisfaction) as the love of the
sufferer, and it is love which binds the mystical body to
the Head. This point is also made in the following pages.
Baptism is "typus sepulturae Christi in passions...bed hoc
sacramenturn gerit typum Christi passi, non passionis. Ipse
enim cibus est spiritualis nobis, ut panis cibus corporalis".
And again: "Christus passus in quantum est panis vitae
significatur in Sacramento altaris; in Baptismo vero in
quantum per passionem poenam originalis peccati delevit". ^
3. d.VIII,7,b)p.l37. 4. 9,d)p.l41. 5- 7,c)p.l38
This emphasis, that it is Christ in love which is important,
is again brought out when it is asked why the Eucharist is
the greatest sacrament: "Dicitur enim maius ratione contenti
et quia significat gratiam unionis, quae maxima est inter
gratias". ^ (Love and grace are very closely connected for
they both proceed from the Holy Spirit). It is the love of
Christ as such which is important here. The detachment of
the Eucharist from the passion itself is well illustrated
when Alexander states that the Eucharist was complete "quoad
materiam et quoad formam, scilicet in coena", but the
sacrament of Baptism lacked its form before the passion.
The Eucharist had full effect before the passion unlike
Baptism. ^ Thus, the passion and its satisfaction, which
formed the necessity of the incarnation for man, has no
central place in the Eucharist. Immediately, then, there
is doubt as to the substitutionary role of Christ's humanity
in the sacrament of love.
The main signification of the Eucharist has been
established - the love which binds the mystical body together.
Where is the causality of the sacrament? "Gausalitas enim
est ab ipsa vera came Christi sub specie panis et vini, quae
scilicet exsistens sacramentum, efficit quod figurat in
corpore mystico". The body of Christ is signified by the
bread and wine; "Species enim panis significat corpus
Christi, species vero vini significat sanguinem, in quo anima
6. d.XII,13,c)p.l97. 7. d.XI,19,p.183.
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intelligitur". The "ratio" "signi ex eo quod est visibile
/bread and wine/; ratio causae ex corpore Christi invisibile
sub Sacramento. Et ideo dicitur hoc sacramentum constare ex
iis, quia ab uno habet prinio rationem signi, ab altero primo
q
rationem causae respectu gratiae conferendae". Godex
"Pa" had earlier stated succinctly "ex sirailitudine
exterior! signum, ex re sacramentum /et/ causa; et hoc est
corpus Christi". ^ The same codex gives a whole causal
process: "Causa efficiens, Verbum increatum; media, verbum
genus creatum; deinde minister in illo verbo, habita intentione
consecrandi. - Causa aaterialis est species panis et vini;
formalis vero corpus Christi genitum et sanetificatum;
finalis vero unitio corporis et animae". 11 The comment
on the final cause is not in the main line of Alexander's
thinking. Although this quotation may or may not be the
writing of Alexander it does give his intent fairly clearly.
The peculiarity of the sacrament's cause, as distinct
from Baptism, is that the "res", the Body of Christ, is under
the species of bread and wine, so that the sign and the cause
are in the one thing, that is, there is transubstantiation.
Alexander asks "quare in hoc sacramento est res contenta
12
quae est significata et non in alio".
"Respondemus... sicut caritas in virtutibus est
complementurn, eo quod idem sit in quod transit actus et
finis, quia idem est in caritate quod diligitur et
propter quod diligitur: quia caritate diligo sutnmuia bonum
propter summum bonum - non sic est in aliis, sicut in fide,
8. d.IX,9,PP.1^0-151. 9. d.X.5,d)pp.157-158. 10. d.VIII,15
(Pa),b)p.l44. 11. c)p.!44. 12. d.VIII,9,a)p.l59.
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sed finis caritatis est ratio in aliis, ut credo summae
veritati propter sumiaum bonuui... sic in sacraaento
caritatis, quod est Eucharistia, accidit quod ipsum
est sacraaentorum complementum. Complementum autem
tunc est, cum idem est medium et extremum. Medium in
sacraraentis est Ghristus passus sive mediator, quia per
virtutem passionis eius omnia sacramenta virtutem habent.
Primum est Deus, secundo Ghristus passus; fit autem
extremum cum se ipsum confert in sacramento. Cum ergo
hoc sit complementum omnium sacramentorum, oportet quod
non tantum sit in eo res significata, sed etiam contenta".
Further, in common with the other sacraments the Eucharist
effects the grace it figures, which grace is in the unity of
the mystical body, and besides this "quia est finis
sacramentorum, habet in se ilium qui est finis et primcipium et
14
medium oanis sacramenti." And so the suffering Christ
whose passion gives virtue to every sacrament is the same as
the Body of Christ under the species of bread and wine, and
so the Eucharist is the complement of all sacraiaents. As
for the Eucharist itself, it is the love of Christ, present
in the Body of Christ being the type of the suffering Christ,
which is the significant thing. This fact the next paragraph
makes clear in its comparison with Baptism, (above, note 4,
page 294)* Since, however, the Christ who underwent the
suffering for satisfaction is the same as the Body of Christ
(in the sacrament), and love is also the complement a£" faith,
then clearly, the Eucharist must be the complement of, for
instance, the sacrameft of the passion and of faith, which is
Baptism. But in each sacrament the suffering Christ and the
13. d.VIII,9,b)pp.l39,140. 14. 9,c)p.l40
passion of Christ play different roles, namely the former
signifying love and effecting the unity of the mystical
body, the latter signifying and effecting the remission of
sin. Only for the latter role has Alexander established
the necessity of the humanity of Christ.
How is transubstantiation effected? The simplest
answer is "virtute enim verborum fit ilia transubstantiatio,
ex institutions Domini". ^ The words are: "Accipite et
comedite ex eo omnes: Hoc est corpus me urn, et iterum;
Accipite et bibite". The transubstantiation takes place
with the words "this is my body". ^ Thus transubstantiation
is in the power of the priest by virtue of the words spoken
by Christ who, at the Last Supper, first transubstantiated
the bread and the wine into his own body, the Body of Christ.
These words and this power continue within the priesthoou.
Thus there is a power beyond the actual Christ. Christ and
the Body of Christ, though the one depends on the other,
are different or apart. This difference is seen in the
question as to whether Christ himself partook of the Body of
Christ in the sacrament. The answer is that he did not as
the highest love, but his disciples did - even with Christ
17
present. This distinction is the equivalent of the idea
of extension of the incarnation which means that there is
a Christ-like power, distinct (if continuous with) from the
actual Christ, in the Church or in the sacraments or in even
15. d.VI,5W)p«113- 16. d. VTiI,|?,b)p.l35» 17. d.XI,18,
pp•181-183•
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the people. In transubstantiation, the priest, the sacrament
and the people tend to assume the place of the humanity of
Christ and the "Christ" present in the Body of Christ under
the species of bread and wine tends to be the Son of God
alone. For Alexander, to make a positive assertion or even
to consider that the Body of Christ was Christ present only
as Son of God, of course, was an impossibility. It is not
orthodox. Thus it is only in a question like the matter of
ubiquity that such a tendency can be noted, not in a direct
question. This becomes evident in the question where it is
asked whether the Body of Christ is in many places. The
first response shows the tendency to diminish the humanity
in Christ.
"Respondemus quod duo concurrunt: unum ex parte
termini, et alterum ex parte principii. Ex parte principii,
Christus mediante suo verbo ad hoc instituto, cui collato
est virtus spiritualis non tantum significandi, sed
faciendi. Ex parte vero termini est ipsura corpus
Christi, hoc est humanam unitum divinae naturae,
quae est ubique. Eon enim omne corpus habet
possibilitatem ut sit in pluribus locis, sed solum illud
quod per unionem accedit ad participandum proprietatea
convenientem divinae naturae per unionem secundum
divinitatem. Divina enim natura est ubique; corpus
unitwm ei possibile est esse in pluribus locis; corpus
vero non unitum determinatum 6St in uno loco". 18
At this point Alexander is attempting to answer a question
in terms of space similar to today's "How is the man Jesus,
relevant to me, two thousand years later?" The answer must lie
in the fact that he was a man of men, in other words in terms
of enhypostasia and anhypostasia, and that this Christ is
18. d.X,4,e)p.!55.
present today by the Spirit. Alexander in his reply
avoids the real problem by tending to overthrow the "a" man
in that the man takes on the characteristic of ubiquity, a
ubiquity which is founded not on Christ's identification with
all men but in his Divinity. Such a Christ requires a new
humanity - in the Church. After the above response there
the moment
follow explanations of transubstantiation but for A the
response to a second question "utrum Christus sit uoique
homo" is significant : "'iste homo' potest nominare personam
cui unitur humana natura; et secundum hoc verum est: 'iste
homo est ubique*, non tamen est ubique homo. Si vero nominet
individuum suppositura huius speciei 'homo', tunc est verum
quod 'iste homo est in caelo' per circumscriptionem
i q
corporalem". J (This incidentally appears to make Christ, the
Son of God, play the role of the Spirit.) The humanity of the
"Body of Christ" is virtually eliminated (into heaven) and
the formulation offends against the "without change" of
Chalcedon. The human cannot be represented by the Divine.
One must be able to say: "wherever the Son of God is, there
is the Son of Man; and wherever the Son of Man is, there is
the Son of God."
The humanity for Alexander, in as far as there is
humanity, resides, in the first place in the spiritual power
of the priesthood and the created word. On the spiritual
power which is in this word Alexander states "quod haec virtus
per Verbum increatum descendit in verbum creatum: Verbum dico
19. Ibid. h)p.l56.
increatum humanatum. Ut autem sit completa circulatio,
20
fit conversio carnem unitam Verbo increato". Thus so far
as there is humanity in the Body of Christ it comes immediately
from the spiritual power in the Church. Alexander, of course,
is not saying that the created word by reason of its
spiritual power makes the Body of Christ "sed panis
21
transubstantiatur in corpus Christi iam exsistens".
Here then, by the spiritual power the priest can make available
the Body of Christ (make "relevant"?) which is said to be
human but might as well be purely divine. To be sure, the
power is derivative but nevertheless it is a power in the
Church - as the chapter on the orders will demonstrate. It
is this "making available" of Christ by the spiritual power
that is the human element which rightly resides in Christ
alone as the Word becomes flesh, and in his Spirit.
Here, Alexander realises that this power resembles
the power of God in the Holy Spirit which operated in the
conception of Christ. He states that "licet operatione
Spiritus Sancti immediate fuerit conceptio, non tamen ipsa
transsubstantiatio fit praeter virtutem creaturae; quia
minus est alterum mutare in ipsurn, quam ipsum creando
22
divinae naturae unire". Thus at this point, as one would
suspect, it seems that that not only does the created word
replace Christ's humanity, but also it replaces the work of
20. f)p,155. 21. s)p.l56. 22. Ibid.
the Spirit. The spiritual power of the priest is again
emphasised as a power in itself by Alexander's separation of
the conception of Christ from the "making" of the Body of
Christ. There are the two acts, not the one in Christ.
In the second place, the humanity resides in the
mystical body. The Body of Christ is the sign and cause
of the unity of the mystical body which is "membra
23 24
congregationis fidelium" ' or the Church. The
Body of Christ is "cibus animae ratione delectationis
spiritualis quae est in cibo". There is a conjunction
"et re et affectu et intellectu", the first is "in sensu",
the second is in the soul "secundum voluntatem informatam
caritate uniente", and the third is in the intellect
25
recalling to memory the passion. ' The food, comes from
the Head himself from whom it flows into the members and
this takes place in the mystical body which is the union of
26
incorporeal things through love to Christ. The
incorporation is principally of the soul in the church
militant - in the church triumphant the body through the
soul will be incorporated - and the incorporation is made
to the Head. Because he is Head both according to his
Divinity and humanity the union with him is in both ways.
"Sed differenter; quia ab ipso secundum quod
Deus effluit gratia et virtus in membris corporis raystici
ab ipso vero secundum quod homo materialiter trahitur
gratia, et in quodam modo effective, quoad effecturn
gratiae. Creaturae enim non est dare gratiam; sed
23. d.XIII,4,p.201. 24. d.XII,13,c)p.l97. 25. d.X,7,g)
pp. 161-162. 26. Ibid, k)p.l63.
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quia per ipsum facta est redemptio a poena, quae
redemptio est effectus gratiae, ideo, dicitur
•secundum quid effective". 27
Thus the man Christ contributes under grace (the same grace
which leads to virtue and sanctification) satisfaction for
original sin, the effect of which satisfaction accompanies
(and possibly removes the barrier to that grace - is the man
"efficient" in this way?) the grace flowing into the
mystical body. This "effective" work of Christ, as has been
pointed out previously, points primarily back towards God
and not towards man. The "materialiter" in relation to
sanctifying grace, as has just been seen, denotes little more
than a divinised man, a channel, certainly not a unique man.
Here, grace and the virtues actually do derive from
Christ as the Son of God (which seems to be the case in the
"Caput" section of the Christology proper). This view must,
to some extent, be modified. First, it is the spiritual
power in the Church which enables this to happen, which makes
available love and grace. Secondly, the love and grace are
present in Christ as a vessel and not necessarily as the Son
of Man, as a result of his conception by the Holy Spirit
or the descent by the dove, and he passes on this power to
the Church. Thirdly, there is an indication that, in fact,
the grace and love in the Body of Christ come directly from
the Spirit. This indication is a comment on a statement by
Prosper Aquitanus: "Caro Christi fidelium est vita, si
27. l)p.163.
304
corpus Christi esse non negligant. Bint corpus Christ! si
volunt vivere de spiritu eius, de quo non vivit nisi
28
corpus eius". The comment is: "lac quo denotatur quod non
tantum corpus Christi verum vivit de spiritu eius, sed etiam
corpus mysticum. Sed aliter vivit spiritu increato, et
pQ
aliter spiritu creato". y Perhaps the Spirit is not so
bound as the earlier statement on transubstantiation might
have indicated (see above page 301 , note 21) although his
work coincides with the work of the priest. The later
statement, however, does appear to detract from the body of
Christ, or rather, the actual Christ, as the source of grace.
Nevertheless, whatever way the matter is viewed, Christ on
earth or the Body of Christ are both subject to the bpirit
in the matter of grace. It is the Spirit who ultimately
sanctifies man; Christ or the Body of Christ is merely the
channel of grace. Christ is not our sanctification.
In spite of this division of Christ and the Spirit
(the Spirit is seen as preceding Christ, not as proceeding from
him) both are involved in the process of transubstantiation,
that is, both to some degree are subject to the uncreated
word. The Body of Christ and the vivification of the mystical
body may be different parts of the sacrament (as ax'e character
and grace in Baptism) but as the priest "brings about"
the Body of Christ, as "sacramenta Novae -^egis efficiunt
quod figurant quantum in se est, sed impedimentum potest
esse ex parte eius qui suscipit" and as the Body of
28. Sententiae ex August, delibatae. n.340. 29. d.XII,7,p.191.
30. d.IV,l,c)p.73.
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Christ figures the union to Christ of the members through
love, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that both the
Body of Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit (together
or apart) are to some extent subject not only to the uncreated
word, the spiritual power of the priest but are also
"humanised" by the mystical body which stands over against
Christ and the Spirit.
In the third place the humanity resides in man or
in the individual members of the mystical body. Where the
incorporation into Christ was discussed it was asked "quomodo
fiat ilia unio?" The answer differs for children and adults.
The union in adults takes place "ratione voluntatis actualis
51
unitae per caritatem". ' Later Alexander comments: "licet
corpus Christi aequaliter sumatur ab omnibus, non tamen aequalis
unio est in omnibus in corpore mystico. ^uidam enim dignius
52
sumunt et quidam minus digne". ^ And earlier he states
"Si vero quaeritur quod dicitur ibi esse proprie sacrament urn,
dicendum quod vera caro Christi sub specie panis et vini
55
exsistens. Haec enim, digne suscepta, efficit quod figurat". ^
In the first two quotations "three humanities" are evident,
the mystical body, the Body of Christ (which is "made") and
the worthy reception. In the last statement two parts of the
Eucharist are evident, the sacrament as sign, and the worthy
reception. The sacrament is complete, however, only when
the sign and the effect (the inflow of grace and love
31.d.X.7,l)p.l63. 32. d.XI,7,g)p.l?5. 33. d.VIII,11,p.143
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forming the mystical body), in which the priest plays his
part and the individual member determines the inflow of
grace by his worthiness, occur. The priest permits the inflow,
the mystical body receives, the individual members determine
the amount. Thus the humanity is provided.
The Eucharist in Alexander's teaching is best described
as the sadrament of love. Love is its heart, and not really
Christ, the Bon of God and the Son of Man. To be sure, he
is the instrument of that love and the Holy Spirit but he
is not the one in whom the sanctification of man has already
taken place, in other words he is not our substitute as he
is in satisfaction. Because this is so the humanity of
Christ has no necessary role (except in its satisfactory role)
and drops into the background. The humanity, for all intents
and purposes is replaced by the Church, in which resides the
spiritual power and the created word, which derives from
Christ, but which is nevertheless a real power. The Orders
pass grace onjto the mystical body of which they are the higher
part and it also supplies part of the humanity. Within
this mystical body the consent of the members in the reception
of grace replaces the work of the Holy Spirit because the
consent of the members also supplies the lacking humanity
of the Body of Christ. The Divine on the one side and the
human on the other side are denoted, in effect, by the three
separate titles, titles which should not be separated;
Christ suffered, the Body of Christ, and the Mystical Body.
In all this, the Holy Spirit actually appears to
be the major operative element, rather than Christ the Son
of God, for grace and love are in the province of the Holy
Spirit. He vivifies the Body of Christ and the mystical body,
and in fact may precede Christ rather than proceed from him.
This view is not completely substantiated in the Glossa.
In fact, there is a possibility that the Spirit in a way
is made subject to the spiritual power of the priest which
derives from Christ by reason of the fact that his work
would occur whenever the priest operates. If this were the
case, the Church sacraments replace the Holy Spirit, in effect,
as the one who brings the benefits of Christ to the members.
It would not be quite as blatant if the Spirit channelled his
grace through Christ, but nonetheless the Spirit would still
be replaced by the Church. Whatever the case, whether Christ
is seen as the channel of grace, or whether the work of
Christ and the Spirit merely coincide in the sacrament when
the priest operates, the Spirit still comes to man as
"alter Christus". This means that the Church and man not
only supply Christ's humanity but also replace the work of
the Spirit; in the Church as he comes objectively to the
member, in the member subjectively in his reception of the
sacrament. As "alter Christus" the Spirit must have his
humanity and this is found in the church, in the same way as
Alexander finds the humanity of Christ in the Church. The
two "Christs", that is, "Sons of God" thus both receive their
humanity in the Church and the members. The freedom
of God then lies in man's consent and not in the Spirit.
The priesthood and the sacraments have a dual role; towards
the Son of God and the Spirit they are human; towards the
member they are Divine. (This is evident in the "Orders".)
In short, they are the mediator.
In satisfaction Christ's manhood is unique but
lacks efficacy. This efficacy is supplied by Baptism and
man. Here Christ's manhood is not unique; it is merely
the channel of spiritual power to the Church which provides
the humanity towards the grace of God and towards man becomes
God. The individual man has to provide his own response.





There are several things which are significant
about Alexander's doctrine of Penance. First, it occupies
the most space, 179 pages of Book IV. (cf. 148 for
Matrimony, 82 for Baptism, 74 for the Eucharist, 46 for
Orders, 14 for Extreme Unction, and 4 for Confirmation).
This may be due, of course, not to its importance, but to
the fact that the doctrine was in a state of flux.
Secondly, as Christ made satisfaction for original sin,
Penance parallels this work to some extent (although the
sacrament must be preceded by Baptism) for actual sins.
The space occupied may also be due to this for actual sins
are man's immediate and pressing problem. Thirdly, there
are two distinct aspects; there is the sacrament itself,
contrition, which takes place simply between man and God,
and there is the sacrament of the Church which is mainly
confession and satisfaction. Absolution is barely
mentioned. Fourthly, and it has this in common with
Matrimony, consent is central. These two sacraments are not
in line with the other sacraments and are difficult to fit
into the concept of the sacrament as a sign and cause of grace.
Alexander begins his doctrine of Penance by a
general discussion on penitence. It is stated to be the
first virtue in adults who have fallen through sin, and Baptism
for adults is of no value unless there is contrition present.
It is the first virtue in adults who decline evil. At
Baptism it figures liberation "a peccato actuali in passo
recidivum. Prior ergo est ilia gratia quae est in
Baptismo ea quae est in Poenitentia". ^ Penitence, the
virtue, at Baptism is for past actual sin, and thus Penance
as a sacrament is for post-Baptismal actual sins. There is
a two fold conception of penitence; intellectually the
virtue of penitence is conceived by faith, in the affections
it is conceived "a timore prirno". This fear is initial fear
which relates to both "poena" and "praemium" whereas servile
fear relates only to "poena", and filial fear only to
2
"praemium". There is a twofold punishment for past errors,
one enjoined by the priest, the other "continuus dolor cum
x
detestatione peccati".
There are two effects in penitence, the remission
of guilt ana the remission of punishment. Guilt is remitted
in contrition and thus penitence is grace, and punishment is
remitted in confession and satisfaction and in this penitence
is a virtue: "tunc enim homo exsistens in caritate satisfacit
et ita reddit Deo quod ei debetur, quod scilicet est
iustitia6. Est ergo opus illud ex caritate et iustitia
procedens". ^ (Penance as a sign arid cause of grace is the
sacrament but at this point penitence in general is being
discussed. Alexander enumerates a number of meanings of
the word "poenitentia". ^ ) Post Baptismal satisfaction
1. d.XIV,l,b)pp.206-207- 2. d.XIV, 2,c)p.207. 3. 3,p.208
4. 6,f)pp.210-211. 5. g)p.211.
is only £rom love - Esau's tears would not have been
satisfactory if they were not in love ^ - as the following
quotation illustrates: "Est enim quaedam poenitentia, cuius
poena satisfacboria est ex virtute passionis Christi et
virtute Baptismi habentis virtuteni ex ipsa; et haec set
prima poenitentia. Est poenitentia secunda, cuius poena
satisfactoria est ex caritate informante dolorem poenitentialem
7
et alia opera poenitentiae". 1 This demonstrates how closely
the virtue of post Baptismal satisfaction parallels the work
of Christ - it is in love and in justice, and, instead of for
original sin, for actual sins. It is "gratia gratum faciens"
which prevenes the work of merit, by deleting guilt and
Q
informing the free will. ("Gratia gratis data" prevenes
while the person is in sin habilitating him to "gratia gratum
Q
faciens" . ) Thus the inference is that the guilt removing
grace, informs the free will, and creates the virtue which is
the fear of punishment and the expectation of the prize by
which meritorious satisfaction is made. This twofold effect
of Penance towards guilt and punishment is seen in terms of
merit in relation to "misericordia". "Misericordia" is
twofold; in the remission of guilt and in the remission of
punishment. The first nobody merits "ex condigno" although
it is "congruous" the Lord should pity the contrite. The
second can be merited and is made after the demission of
guilt and the "reatus" of eternal punishment.^ Thus in
6. 9,a)p.215. ?. d.XVI,14,i)p.263. 8. d.XV,8,p.226
9. Ibid. 10. d.XVII,19,p.298.
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Penance there is the remission of guilt and penitence as a
virtue informed by love. (The contrast between Baptism and
Penance highlights the place of voluntary love in the
latter. If Baptism "quod tantuia trahit virtutem effectus
a passione Christi" is undergone insincerely "recedente
fictione, elicitur effectus". But Penance has it virtue
from the passion of Christ "et praeter hoc ex opere nostro,
quod est satisfactox'ium poenae". Thus if penitence is
made in mortal sin it is not pleasing to God in as far as it
is "ex opere nostro". "Causa autem huius est, quia peccatum
quod debet per poenitentiam deleri, ex propria voluntate
contrahitur; et ideo satisfactor ium illius debet esse
voluntarium quod Deo placet cum fit. Hoc autem non est
praeter caritatem". The sin deleted by Baptism was
contracted from the "voluntas" of the first parents, and
thus being contracted through another, satisfaction is made
through another. ^ in Penance, or penitence, the
penitent; is of foremost importance which he is not in Baptism.
If there is no "voluntas" at work in love part of the whole
point of penitence is lacking.
So far it has been penitence generally that has been
considered and in particular the centrality of man's part,
that is, the virtue. However within Penance itself the
sacrament, there are several divisions. On the one side there
is a man's contrition, which in itself can include the
deletion of guilt and the satisfaction of punishment. On the
11. d.XV,2Q,h)p.242
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other side there is that related to the church, confession
and satisfaction, which include the relaxation of punishment
and the satisfaction of punishment. On the side of man in
contrition the work of "voluntas" is required, but also on
the side of confession and satisfaction, the "voluntas" is
necessary, as well as the power of the church which derives
from Christ. This sacrament is different from the others
"non enira iustificatur homo a peccato mortali sine voluncate
eius...Quia ergo dolor voluntarius requiritur in contritions,
12
formatus a gratia, necesse est adesse poenitentiam virtutem".
(This statement is made in the context of the three parts of
Penance.) "Penance" covers the three parts - contrition,
confession and satisfaction - but it could refer only to
contrition. Alexander does not integrate completely contrition
on the one side, and confession and satisfaction on the other
to give one rounded view of the sacrament. The problem is
created by the fact that contrition appears to be able to
render the sacrament of the church unnecessary, or nearly so,
and this would undermine the authority of the spiritual power
of the keys of the orders through which the virtue of Christ's
passion works.
Alexander is aware of this problem when he asks
"utrum sint ilia tria partes subjectivae vel integrales
poenitentiae". He answers that "aliter est loqui de
poenitentia secundum quod est satisfactoria, et aliter de
12. d.XVI,l,f)pp.255-254
ipsa at est virtus, aliter ut est sacramentum". As a
sacrament it can be looked at from the point of view of
what it is as sign and cause, or from the point of view of
the institution, or as to what is the sign and what the
cause, 'fhe institution of the power of the keys is found
in James 5:16 "Confitemini alterutruia peccata vestra" which
is first signified by Luke 17:14 "Ite, ostendite vos
sacerdotibus". The sacrament signifies the grace of the
V
deletion of sin. As sign it is divisible; there is
something in contrition, something in confession and
something in satisfaction. Contrition is a sign of the
remission of guilt; undertaking penitence in confession
signifies the deletion of purgatorial punishment inco which
the eternal punishment is commuted; in satisfaction there
is the sign of the deletion of temporal punishment. For
the completion of the sign all these parts are required.
There is a part which is of the "esse" (contrition) and parts
which are of the "bene esse" (confession with satisfaction
"prout satisfactio est praeter contritionem"). This is so
because in contrition itself is the "esse" of Penance as it
is the cause of the deletion of sinT iiowever, as sign, both
confession and satisfaction are of the "esse" of Penance and
principally confession by reason of the "poenitentiae
susceptae". "Dico autem de poenitentia secundum quod est
satisfactivum Ecclesiae. Aliter enim est loqui de
poenitentia ufc est satisfactivum Ecclesiae, et aliter ut est
sacramenturn". As a sacrament Penance is completed in
contrition; as "satisfactivum Ecclesiae, non fit sine
suscepta poenitentia a sacerdote ex vi clavium in
15
confessione". ^ Here the part of the Church is small,
in fact contrition can be the complete sacrament. But
before the Church man still can be a debtor in relation
to punishment. The Church also has a role in relation to
guilts "deletio quoad culpam fit duobus modis: vel respectu
Dei, et sic in contritions; vel respectu Ecclesiae, et sic
14
in confessions, quoad forum poenitentiale". The two
aspects of confession may also be expressed in the following
statement: "confessio duo importat: ostensionem peccati et
susceotionem poenae, taxatae secundum iudicium sacerdotis,
1
relaxatae ex vi clavium, quae via habent ex passione Christi".
Whether this is more than a sign is doubtful but the one real
power that the church has is to relax purgatorial punishment:
"Sed sacraaentum illud, prout est Ecclesiae, cuius virtus
consistit in virtute clavium, necessarium est non ad
dimissionem culpae, sed non imputetur ad poenara".
A division between the parts of the sacrament
similar to that stated at length above is found earlier in
the Glossa where "Poenitentia-sacramentum" as a sign and
cause of grace is discussed. With contrition preceding,
Penance received from a priest is a sign but not a cause of
the remission of guilt in contrition in which grace is infused
spiritual grief in the soul without tears etc. is a cause but
not a sign; and it is "causa st signurn, cum dolor ills
13. d.XVI,l,e)pp.252-253. 14. 7,p.257. 15. d.XVII,9»
e)p.284. 16. d.XXII,3,p.364.
spiritualis in signum corporale prorumpit, st significat
gratiam remissionis poenae aeternae virtate passionis
17
Christi et virtus clavium". The problem of how the
three parts make up one sacrament arises again at the end
of the discussion on Penance. Alexander ties the parts
together in the first part of the response. In "perfecta
Poenitentia quae est sacramentum Ecclesae" there are not
three sacraments but one: "-non enim a signatione perficitur
sacramentum, sed a causalitate, quae ex institutions et
sanctificatione procedit". The remission of guilt and
punishment is what is caused and is what perfect Penance
figures. "Uncle tarn confessio, rations susceptionis
poenitsntiae, quam satisfactio confert ad remissionem
poenae; et ita non tantum est principium cognoscendi, sed
TO
etiam causandi exterior Poenitentia est principium".
But in the next answer to the question what is the "res"
only, and what are the "res" and the "sacramentum", this tie
appears to be loosened somewhat. The exterior penitence,
which is in satisfaction, is the sacrament only, the interior
penitence, which is in contrition, is both "res" and sacrament,
and the reraission of sin as far as guilt and punishment is
"res" only. Then it is suggested that some lack the benefits
of Penance since they do not fulfil the exterior penitence.
Because of this Alexander states that "videtur potius esse
dicendum" that the "esse" of the sacrament is principally
17- d.XIV,6,g)p.211. 13. d.XXII,2,d)p.393-
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in contrition, Exterior contrition is a sacrament only;
interior contrition is both, the sacrament and "res"; and
"res" is the remission of sin. "Et consistit similitudo
in annihilations• In contritione enia annihilat se homo:
in remissions peccati Deus annihilat culpaa"• In confession
there is an exterior (sacrament only) and an interior
(sacrament and "res") obligation, the latter being the
interior consent to satisfaction; "deobligatio" on the part
of punishment "quondam cum obligations cuiusdam poenae
sensibilis, est res tantum". In satisfaction there is an
exterior (sacrament) and an interior (sacrament and "res")
"impletio" the latter consisting in the will to satisfy;
1Q
"impletio poenae dimiesae" is the "res" only. Thus
even more there appears to be a division between the pen^itent
ana the church so that contrition can almost stand by itself
and even in confession and satisfaction which relate to
punishment the interior element appears almost self-sufficient.
k further attempt, not so much to integrate the parts
of the sacrament but to justify the church siae of it, is
found under the discussion of the sacrament of Matrimony in
which there arises exactly the same position. The problem
arises because the other sacraments have sensible signs (oil,
water, etc.) but Penance and Matrimony do not. The answer
to this problem is first, that these two sacraments were
instituted in paradise, "dum adhuc homo spirituali mente
praeditus erat, nec per conversionem ad sensibilia subiectus
19. d.XXII,2,e)pp.383-384.
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peccato". Then, also, the nature of these sacraments differ:
"Coniugium enim consistit in consensu expresso per verba
de praesenti. *^uid enim habet maiorem convenientiam cum
verbo interior quam verbum exterius, quod ab ipso generator".
A similar situation exists in Penance. "Recte ergo haec duo
sacramenta, quoniam signa generantur ab affectione animi, sunt
universalia sacramenta Legem naturae concomitantia". As man
was seduced by sensible things separate from him so the other
sacraments instituted after the Pall have exterior matter.
Then, again, in these two sacraments "est homo sicut cooperans
Deo; dico autem de homine qui recipit affectum sacramenti.
Deus non iustificat hominem, nisi homo faciat quod in ipso
est" and similarly in Matrimony consent is necessary. This is
not so in the other sacraments "immo actiones sacramentales ad
alias pertinent personas, quam ad eas quae suscipiunt
sacramentum". Before the Pall man could stand and progress
with no other help than God, but after it he needed another
aid to rise again. And so these two sacraments,
quae ante peccatum erant instituta, materiam acceperunt
ex ipso qui suscepit sacramentum, per ipsius operationem.
- Secus tamen est de sacramento Poenitentiae et de
sacramento Coniugii. ham sacramentum Poenitentiae quoad
partes suas non habuit effecturn antequam lapsus esset
homo in peccato; et propter hoc in parte dependet
effectus eius a ministris Ecclesiae, prout de virtute
clavium fit in parte relaxatio poenae aut commutatio.
Coniugium vero est inter omnia quoad hoc spiritualius;
eius enim effectus melius permansisset, sic homo in
statu innocentiae perstitisset". 20
20. d.XXVI,5»f)pp.451-452
Thus the church has the power of relaxation "ut non imputetur
ad poenam". (In Patrimony the church's part is practically
just an outward form.) This power of the church maybe almost
necessary (and very helpful) for the purpose of relaxation
but it is questionable whether it is absolutely necessary.
Certainly, Alexander has not been able to integrate the parts
very successfully and indeed comes down heavily on the side
of what might be described as "individualistic pietism"
rather on the side of the institutional church. Of course,
the Church in its role as the relaxer of punishment has very
considerable practical power. It is certain, over against
the uncertainty of an individual's contrition.
The last part of this discussion will centre
firstly on contrition (and justification) by itself, and then
on the Church side and the power of the keys by itself.
21
Contrition is a "dolor voluntarius... formatus gratia",
22
for the remission of sin. In contrition there is a
deletion of guilt, and of punishment in part. The deletion
of guilt is the effect of grace through itself in as far as
it purges the free will from sin. As far as the deletion of
punishment in part, the movement of faith referring to the
articles on the remission of sin, eternal life, and eternal
punishment, is first. Punishment arouses fear and life
impresses the movement of hope and between these two
movements is that of contrition "quo se homo annihilat pro
peccato quo erga Deum deliquit". That is the movement of
21. d.XVI,l,f)p.254. 22. d.XVII,l,a)p.271.
"iustitia". ^ (Not all punishment is deleted because
there is a certain punishment "quae debetur omni mortali
in quantum tale, et haec est dolor continuus usque ad finem
vitae. Nam, quia mortals est debitum poenae aeternae, oportet
quod poenitentia obliget ad vinculum detestationis perpetuae.
Sed est alia quae debetur mortali secundum proprium genus:
alia enim debetur fornicationi, alia adulterio; et hanc
24
poenam delebit contritio, tanta potest esse". The
discussion on the resurrection also made clear that corruption
and death, which is a punishment, is not deleted till the
final resurrection.) The form of contrition is grace and
voluntary grief; the sensual and spiritual are the matter.
For the effects of these Alexander refers the reader to the
25
following distinction. y
This distinction begins with a discussion of
contrition and in the response of the first section the
effects are enumerated. Grace has the effect of the
penitent wishing to grieve for sin. Other effects are
enumerated as well as the effect of grace in grief. Then
this passage follows: "Effectus autem gratiae secundum
se est delere culpam. Secundum quod adiungitur / ei
voluntas / habitualis vel actualis detestandi peccatum,
delet reatum poenae aeternae. Secundum adiungitur ei dolor
sensibilis, delet poenam purgatoriam sub conditione.
Secundum quod coniungitur operibus misericordiae et
23. i)p,273. 24. d.XVIII,1,III,d)p.312. 25. d.XVII,
I,l)p.274.
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satisfactionis, quae in tribus praedictis consistat,
26
delet poenam temporalem". Spiritual grief is finite
in its dimension, but infinite in its power, namely, in
the deletion of eternal punishment. "Sed hoc non habet
ex se, sed ex gratia; meritum enim quodam modo congruentia
27ei attribuitur". ' Thus contrition in itself can complete
Penance as far as it is possible in this life. There would
be some doubt as to the amount of satisfaction necessary,
however. It should also be noted that spiritual grief on
the part of man plays a part in the deletion of eternal
punishment for actual sins, something which was reserved to
God alone in the actual Christology in relation to the
punishment for original sin. It is not a full-fledged
semi-Pelagianism which occurs in relation to eternal
punishment. It is a half-way house to it, that is, God does
not owe man anything for this grief (which he does when
temporal satisfaction has been made, namely, the remission
of sin) but there is a certain "congruence" of man's grief
with the grace of God.
Penance leads to justification. It is when this
word is used that one realises the full semi-Pelagianism
that is involved. Justification comes at the end of a
process in which man plays a real and necessary part.
Justification for Alexander is not in Christ as far as
actual sins are concerned but in grace and man. "De quatuor
26. d.XVIII,1,II,d)pp.310-311. 27. 1,IV,c)pp.312-313
quae exiguntur ad justificationem", the first is the
infusion of grace, the second is the movement of the free
will towards God, the third is the movement of contrition
of the detestation of sin, and the fourth is the remission
po
of sin. "Duo istorum sunt Dei, et duo hominis".
Remission of sins thus depend greatly on man. In relation
to original sin there is the infusion of grace and the
remission of sin for justification and this is common to
both children and adults. For actual sins, however, adults
PQ
must have the movement of the free will. In as far as
the remission of sin as guilt is concerned the infusion of
"gratia gratum faciens" occurs at the same time as the
remission of sin although there is a "before ana after" by
nature for the four parts of justification. In relation
to punishment there can be a "before and after " both
30
in time and in nature. ^ This doctrine pushes Christ
very much into the background in relation to actual sins
(although Penance in some way is said to have virtue from
the passion of Christ) and more than ever man comes to the
forefront, something which had not happened in Baptism and
the Eucharist where grace and the Church were more prominent.
Thus for contrition tremendous claims are made.
What of the sacrament of the Church? For this Alexander
28. d.XVIII,5»a)pp.275-76. 29. f)p.277» 30. i)p.278.
31. It is stated later that the penitent must have faith
in the passion of Christ but this is in relation to the power
of the keys. Logically it would seem that only the Church
has this virtue; the virtue does not altogether cover
Alexander's view of contrition - at least here.
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makes considerable claims also, His position is reasonably
summed up in the following statement:
"Hon negatur hie solam contritionem posse delere
peccatum quoad culpam et poenam quoad Deum, sed non in
foro Ecclesiae. Praeterea, unitas caritatis, qua unitur
corpus mysticum, iuvat ad remissionem peccati, virtute
cuius supplicationes sacerdotum obtinent peccati
indulgentiam a Deo; et ita, licet possit remitti, non
tamen de facili praeter supplicationes sacerdotum virtute
unitatis Ecclesiae". 32
This statement does not mention the power of the keys, but
does mention the fact that one can be a debtor before the
Church, and that the Church by her love has a certain power.
However the words "iuvat" and particularly "de facili" are
significant (and this would apply to the keys also) for in
helping and making things easy the Church, by its very
stature, was of great importance.
"Poenitentia... prout est sacramentum Ecclesiae
consistit in suscepta poenitentia post confessionem a
33
sacerdote iniungente". This is the "second" sacrament
of Penance, contrition being the "first" and "real"
sacrament. Confession has two elements: "ostensio" of sin
and the undertaking of punishment which is determined by
34
the priest and relaxed from the power of the keys. ^ If
"ostensio" is accompanied by grace it deletes some punishment;
"poenitentia suscepta" from the power of the keys again
relaxes some punishment but not totally for this is related
to satisfaction in the sacrament. ^
32. d.XVII,13,p.296. 33. d.XVI,14,g)p.263. 34. See above,
note 13. d.XVII,9,e)p.284. 33. d.XVII,9,f)p.284.
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The power of relaxation is not complete for there must he
"aliquam sensibilem poenam" beyond the contrition in
36
confession. v
The articles of faith which move the penitent to
confession are: "the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of
Saints, and the Remission of Sins". In confession "convenit"
to have faith that the Catholic Church has the power
"solvenai et relaxandi de poena". The Church has the power
by reason of its Head "quod influit principalioribus meabris
Ecclesiae hanc potestatem. Praeterea, oportet habere fidem
quod merita Bcclesiae, non solum militantis, sed etiam
37
triumphantis valent ad remissionem peccati". The merit
of the Church triumphant is of value because "prius solverit,
dum fuit in Ecclesia militante" just as the passion of Christ
and the passion of the Apostles are of value. ("Adimpleo ea
quae desunt passioni Christi in carne mea pro corpore eius quod
est Ecclesia". Col.1:24) In a similar way a penitent
who is within the Church's bounds but not within the mystical
body can be revivified by inflowing love or grace which is in
39
the principal members and especially the Head.
It should be noted that the merit which comes from
Christ is dependent on the love in him just as satisfaction
depends on love in relation to original sin. Although
Alexander does speak of the merit and satisfaction of Christ
interchangeably in the Christology proper there is an important
distinction as has already been noted. Christ could make
36. d.XX,14,s)p.361. 37- d.XVII,9,i)pp.283-286
38. d.XVIII,7,p.327. 39. d.XV,20,m)p.243.
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satisfaction for original sin only as the Son of God and
the Son of Man; his merit which was work beyond what
was needed for satisfaction was incidental to his incarnation.
The distinction is the same as the one between the passion of
Christ in Baptism and "Christ suffered" in the Eucharist.
This merit differs in no way, except possibly in quantity,
from the merit of the Church which like Christ's merit is
something which has been earned personally beyond what
was necessary as satisfaction for actual sin which
satisfaction must be personal - although transferable.
Satisfaction ma.y be described as negative satisfaction
returning to normal (for sin only remedied by the "Other"
because committed by "another"), merit as positive
satisfaction going beyond what was required (and
transferable because it is personal). The important point
is that Christ's humanity is, in no way, in merit, as it is
in satisfaction, peculiar or necessary because it was
personal. Mere inspiration, not incarnation, is necessary.
Such inspiration can be found in Moses or Elijah or the
Apostles.
The merits of the Church militant or triumphant
(for actual sins) can be another's satisfaction for they take
the same form as the work of individual satisfaction for
actual sins but are surplus. It is thus that the Church can
relax the punishment for the actual sins of its members:
"Sicut dolor proprius pro peccato est satisfactorius, ita
dolor communis Ecclesiae universalis... est adiutorius in
satisfactions: non quod per se plene satisfaciat, sed /quod /
cum poena penitentis iuvet ad satisfactionem, sicut ex ratione
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suffragii potest haberi. Suffragium enim est meritum
40
Ecclesiae poenae alicuius diminutivum".
However, the more important power in the Church
is the power of the keys from Christ. Deriving from Christ
(see also the chapter on Orders) there is a "substantial"
power which consists in the commutation of the purgatorial
punishment into temporal punishment, and in the conferring
on the penitent relaxation of this. Besides this, there is
an "accidental" power in which the principal dignity of the
Orders consists and that is the power of binding and loosing
41
through excommunication. On this latter power Alexander
is cautious as to its effect. It certainly is not absolute
42
and the excommunicated person should not despair but
it should be noted that when a person is wrongly punished
in this way by the Church, the punishment holds good in
43
heaven, not as punishment but as merit for patient endurance.
This points up the fact that the Church has power in itself,
subsidiary to God but, nevertheless, a power and this
fact is brought out by Alexander's frequent mentions of the
forum of God, the Church and the individual ("Dei, Ecclesiae
et propriae rationis"). A person may be a debtor in the
forum of God and not in the forum of the Church and vice
versa. Similarly he can be a debtor to himself but not to
44
God and the Church. The last two ways describe what is
often the situation but the first is more disturbing. The
40. d.XX,8,p.354. 41. d.XIX,3,c)p.339. 42. d.XVIII,12,
pp.329-336 demonstrates this caution. 43. d.XVIII,8,p.328.
44. d.XVI,6,c)pp.256-257.
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conclusion may be that the Church can be more loving than
God. To oe a debtor before the Church and not before God
(the second way) occurs in any Church situation but here
there is probably something more as the above reference
(note 4J) made clear.
Apart from this, there is the considerable authority
in the Church in the substantial power of the keys which
commutes purgatorial punishment into temporal and relaxes
soiae of the latter. ("Relaxatio est temporalis poenae
debitae permissa diminutio". ^) Alexander in reply to a
series of questions on demitting "macula peccati" and "reatus
poenae" and as to whether the priest remits "reatus poenae
aeternae" from the virtue of the keys states that there are
46
many "vincula" of sin. "Est enim quoddam vinculum culpae,
et est quoddam vinculum poenae". First, there is the
"vinculum capivitatis" from which the prisoner cannot escape;
second, there is the "vinculum servitutis" which is paid to
the devil, which is loosed completely when the Lord dimits guilt
in contrition; third, there is the "vinculum aeternae
damnationis" from which the penitent is completely absolved
on worthy confession; but he is held to the fourth, the
"vinculum expiationis" in purgatorial punishments "in hoc
autem quod sacerdos solvit, obligat ipsum ad vinculum
expiationis per poenam sibi iniunctam". The penitent is held
to the fifth which is the "vinculum perpetuae det^stationis";
45. d.XX,14,I,a)p.357* 46. Richard of Lt. Victors
De potestate ligandi et solvendi, cc.2-3.
■ "
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but be is freed from the sixth, "vinculum pronitatis" to
evil works or difficulty in doing good through the exercise
of the work of grace, in which is conferred
"virtus consuetudinalis". - "Per iam dicta patet quod
dimissio reatus poenae aeternae est a Deo; sed propter
vinculum expiationis ad quod tenetur, sive confessionis,
a quo absolvitor suscepta poenitentia ex vi clavium a
sacerdote, dicitur dimitti a Domino per ministrum. Et
haec est causa quare quidaa dixerunt quod Dominus per
sacerdotes dimittit reatum poenae aeternae non quin
reatus poenae aeternae esset simpliciter a Domino
dimissus". 47
In the next paragraph there is a significant statement. It
had been objected that in contrition the "reatus poenae
aeternae ex gratia coniuncta dolori spirituali" was demitted
AO
(as has been seen above on note 26. ) In spite of this
Alexander replies; "rations vinculo confessionis, a quo
si non absolvitor, potest redire vinculum damnationis aeternae,
propter hoc exigitur quod salvatur homo a vinculo damnationis
per vinculum expiationis susceptum". In regard to purgatorial
punishment which is dimitted in contrition Alexander states
that it is only when there is sufficient contrition that
satisfaction is complete in regard to God* But it always
40
diminishes this punishment. In spite of this attempt to
integrate, what is seen here is in fact a plain contradiction.
(Alexander is aware that he holds both positions). Either the
first is true or not, either contrition is the sacrament in
itself or not. The fact that contrition is the sacrament does
not exclude the power of the confession and the fact that
47. d.XVIII,4,IV,l)pp.322-323. 48. m)p.323. 49. n)p.323
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contrition might not be sufficient, but there is a considerable
difference between being an important aid and a necessity.
On the whole Alexander prefers it as an important aid; here,
however, it is moving towards the position of being necessary
- certainly only in retrospect - as both a sign and a cause,
where indeed the "voluntas" of the penitent must act but
instead of being faced only by God he is now faced by the
Church. This move would seem to be inevitable to bring
Penance into line with the other sacraments and within the
Glossa one sees the move in process.
On the commutation of purgatorial punishment to
temporal punishment, it is stated that the Church has power
in that, in a certain way, purgatory belongs to the area of the
>•
Church militant because purgatory is "in between" and so it is
subject to the power of the priest from the keys. This is
so because satisfaction was enjoined on the penitents when
50
they were on earth. ^ This commutation of purgatorial
punishment occurs "per gratiam medianti vi" for it is not
only the work of man but also of God. The priest cannot
conimute all purgatorial punishment as this would be unjust
51
for no sin is unpunished by God or man. y
Finally, on the power of the keys, there is the
priestly power in "relaxation" which is the permitted
diminution of temporal punishment. Relaxations are efficacious
and the quantity of punishment corresponds to the quantity of
sin. "Deus enim remittit peccatum delendo culpam, et commutat
50. o)p.324. 51. r)p.325
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poenam aeternam in aeternam. Sacerdos vero de temporali
relaxat". If a penitent desires relaxation he must have
"fides vel intentio dantis" for he must believe that such
relaxation can be made by the Church; and "recta aestimatio"
so th^t he might be absolved from satisfaction, and such
52
being the case, with love present, relaxation is made. ^
In dying for Christ or for fighting the foes of the faith
satisfaction is made as far as| God is concerned but not
55
"quoad forum Ecclesiae". ^ The Church by reason of its
perfect members can be a help but cannot make a full
54
emendation. There must always be some "poena
55
sensibilis" which cannot be relaxed. " Confession and
satisfaction lead to the remission of sin. ^
Thus the Church has very considerable practical and
possibly decisive powers. The part the penitent plays is
still important but the priestly power extends to the
commutation of purgatorial punishment, the relaxation of temporal
punishment, the allotment of satisfaction, and it would
appear it has some part to play in the commutation of
eternal punishment. There is also a move towards making
confession necessary, at least, in confirmation of contrition.
It might be noted that in the concluding responses on
commutation and relaxation of punishment, some punishment
is always required. This gives a fearful view of the grace
of God, an awful uncertainty and leads the penitent to a
52. d.XX,14,lv,p)p.359. 53. r)p.360. 5^. q)p.360
55. s)p.361. 56. d.XVII,9,f)p.234.
desperate urgency to make his satisfaction. Because
purgatorial punishment was unknown and unknowable it must
have presented an awful prospect to the believer and thus,
doubtless, the great need to be freed of purgatorial
punishment arose more and more. In Alexander however more
emphasis is placed on immediate temporal relaxation. The
fact, however, that the Church, in its perfection, was
known to have a considerable authority over Purgatory,
whereas the believer, however contrite he may have been,
must have had grave doubts as to his own satisfaction,
would lead him inevitably to lean on the Church. The
doctrine of satisfaction developed by Anselm is beginning
to run amok when applied to the penitential system. In
v
the Christology the appeasement of an angry God was an
idea which was hardly present; here, in the doctrine of
Penance, the justice of an angry God becomes paramount and
the forgiveness of guilt, and the merit of Christ begin to
drop into the backgi-ound as signs of the "true" God.
Christ's merits are those of a good man helping placate
the just God. Here, because of this view of God's
"gracelessness", the grace of Christ, God's amazing
condescension in the incarnation is lacking. In its place
a full semi-Pelagianism is erected with the Church doing
its best for the believers in an effort in which the love
of Christ is merely the best of many.
To sum up the doctrine of Penance in the Glossa.
Firstly in contrition as a sacrament, apart from the
sacrament of the Church, man plays a vital part in his own
salvation. The work of Ohrist peculiarly as man in this
is negligible. The meaning of the phrase "from the virtue
of the passion of Christ" is difficult to assess in regard
to this sacrament, it best it would appear that Christ by
his satisfaction made way for the full working of grace
which works in contrition, and that Christ as man but not
as the substitute is the channel of the love necessary for
contrition. Except in regard to the sacraments of Baptism
and Penance as Church sacrament, the part of the passion or
its virtue is difficult to assess. This is not a worked
out doctrine. In the sacrament of Penance it would appear,
at least in considerable parts of the doctrine, that the
Church (and therefore the power from Christ) is unnecessary,
although most helpful and sure.
Secondly, the connection of Christ particularly to
the sacrament of the Church in one regard is merely that of
one among many. His merit is earned in loving suffering
over and above what was required for satisfaction. Christ,
like the Church could gain a "debt" from God. Thex'e is,
however, a more concrete expression of this overflow from
Christ, and peculiar to him, and it is the power of the Keys.
This power is put into the hands of the Orders, and becomes
a real power within the Church, ceasing practically to be the
power of Christ who gave it. With this power Christ is not a
unique, although a most honoured man, for the Church shares
the power with Christ - even displacing him - as it shares
the merit of any of its saints. Because this element is
lacking so too is any true incarnational doctrine for actual
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sins. They are not on the same level as original sin in
which only the Son of Man should satisfy, only the Son of
God could. The fact that the Church has its own power is
emphasised by the use of the idea of the forum of God and
the forum of the Church in a way which suggests more than
a difference. It is a difference between two which have
similar powers. Further, the faith of the penitent is also
put in the Church and, in particular, in the articles on the
Church, the Communion of Saints, and the Remission of Sins.
The Church, through the keys has the power of purgatorial
commutation and possibly even some power in the commutation
of eternal punishment. Grace is necessary in this aspect
and once again it is loosely and vaguely connected to the
sacrament of the Church (and by implication to Christ).
However, grace's working in general does coincide, in confession,
with the power of the keys; there is no absolute coincidence
but it is close. Here, it does not work, apparently,
through the sacrament of the Church as in Baptism. In
relaxation the power of the keys seems more certain and greater
and the teaching is clearer on the whole than on commutation
either of eternal or purgatorial punishment. Here also the
Church's power is not absolute but it is very nearly so.
Over against individual contrition the sacrament of the
Church has great advantages although it may not be "esse".
It is certain; the Church is the mystical body; the
commutation and relaxation present an easier way for the
individual than through his own contrition and satisfaction;
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the Church provides an insurance "so that punishment is not
imputed" and indeed confession may be necessary so that the
penitent does not slide back into eternal damnation.
Thirdly, in the sacrament of the Church, in
contrition the part of the believer is still equally necessary
in the virtue which must be present in this contrition for
satisfaction or relaxation. Grace (the "grace of virtues")
must therefore be present.
Fourthly, the Church's part in relaxation and the
allotment of satisfaction is ultimately saving as it enables
the believer to make a step towards remission and eternal
life. Man must justify himself as far as in him possible
to gain eternal life.
Fifthly, in the sacrament of Penance, the work of
man very closely parallels the work of Christ in relation to
actual sin. The penitent in the sacrament must possess love
in a way similar to that in which Christ's satisfaction (and
merit for actual sins) required him to be love-filled.
Christ was filled with love; the penitent is filled with
love - either from Christ or the Church or both. This love
pours into the penitent so that he can be truly contrite
(again the "grace of virtues"). Further, the Church can
store up a treasury of merit for actual sins which like
the use of Christ's merit through the keys, can be used for
believers who are lacking. The doctrine of Penance, then, in
contrition practically eliminates Christ, and in the Church's
part, with its love and the power of the keys, pushes him well
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into the background for everyday matters - the main
condition is that the penitent should undergo Baptism by
which original sin and its debilitating effects are removed.
CHAPTER 10
OKDERb
In the chapters on the Eucharist and Penance the
power of the priest was particularly evident in regard to the
power of transubstantiation and the power of the *ceys. In
the discussion of Penance it was stated "annexae autem sunt
claves principaliter Ordini sacerdotali". 1 Under the
doctrine of Penance indeed there is a lengthy discussion of
the keys to which reference will be made in the following
page s.
First, however, the definition of Orders in
Alexander's discussion of the sacrament of Orders will be
given. Peter's definition was "Ordo est signaculum quoddam,
2
quo spiritualis potestas traditur ordinato et officium".
By this definition Orders are distinguished from the other
sacraments. "Signaculum" denotes character /Baptism and
Confirmation also confer character/; "in quo spiritualis
potestas traditur" distinguishes the sacrament from the
sacraments in which character is impressed for spiritual
power is not given to the members of the Church; "et
officium" denotes the exercise of the power from the virtue
x
of "Ordo". y In this sacrament there is the "character
excellentiae; unde debent ii esse sicut mediatores inter
Trinitatem increatam et inter eos qui generaliter homines
dicuntur". (There are three states of faith: the first
1. d.XVIII,3,I,d)p.315. 2. d.XXIV,2,a)p.399. 3. e)p.400
4. h)p.400.
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in Baptism illuminates the intellectual soul; the second
in Confirmation is, on worthy reception, "robur fidei"; the
third in Orders, principally for the priest, is "excellentia
fidei". 5).
Alexander then gives another definition of Orders
from which one can deduce who belongs and who does not
belong to the Orders: "Ordo est sacramentum spiritualis
potestatis ad aliquod officium ordinatum in Bcclesia ad
sacramentum communionis". He points out that the latter
sacrament is the most worthy of sacraments because the
total Christ from whom every sacrament derives is contained
in it (this is not the whole divinity because it cannot be
contained). For this sacrament it is right that all spiritual
power, founded in the faith in the Trinity, should be
ordained. In this faith spiritual character is given.
"Ex quo perpenditur: cum potestas Ordinis
sacramentalis sit ad sacramentum communionis, et hoc
pertineat ad Ordinem sacerdotalem, in eo debet stare
omnis Ordo. Dignitas vero episcopalis, quae super-
additur, est ratione causarum, et quia ibi suppletur
potestas Domini in conferendo Ordinem sacerdotalem.
Sicut Moyses, licet non esset summus sacerdos
simpliciter, tamen erat summus quoad hoc, quod consecravit
Aaron". 6
Two things should be noted; first, the priestly power
separates the priest from the laity; in other words there
is a real power involved here not open to all by faith in
Christ; (they are also "mediatores" of "gratia gratum faciens"
n




of containing Christ in the elements, a special power,
almost if not "totally" divine and surely one which replaces
the Spirit whose function it is to bring God to man, is
necessary to perform it. The bishop has a special part to
play in the conferring of this power. This part will now
be investigated.
The objection is raised that the handing on of
the power is purely of man. This is denied because the
handing on is not of man as man but in as far he is spiritual
having the spiritual power conferred by God. "Christus enim
contulit Petro potestatem, et in eo ceteris Apostolis et
eorum successoribus. Ab iis autem potestas spiritualis in
Ecclesia. Ratione ergo huius potestatis confertur potestas
spiritualis in minoribus Ordinibus; a plenitudine enim
O
potestatis descendit potest secundum magis et minus".
The imposition of hands and the words signify the conferring
of power. The bishop from whom power descends to the others
alone ordains. In the matter of conferring there is not an
q
equality, but the superior confers on the inferior. J An
archbishop consecrates a bishop, not as archbishop but with
power from the pope. The pope is consecrated in as far as
he is pontifexirom another pontifex, but he receives the
fulness of power from the conferment on Peter of whom he is
the vicar. 10
In the doctrine of Penance it was asked why the
power of binding and loosing was conferred by the highest
8. d.XXIV,9,IV,r)p.425. 9. s)pp.425-426. 10. t)p.426
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order only. Alexander replied: "com sit ordinata potestas
Ecclesiae militantis ad triumphantem, quod est supremum in
militanti suscipit potestatem ab eo qui est caput in
triumphante. Et propter hoc potestas clavium confertur
summo Ordine a Christo in persona Petri". ^ (The power
12
of the keys is only one power of the spiritual power .)
Later it is asked whether Christ had the power of the keys
which he appears to have had as Peter was given the power
by Christ. Alexander replies:
"Glavium potestas dupliciter dicitur; vel quae
est per claves, vel quae est ab ipsis clavi >us.
Habuit ergo et habet Christus, secundum quoa homo,
potestatem per claves solvendi et ligandi, ita quod
"per" notat causam instrumentalem. Et secundum hoc
est potestas in ipso excellentiae, in sacerdote vero
potestas ministerii. Christus ergo solvit et ligat
per ministrum habentem illos qui recte ligati et
soluti. - Si vero dicatur potestas quae est a clavibus
vel in clavibus, secundum hoc, cum huiusmodi potestas
sit ministerialis, non competit Christo, qui, ex quo
factus est homo, factus est rex super omnem creaturam.
Sicut ergo potestas ministerialis clavis non competit
regi terreno, sic nec potestas clavis spiritualis regi
spirituali". 13
Alexander, in the first part of this quotation, does attempt
to state that Christ is at work, but in the second part of
the quotation it is clear that the power has been passed on
to the ministers on earth. Christ is not the minister there;
the priest is. (This may mean in effect that the humanity
of Christ is assumed by the priesthood.) This fact is made
clear by the division between Christ as the head of the Church
triumphant and Peter as the head of the Church militant,
and especially in the description of how Alexander sees the
11. d.XVIII,3,IV,a)p.317. 12. b)p.317. 13. VII,p.319.
"spiritual" not "human" power conferred. It is handed from
pope to pope "in Ecclesia". It is significant that in all
this discussion, the Holy Spirit is barely mentioned. (Only
in quotation of the words at the ordination "Accipe Spiritum
14
Sanctum". ) In fact, he need not be for the "spiritual"
power, in fact, handed onjto the Church is divine (or
spiritual) and the Church supplies the humanity. If the Spirit
were seen to play his proper part in bringing the whole Christ
to the Church (and not as an "alter Christus" working through
Christ), then the humanity of Christ would not be "left
behind" either on earth, or in heaven, nor would the Church
assume the freedom of God in the "ex opere operate". To
describe Christ as being the "causa instrumentalis", in
spite of the fact that Alexander probably intended far
more than this, in these circumstances, is to state that
Christ was merely the inSttuMitof this power. He no longer
directly is the source o£ cnis power.
The spiritual power also is the ministerial, the
earthly, the not entirely human, power of the priesthood
(in regard to the members) which effects the working of the
sacraments as in the power of the keys. It is a new mediation.
The virtue of transubstantiation is "in ipsis verbis lesu
15
Christi". ^ In the Eucharist the deacon's task is
1
"ministerium", that of the priest is "consecratio" . Does
this signify the human and the divine elements? The sacrament
14. d.XXIV,10,p.428. 15. 9*IV,u)p.426. 16. v)p.427
of Orders is the key, in fact, to the whole sacramental
theology. It, in fact, not the Eucharist, is the "beginning"
and the "end" of all the sacraments.
One last matter is significant. It is the relation
of the priest of the Old Law to the priest of the New Law.
They are both priests; the difference lies in the greater
power of the latter. The host is figured iD the Old Law
but there is no identity of sacrament and the figured as
there was a different virtue conferred. In virtue of the
words of Christ, however, the priests of the New Law can
transubstantiate the bread and wine into the body and blood
of Christ. This power was not conferred on the priests of
the Old Law. And because the faith of ancient and modern
priests is in the one Head that does not make them the same:
"Nam per caput ministerii in Nova Lege transfunditur gratia
In membra, dico per verborum ipsius virtutem, licet ipse sit
indignus... Non sic autem fuit in Veteri Lege, sed ad
invocationem eorum dabatur aliquibus gratia a hpiritu Sancto".
The difference between the priests of the Old and the New
1 ft
Law, then, is that the latter abound more in grace. (And
it would appear "grace of virtues" and "sacramental grace"
indifferently. This is to be expected as the "gratia gratum
faciens" relates to guilt, punishment, and merit.)
These are revealing and clarifying statements. The
priests of the New Law possess some thing which is grace.
This they possess by the use of the words of Jesus. What is
17. d.XXIV,12,c)p.430. 18. 13,a)pp.430-433.
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very significant is that the priests in the Old I/aw received
the Holy Spirit by invocation. In the Hew Law the situation
changes. Through Christ filled with grace from the Holy
Spirit, grace, or spiritual power, flows into the priesthood.
(This will include the transfer of satisfaction for original
sin and merit for actual sins of which Christ is the source).
Thus the priests of the Hew Testament practically possess the
Holy Spirit - or replace him - as well as performing the
function of Christ. Christ does not eliminate the priesthood;
he is merely the channel of grace from the Holy Spirit to the
new priesthood and as such enhances its power. He is another
and greater Moses but he is not here the substitute, the
great High Priest, who is both the Son of God and Son of Man,
man's justification and sanctification. And at this point,
unlike his role in satisfaction, Christ has no peculiar role
to play; there is no substitutionary element.
This comparison practically sums up the whole
discussion of Orders. The priest is the mediator between
God and man; he has power apart from Christ although
derivative from him. This power is "in Ecclesia" so that
the freedom of God, that is, the work of the Holy Spirit,
iq
is bound by the priesthood. y Alexander would have hesitated
to state this and indeed in one or two occasions grace sits
rather loosely with the power of the priesthood although
apparently coincident with it. If the Holy Spirit is
19. cf. Bk.II,d.XLIII,9*PP»415-416 where the sin against the
Holy Spirit is to offend against the unity of the Church
in which there is remission of sins.
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eliminated, or "becomes an "alter Christus", the freedoxa
of God is transferred to the disposition of the priest or
to the consent of the believer. Further the priesthood
then becomes identifiable with the person and work of
Christ because the Holy Spirit is not present to be the
freedom of God in Jesus Christ, and grace flows, on
consent, necessarily, from Head to priest with all Christ's
benefits. In this way the priest becoxaes the second
mediator; Christ is no longer unique. Thus the true
incarnational element is lacking. With the freedom of God
absent the power of relaxation would tend to lead to
presumption and laxity because of the "ex opera operato"
element. This "downgrading" of the costliness of sin is
contrary to, and possibly because of, the harsh view of God
and punishment that was also held.
Thex*e is, however, one thing that should be noted
about Alexander's sacramental thinking. In spite of serious
weaknesses in his Christology Alexander does make Christ,
in a sense, central, fox' not only is he the satisfaction
to God fox* original sin, but also through him comes the
forgiveness of guilt in grace with its many other effects.
Before Christ, guilt and grace were loosely tied to him if
at all. after Christ everything flows through him even if
not necessarily. It is this point that I would want to make
against Kilian Lynch when he wishes to divide between
sacramental grace and the gx*ace of virtues (or "gratia gratum
faciens"). The fact that, as Lynch admits when he states that
Alexander was vague on how they were connected, Alexander puts
the two into the one grace, although distinguishing the parts
of the sacrament against sin and to good, is of great
importance, for it means that Alexander is far more Christ-
centred than Lynch's position would admit. My impression is,
in fact, that when Alexander spoke of "grace", on the whole,
if not always, he thought of either "gratia gratis data" -
and then he would state the fact - or "gratia gratum faciens"
with no idea of divisions, divisions which in Book III are
stated to be impossible. (As Lynch points out). This does
not exclude divisions in what is caused - against sin, to
20
good, faith, hope, love etc. For Alexander, in his
sacramental theology, Jin all-inclusive grace flowed from1
i
Christ as it is pictured more simply in the "caput" section
of the Christology proper. This section does not feature
the sacraments and thus one would suspect is not firmly
*
- Is
integrated, a fact which is true of much of Alexander's
theology. One might suspect that the "caput" section may
have been an attempt to correct a on^-sidedness in the
Christology proper, after the work on the sacraments was
done. It is this broad view of Christ's work and his
centrality that Robert S. Franks drew attention to in his
comments on the Summa which is Alexandrine, at least, in its
environment and in a great part of its source material. lie
stated:
"He has, in fact drawn firmly the lines of a
comprehensive theory of the work of Christ of a much
wider scope than the Anselmic theory of satisfaction.
Here for the first time in the history of the Latin
20. See Bk.II,d.XXVI,6,b)p.242, lines 14-20
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Church do we contain a unified view of Christ's work
that is anything like as comprehensive as that of the
Greek Fathers. Hugo and Lombard have certainly prepared
the way for this wider view; but it was Alexander who
achieved it. His merit in this regard has by no means
been sufficiently recognised... The dominating principle
of Alexander's whole doctrine of the work of Christ is
the Augustinian doctrine of the constitution of Christ
as the God-man with a view to the salvation of man by
divine gfrace"• 21.
In the Glossa this wider view has not been achieved but it is
distinctly there. What is faulty is the lack of the
enhypostatic element in regard to actual sins and, in regard
to satisfaction for original sin, the fact that "grace" also
takes over the anhypostatic role of Christ and that Christ
is merely a channel of sanctifying grace. These faults are
perhaps not so much due to this developing Ghristology but
to defective doctrines of the Church, ministry, the sacraments,
of grace and the Holy Spirit. Only the Word of God in
Scriptures could rectify these defects as the Word did to a
considerable degree at the Reformation. Unless they were
rectified they would always stand in the way of a good
Christology no matter how good one's instinct was.
In Book. Ill under the Christological discussion,
an interesting parallel to the above is found. In what
follows there may be a suggestion that the Church is detached
from its historical roots. It is asked whether those who
kill Christ in his members sin more than those who killed him
while he was on earth. The quantity of sin is measured by
22
the contempt. This is an interesting answer for three
reasons. Firstly, it separates Christ in heaven and Christ
21. Robert S. Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of
Christ, p.231. 22. dist.XX,8,III,p.234.
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on earth; does this mean, then, that Alexander detaches
his theology from the historical Christ in favour of the
"existential" Christ? (This separation also appeared when it
was stated that Christ left his suffering behind.) Secondly,
there is an identification of the heavenly Christ and his
members and here by implication the connection to the
heavenly Christ is not made through the earthly Christ.
Thirdly, with doubt thrown on the present need of the earthly
Christ and with the identification of the heavenly Christ
and his members so that to kill them is worse than killing
Christ (it is bad only because the earthly Christ, now
ascended, identified himself with the members) there appears
to emerge a straight forward doctrine of the extension of the
incarnation in the Church of such a kind that the word
"extension" is hardly applicable for the connection to the
earthly Christ has been cut. Rather the word might be
"replacement". This conclusion is somewhat but not completely
modified in "L". "^uoad alias tamen circumstantias, est aliud
raaius. Simpliciter tamen maior dicitur maioritatem
plurimarum cireurnstantiarurn". The objections to the suggestion
that it was greater to kill Christ in the members had been
that Christ was greater "in se" than "in membris" and it was
greater to be united in the Person in one hypostasis than
25
through voluntas and love as the members were. The
separation of the heavenly and the earthly Christ still exists,
as, well as thst of the members and the earthly Christ. The
23. dist. XX,19(L),III,p.240.
answer is still in favour of the "in membris", in spite





In the Questiones there is one considerable
difference from the Glossa in the doctrine of the sacraments
and there is also some "tidying up" and a greater clarity.
Whether this greater clarity is altogether necessary or
better is in some doubt as the very vagueness of the Glossa
was at times more true in the end to the doctrine of Christ
than a clarity which makes points unambiguous but less sound.
For instance the clarity emphasises the "ex opere operato"
element in the sacraments, thus enhancing the power of the
Church, because sacramental grace and the Spirit as he is
involved here become clearly attached to the sacrament in
contrast to the grace of virtues which is freer to move as
it wills in accordance with faith. In the Gloesa, because
there was only one grace, the freedom of the "gratia gratum
faciens" extended to the grace against punishments and sin
which it included, and the Spirit remained freer because
of this. The relation of grace and the Spirit and the
sacraments remained somewhat uncertain and because of this
one felt that the power of the Church in the sacraments was
less automatic. Without doubt, that power is expressed in
the Glossa and possibly the vagueness is no more than a passing
phase and with the presuppositions present could not be anything
more than that, but the fact remains that the clarity did not
lead necessarily to a sounder or happier position but in the
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opposite direction.
This clarity or desire for clarity may have been
the cause of the one considerable difference between the
Glossa and the quaestiones. This has already been mentioned;
the quite clear distinction in the .^uaestiones between
sacramental grace and the grace of virtues and the fact that
the latter is not involved in the sacraments. The clarifying,
if it is that, adds up to a new theology of the sacraments,
new implications for Christolcgy, and a new doctrine of grace,
there being further evidence elsewhere, in regard to the
latter, that there is somewhat different thinking on grace
from the Glossa in general. Part of the greater clarity of
the quaestiones is that it has a question "De sacramentis in
genere" £%• XLVIII). One can discover the principles with
more certainty than in the Glossa. Sacraments, through
themselves, are statea to be given properly for the reparation
of wounds. ^ This the Glossa also holds, however, the
u
^uaestiones follows this out with rigor. The exposition is
found in a query on the number of the sacraments. In the
argument that precedes the responses it is no tea tnat "quidam"
concede that there are seven sacraments accoraing to the seven
virtues; Baptism and faith, Confirmation and fortitude, the
Eucharist and iove, Orders and prudence, renitance and justice,
2
matrimony and temperance, Extreme Unction and hope. This
enumeration which the Glossa accepts and practises, as has
been seen, is rejected by the quaestiones because, as it is
1. memb. ,0,p. 84b. 2. 10,p.847.
stated, although the grace in reparation can be divided, that
for merit cannot be, but is totally given. One who has one
virtue has every virtue. J "Gratia gratum faciens" is not
given by virtue of the sacraments, although it may well be
its consequence, because "acceCdenti digne ad sacramenta"
is necessary for "gratia gratum faciens". Sacramental
grace on the other hand comes from the universal grace of
Christ in the passion "a qua virtute sumunt sacramenta, et
particularis descendit ab hac; et haec particularis est vel
contra istam laesionem vel contra illam". ^ One would admit
the force of the idea of the indivisibility of the grace of
virtues but why there should be any difference in regard to
sacramental grace is not altogether clear. Certainly it does
make more sense of the idea of the "virtue of the passion"
when it is applied to various sacraments but that one should
not also divide out the virtues, as the effects of the grace
of the virtues, amongst the sacraments, as the Glossa does,
does not seem altogether logical except for the reason that
this grace is not divided.
The relation of Christ to punishment is stated
clearly in another question "De passibilitate Christi et
Adae" (14.XVI). As far as causality Christ satisfied for all
punishments. He deleted all which were not ordained to merit
but those which did help in merit such as "mores, concupiscentia
ignorantia, infirmitas" remained, "unde, licet passio Christi
3. 28,p.860. 4. 31,PP.861-862. 3. Ibid.
sit sufficiens causa delendi oianes poena^ non tamen delentur
omnes in praesenti, quia hoc non esset nobis utile". ^
This explains why punishments are left and explains how
Christ's satisfaction for original sin applies to the
punishments of original sin but it does not explain why these
punishments should not be all tempered in the one sacrament.
It also does not explain Penance; nor really indeed why
Christ should be "contained" in the Eucharist which the
Glossa does in describing it as the sacrament of love - it
explains not so much why the Body of Christ should be
contained but it at least explains the sacrament's great
importance.
It remains only to give in outline the reason for
the number of the sacraments and what they signify and what
they cause. There is a threefold assimilation of human
nature to God; in nature, grace and glory. The similitude
of grace is twofold "secundum duplicem gratiam". There is a
grace to good works which is multiplied through virtues, gift
and beatitudes; there is another grace which is for the
reparation of wounds proceeding from the evil of guilt or sin
"Una similitudo est ad Deurn, scilicet ilia quae est in
virtutibus, donis et beatitudinibus. Altera, ilia scilicet
quae est in sacramentis, respicit Mediatorem, qui est Be us
et homo". The former would have existed with or without sin.
The former grace is discussed in Books II and III of the
Sentences, the latter in Book IV. This latter grace, the
sacramental grace, relates to the Mediator because, through
6. Disp. IV,Memb.5,108,pp.273-274.
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the sacraments, man is reformed in the similitude of Christ
who came to redeem man, "Christus enim, pugnans pro nobis
fortiter contra diabolum, in ara crucis consecratus sacerdos
pro nobis satisfaciens, sponsus Ecclesiae resurrexit oleo
gratiae plenae delibitus". In Baptism man is conformed to
"Christus passus"; in Confirmation man is reformed in the
similitude of Christ fighting the enemies; in the Eucharist
man is reformed in the similitude of Christ the sacrifice;
through the Orders to his priesthood; through Penance man is
conformed to Christ as he is satisfier; through Extreme
Unction man is conformed to Christ "secundum quod resurrexit
oleo plenae gratiae delibitus, qui stolam corporis et animae
habuit". In the sacraments there is a cause relating to the
Son as the Father operates through him. The Son, as Cod, operates
"per se horainem"; as man, he is the universal dispenser
through ministers, and the ministers through the sacraments;
7
"sacramenta autem per gratiam efficiunt ulterius". The
sacraments can be divided as signs of grace - freeing from
evil which relates to three sacraments, enabling to good
which also relates to three sacraments, and one sacrament
relates to both aspects. The first three are Baptism, Penance
and Extreme Unction, the latter three are Matrimony,
Confirmation, and the Eucharist, and Orders relate to the
O
last. This division relates, it should be noted, only to
signification, not to causality. The next paragraph expounds
the divisions according to causality. Matrimony repairs the
7. Q.XLVIII,Memb.2,pp.849-851. 3. 18,pp.851-854.
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faithful carnally and Orders repair the faithful spiritually;
Baptism deletes the original injustice and the punishment
corresponding to it, and diminishes "pronitas"; to counter
the proneness to actual sin Confirmation helps in resistance;
when man falls into sin there is Penance in which actual
guilt, either mortal or venial, is remitted and this can be
repeated; and there is an obligation to punishment in
purgatory if satisfaction is not made; still there is
debility while "in via" and this is the reason for the
Eucharist . A guiltless infirmity, on the part of the body,
which is venial is alleviated by Extreme Unction. Thus
Q
there are seven lacks, and seven sacraments. ?
The distinction between the grace of sacraments and
the grace of virtues has the effect of dividing Christ,
something which was already present in embryo in the Glossa
but in practice was not present. There sacramental grace
included the grace of virtues so that when man put on Christ,
he also had sanctification of life. As is seen in the Glossa
these two aspects were not properly grounded in Christ but
at least when Christ's work was applied man was sanctified.
In the Quaestiones, on the other hand, sanctification of
life takes place apart from the sacraments under the grace
of virtues, so that the Spirit very obviously, in this regard,
is seen to be using Christ merely as a channel for sanctification.
Sanctification is now completely disassociated from Christ's
/■
satisfaction which was not conclusively the case in the Glossa.
9. 19,pp.854-856.
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Christ is not seen as removing an otherwise insuperable
barrier but rather as getting rid of a nuisance, he is not
necessary at all for sanctification (although he is the
channel of the grace of virtues as Head) as the distinction
between the graces made quite clear when the grace of virtues
was related to "God" and the sacramental grace was related
to the "Mediator". This was made clear, also, by the fact
that it is pointed out that grace of sanctification would
have existed without sin. This is correct in its intention,
but the implication, then, is that Christ, as man, as
Mediator, would have been unnecessary.
This fact is demonstrated in the comparison the
Quaestiones makes between the Old Law and the Hew Law where
there is no doubt, as there is in the Glossa, that the grace
of virtues is fully operative to all intents and purposes
under the Old Law. When Christ makes satisfaction the
ancients cross into the beatitude which they have
already merited. This distinction between satisfaction
and sanctification is also demonstrated in relation to the
Spirit where the power of the keys is desci'ibed as "without
the Spirit" and dimission which requires love is described
"with the Spirit". The former is associated with Christ giving
the Spirit through the sacrament, the latter i3 simply in
Ti
the Church. Thus in satisfaction, the sacraments of the
Church replace the Spirit; in the grace of virtues the Spirit
is active but apart from Christ. In both cases the Spirit -
10. Q.XX be Iustitia Legis Veteris, bisp.I,Memb.l,6-8,pp.361-
363. 11. q.LXI. De Clavibus, bisp.I,Memb.6,43,p.1222.
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or the Church's sacraments in the former case - plays the
part of an "alter Christus". In satisfaction, Christ at
least performs an objective function but in sanetification
he has neither an objective nor a subjective role.
In regard to the "virtue of the passion" the
Quaestiones is far clearer than the Qlossa and in this
respect probably interprets it correctly. The passion
counters the punishments of original sin. However both in
the Glossa and the Quaestiones this is of some doubt in
regard to Penance. In all the other sacraments Christ is
necess ry in the reducing or resisting of these punishments,
that is, they are the result of original sin. This does not
apply to actual sin, however. It is not due to original
sin in the same way; it is due to the failing of personal
"voluntas". Christ can satisfy for original sin because
that was due to another and thus another (Christ) can satisfy
for man. Original sin corrupts man's nature. Actual sin
is personal and thus can only be satisfied personally, that
is, by man himself voluntarily or by smother's personal
satisfaction. This satisfaction Christ can make — and hence
the power of the keys - but also any other man can contribute
to another's merit and satisfaction. Here Christ is as other
men. It is only for original sin, not actual sin, that God
alone can, but man alone should make satisfaction. This analysis
applies equally well to the Glossa but arises here also because
the virtue of the passion is clearer in the Quaestiones.
It is not only in regard to Penance that one must
have doubts as to the adequacy of the Quaestiones' teaching.
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This teaching relegates the Eucharist to a minor place,
although the relation of it to the sacrifice of Christ is
ominous, and the actual function of Orders is far more than
merely the diminishing of an infirmity. Marriage fits rather
awkwardly into the pattern although the view held is
persistent in the Church and contributes to a low view of
marriage. In spite of these differences the part of man
is still as important as ever, especially in Penance, and the
part of the sacraments greater in regard to sin and
punishment, although the sacraments as such become more
specifically Christocentric but in a more limited area than
the Giossa.
ruaestiones - Baptism.
In the doctrine of Baptism in the ^uaestiones the
question on the sacraments in general has covered the general
situation. However the close association of the sacramental
grace and Baptism, the "ex opere operato" element, is
demonstrated in relation to circumcision. In circumcision
original sin in relation to both guilt and poena was deleted
"ex vi gratiae fidei credentium" but Baptism "habet in se
gratiam, quia vas gratiae est; circumcisio ve.ro fuit signum
gratiae futurae per Christum, sed Baptismus gratiae iam factae
12
per Christum". Under Baptism guilt is deleted in the soul
through the Spirit, and punishment in the body through the
water, and so the spiritual cleansing takes place spiritually,
12. v^.L., De Circumcisione, Memb.3»19»pp.B85-B86.
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the bodily by the bodily. ^ Here again there is the
distinction of the grace of virtues and sacraniental grace
although the association is close, let the distinction is
pointless unless sacramental (Baptismal) grace is "ex opere
operato". The dilemma of this distinction is pointed up
here because Baptism is the sacrament which brings people
into the Ghurch and people in the Church have faith (from
the grace of virtues) and how can they have faith if the
sacrament of itself brings only sacramental grace? Another
way of putting this is how can t;he Baptised have Christ and
yet not have faith, that is, sanctification? The answer is
found by associating the two graces without making them the
one grace but this answer is unsatisfactory for, then one
must say, in effect, either that Baptism does convey faith
if one wishes to state that entrance into the Church marks
the beginning of faith (or faith marks the entrance into
the Church), or, if one does not wish to state this, then
one can be in the Church without faith as sacramental grace
is "ex opere operato", or that one can be in the Church by
faith and without the benefits of Christ conveyed by Baptism.
It is this sort of dilemma which makes the vagueness of the
Glossa more attractive and in the long run sounder. It, at
least, recognises that the two (sacramental grace and the
grace of virtues) go inevitably together. There is th6 further
consideration that the sacramental grace relates to "carentia"
which relates to the cognition and faith, and the fact that
15. Q.LI, De Sacramento Altaris, Disp.III,I*lemb.l,75»P-923*
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sacramental grace removes this "carentia" and if this leads
to something less than formed faith (in which the grace of
virtues is involved) then the work of Christ is relegated to
being something very much on the level of "gratia gratis
data". It is difficult to see how the faith which Christ
helps to clarify by removing the "carentia" can be anything
else than formed faith, that is, from the grace of virtues
("gratia gratum faciens"). Christ's work must lead bo
something more than unformed faith, or implicit faith,
because that is already present to the philosophers and to
those living carnally under the Law. If it does then faith
would be impossible without Christ, that is, satisfaction at
least removes a barrier to faith. Under the Old Law it seems
that faith and the deletion of punishment were united under
the "gratia fidai credentium". In the Uew Law under the
sacraments, they are divided which is far less satisfactory.
This problem of the relation of punishment and faith or
"carentia" and faith is merely a narrower consideration of
the wider problem of how one can have Chrisb and yet not
have the Spirit.
Ouaestiones - Eucharist.
The result of the division of graces in the quaestiones
is most marked in the doctrine "De Sacramento Alfcaris" for it
changes the whole direction of the doctrine of the sacrament.
The first effect of the Sacrament of the Altar is "reparatio
debilitatis ab originali" and "quod est contra venialia, hoc
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est ex consequenti". * The first effect is not clearly
mexitioned in the Glossa unless it is hidden under "rations
difficultatis standi contra tentationes datur sacramentum
15
Eucharistiae". ^ This reason does not play any great part
in the doctrine of the Eucharist in the Glossa however. The
diminution of venial sin is mentioned several times in the
Glossa and it would appear that this is the effect of
the sacrament in relation to sin. "Hec sequitur, si est
maius, quod quoad hunc effectual sit maius". This is
in the context ox the Eucharist's effects against sin. In
the Glossa the Eucharist is the sacrament of love, the
sacrament of the mystical body, the sacrament by which there
is a gx-eater incorporation into the mystical body by love.
It is the sacrament of the suffex'ing, love of Christ. The
Sacrament of the Altar in the ^uaestiones signifies by the
bread the union of the divine and human nature xn the
incarnation upon which follows the conjunction of the members
with the Head; and by the wine redemption is signified. This
17
is the sacrament as far as its si^nification. ' «hen
it is asked why the Eucharist is so small in its effect - as
was asked in the Glossa also - the reply is "bacramentum autem
Eucharistiae dignius est ratione eius quod significat, non
1 ft
rations effectus". The Glossa was not content with this
answer for it gave a considerable number of effects, and effects
related to the love of God and man, of Christ and the members.
In the ^uaestiones the perfection of the sacrament is the union
14. <4.LI,Hisp.I,Memb.l,7»p*894. 15- Glossa IV,Introit.,12,p.7.
16. Ibid.,d.XII,13,p.197. 17. v}.LI,Memb.4,24,p.902.
18. Memb.6,28,p.905»
360
of body and soul to deity. Only a man of our kind should
satisfy, but only God could satisfy,
"unde oportuit quod Deus et homo esset. Sacramentum
ergo quod est nostras redemptionis, perfectionem
habet ab hoc, quod Filius Dei in humana natura passus
est; unde ratione illius quod supereminet humanae
naturae, et hoc est unio animae et corporis cum deitate,
habet /esse/ hoc sacramentum. Unde oportet quod hoc
habeat hoc sacramentum, quod scilicet supereminet
naturae humanae, et ab hoc habet esse hoc sacramenturn".
The causality of the sacrament comes from the union of deity
iq
to the body and soul. y The effect of this causality
appears quite out of keeping with the causality, its perfection
and its signification. The signification really has not much
to do either with the satisfaction or the redemption; the
sign is the Body of Christ in the sacrament which signifies
the mystical body and yet the mystical body is the "unio in
caritate fidelium" and this existed before and after the
20
advent of Christ and they* were united in the faith of Christ.
It would appear that the mystical body in its union in faith
and love has more to do with the grace of virtues. And yet
this great signification effects "reparatio debilitatis ab
originali" which is the result of a sacramental grace.
The reason for this is somewhat difficult to see. The result,
f
however, is to give a good example of being able to have the
"Body of Christ", but not sanctification of life, bestowed in
the putting on of Christ. The Glossa is very much to be 'I .•
preferred when it talks of this sacrament as a sacrament
of love and incorporation in the mystical body. In fact,
an actual displacement of the importance of sin and punishment
19. Disp.Itf,Merab.l,107,pp«934-935>* 20. Disp.I.Jflemb. 3»26,
pp.903-904.
takes place in the sacrament. This way, with its faults, it
at least tends to ex^alt Christ far more and to put him at
the centre of things. Satisfaction and sanetification are
put into close proximity at least.
The virtue of transuhstantiation according to the
^uaestiones is in the words "quia varbum Christi est
potestate plenum. Ex eo enim quod verbum est, ad significandum
est; eo quod Christi est, est ad faciendum". The power of
transubstantiation was a special superadded power for any
of Christ's words were full in power: "Hoc autem verbum
habuit complementum potastatis, ad quod omnia mirabilia
quae sunt; in illo sacramento ordinata sunt". This power is
"supermirabile" of all the miracles in the Bible "scilicet
t
potestas haec in verbo creato, et ad hoc ordinantur. St
hoc fuit conveniens, ut in hoc verbo crsato esset complementura
potestatis; st noc fuit quia nobrlissima creatura inter omnes
21
creaturas est humana natura in Christo". The work of
transutstantiation is attributed to the Word because the
sacrament is attributed to Christ, the Word incarnate, vdiereas
the conception of Christ is attributed to the Holy Spirit to
22
whom grace is appropriated. The sanctification of these
words is a sign and a cause "non autem est causa ad dandum
gratiam, sea ad convertendum panem in corpus Christi".
In these quotations ana references two things are plain:
first, it is demonstrated what considerable power is encased
in the created word which is handed onto the priest in which
21. bisp • \/±, memo • 1,165 »p» 952 • 22. Me rnb.6,136 ,p. 961.
23. Q.LII,De Poenitentia Virtute et Sacramento, Disp. Ill,
Memb.l,57»P»1003-
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power, like the power of the keys, the bpirit of Christ is
displaced by the priest; second, Christ is once again divided
so that from him comes the grace of virtues apart from the
sacrament, transubstantiation which is an extraordinary
miracle which has little effect, and sacramental grace which
diminishes the debility of man. The latter two elements
enhance the power of the priesthood both in regard to the
people and in displacing Christ so that they, in fact, become
the mediators. Once Christ is divided in such a way that the
people become dependent on the priest for the whole Christ,
the place and the power of the priest must keep on increasing
at the expense of the One to whom they are ministers.
,'uaestiones - Penance.
In the ^uaestiones an anomaly, namely the uncertain
place of the Church, which was present in the Glossa,is
removed in a far clearer treatment of the doctrine of Penance.
In the Glossa some confusion arose because the virtue in
contrition, by reason of the fact that contrition had virtue
and was therefore the sacrament, was hard to distinguish from
the sacrament itself. This meant that the Church element
could be practically eliminated although it was not the
Glossa's intention. The Glossa's intention was that the
sacrament should convey grace which meant that sacrament
and virtue (not necessarily sacrament ana the grace of virtues,
however,) had to be distinguished. If this was not done,
Penance did not fit into the definition of the sacraments,
and indeed was not a Church sacrament. The ^uaestiones
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carefully distinguishes the various elements. Here
sacramental grace is said to be twofold, that signified
in the sacrament, and that caused by the sacrament. The
sacramental grace (which it is improperly called) which
is signified, signifies the remission of sin as far as guilt
and punishment, and is the same in essence as the virtue of
penitence, but it is "virtus" in moving the free will to
grieving for guilt and satisfying for punishment, "gratia"
as it remits guilt. The grace, however, which is caused
"ex vi sacramenti poenitentiae" is not the same as the
virtue of penitence "quia haec gratia est remissio peccati
quoad aliquam partem de virtufe clavium. Virtus enim clavium
habet ex passione Ghristi virtutem, qua dimittitur aliquota
poena. Unde virtus clavium habet potentiam ad deletionem
totius poenae, ex passione Christi, qui pro omnibus
satisfecit; tarnen requiritur aliquid ex parte poenitentis
sicut postea dicetur". This grace is "iniunctae a discreto
24
sacerdote", the virtue is given in contrition.
One of the later paragraphs to which the reader is
referred is evidently that which discusses the "res" of the
sacrament. This "res" can be either signified or signified
and caused. The sign of the remission of guilt and
punishment "est susceptio poenitentiae iniunctae in confessions
virtue clavium, cum proposito poenitendi et cum absolutione".
So that this sign might also be a cause contrition is demanded
on the part of the penitent; "coexigitur enim contritio ad
24. Q.LII, De Poenitentia Virtute et Sacramento, Disp.II,
Memb. 5»^5»P*993«
hoc praedtcta susceptio sit: causa dimissionis peccati quoad
culpam et poenaia... sed propinquius causatur et significatur
remissio poenae, et per hoc remissio culpae". And the reason
for this is obvious because in Christ "erat gratia et poena
sufficiens ad deletionem otanis culpae et poenae. Clavis
ergo non tantum habet virtutem a poena, sed etiam a gratia
universali quae fuit in anima Christi. ^uoad hoc ergo quod
clavis habet virtutem a gratia quae fuit in Christo, respicit
culpam; quoad hoc vero quod habet virtutem a poena quam
sustinuit, repicit poenam". Universal grace corresponds to
guilt and is sufficient but particular grace is infused into
the penitent for deletion; it is not divisible. Universal
punishment corresponds to the penitent's punishments and is
sufficient but punishment of the penitent must be added and
this punishment is in contrition, confession, and satisfaction
It is interesting to note that evidently the grace of virtues
is infused, here, via the keys and the confession is the
cause of guilt's remission as well as the remission of
punishment. This is not altogether consistent although in
the same paragraph Baptism is given as a parallel in which,
it is stated, if it is taken insincerely, only character is
impressed and what is signified, the remission of original
guilt and punishment,is not effected. In these cases, there
is a recognition of the impossibility of dividing the graces
in fact (although character still is impressed - there was
some hesitation in the Glossa on this). This admission would
25. D isp. Ill,Memb. 1,!)4,pp.999-1001.
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make the rigid distinction between the grace of virtues and
the grace of the sacrament pointless, if it is argued that
the former needs the consent of the recipient, the same has
to be said about the latter where consent is also needed. If
this were not so, the mere act, the ritual of the sacrament
would be the sum total and such an extreme "ex opere operato"
position can hardly be contemplated by the Quaestiones. Of
course, the grace of virtues leads to action and merit
whereas sacramental grace does not, but inaction and lack of
merit can only be after the grace is received, not before it.
If the latter were the case this would lead to a real
distinction between the two graces on the grounds of consent.
Otherwise the relation of grace and receiver would appear to
be the same in both the grace of virtues and sacramental
grace. The distinction between baptism and Penance, and this
is the most significant distinction, is the fact that what is
given in Baptism is purely objective, consent only being
necessary, whereas in Penance the grace of the virtues must
lead to virtue before the sacrament can be causal and. thus
Pfi
complete. Thus man must play his real part just as the
Glossa holds. On satisfaction by the penitent he is fully
absolved. ^
The reason for the necessity of man's part is that
actual sin arises from the free will and therefore it is right
that the free will should take part in the remission. This
does not apply in regard to original sin and Baptism because
26. Memb.1,57»p•1003. 27- Memb.2,60,p.l005.
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that sin was not contracted by the free will but from Adam.
As that is the case, this will mean that the virtue from the
passion of Christ must come from his work as singular man,
not as the new Adam, or rather the work he thus performs
for man is not peculiarly that of the Hon of Cod, and the
Son of Man. It is only original sin for which only the Son
of God can and only the Son of Man should make satisfaction;
actual sins require personal or actual satisfaction. Here
Christ may be the greatest help but he is only one among
many. This is evident from the fact that the merit of the
life of the priest can help to relax punishment and this is
from grace; the power of the keys comes from a universal
29
cause, from the passion of Christ. This is meant to
distinguish the priest and the keys but actually the fact that
merit of life can relax puts them on the same level. This is
made very clear by a distinction made concerning Christ in
regard to actual and original sin.
"In Christo fuit poena actualis, et in eo fuit poena
originalis peccati. Potest Christus considerari in
quantQwi fuit singularis homo; et sic poena ipsius
actualis fuit, quia fuit ab actuali voluntate huius
singularis hominis. Item potest considerari Christus
in quantum est caput; et sic poena eius originalis
dicitur. Poena ergo actualis Christi est contra
actualera delectationem quae est in peccato; unde
haec, cum poena quae est in poenitente, deletiva est
actualis peccati. Poena autem originalis Christi
tantum deletiva est originalis peccati parvuli ipsius
in Baptismo, sine aliqua poena ex parte baptizati, quia
poena in parvulo fuit totaliter aliunde contracta.
Patet ergo quod causalitas quae est in Baptismo et
Poenitentia sumuntur secundum aliud et aliud". 30
28. Disp.II,Memb.5»47»P*996. 29. Q.LXI,De Ciavibus,Disp.
I,Memb.6,41,pp.1221-1222. 30. Q.LII,Disp.III,Memb.3,p.1006.
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Even without such a statement, the fact that man must make
his own satisfaction, at least in part, is sufficient
evidence that his satisfaction and the satisfaction of
Christ for actual sins are on the same level. This
statement also raises some doubt as to the universality of
the satisfaction of Christ made for original sin. Christ
as Head is Head of the good only; does this mean that in
fact the satisfaction does not apply to all men? This
matter is also raised in the quaestiones in relation to
the grace in Christ, and on the discussion of the kind of
satisfaction Christ made.
Two final matters remain to be mentioned. Firstly,
the idea of an angry God and a merciful Christ, a form of
Sabellianism, is made rather clear by one or two statements
in the i^uaestiones. There is a dissimilarity between
eternal and purgatorial punishment on the one hand and present
punishment on the other hand. In the present man expects
the mercy of the Lord because the Lord in the present is more
merciful than just; as fax as future punishment is concerned
he is more just than merciful although he is both in both
times. In the time of mercy he diminishes punishment, but
in the time of justice the sinner will be punished, and in
the forum of God, where there is eternal and purgatorial
punishment, punishment is neither diminished nor taken by
another. The reason for this is that the keys have their
virtue from Christ's passion which relates principally to
31
mercy where mercy is greater than justice. This view
31. ^.LXII,De Kelaxationibus, Memb.l,L,pp.1233-34.
mast, and did, create a fearful uncertainty, and a greater
emphasis on the Justice of God which had to be satisfied.
Consequently the place of the keys and the Church, and the
place of the individual's contrition would assume
overwhelming importance. Secondly, the fact that the grace
of virtues is required in this sacrament demonstrates how
far the "ex opere operato" character of the other sacraments
has gone, how really "graceless" they are, how really
"Spiritless" and how far, as a result, the Church has gained
control over these "virtues of the passion". The sacrament
required a minimum of involvement - a disposition which in
the case of Baptism would appear Pelagian - and the effect
in the life of the receiver follows automatically on the
right reception of it. The freedom of grace, the freedom
of the Spirit of Christ disappears. Freedom is maintained
in Penance only by the grace of virtues and man's free will.
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CHAPTER 12
GRACE. FREE WILL. AND MERIT.
Alexander, like many theologians, saw creation
proceeding from innocence to glory through the intermediate
stage of grace. There are two sides of this process, on
one side was grace, on the other side was man. Prom the
time of creation there were always these two sides, but sin
on man's side complicated the process as it introduced
guilt, punishment and the need for satisfaction. Most of
the previous discussion has been concerned with the
elimination of sin. In spite of this sin the basic pattern
of grace on the one side, and man on the other, remains
with modifications. Alexander states this basic pattern
in a series of questions which sets out to show that the
beginning of grace was in the will of God, but the
beginning of evil and damnation were not. "Quare Reus
dat gloriam? Quia iste meruit. Quare meruit? Quia Deus
dedit gratiam. Quare dedit gratiam? Quia voluit. Quare
voluit? Quia voluit. Ex altera parte square homo damnatur?
Quia fecit malum. Quare fecit? Quia voluit. Quare voluit?
Quia voluit". That the merit has more content than merely
grace and that man's will to sin did not exclude his capacity
for it, will be seen later. (Alexander goes far beyond, for
instance, Bernard of Clairvaux, who stated "God, therefore is




and supplieth to tfcie will the fulfilment of the work",
in spite of the fact that Alexander quotes this in Book II
without comment in the discussion of grace which appears in
the general discussion on free will). The two sided process
from innocence to glory can be more clearly seen in the
following quotation and in this is included what might be
called the "interruption" of sin.
"Ante lapsum potuit malis resistere, sed non sine
gratia proficere. Procedit Spiritus Sanctus in
creaturas ad ipsas sanandas, quoniam illuminat animana
ad cognitionem veri habendum, purgans ignorantiam,
accedens ad Dei aiaorsni, purgans malam concupiscentiam,
dat robur ad operis perfectionea. Tripliciter ergo
in bonis iuvat: monet eniia ut bonum cogitet, contra
desidiam; docet rationem qualiter faciendum, contra
imprudentiam; excitat voluntatem ut bonum facere velit,
contra negligentiam. In declinando a malo, primo facit
detestationem peccati in compunctione; secundo cor
contritum facit supplicare pro venia; tertio remittit
peccatum". 3
Apart from the Pelagian implications, this might be reasonably
satisfactory if this process under the holy Spirit led up to
Christ and centred in him. However, as has already been noted,
except in relation to faith, there does not appear to be any
necessary connection between the work of Christ ana the work
of the Holy Spirit, except that both form part of a whole.
In his sacramental teaching Alexander brings the work of
Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit more or less together
although they still appear to operate side by side rather
than in the way of the Trinity. Outside that teaching the
separation is most marked. (And therefore, also, the work of
Christ and the working of grace which is attributed to the
Holy Spirit.) It is significant that the doctrine of the Holy
2., Serjaairci, Concerning GrTcp JVee Wj iX yp 90-gl'i AJ&VI*17^ p. 2<4-9.
3. Bk.I,d.XIV,6,p.151.
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Spirit is not discussed after the incarnation but purely
within a Trinitarian - or so-called-Trinitarian context.
Side by side the "mission" of the Son and the "mission" of
the Spirit are discussed. The two missions are pointedly
distinguished: "Per missionem Pilii in carnem unitur
Creator creaturae ... Sed ex missions Spiritus Sancti non
4
sequitur unio Creatoris et creaturae in unam personam".
This means, quite rightly, that the Holy Spirit was not
incarnate, but it also implies that the mission of the Holy
Spirit (a temporal mission) is something besides that
achieved in the mission of the Son (something "besides"
rather than as a continuation of the work of the Son). There
are, in fact, five missions but the first two only need
concern us here: "quintuplex est missio, scilicet in
carnem, quae ad Filium pertinet; secunda in corda fidelium,
quae etiam Pilio convenit ratione sapientiae; tertia est
missio ad praedicandum; quarta in Sacramento; quinta in
iudicio futuro, quia sub forma servi iudicabit. In hoc
autem capitulo determinat de missione in carnem et in corda
fidelium, scilicet de corporali et spirituali missione". ^
Here, again, the work of Christ and the work of the Holy
Spirit coincide in faith or in wisdom in the hearts of the
faithful but also again there is a separation between them
made in the last sentence. This separation is clear at the
beginning of the next distinction. "Dictum est supra de
missions Filii. Nunc agitur de missions sive processions
4. 1,p.148. 5. d.XV,15,P.157.
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Spiritus Sancti temporali, quae duplex est, scilicet
corporalis, quando mititur in specie columbae, et spiritualis
in corda fidelium". This division is more simply (and
perhaps too simply) stated in a quotation from Bernard:
"Venit a Patre missuE Dei Filius et dedit fidem; post
Filium missus est Spiritus Sanctus et dedit et docuit
7
caritatera". ' This division was also found in the "caput"
section of the Christology proper. To be sure, in the
Glossa faith is not without the Holy Spirit, nor is lov6
without faith, but the coincidence of these aspects in the
Glossa is not Trinitarian, that is, the Spirit is not the
Spirit of Christ in faith and love, but the Son contributes
mainly to faith, the Spirit mainly to love. With it
established that Christ and the Spirit are separated in an
untrinitarian way by Alexander and that the Holy Spirit is
hardly connected with Christ, the two sided progress to
glory can hardly be Christological. It is now time to
return to a discussion of that process.
In his discussion on the mission of the Spirit
Alexander quotes Rabanus who gives three "times" of the
Holy Spirit. "Datus est Spiritus Sanctus bis in terra, semel
in caelo a Domino". The first is before the passion,the
second between the resurrection and the ascension, the
third between the ascension and the second advent.
Alexander's comment is:
6. d.XVI,1,p.162. 7» d.XVIII,7»P*134; Bernard, Sermones
de diversls. serm.45,n.4.
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"primo dedit Spiritual Sanctum in terra passibilis;
secundo in terra impassibilis; tertio in caelo
impassibilis. Primo ad gratiam gratis datam quoad
corpus secundum sanitatem; quoad intellectum secundum
doctrinam, qui est primus modus quern Rabanus innuit.
Secunao ad gratiam gratum facientem secundum affectum
et quoad apparitionem in Unguis, ut affectus
efficaciam haberet movendi intellectum. Tertio quoad
gratiam perfectionis in gloria. Et quia non o
pluribus modis gratia, solum est divisio trimembris".
This last statement is generally true but Alexander himself
is able to see many types of grace and many effects of grace.
All of them, however, in some way come under these three
categories. It is with the first two graces, or with the
field they cover that the present interest lies. The first
of these "disposes" man (and indeed, at times, might almost
mean "creates" him); the second is grace proper which is
subsequent to the effects of the previous grace ("saving"
grace covers the second type) and with the free will leads
onto the works of merit. The end of the process then is the
grace of perfection in glory. This process in its first two
parts is stated by Alexander as follows: "Est ordo in natura
et est ordo in gratia, ^ui in natura, est a gratia gratis
a
data; qui in gratia, a gratia gratum faciente". y
The main discussion of grace is found in distinction
XXVI in Book II. In this distinction Alexander amplifies
his ideas on the various workings of grace and in so doing
implies the many uses of prevenient and subsequent grace.
This discussion fits generally into the pattern just stated
above. Sometimes prevenient grace is that which bestows the
natural gifts (this is almost creation), and subsequent grace
8. d.XVl,7,pp.l64-I6b; In Peter's Glossa ordin. on Acts 2:2,
ap. Lyranum. cf. Rabanus on 1 Cor.12:11. '9* Bk.II,d.lX,18,
P. 93.
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then refers to the "dona bona superaddita". These then would
be the prevenient grace to the grace "quae facit gratura".
Sometimes prevenient grace is that through which man is
liberated from sin, and subsequent grace by which he is
just. This would be prevenient grace to the subsequent
grace "qua bene operamur". This would be prevenient grace
to the grace by which temptation is resisted. Sometimes
prevenient grace is "in via" and subsequent grace is "in
patria". Thus it is obvious that grace is present from
beginning to end for Alexander. The last grace is the grace
of glory, all those "gtaces" from the grace "quae facit
gratura" are "gratia gratum faciens" and the two before these
are "gratia gratis data". At the most this latter grace
disposes man to "gratia gratum faciens" which is defined by
Alexander as follows: "Gratia est forma a Deo data gratis,
sine merito, gratura faciens habentem et opus eius Deo reddens
11
gratum". This is the most comprehensive and clearest
definition given of this grace. The usages of the word grace
are many, however, and these usages denote its scope.
Sometimes it denotes "gratia materialiter" which is Christ.
Sometimes it refers to a virtue, like faith / this is a very
broad use of the word/. Sometimes it denotes "donum naturale
nobis datum" or grace freely superadded. Then it can be
"gratia gratum faciens" through the infusion of which all the
virtues are present, and thus grace is either uncreated,
namely, the Holy Spirit, or created /"quae est causa efficiens
10. d.XXVI,l,b)pp.239-240. 11. 6,c)p.243
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coniuncta cum virtutibus". / This grace is either general
b,y which sins are remitted or special so that it is said
"divisiones gratiarum multae sunt". (1 Cor. 12:4) / Are these
the two sides of "sacramental grace" : for guilt and for sins?
The correspondence does not appear to be exact./ Finally
there is the grace "quae est consummata" which is eternal
15
life. Again the pattern of nature, grace, and glory
comes out. it should be noted that grace, either as the
uoly opirit as uncreated grace or as created grace, does not
lead up to Christ's work nor is it necessarily derivative
from him. It apparently works along side or above. Christ
is "grace filled", that is, in regard to grace he has more
grace than man but he is not unique. (This is apart from
satisfaction). It is grace that remits the guilt of sin and
sanctifies man. "Gratia gratum faciens" is one but its effects
are many.
There is one "grace", however, which does not fit
into this general pattern of the three graces, nor of the
idea of uncreated and created grace. In the same distinction
Alexander lists a fourfold division of grace "scilicet
praedestinationis et vocationis et iustificatiouis et
magnificationis". (Roms. 8:30) The grace of predestination
is prepared from eternity "et talis non est in creatura, sed
14
in Creators tantum". This is hardly grace in the common
use of the term and, although it has some connection with
the grace of glory and perhaps present grace, it will not be
12. Footnote,p.242 13. 6,b)p.242. 14. 18,e)p.251
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discussed here but in a separate chapter on predestination.
The other three "graces" mentioned free from evil (vocation),
and confer good (justification) /these are "gratia gratum
faciens"/ and complete the good (magnification). /This
15
approximates to th6 grace of glory/. ^
Within the grace to do well (of "proficiendi ad
bonum") which is the other part of the grace which resists
evil, there are two types of grace: "gratia proficiendi ad
beatitudinem" and "perse^yerandi". Adam had the first,
ir in
but not the second. The latter leads to merit
which is the reason Adam could not have had it as he had no
18
incentive to sin and so his persistence was not meritorious.
Sufficient has been given to show the general outlines
and scope of grace. There is a process from innocence to
glory and within "gratia gratum faciens" there is an answer
to the situation of sin, by remission of guilt, sanctification
and justification. Alexander is at pains (although the
process seems to imply intervals in which man must do something)
to demonstrate that grace of the Holy Spirit is the beginning
and at least the end of all man's efforts. (This is quite
apart from the problem of its relation to satisfaction and
Christ). .Indeed, in distinction XXVIII Alexander sets out to
refute the Pelagian heresy "quae dicebat quod liberum
iq
arbitrium operator bonum et ad vitam aeteraam". 7 This
objective is also stated in the following way; "Alius non
potest mereri alii primam gratiam nisi habeat gratiam; unde,
15. Ibid. 16. d.XXIV,l,e)p.208. 17- d.XXIX,l,p.273
18. d.XXIV,l,d)p.207. 19. d.XXVIII,l,a)p.265.
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si aliquis meretur sibi primam gratiam, sequeretur quod
20
illam haberet". This is the relation of prevenient grace
to subsequent grace. However, Alexander does not cover all
Pelagianism by his definition. He omits semi-Pelagianism
in which grace prevenes but to which man of himself consents.
It is this position which Alexander takes up.
Before going on to discuss the nature of man and
his free will, there are indications that "grace", as
Alexander sees it, or the Holy Spirit at work, is not the
Biblical (or Reformed) view of the work of the Holy Spirit
as expressed for instance in the Scots Confession:
"for of nature we are so dead, so blind, and so
perverse, that neither can we feill when we are pricked,
see the licht when it shines, nor assent to the will
of God when it is reveiled, unles the Spirit of the
Lord Jesus quicken that quhilk is dead, removes the
darkness from our myndes, and bowe our stubborn hearts
to the obedience of his blessed will". 21
Firstly, grace can be taken away "per indignitatem subiecti
22
habentis illam; unde per defectum separator". Thus,
although grace is not taken away to cause sin, sin does cause
the removal of grace. This leads one to doubt whether this
is really the grace of the Spirit of Christ without whom
there is no regeneration of will or works. If sin can eject
grace, who then can be saved? Surely the grace of Christ is
present in spite of sin. That makes the "good news". Sin
is the "impossible" contradiction. Alexander's "grace"
implies man's goodness. Secondly, this grace is less
extensive than that described above, as the sentence "nos sumus
20. 2,p.265. 21. Article 12. 22. d.XXVI,14,p.248
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coadiutores Dei, id est consentimus Domino adiutori",
indicates. Statements similar to this are scattered
throughout the discussion of grace and free will.
Possibly most revealing in this regard is
Alexander's conception of the working of grace in love.
This serves to demonstrate the limitations of grace, the
two sides of the process to glory, and as an introduction
to the next aspect of this discussion, the part of man.
"Per donum caritatis homo assimilatur Spiritu bancto,
24
qui est amor". Uncreated love is in God, created love
is in man and this love forms the bond between man and
Godj "Deus et homo uniuntur in caritate, id est sunt
unum, id est in una voluntate, scilicet in volendo unum,
quod est Deus. Caritas autem increata unit tantum sicut
finis; tantum creata unit sicut forma et accidens ex parte
nostra; ex parte Dei substantia. Et creata fertur ad
25
increatam sicut accidens ad substantiam". ^ Grace and
love are intimately connected and with grace "quantum est de
se" illuminating in the "intellectus agens", love, awake or
asleep, is moved as there is nothing of time in love as with
26
believing and hoping. This does not remove the need for
consent to uncreated grace or love. Grace moves "quantum est
de se", that is, on its part, it is its own mover. However,
the close relation of (and the almost mediatorial role of)
uncreated grace or love and created grace or love, the two-
sided operation - of God and man - is well demonstrated by
23. d,XXVI,7,p.244. 24. Bk.I,d.XVII,10,c)p.l72
23. 29,d)p.l80. 26. 18,p.176.
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the following quotations: "Spiritus Sanctus est fons sicut
persona inhabitans per gratiam, separata secundum substantiam
a nobis; sed caritas est fons sicut forma comparata ad
finem". "L" has a similar but fuller statement:
"Spiritus Sanctus est fons sicut principium effectivum
separativum a nobis secundum substantiam; caritas est fons
sicut formaliter, ut manens in subiecto; gratia est fons sicut
effectivum non separatum secundum substantiam, per modum
po
formae comparatae ad finem". On the one side is the
Spirit (uncreated grace and love); on the other is created
grace and love. These quotations are attempts to explain
the secret working of the Spirit in sanctification but they
are defective because grace is almost transferable "stuff",
because the sin of man can remove the presence of grace and
his consent is needed for the infusion of grace, and because,
as soon as uncreated grace or love becomes created grace or
love then it becomes a part of man himself. He then becomes
the centre of sanctification instead of the Holy Spirit, or
better, the Spirit of Jesus Christ. Substantial love from
grace becomes the common ground of, and the mediation between,
God and man, man sanctifying himself by it. The workings
of man, his virtue and his merit, become his works for which
he can take credit as they are part of him. They are
27. Bk.III,d.XXXI,3,p.365. 28. Bk.Ill,d.XXXI,14(L),p.371
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not then the secret workings of the Holy Spirit. 7
There is, moreover, in Alexander more evidence of
semi-Pelagianism than this limited view of grace. There is
also his view of man. The process to glory can also be
viewed from the side of man. There is a good of nature,
■50
grace, and of glory. ^ Nature precedes grace just as the
evening precedes the day in creation. Man is said to be
in the similitude of God "quoad naturalia", and in the image
of God "quoad gratuita". ^ It is the image which is of
particular interest. There is a trinity in the soul;
memory,which is "conservatio similitudinis Dei", is related
to the Father; intelligence, which is "potentia per
similitudinera Dei in veritatem /se/convertendi", is related
to the Son; and "voluntas", which is "vis per quam
inclinamur in summan bonitatem", is related to the Holy
Spirit. ^ In the soul of man there is "duplex intellectiva,
34
una cuius est cognitio veri, altera cuius est dilectio boni".
(The separation of cognition and the good-faith and love -
is not as rigid as this would make it appear for both faith
and love are of grace and it is with love that faith becomes
"formed". Prior to that it is "unformed" faith.) There is
29. Cf.Bk.II,d.XXVI,12,p.24?. "fiota quod iustitia increata
iustificat sicut causa separata; et gratia creata iustificat
sicut causa primo coniuncta; et fides sicut causa per raodum
fundamenti; et caritas per modum formae comparatae ad fineia:
unde sic movens est ut finis; et iustitia iustificat per
modum causae formalis.
30. d.Ill,19,p.35. 31. d.XIII*7,p.l28. 32. d.XVI,3,
c)p.l47. 33. d.III,5»p.26. 34. d.V,8,p.48. 35. Bk.III,
d.XXIII,8,p.263.
both a natural cognition (."gratia gratis data") and a
36
cognition from grace ("gratia gratum faciens"). v The point
is that, although faith, cognition, and wisdom are related to
the Son - and there is something of this prior to "gratia
37
gratum faciens" - faith which leads to eternal life, " is
from "gratia gratum faciens" and therefore, together with
love, is from the Holy Spirit. Thus, insofar as the uoly
Spirit is separated from Christ so too is faith, although
38
the articles about Christ are the object of that faith. ^
The connection would appear incidental rather than
necessary. When man siiis it is not really the image (.as
described here) on man's side that is damaged or lost,
rather grace is withdrawn. Man thus retains his "capacity"
if not his "activity".
"Homo est imago secundum animam, et hoc secundum
superiorem partem rationis, secundum habitum; sed per
reformationem gratiae vel per gratiam reformantem dicitur
homo imago secundum actum. Unde dicendum est quod
imago creationis non potest amitti, deformari tamen
potest; et per imaginem recreationis potest ilia prius
deformata reformari. Unde ilia actu fit amissibilis". 39
("non habitu" 40 ). "Ut imago est, non diminuitur;
sed ut bonitas est, diminui potest"• 41
Sin however, cannot be ignored and thus there are now four
42
states of man: innocence, grace, glory and guilt. As has
already been seen, guilt and eternal punishment are deleted
by grace alone but satisfaction for the sin of Adam is made
by Christ. This is the blot that has to be removed before
grace can lead finally onjto merit and glory. Thus the basic
36. Bk.I,d.X^VI,19»PP.468-469. 37* Bk.III,d.XXIII,11,a)
p.268. 38. 9*1 »P* 266. 39. Bk.iI,d.XVI,5»t>)ppl49-150.
40. Footnote,p.130. 41. 5»c)p.l50. 42. d.XIX,1,p.165*
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pattern is retained.
In this process the "voluntas" in the free will
of man plays an important part. The process is affected but
not basically changed by sin for "voluntas" is Still in man.
Angels, once they sin, cannot do right again "sed homo post
peccatum habet iterum voluntatem convertibilea ad bonum;
ideo non oportet huiusmodi duplex genus hominuai ereare,
quoniam in eodem successive potest esse bonum et malum". ^
This is the reason why Christ is necessary only for
satisfaction. Once that is made, the process can be resumed.
And in that process it is of the "voluntas" of man "praeparare
materialiter, sed gratiae est praeparare formaliter".
The "voluntas" can also be described as "efficiens sub
efficients, ut in bonis". ^ Free will is px^imarily of
the "voluntas" and "secundum voluntatem est omnium actuum
46
aliorum". It is "habitum naturalem, et talis est habitus
potentialis vel potentia habitualis. JSt in eo quod * liber*
est ipsius voluntatis; et in eo quod *arbitrium', est
ipsius rationis. Unde voluntas et ratio nominant eamdem
47
vim ad diversos actus, ut ad bonum et verum". ' Free
will "prout liberum est, non est ad malum; sed prout est
48
arbitrium, magis mali quam boni". Thus in man there is
a possibility of evil, an evil which is not from God for
the free will has a double relation, "a Deo" and "ad Deum
per suos actus". The cause of evil is in its deficiency
43. Bk.II.d.XXIII,5,p.203. 44. d.XXV,30,p.238. 45. Bk.I,
d.XLVII,l,p.475* 46. Bk.II,d.XXIV,3,c)p.212. 47. 9$
p.213. 48. d.XXV,19,p.234.
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not in the relation "a Deo" but in the relation "ad Deum".
"Potens autem est in malum, non do suo ordine, sed de sua
potentia: non in quantum potentia vel voluntas, vel a Deo
vel ad Deum, quia sic malum esset a Deo, sed in quantum ex
49nihilo". "Malum est ex voluntate in quantum est ex
50
nihilo", y Before the fall, the free will helped man to
resist evil, but after the fall it tended toward evil.
This does not mean, as has been noted, that the "voluntas"
or the free will has lost its ability for grace and good.
The reason for its inability lies in the withdrawal of
grace. Grace is needed for man to progress in good but
because the will sins, grace had to'be withdrawn. However
when grace deletes guilt and eternal punishment and Christ
makes satisfaction for original sin, grace does actually
return and the "voluntas", although there still is "pronitas"
to sin remaining as the discussion on the sacraments
demonstrated, can co-operate with grace to good: "sola
voluntate peccatur, non tamen sola voluntate recte vivitur,
52
sed cum gratia". ^
The aspects of "voluntas", as natural, as co-operating
with grace, and as sinning, are demonstrated in the following
quotation concerning the various laws. "Lex naturae est
re gula voluntatis naturalis;
et lex gratiae est regula voluntatis secundum
superiorem partem rationis; et lex Moysi est regula voluntatis
secundum inferiorem partem rationis; et lex carnis secundum
49. uk.I,d.Ill,53*1.i)p-70. 30. Ibid. l)p.70. 31. Dk.II,
d.XXV,23,P.236. 52. d.XXVIII,6,p.268.
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voluntatem sensualitatis se habet". ^ Thus voluntas has
been adapted into a new pattern but not a basically new one.
Sin is encased in a lower part of the reason. This pattern
was stated at the beginning of the discussion from man's
side as the good of nature, the good of grace, and the good
of glory. Here, too, the law of Moses has its place as a
step. That pattern is now stated more comprehensively in
relation to free will with the fact of sin brought into
the pattern.
"liberum arbitrium, ut est natura, potens est in
bonum naturae; sad ut est liberum arbitrium potens est
in bonum in genere; et ut est liberum arbitrium habens
gratiam gratis datam, potens est in bonum ex
circumstantiis; et ut est liberum arbitrium habens
gratiara superadditam, potens est in bonum difficile .
Deinde est habens gratiam qua liberamur a malo; deinde
sequitur gratia qua bene operamur; deinde sequitur
gratia qua possit stare; postea sequitur gratia unde
proficere possit". 54
It is evident from all this that from the beginning only the
good or the meriting (whether it was merit or not from the
beginning is largely a matter of terminology - merit from
"gratia gratis data" does not win a debt from God but
something close to it) could be saved. At first this
included all men (Adam) but on his sin there arose the
division, which was potentially present from the creation,
of those who would will good and those who would will evil.
With the absence of grace through the guilt of sin, man. could
do only evil but, with the forgiveness of guilt and with the
satisfaction made by Christ, grace returned (how far it
53. d.XXXII,4,p.308. 54. d.XXVIII,4,pp.267-268.
hinges on the satisfaction is never entirely clear in the
Glossa; there is some relation undoubtedly) and man could
return to the pattern of creation. Now, however, there is
"pronitas" (which is not an obstacle to grace) and people
who have the ability to good and a tendency towards evil.
Christ did not overcome the tendency towards evil, the
badness (although he did reduce its effects), for he could
not assume that without being bad himself. This has been
seen in the Christology proper. However, he did clear the
way completely as far as penal satisfaction for original
sin. Thus, ultimately, in Alexander's theology, it would
appear that one's salvation depends on the use one makes
of grace, that is, it is a fully semi-Pelagian theology.
(This may not be so in the doctrine of predestination.)
Thus from creation as far as the "bad" are concerned they
are too bad to save, or as far as the "good" are concerned,
sin does no greater damage than that which Christ's
satisfaction can repair, and apart from this man can save
himself by the use he makes of grace. This limitation of
the scope of Christ's work reduces the goodness of the news
considerably because far more than satisfaction, made for
all men, is required of man; it concentrates the individual
on his own goodness; and seriously affects for the worse
one's whole attitude to creation and to all men. The
separation of the work of Christ from the work of grace is
really a problem in Trinitarian theology but insofar as Christ'
work of satisfaction by implication was only for the good and
his work in sanetification minimal - certainly as man - it is
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evident that Christ's humanity need not be unreservedly
(except "without sin") man and mankind. This view of grace,
and man, explains Alexander's - and many others' -
Christological position.
It only remains to see how grace leads to merit and
to see how merit operates. "Anima est proprium subiectum
gratiae, et potentia animae est subiectum virtutis. Unde
gratia facit bonitatem voluntatis, quae bonitas est virtus". ^
Thus grace with "voluntas" makes the virtue. Grace is always
one in the soul because there is one substance of the soul
but as there are many powers of the soul so there can be
56
many virtues. y For the movement of any virtue the
movement of love is necessary "et non convertitur". Love,
is "sicut motor communis" and any other virtue is "motor
specialis" as the sun is to man or plants. Although faith
is the "fundamentum", it is not the "motor universalis"
because the work of faith is not the basis of the worx of
57
virtues. yr All acts of virtue tend to beatitude with love
58
mediating, but love is immediate. ^ Thus faith is bound
up in love, as has been maintained previously. Formed faith,
the virtue, is a sign that love is present and therefore also
that "gratia gratum faciens" is present. Baptism in bringing
faith, therefore, must convey this grace of the Holy Spirit,
and with it, potentially, at least, all the other virtues and
necessarily faith. Alexander, in short, when he talks of
53. d.XXVI,5,pp.241-242. 56. 15,p.248? almost identical
in Bk.Ill,d.XXXIII,l,e)p.382. 57. Bk.Ill,d.XXXVI,7,p.447.
58. d.XXIII,13,d)p.272.
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sacramental grace, includes within it the deletion of guilt
and punishment (.that is, the deletion of eternal punishment
and of Christ's satisfaction for temporal punishment), faith
which is cognitive and love which is operative, a rigid
division between faith and love cannot be maintained although
faith is by no means the comprehensive element which it is in
the Jtsible and the Reformed tradition. The limitation of
faith to the cognitive or the intellectual, as faith "about"
Christ and other articles, which in Alexander is its peculiar
role, rind the suggestion that it is separated from the
sanctifying love, must have led the authors of the Boots
Confession to state "blasphemy it is to say, that Christ
abydes in the hearts of sik, as in whome there is no spirits
CQ
of sanctification". Certainly, at times, in Alexander,
for instance in the "caput" section, and in relation to
uncreated character and uncreated grace, ana in the contrast
"having Christ" and "having the Spirit, there have been
strong suggestions of this, but over all it would appear that
basically this is not Alexander's position. The distinction
between faith and love can be made (but it really is within
faith between cognition and affection and faith as a virtue
has both) but it is probably "without separation" and
"without division". The application of rigid distinctions
noted in the Scots Confession has not yet been made. Faith
and love coincide and, as a faith which merits, the source
is in grace and the Holy Spirit.
59. Article 15.
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The virtue which consists of grace and the "voluntas"
working together in good does not necessarily lead to action.
"Gratia est habitus semper cum suo actu; ideo nunquam exit ab
otio in actum. Bed virtus est habitus aliquando cum suo
60
actu, aliquando non; ideo aliquando otiosa". It is
difficult to give any real meaning to this statement on grace
in light of the second statement on virtue but it obviously
is intended to maintain the priority of grace and, indeed,
the fact that grace is grace, that is, it is made no better
or worse by man; its effect, or act, lies within itself.
This is a Biblical tendency and one feels that Alexander
was eager to maintain it all along against a Pelagian
tendency, but, in fact, for him the "act" of grace lies in
the virtue or the act of the virtue (which takes the
irresistibility out of grace and lends it its freedom as
consent noes in the sacraments) and in this the "voluntas"
of man is necessary as a contributing factor: "solus
Deus tamquam causa effectiva operatur virtutem, sed homo
tamquam causa receptiva; unde est tamquam consentiens". 61
Whether the consent leads to "otiosa" or active virtue is
of little importance for consent is needed both for the entry
of grace to create virtue (as in Baptism) and for the
activity of grace in active virtue. This distinction between
active virtue and inactive virtue does eliminate the idea of
irresistible grace for if grace were to create active virtue
with its own working, then there could be no merit as far as
60. Bk.II.d.XXVII,b.PP.236-257. 61. 8,d)p.258
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Alexander is concerned, nor could there by any human
freedom either for merit or within the sphere of grace because
grace would not allow or create freedom but would altogether
eliminate it. Man would be swallowed up in God. The
doctrine of merit recognises, at least, that grace and
freedom are not incompatible. What is wrong in the doctrine
is the fact that freedom is not based in grace (in Jesus
Christ) but is based in man himself.
That Alexander was attempting to repudiate the
possibility of irresistible grace becomes evident in
statements a few pages later when he discusses grace, virtue,
and free will. Also evident, here, is the fact that free
will is necessary for virtue or merit, and the fact that the
free will can resist or consent to the grace which is
present. The grace of God, for Alexander, reveals the true
and the good, it makes the good, but it does not create
the will to good. Man has to decide that. This is just
the position of much modern Protestant pietism. In
Alexander, neither the knowledge of God in Christ, nor the
goodness of God in the Holy Spirit lead to the service of
God. A separate step is necessary. In the section in
question, Peter is quoted as stating that virtue moves the
free will. In Peter there is a quite distinct division between
virtue and the free will. Virtue is an intermediate stage
between grace and free will. In Alexander the distinction
is not clear because "voluntas" helps create virtue and is
also the principal part of the free will. In this section
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Alexander demonstrates this connection, the fact that this
discussion parallels that on the inactive and active virtue,
and the fact that the relations of grace, virtue, and the
free will were not agreed upon generally. It is argued, then,
that the movement of virtue, mentioned by Peter, because it is
"gratuitus'1, would also be meritorious. But against this is
the fact that all meritorious movement is from the free will
and this movement is not. "^uidam" solve this problem by
stating "quod virtus movet liberurn arbitrium, id est
informat". But against this is the fact that virtue always
informs the free will. It is in it and therefore always
moves it. "^uidam" solve this problem by stating that this
is not "inconveniens" since grace is a spiritual light and
so always is in its act. "Unde licet gratia semper movet,
non tarn liberurn arbitrium semper movetur, quoniam aliquando
ftP
non obedit. Aliter enim semper meretur liberum arbitrium".
62. 11,p.261. This quotation is in fact, the explanation
of the problem of grace, the good life and merit in the sacraments,
(p.13 of Glossa IV") The grace of the sacrament (which is the
"vasey leads to the good life but the good life needs the
participation of man. The reception of grace in Baptism
(which operates of itself) does not necessarily make merit.
Free will has continually to be used. In the above passage,
the reception of grace does not necessarily make merit; man
has to use it for that purpose in his free will. The grace of
Baptism is thus not "sacramental grace" as kilian Lynch would
call it but is "gratia gratum faciens" which has many effects -
one operated in the reception of Baptism, another being the
creation of a virtue, which is made active by the use of the
free will. There are only three graces in the Glossa and
"sacramental grace" is not one.
It is evident that "virtus" lies somewhere between being
"gratia" and being meritorious. Its place, however, is not
fixed.
Sufficient has been said to fulfil the purpose of
this chapter, namely, to demonstrate the place of grace
whereby the Holy Spirit works alongside and apart from
Christ, and to demonstrate the place of man in the process
to glory, or his place in the plan of salvation. To sum up,
three quotations will be given, the first on the "principium"
of merit. "Unde triplex est principium merendi, scilicet
gratia quae reddit subiectum gratum, et virtus disponens
potentiam, et caritas disponens opus illius potentiae in
finem, unde ^eddit opus Deo caruin. mt sic patet qualiter
intelligendo gratia ante virtutem est, et virtus ante
63
caritatem, licet simul sint secundum esse". The second
quotation demonstrates the place of free will in relation to
the theological virtues, faith and love, and the "vis merendi"
"Ad rationem merendi exigitur fides funaamentum et caritas
complementurn. Est enim caritas forma omnium virtutum. Unde
vis merendi habet unam rationem secundum quam inclinabilis
est per fidem, et sic arbitrium est; et aliam rationem
secundum quam inclinabilis est per curitatem; et ideo
composita est sua intentio. Unde liberum arbitrium dicit
64
intentionem compositam ex voluntate et iudicio". The
final quotation demonstrates grace's "reaction" to sin. It
is evident from this quotation that once Christ has made
63. d.XXVII,3,p.255. 64. d.XXV,4,pp.225-226.
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satisfaction for man, it is grace which gives faith and love
in Baptism. It is also evident that, apart from the satisfaction
which only Christ could make, that man has to co-operate in
the reception of Baptism and that free will is active in
Penance, or penitence. This means that the Holy Spirit is
indeed an "alter Christus" and not really the Spirit of Christ
who brings man in faith to Christ with all his benefits. The
objective part of salvation is divided between Christ and the
Holy Spirit; the subjective part of salvation is shared by
the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, and man (because grace is
not irresistible). It is love in God and man which forms
the bond between God and man, not essentially, (although
perhaps "materially") the man Jesus Christ. The relevant
quotation is as follows:
"Nota quod est gratia innocentiae; et hanc
habuit Adam ante peccatum, dum nihil nocuit vel in
se vel in sui natura. Et etiam gratia fidei sive
generalis iustitiae; et haec datur in Baptismo, nisi
fictus accedat. Est etiam gratia purgans a peccato per
cooperationem liberi arbitrii, et talis est gratia
poenitentiae. Istis autem tribus generibus gratiarum
respondent tria genera peccatorum per oppositum. Ham
peccatum originale abstulit gratiam innocentiae, et
per gratiam fidei liberator ab originali peccato, licet
remaneat fomes. Et huic gratiae opponitur actuals
peccatum, sed ab actuals peccato liberator per gratiam
poenitentiae. Et huic gratiae opponitur peccatum in 65
Spiritum Sanctum, ad quod non sequitur gratia liberans".
It is evident from the last sentence that it is the free will
that ultimately saves for it is free will that chooses to
commit or not to commit the sin against the Holy Spirit.
Unless God becomes man, and this grace does not do because
65- d.XLIII,7»p.414.
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it is not of the Holy Spirit to become incarnate as Alexander
states, and because grace is not irresistible, man must make
his own response to God for there is no one else to make it.
It is this view of the role of Christ, both in regard to man's
subjective response to the satisfaction of Christ and in regard
to man's objective and subjective sanctification, which are
given in the Holy Spirit and man, which makes for a defective
Christology in Alexander's theology.
guaestiones
The Quaestiones introduces a new grace, "gratia
sacramentalis", as has been seen in its sacramental teaching.
This grace is distinguished from the grace of virtues of
"gratia gratum faciens" which in the Glossa conveyed the
j
effects of what is now called in the ^uaestiones "sacramental
grace". This division removes Christ further as a necessary
cause of sanctification in his satisfaction because there is
now no close association between satisfaction and sanctification
and because the sacramental grace is aimed only at punishment.
Although the grace of virtues derives from Christ it does
not have, as has been affirmed, both in the Christology
and the sacramental theology, a necessary relation to the
Son of Man as the sacramental grace in its satisfaction of
original sin has. Grace is multiple according to the
Quaestiones, that is, universal and particular. The universal
is the passion of Christ from which the sacraments assume
3^4
virtue, and the particular derives from this. The particular
grace is against this or that wound. Then there is "gratia
gratum faciens", and this is in virtues and gifts. Then
there is also "gratia gratis data" given for the perfect
ordering of the Church, and these are nine as listed in
1 Cor.12:8-10. It is not "gratia gratum faciens" in the
sacraments because this is required in ever/ member. "Ad
hoc ergo quod quaeritur, estne gratia gratum faciens in
omni sacramento, dico quod hoc accidit, quia ibi deletur
originals cum poena sua et actuale; sed ibi est gratia ex
consequenti, et non ex virtute sacramenti, quia accedenti
digne ad sacramenta necessaria gratia gratum faciens".
It should be noted that the Glossa has included the universal
and special graces under "gratia gratum faciens". Here
the "ex opere operato" character of sacramental grace is
very marked. The justification of the division of these two
graces, that is, the division of the grace of virtues, and
sacramental grace, which are both present in Christ, still
is not very convincing especially as the grace of virtues
is divided up into virtues and gifts, much as sacramental
grace is. The number "7" (the sacraments) may have some
mystical significance which demands a division of sacramental
grace. This number appears the only real reason for the
division.
Justification is "nihil aliud... quam liberi
66. Q.XLVIII, De Sacramentis in Genere, itiemb. 2,Jl, pp. 861-862.
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arbitrii rectitudo". This rectitude is "a Deo movents in
Deum finem". From God to man grace proceeds in order; as
predestination in the counsel of the most high, vocation
through fear, justification through the revelation of this
counsel through love. "Unde iustificatio est amoris gratuiti
infusio". In regard to the "principium a quo" this is called
gratification, in regard to "illud in quod" as it relates to
the "a quo" it is called "infusio amoris gratuiti"; in regard
to the "dispositio ad finem" it is called justification:
"Dictur enim iustitia, in quantum perficit animam ad recte
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agendum". ' This may appear less Pelagian than the Glossa
although justification does follow sanctification but the
^uaestiones does not differ much from the Glossa in its
semi-Pelagianism. There may be more emphasis on grace and
less on the free will as, for instance, when it is stated
that something is demanded from man in justification but
68
not as "co~operans, sed ut non repugnans" but then in
justification, it is stated, two things are from God's side,
two from ours, namely, movement of the free will and contrition
after which there is remission of sin, Goc'e second act. ^9
To be sure, virtue may occur without man moving (here the
Glossa was not quite clear), but it is not without man's
70
consent. ' To be sure, the capacity for "gratia gratum
faciens" is made in man by "gratia gratis data" as it is
beyond nature for man to have the capacity for the first
67* <4.LIII, De Xustificatione Impii, Memb.1,8,pp.1016-1017»




grace, ' but then the latter grace is part of man by this
time and it had to be accepted by man originally. Then again,
as in the Glossa, Bernard is reinterpreted. Bernard's
"immutando malam voluntatem, sibi per consensual iungit"
becomes "liberum ergo arbitrium tantum consentit divinae
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voluntati mutanti nostram voluntatem". ' There is a world
of difference between these two statements. Perhaps the
^uaestiones does diminish the part of the free will; yet,
in reality, the difference exists more in the words used
than in fact.
71* Q.XI, De lilectione, Memb.5,25 and 26,p.148. 72. XXXIII,
De Libero Arbitrio, lisp.II,Memb.1,33,p.377. nernard, De gratia
et lib, arbit., c.14,n.46.
CHAPTER 15
OLD LAW ADD NEW LAW
The role of grace and love, aid the relation of
Christ to grace and love is illustrated, to some extent, by
the question as to whether the ten commandments, the "raoralia"
justify or not, and by the comparison of the Old Law and
the New Law. Both these questions appear in Book: III. To
the first question Alexander replies that "iustifiaare" has
more than one meaning. Either it means "/facere/ ut habeatur
iustitia" and in this case only grace or virtue, but no
precept or work^ justif ies, or it means "exercitio bonorum
operura facere iustum" and so the "moralia", not only in the
Old Law, but also in the New, justify. They do so in
different ways, however, for there are two parts of justice,
"declinare a malo" which is related to fear, and "facere
bonum" which is related to love. The ten precepts of the
Old Law, observed carnally, justified in relation to declining
from evil in that they induced the act of fear. If they were
observed spiritually they justified in relation to the doing
of good. This had two aspects, in freeing either from guilt
or from punishment. "Si ergo gratia adiungatur intelligentibus
spiritualiter et in fide Venturi et operantibus in caritate ,
non adhuc iustificant quoad poenam perfects, sed quoad culpam
solum. Sed gratia adiuncta praeceptis evangelicis iustificabat
perfects quoad poenam et quoad culpam". ^ Thus love and
1. d.XXXVII,7,l,c)pp.469-^70
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therefore grace operated under the Old Lav/ but there had to
be faith in the One who was to come. Christ's work was to
make satisfaction and, once this was made, grace joined to the
precepts of the Gospel worked faith, love, and the remittance
of guilt fully. Faith under the old Law is associated with
Christ as it is under the Gospel but love is not, at least,
explicitly. However, faith and love work together and
so in that sense they are both related to Christ.
Nevertheless, under the Old Law, it would appear that grace,
from the Holy bpirit, working faith and love, works apart
from Christ whereas, in the sacraments, under the Gospel,
Christ is the channel of grace. This view is by no means
universal in the Glossa. It is however still grace joined
to the precepts of the Gospel that justifies perfectly. In
other words, before and after Christ, the bpirit is an "alter
Christus" in sanctification (sanctification preceding
justification) but after Christ he channels grace through
Christ, and in that grace is contained the benefit Christ
himself bestows, namely, the elimination of tempoi'al punishment.
Although this seems to be Alexander's real position,
namely, that both the laws of the Old Testament and the New
Testament can be spiritual (which would be sound if the bpirit
was the Spirit of Christ and not an "'alter Christus"),
nevertheless, in effect, he does often make the distinction
between the Old Law and the New Law, the one between declining
from evil and doing good. This view would mean that Christ
removes the barrier so that grace can bestow faith and love.
This has a certain basis in the fact that the temporal
punishment which Christ removes is "carentia visionis Dei"
which is related to the cognition to which faith relates in
turn (or one part of faith, the non-operative). If this
"carentia" is not removed by satisfaction, then, faith cannot
exist and therefore neither could love whose baeis is faith
and which enables one to do good. This is good in that it
makes Christ more decisive, wrong in that Christ's work has
no retrospective reference in time. This limitation made to
Christ's work is quite in keeping with much of Alexander's
thinking; in the first quotation (p.397) on justification
his work applied only to punishment. Alexander several times
makes the distinction between declining evil and the doing of
good as the difference between the Old Lav; and the New Law.
The ceremonial laws justified in neither way but the moral
laws in the Old Testament justified in declining evil and in
2
the New Law in doing good. When Alexander actually
discusses the matter of the differences between the two laws
there are similar distinctions. The most correct title for
the two laws are "Lex Vetus" because "law" denotes "terminum
a quo, scilicet malum", and "Testamentum Novum" because
"testament" denotes "terminura ad quem, scilicet bonum". ^
The two laws are also distinguished in regard to the efficient
cause. Moses is the efficient cause of the Old Law, Christ is
the efficient cause of the New Law. "Unde in 1 loan. 17:
Lex per aoysen data est, gratia per iesum Christum". This
2. 7,1,d)p.470. 3. d.XL,2,I,a)p.540. 4. b)p.540
is to see Christ as the dividing line between the Law (fear)
and grace (love). Another difference is in the material
causes, those of the Old Law are the carnal precepts and
5
promises, those of the Mew Law being the same spiritually. '
Again there is a difference "secundum tarminos": the justice
of the Old Law freed from punishment, the justice of Christ
saves; "secundum fines": the end of the Old Law was an
imperfect obedience, fche end of the Mew Law was a perfect
obedience to death; "quasi causa formalis": in the Old Law
it was fear, in the New Law it is love. ^ This is sufficient
evidence to indicate that, at least, Christ was a dividing
line in this type of thinking. This does not mean that he
was more than that. The logic of Christ's satisfaction would
mean that faith could result only after the "carentia divinae
n
visionis" is removed "per gratiam crucifix!" ' and thus the
working of grace in love would come fully after the
satisfaction was made. However, guilt was removed under the
Q
Old Law and this is the result of grace which is "gratia
gratum faciens", the grace to do well. Thus love could come
under the Old Law. So there may have been a possibility of
doing well under the Old Law, but the effect was imperfect
because man still suffered UQder "carentia" whose removal was
signified but not caused under circumcision. Then again,
there may be an indication of the concept of Christ as "caput"
5. c)p.540. 6. d)p.541. 7* Phrases from d.XXXVII,12(L),1,
c)p.477 which parallels the text used above, "AE".
8. eg. Bk.I,d.XLVi,19,p.468; Bk.II,d.XXVI,6,b)p.242.
from whom flows faith, an<i possibly love. But just as this
section was not an integral part of the Christology, it would
seem that this thinking is not altogether characteristic of
the Glossa's outlook on the Old Law.
C.uaestiones
In a comparison of the Old Law and the New Law in
the -^uaestiones there does not appear to be any hesitation
at all in affirming the full worming of the grace of virtues
("gratia gratum faciens") under the Old Law. It is correct
to affirm that grace is at work under the Old Law, and in
the :^uaestiones this grace is derived from the believer's
faith in Christ. Where one begins to have doubts, however,
is on Vae view of the Quaesbxones (as opposed bo the Gioss&J
in whici.1 it uoes not associate this grace with Christ, the man
In fact, Christ, the man, is downgraded as compared with the
Glossa's hesitant views. The Glossa does, to its credit,
associate the satisfaction of Christ, satisfaction made by
the man and him only, with the sanetificat ion of man, firstly,
and with some reason, by giving the impression sometimes that
Christ's satisfaction removed a barrier to grace, and secondly
by making Christ the dividing line between a time of no grace
and a time of grace. These views are closely associated.
The second view is imperfect in that it is chronologicalr
which also was the case with the application of Christ's
satisfaction. However, a basic problem with both the
Quaestiones and the Glossa is their substantial view of
the grace of God and the fact that with this view they see
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sane t if icat ion taking place outside Christ (.this is the
theology of Christ as Head, the channel of outflowing
sanctifying grace). ^There are then only two alternatives,
one being to admit that sane t if icat ion takes place in aien
before Christ which entails the subsequent downgrading of
Christ as critical in man's history, that is, as the One in
whom God is revealed and man is justified and sanctified
(which applies to men before (and after) Christ); or attempting
to see Christ as critical in the history of man which entails
the impossible division between a graceless law and a law
of grace with the implic it ion that Christ really applies
only to those who come after. Possibly it is the fact that
neither alternative is attractive to the piety of the Glossa
which causes its equivocation. The paaestiones finds a
solution in the grace o£ the Head by which Christ is made
source of grace to the believer. This may appear more
satisfactory superficially, but one must doubt whether it is
in fact for the reasons already stated in that the decisive
critical element of Christ's ministry is practically eliminated.
This fact ie seen in a few paragraphs of the quaestiones.
The moral precepts of the Old Law, it is stated, were
meritorious of eternal life "sed habebant impedimenturn, quia
omnes erant rei poenae aeternae. Unde oportuit quod fieret
solutio iliius impediment! ad hoc ut statim esset transitus in
Q
vitam aeternam". y The impediment exists "quia aondum
"I A
pretium originalis culpae per Christum fuit solutum".
9. Q.XX,De lustitia Legis Veteris, Disp.I,«'iemb.l,6,p.362.
10. 8,p.363*
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The precepts of the New Law justify without any impediment.
The Old Law justified without "plenum lumen" because under
12
the Law there was a veil. Justification in the Old Law
relates to a "terminus a quo" whereas the justification of
the New Law relates to a "terminus in quern" and thus there
was a greater prize under the New Law but in spite of these
facts "tamen ratione obedientiae potuit aliquis in Vetori
13
Lege magis mereri quam in Nova". ^ In spite of the fact
that the New Law was lighter than the Old, that it was clearer,
and that it headed towards a greater prize, there does not seem
to be any great difference before and after Christ, not even
grace is really affected. Christ removes an impediment so
that without further ado those meriting under the Old Law
can cross over into eternal life. In fact the substance
14
of the Law is found in the Law of Nature. Christ does
not add anything basically new to the situation of sanctification.
He fulfils the moral laws by addition, the judicial laws
have their justice tempered with mercy, the sacraments become
causal, the ceremonial laws signified some thing under a veil
and with the veil removed it is manifest; the promises which
were imperfect being indefinite about life, now are perfect
13
with definite promises on eternal life. ^ This view of
the Old and New Law emphasises very strongly the process
from innocence to glory and limits the place of Christ
in that process to the removing of an "impediment".
11. Disp.II,Memb.3,25,p»368. 12. 26,p.368* 13. Memb.





The "scientia" arid the "praescientia" of God in
Alexander provide interesting, and somewhat intricate subjects.
Although these topics are lacking in Christocentricity and
would be greatly enriched by a Christological basis,
nevertheless they are rather remote from the central purpose
of this thesis. This, however, is not true of what might
be the best example of a non-Christological treatment of a
doctrine which should be markedly Christological, and that is
another "scientia", namely, predestination. This doctrine,
as presented by Alexander, speaks of a God behind Christ,
not revealed in Christ, nor yet in the holy Spirit. In fact,
so lacking in a Christological basis is it (which is not true
altogether of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit) that it appears
to cut completely across the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and the
grace of the Holy Spirit even as Alexander, himself, presents
them.
Predestination is "respsctu salvandorum sive bonorum
finaliter". ^ Augustine had defined it as "preparation
2
of grace in the present and of glory in the future",
a definition which Alexander accepts but does not work out
at all clearly in relating the two parts of the definition.
However, when he is discussing predestination and prescience
he does use both parts and states "Praedestinatio... tam
respectu gratiae, quam re spectu gloriae, determinat
1. Bk.I,d.XXXV,3,p.349* 2. Augustine Be Praedest.
sanctorum. c.l0,n.l9*
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praescientiam cum causalitate". v .Naturally, with
predestination, the subject of reprobation always arises.
According to Alexander, whereas predestination tells of the
"pietas" of God, reprobation tells of the "maiestas" of God
but they are not of the same "genus", although both are a
prescience. Reprobation is the preparation of eternal
punishment; predestination is defined (at this point at
least) as predestination of grace in the present. The
4
former pertains to justice, the latter to mercy. The
distinction between predestination and reprobation is founded
upon the fact that the prescience of God does not cause
reprobation whereas in predestination it adds "proprium
effectum". And here the cause relates to final grace:
"Sic enim Deus praeparat alicui gratiam finalem
praedestinando, praescit illam finalem et est illi ut causa". ^
So far the discussion falls under the general
discussion of prescience (which relates more to cause than
effect, and hence, possibly has no particular interest in the
relation of present and final grace). Predestination and
reprobation in general are later discussed on their own. Here
again the same distinction between the two is made.
Predestination is the prescience of the good with causality
whereas reprobation contains only precognition "causalitas
enim residet penes liberum arbitirum". It might be
significant that, here, Augustire1 s use of the word "preparation
is not used. This word would appear to indicate some process
3. d.XXXV,6,p.351. 4. d.xxxv,5,p.351. 5. 6,p.351.
6. d.XL,1,p.400.
through grace to glory. The reason, however, for Alexander
not attributing to God the causality of reprobation is
7
obvious: "Deus enim neminem vult peccare". ' But then the
possibility arises of God being the cause of reprobation in
that he took away grace, and eternal reprobation is "Deus
reprobans". In reply Alexander states that God certainly is
the cause of punishment but it does not fellow that reprobation
Q
is the cause of obduracy. The proper cause of the "non
apponere gratiam" is the evil will and God, in His justice,
Q
causes grace not to be bestowed on the sinner. This is just.
To the suggestion that the "subtracts /gratia/" is the cause
of evil since the "apposita gratia" is a cause Alexander
replies: "In bonis gratia est prior et bona sequitur voluntas;
in malis vero e converse, mala voluntas est prior et non
apposita gratiae sequitur".
The distinction between predestination and reprobation
except insofar as the suggestion that God takes away his
grace from the sinner which has been questioned in the chapter
on grace, is at present valid. Alexander makes the point well
that God wishes man to be saved but does not wish reprobation
or obduracy on man; that is the work of man. "'Subtracta
gratia' non notatur causa, sed concomitantia". However,
then the question must arise, and, indeed, does arise, since
all men have sinned in Adam, and God is the highest justice,
why are not all "digni obtusione et non omnes damnantur"?
Alexander replies with Anselm "Si punis, iuste punis... Si
7. 16,p.410. 8. 20,a-f)pp.411-412. 9. g)p.412
10. i)p.413. 11. d.XLI,2,p.414.
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parcis, iuste parcis". The use of this answer would,
suggest that there is more in the cause than the evil will
of man. If all men are evil, then the justice of God must
cause him to withdraw grace. Why should some he saved then?
Alexander would reply that that lies in the mercy of God.
But then the reply would be that God, in fact, by not
exercising his mercy to restore grace was a cause, if only an
indirect cause, of reprobation. Certainly this does not fit
into a picture of God who wishes to save all for obviously
he could have but did not decide to have mercy in relation
to the reprobate. He had mercy only on those he predestinated.
The question of predestination raises another query
about reprobation. Works, writes Alexander, are not the cause
of man's election; this lies in the will of God "cuius nulla
13
causa quaerenda est". ^ In other words predestination lies
"in eternity"; God determines to save some from eternity.
This he does by the grace of predestination. The question then
is, if the reprobate never had this grace, how can it be
subtracted from the reprobate? If it was present grace that
was subtracted, as it is obvious it must have been, this still
does not alter the picture for God never gave the reprobate
the grace to be saved so how could he be other than reprobate?
Thus God would cause reprobation. The force of this latter
argument, however, rests on the presupposition that the grace
of predestination has little if any relation to present grace,
that is, the grace of predestination does not work through
12. 15,p.422: Anselm, Proslogion, c.10. 15. d.XLI,o,d)p.416.
present grace but beyond it. If the two were related
essentially, then there would be force in Alexander's
statement that the reprobates deserve their reward because
they would then be rejecting the grace of predestination
in present grace. However, it will be seen that the relation
between the two graces in the Glossa, if there is one, is not
worked out and indeed seems purely accidental.
The way predestination is viewed would appear to
exclude this possibility. Alexander states that the number of
the saved and who is to be saved is certain. There can be
no changing of this number not even for unworthiness. The
punishment which is bestowed on the elect by which they cross
over to the damned (Matt.25) does not concern final grace for
just as glory is determined for the predestinate so too is
14
final grace. The predestinate will not be damned even if
they sin for sin speaks of accidents and when it is said
"Iste est praedestinatus', accidit huic esse praedestinaturn".
There is absolutely no possibility of damnation just as white
cannot finally be black. "Hi praedestinatus est, salvabitur
vel futurus est salvari; si vero damnabitur, futurus damnari.
Sed impossibile est alterum illorum alteri succedere, quod
Ifi
futurus damnari futurus sit salvari vel e converso". This
is very near pure determinism, that is, creation is ignored
and ceases to be creation and present grace is a fiction.
There are three possibilities which might temper
this somewhat. First, in some way, free will which is so
14. d.XL,6,d)p.403• 15. 7,p.404. 16. 9,404
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important in the other three hooks and apparently helping
to effect man's salvation, may enter into this process of
predestination and man then could really deserve his reprobation.
Secondly, the grace of predestination could work through
temporal grace to effect salvation thus making room also for
the free will as Alexander sees it. Thirdly, and one would
suspect, the least likely possibility for Alexander,
predestination and reprobation could take place in Christ,
or at least have some relation to Christ. These are the
possibilities which might provide some evidence of a real
creation.
First, then, the free will. It is suggested that,
although, for instance, a hundred were predestined, yet through
good works some more not confirmed in final evil could be
saved. Alexander concedes that when the free will operates
to good or evil, theoretically it is possible to be damned
or saved:
"Cum autem sit commutandum id quod est
praedestinaturn aut praescitum, quae important aeternam
praefinitionem, cum gratia et malitia finali et
salvations et damnations, concedenda est locutio cum
verbo necessitatis; cum verbo autem possibilitatis non
est concedenda nisi cum determinations, ut sit sensus;
praedestinaturn possibile est damnari, ut huic insit
potestas ad damnationem et eidem potest inesse
praedestinatio. Haec ergo concedenda est: 'possibile
est istum salvari', demonstrato reprobo secundum omnem
modum: non enim repugnantia est inter ipsum liberurn
arbitrium et salvationem et poenam. Et non sequitur:
'possibile est plures praedestinari quam
praedestinantur'; non enim hie respicitur possibilitas
liberi arbitrii in praesenti, sed quid futurum est,
scilicet utrum salvabitur vel damnabitur. Et quia haec
non conceditur: 'possibile est quod futurus salvari
damnetur' vel a converso, non conceditur quod plures
possint praedestinari quam praedestinantur vel reprobari
quam reprobantur". 17
17. d.XL,12,b)pp.407-408
Predestination is necessary in itself and there is no
contingency in God but there is in the effect or in "liberto
1A
arbitrio possibili ad effectual". When one is wedded to
such a doctrine of predestination in all its determinism -
how can one distinguish between cause and effect here? -
free will, as Alexander conceives it in Book II and elsewhere
is merely play acting. Such free will and this type of
predestination are simply incompatible. Both cannot be true.
And this makes a mockery of free will as a cause of reprobation
In fact, in the same section as the quotation immediately above
Alexander all but admits this when there is posited a "duplex
ratio" of reprobation, one which relates to justice and the
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other "non propositus misericordiae" or "non miserendi".
"Ratio" is not equivalent to "causa" in Alexander's thinking
but in spite of this it very nearly is. Before this can be
ascertained finally, the relation of predestination and present
grace must be investigated.
Already, however, enough has been stated to bring
against this view of predestination very serious charges which
will have fuel added to them in the discussion on present grace
and Christ and predestination. The first charge is that the
situation of the sinful creation is not changed at all by
predestination, that regardless of what happens some are
to be saved, some are to be damned. It does not really matter,
further, whether man is converted or not; this will not change
their destiny. The second, and at this stage the possibly more
18. 17tP.410. 19. Ibid,pp.410-411
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serious charge because, as yet there is still an element of
doubt as to the relation of the grace of predestination and
present grace and therefore the possibility that predestination
may affect the situation, is that sin is not taken seriously.
It is taken seriously in relation to the reprobate who are
damned for their rejection of grace but it is not taken
seriously in regard to the predestined. The predestined
can will what he likes, it appears, they can even cross over
to the side of the damned, but they cannot reject their
predestination. Certainly Alexander is attempting to maintain
the fact that free will does not control Cod or affect him
(which has not been particularly well maintained elsewhere),
that, in fact, God chooses man and not vice versa, but in so
doing he has claimed too much. In the process he has eliminated
the possibility of man's freedom and his responsibility of
obedience to God. With such a doctrine of predestination, a
real conversion, a real change in man, must mean a change in
God if free will is what Alexander has maintained that it is.
If, however, free will is established by God in grace or in
Jesus Christ (which, if the latter were so, would mean that
there has been a misreading of the other books of the Glossa)
then the change in man does not mean that God is changed or
controlled by man but that God in grace, or in Christ, effects
the change in man, or works out his predestination in man.
This, however, is not the case, either in grace or in Christ
according to Alexander.
Secondly, present grace and the grace of predestination.
412
Ho doubt because Augustine had connected present grace and
the grace of predestination, and because it would seem that there
must be some connection between the graces as they are from
God, Alexander does make some attempt to coincide the two
graces. The fact that he distinguishes between an eternal
election and a temporal election does not necessarily divide
the graces - the former is nothing else than "praevisio ad
gratiam et gloriam", the latter is "collatio gratiae in
20
presenti". In fact eternal election would appear to lead
through grace to glory. This link has already been mentioned
at the beginning of the chapter. It is also made in the
distinctions on predestination itself where God is said to
foreknow grace and prepare it, and to foreknow glory ana prepare
21
it. (There is no question here of predestination being
merely foreknowledge). But this is about as far as he goes.
In fact it is at the point of the denial of foresight as the
cause of predestination that one begins to suspect the flimsy
connection of present grace and predestination. The question
is whether the foresight of works is the cause of the prevision
of grace. Alexander replies that "praevisio operum et gratiae
eadem est in substantia; et licet gratia detur ad operandum,
nec praevisio gratiae vel operum est causa electionis ipsius
personae, sed sola Dei voluntas, cuius nuxla causa quaerenda
22
est." The last sentence would find support in any good
reformer. However, there is a suggestion of a difference - or
lack of coincidence - between eternal election and the conferring
20. d.XXXVI,2,pp.356-357. 21. d.XL,13,p.408. 22. d. XLI,
6,d)p.416.
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of present grace. God, here, appears to be put into the
position of his right hand not knowing what his left hand
is doing. This may be only appearance; there is no positive
affirmation of this suspicion and silence does not mean
consent although it is surprising that the connection between
grace and election is not mentioned here if there is a
connection. But there are mora positive signs of a
distinction. On the subject of whether the number of the
elect could be increased, Deuteronomy 1:11 is given as a
proof that the number can be increased, - "Dominus Deus addat
ad hunc numerum". To this .Alexander replies that this is the
number of those having present grace but does not refer to the
final grace of the predestined: "novit enim Deus non tantum
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istum numerum, sed ad hunc". ^ Then again Peter Lombard
had suggested in his commentary on Malachi 1:2 that the
"dilectio" of God was either from foreknowledge or works.
This, Alexander states, refers to temporal election and not
eternal. Then it is asked whether temporal "dilectio" is
from works in the conferring of grace and the reply is "quod
non, immo quoad gloriam praeparatam, quam oportet praecedere
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merita in adultis". Here, the first reply makes the
distinction between the graces, but, in the second, it appears
that temporal grace is given for works of merit as the suitable
prelude to a glory already prepared. This would mean that
temporal grace is not the means to glory, nor does it express
the will of God from eternity, that is, it is good to have
2p. d.XL,12,c)p.408. 24. d.XLI,7,p.417
temporal grace to raerit, but it is not necessarily the
reflection of God's ultimate will. The separation of temporal
grace and the grace of predestination is again evident in
reply to the question as to whether one can pray that one
should be predestined as one can pray for the first grace
which is the first effect of predestination. The answer is
in the negative: "Gratia snim temporalis est, quam possunt
praecedere orationes sanctorum; praedestinatio vero est
aeterna, quam nihil potest praecedere; unde non potest
impetrari"• ^ Does this mean that with temporal grace
bestowed through prayer one cannot be certain that one is
predestined? (Presumably Alexander does not see the prayer
as a fiction; that is, it is of no point with the non-
predestined). That would appear to be the cas6. Or noes it
mean that more grace can be ashed for the already predestined?
Then, however, one has to ask, how does one know one is
predestined to see whether prayer should be made? To this
there appears to be no answer for as was stated in the
discussion of predestination and free will, unworthiness, or
even the crossing over to the damned - which would presumably
be signs of a lack of temporal grace - do not upset one's
predestination. That will also mean, perhaps not logically
but practically, that those who do have temporal grace must
have doubts as to their predestination. In other words,
to the believer and unbeliever alike, God will appear to be
divided in regard to temporal and eternal grace.
25. ll,d)p.419.
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There is the possibility, however, that all those
who have temporal grace are predestined, that is, although God
does not work through present grace to predestination, he does
bestow present grace only on the predestined. This possibility
seems to be ruled out by answers in Book III. The first
answer is to the question whether the "praedestinatus malus"
is more loved than the "praescitus bonus" by God. There can
be two answers: "'ad minus' diligatur, vel 'ad maius'
diligatur". The px'edestined bad are loved more in the latter
sense, the preknown good are loved more in the former sense:
"Vel magis diligatur secundum praescientiam. praesentis effectus,
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et sic px'aescitus bonus magis diligatur". The implication
of this answer is that the pre Known good could possibly be
one of the reprobate. If this were not so, there is no point
in asking the question because then the preknown good would be
the more loved on both scores. However, there is a possibility
that Alexander is merely comparing present grace and the grace
of predestination. This comparison again appears pointless
if present grace is absorbed by the grace of predestination
which would be the case if all those who had present grace
were the predestinate. The doubt is cleared up in the
answer to the next question whether God can love and hate at
the same time which appears possible because he can hate the
predestined as presently bad, but love him because he is
predestined. The answer is: "odio haberi potest aliquid
secundum nunc temporis, sea diligi secundum nunc
26. Bk.Ill,d.XXXII,2,d)p.377•
416
aeternitatis; et sic unum et idem diligere potest et odio
haberi vel e converso". ^ Thus present grace (as the "e
converso" indicates) is no necessary indication of eternal
predestination. The third answer is again interesting because
it qualifies beyond recognition a position apparently held
in Book I. The question is whether it can be said about the
preknown good in the present that God "praeparavit gratiam in
praesenti". The answer is "praeparatio sonat in stabiiitatem;
ideo non proprie dicendum est quod, 'praeparavit gratiam in
praesenti', sed potius 'praevidit', quoniara praevisio sonat
PR
cum temporis mutations". This answer, if it xs by the
same author, and there is no reason to suspect it is not for
such qualifications in the Glossa are reasonably comraon,
confirms a suspicion that Alexander in iiook I was more
interested in the preparation of final grace than in present
grace and that his inclusion of the lattexn was possibly little
more than deference to authority. (Another example of this
is found in his doctrine of the sacraments where there is a
loose connection with a traditional definition).
These three quotations confirm the suspicion that
present grace ana the grace of predestination have no necessary
connection; in other words, the believer has no ultimate
certainty even in the grace bestowed by the sacrament of the
Church. This grace was loosely connected to Christ in the
sacraments. Here not even such a connection of predestination
with Christ is possible through grace. Also, as has already
27. e)p.377. 28. f)P.377
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"been maintained, there would he no certainty of election
for the present bad even if only those with temporal grace
were the elect. However, it is the third of these answers
in the previous paragraph which is most significant for the re¬
probate for it indicates that they could never have been offered
the grace of predestination, not even in present grace for
prevision does not include causality. If this is so the fact
of the free will's rejection of grace is definitely not the
only cause of reprobation because, according to Alexander, the
predestined bad also rejected present grace, 'lhere must be
another causal element and that is found in the non-bestowal of
the grace of predestination by God. In short, it is implied
that God is the cause of the reprobates being reprobates not
merely of their punishment.
There is another interesting answer by Alexander
to the question on "occultissima merita". In this answer
there may be an attempt to coincide present or temporal grace
and the grace of predestination. The question is whether
"voluntas Dei venit de meritis". Alexander replies that the
"de" does not denote a cause of the divine will,
"sed materiam extra circa quam; vult enira Deus
ipsum mereri cui confert gratiam. Et adhuc notatur
convenientia. Et non accipiuntur ibi opera exteriora
ut procedunt de libero arbitrio, sed quae procedunt a
gratia; et sic dicuntur merita. Won autem accipiuntur
merita prout temporalia sunt, sed prout sunt in
praevisione divina; et ideo dicuntur occultissima.
Horum autera meritorurn est convenientia ad Dei
praevisionem sive congruitas: congruit enim Deum
velle dare gratiam illi qui bene usurus est ea, non
quod usus gratiae sit causa divinae voluntatis. Et
plus est dicere 'meritis occultissimis' quam 'meritis';
et plus est dicere 'meritis' quam 'operibus'. Unde,
licet dicatur quod venit de occ ultissirais meritis, non
tamen sequitur: de meritis; meritum enim per se dictum
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elicit opus procedens a gratia prout temporaliter fit;
sed occultissimum dicit modum per quem est in scientia
beneplaciti. Wee sequitur quod si venit de meritis,
quod venit de operibus, nam opera, secundum se dicta,
non determinant gratiam et rem temporalem supponunt". 29
It is also asked how a sinner can, by his works, "precede"
justification. Alexander replies that the "praecessio"
does not relate to the sinner "sed, cum iam est peccator et
facit quod potest ad gratiam habendum, quod in ipso est voluntas
obedientiae, respectu cuius est convenientia ut detur gratia;
et haec voluntas obedientiae est illud quod dicitur praecedere
in peccatoribus". To this it is better to give the name
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"congruitatis" than "dignitatis et meriti". The first of
these answers seems to deal with predestination, the second
with present grace and possibly by implication with
predestination. Both illustrate the same point, one being the
relation of God to grace, the other being the relation of God
in that grace to the disposition of man. It would appear from
the first quotation that God is pictured as taking a side-long
glance at his prevision to see the hidden merits ("congruity"),
in other words to see how man would use his grace. According
to this foresight, it is congruent that God should predestine.
In the second case present grace is related to the voluntas of
man in a similar way; it is congruent that God should bestow
grace. This appears to be a matter of definition. Merit,
which has "dignity", by definition, consists of grace and free
will; this makes merit "congruent" for predestination. Before
grace there is no merit but the free will still can be disposed
29. Bk.I,d.XLI,14,o)pp421-422. 30. d)p.422
419
with the help of "gratis gratis data"; this makes it
"congruent" for present grace. Both "congruencies" are merit
in the generally accepted Reformed view of merit. If God is
determined, or influenced, by this disposition of congruence,
his predestination is foreknowledge. If however, the merit
is merely a "congruency" with predestination then there is no
necessary connection between the bestowal of the grace of
predestination, and present grace and free will. There is no
possibility of knowing whether one is predestined by the right
use of grace arid so the uncertainty already mentioned must still
arise. There does seem to be a possibility that those who have
present grace are the predestined but it already has been seen
that this identification cannot be absolute. Further, if
predestination is merely foreknowledge the injustice to the
reprobate is removed but then predestination ceases to be what
Alexander has defined it.
There is yet another possibility here and it is that
Alexander is not discussing at all the problem of predestination.
The section is begun from that point of view: Bulla merita
praecedunt voluntatem praedestinationis: voluntas enim talis
aeterna est; omne autem meritum teinporale est; quare non
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praecedit". ^ He may be discussing, in fact, the problem
of the will of God being determined for present grace by merit
because the discussion of predestination may have been concluded
with the opening statement just quoted and the next problem is
concerned with the "voluntas" of God and hidden merits; "Adhuc,
si haec aliquo modo vera est: 'voluntas Dei venit de
31. 14,a)pp.420-421
occultissimis meritis', utram venit de occultissimis operibus?
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nam omne meritum opus est". This is certainly the question
answered; it may have no connection, and if one, only one of
a parallel problem, with the first statement of the section
on predestination. The second answer certainly is not
discussing predestination. The question, then, may be more
concerned with God's "voluntas" in relation to present grace
and not to predestination. This would coincide nicely with
the fact that previously in Book I predestination has been so
rigidly defined, that the section of Book III quoted is in
apparent contradiction to the first of these answers, and
that Alexander goes on to discuss "praedestinatio, slecfcio,
vocatio, dilectio" the latter three all having their temporal
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aspects. This later discussion indicates some connection
between the four but it is still a very loose connection.
The question of the "voluntas" of God arises some
distinctions later after discussion of his omnipotence, about
possibilities and impossibilities, and whether what was made
could have been made better. There is a "voluntas ex
consideratione naturae" which pertains to beatitude if man
wished to be fully obedient; and there is a "voluntas ex
considaratione meriti". By the first God wishes ail men
to be saved but not by the latter because certain men merit
34damnation. ^ In relation to damnation and salvation the
"voluntas" of God is alone the efficient cause but there
is a certain disposition on the part of the recipient
32. Ibid. 35. 19,p.423. 34. d.XLVI,!,pp.458-459.
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according to the goodness or the badness of the free will.
Then there is an antecedent will of God "ex causa faostra"
which is the "voluntas bene faciendi" in which the well doing
derives from grace and free will. But still "Beus est operator
et homo cooperator". ^ This may be called consequent not
because man is the efficient cause of salvation but because
salvation and damnation are consequent to the meritorious or
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non meritorious movement of the free will. The bad are
37
in the "voluntas permissionis" of God only. Here,
Alexander obviously holds a position which he had in the
doctrine of grace ana merit. it is in relation to this grace
(present grace) and free will that he appears to have no
difficulty. He is not nearly as determined to assert the
absolute priority, although he is at pains to assert the
priority, of God's will. This, no doubt, is because he is
dealing with the immediate relation of God and man and temporal
grace so-called, and not with the far more difficult problem,
as far as he is concerned, of God's eternal decree and
foreknowledge in relation to man who is finite and temporal.
There is a third place in tiiae besides in free will
and grace where the grace of predestination could make
contact. It is in Jesus Christ. This is the most important
and yet it can be dealt with very briefly. If the predestination
from eternity is made in Jesus Christ, then the problem of the
knowledge and the certainty of election are resolved (the
problem of grace) as is also the problem of the free will. If,
35. 3 »g)p»460. 36. i)p.461. 37- h)pp.460-461
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in Ghrist, man is predestined, then God is not acting above
man's head but right down Wich ha.to, then God's will is sure,
then man's free will is established and real in Ghrist, (then
sin is taken completely seriously because then it is not
possible to reject God's grace without disastrous consequences),
and then because Ghrist is the one towards whom creation strains,
creation is given its honoured place before God, as creation.
Man would he making the impossible contradiction by rejecting
his election because man's will is free only in Ghrist. If
man is free and rejects God's grace but is still predestined,
that is inevitably finally saved, as Alexander appears to
hold, then sin is not taken seriously; nor, for that matter,
is man's freedom very important; it is not something new,
even if he accepts God's grace; he is still elect. Alexander,
however, as one would suspect, does not attach predestination
to Christ. This was seen also in the Christology proper.
"Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus. Won ergo
attribuendum est esse praedestinaturn Filio Dei simpliciter,
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sed Filio Dei secundum humanam naturam". v Ghrist is thus
seen as predestined like any other man, but he is not the elect
one by whom, in whom, and through whom we are elect.
Predestination, for Alexander, is not a Trinitarian concept
in which God in his Son predestines man to salvation.
Predestination, for Alexander, is between "God" simply and man.
It takes place beyond Ghrist in eternity. There is no mediator.
The problem for Alexander in the doctrine of
58. d.XL,3,d)p.401
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predestination is the problem of time and eternity. To put
this another way; it is a problem because predestination is
not seen to be in Jesus Christ, in Alexander it is a totally
non-Christological doctrine. In fact it is a doctrine very
slightly related to creation. If predestination as
foreknowledge, in which man is the real predestinator, is ruled
out, and it would appear that it is, and predestination is seen
as something done (the very word of action is out of place)
irrevocably in a still moment of eternity in which time has
no real place, then one cannot conceive predestination as
being other than unrelated to creation. Free will, grace and
most importantly Christ, are ignored and overrun. What takes
place in time is unimportant and sin ceases to be a problem
at all. If Christ has no part, then, free will can have no
real part. There was a possibility that for Alexander the
grace of predestination and present grace might be understood
to work together but their workings are basically different in
the Glossa, the latter needing the free will to work salvation,
the former needing nothing. Either one or the other must
go. Alexander does make some attempts to integrate the two
graces but his attempts must fall apart because they are as
incompatible as determinism and freedom. His attempt, besides
being in deference to the great authority of Augustine, may
have been due also to some sense of uneasiness at the lack of
integration. But there can be no integration between temporal
grace and the grace of predestination until there is an
integration between time and eternity. Only, in Christ, is
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that problem resolved from the side of God, or rather, in
Ghristocentric theology, the problem never becomes serious
enough to disintegrate a theology. The other resolution is
simply to call foreknowledge predestination. This puts the
solution into the hands of man. This solution Alexander,
because of his emphasis on the priority of grace, and because,
no doubt, he stood in the Christian tradition, could not
accept in the Glossa.
w.uaest tones
There are two quite distinct differences in the
doctrine of predestination as it is contained in the
Quaestiones. First, the connection between the grace of
predestination and present grace ia made clear; second,
the doctrine of predestination equates predestination with
foreknowledge. This does not mean that there still are not
tensions in the doctrine between the eternal decree and the
temporal working but these, by and large, are reduced to the
minimum. Then, there are two almost entirely new subjects
introduced, related closely to the doctrine, which are worked
out in general agreement with the doctrine of predestination
in the ^uaestiones. These are the questions "De Praadestinatione
Christi" (Q.XII) and "De Libro Vitae" Q.XLI).
The Augustinian definition "praedestinatio est
preparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro" is
stated and practised (certainly, in a way different from
Augustine). "Et ponitur hoc toturn in definitions, quia
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praedestinatio respicit aeternitatem at ante et aeternitatem
ut post, et illud quod tempus comitatur in medio. <^uoad hoc
autem quod est post, dicitur 'gloriae in futuro'; quoad hoc
autem quod est ante, dicitur 1praeparatio'; quoad medium,
dicitur 'gratiae in praesenti'. The preparation has two
aspects; one which is "temporalis" "cum est scientia quod
iste hene usurus est gratia finaliter" and eternal "cum est
voluntas dandi ei". "Importat enim voluntatem ab aeterno
dandi isti gratiam, cum praescientia, quod scilicet usurus
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est gratia finaiiter". From this it would appear that
man is the cause of predestination. However, the relation
of man and predestination is put more subtly. Predestination
is the cause of grace. It is not necessary as a compulsive
it
cause but^is necessary as an "indeficiens causa est ut habitus,
aliquando tamen non est causatum, quia non semper est
susceptibile". This susceptibility is "congruent" to the
receiving of grace "quae est effectus praedestinationis.
Susceptibile enim gratiae finalis est voluntas indeficienter
Deo adherens". This susceptibility "simul est cum gratia, ita
quod gratia non sit prius tempore". Not on account of this
is susceptibility a contingent cause for a contingent cause
is "ubi deest aliquid ex parte sui, et requiritur aliquid ad
hoc ut exeat effectus in esse, quod est de esse causae...Sic
non est ex parte praedestinationis, quia ex parte eius est
41
tota causa".
. This statement would be reasonably acceptable,
apart from the suggestion that man's acceptance exists outside
39* be Praedestinations, Disp.I.Memb.2,8,p.l07* 40. 15*
p.109. 41. Disp.II,Memb.1,41.pp.117-118.
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the grace of God, for it is true that grace does not work
without man, without his freedom. This was a criticism of
the doctrine in the Glossa, that man and creation were
completely overrun. But in the section on the Glossa it
was pointed out that the alternative to this, with the
presupposition of predestination from a still point of
eternity which was quite inflexible, was to see predestination
as foreknowledge. The ^uaestiones does not escape this
alternative. To a query on what type of cause predestination
is,the answer is that it is efficient in one way and
exemplary in another. God has in himself prescience and
"voluntas": "ratione ergo voluntatis ponetur in genere causae
efficientis; ratione praescientiae, in genere causae
exemplaris, respectu gratiae in quantum est verum. lit in
utroque genere est causa propria, sed non talis qua exsistente
semper sit causatum, quia requiritur quaedam ratio ax
parte suscipientis". The causality does not come from the
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voluntas of man but there is "congruentia secundum rationem".
"Ratio" is not "causa" but the fact remains that the "causa"
only exists when there is also this "ratio" there. The
"ratio" does not make the cause necessary but predestination
occurs only with the "ratio". "Ratio"could Almost be
translated here as "compelling reason". It is a word which can
mean "method", "logic", "system", "reason", and "cause"
according to its context - earlier it was used almost to mean
"definition" with the idea of "working" or "method" - and the
42. 44,pp.118-119.
use of it here over against "causa" looks very much like the
act of a person who believes he has found the solution to a
problem when he has found a word to describe it. Certainly
here "causa" is direct and "ratio" is indirect, that is, there
is a difference, but ultimately they are both causes. This
view of "ratio" is repeated several times and in various
contexts. There is no cause in the receiving of grace
117.
although there is "ratio" on part of the receiver. ^ There
is no causality outside predestination although there is
a "ratio" required in regard to it. There is not a
temporal cause of predestination but there is a "ratio" "ex
parte scientiae Dei, quod iste usurus est gratia bene, ille
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autem non bene". ' "Voluntas" on God's part is equal for
all; but "voluntas quoad connotatum non similiter se habet
ad omnes: non quod dependeat a libero arbitrio, sed e contrario"
Hidden merits in the prescience of God are not merits although
47
they are the "ratio" of God's "voluntas". ' There is a
dignity of congruity in the desire of man for justification
48
although that does not mean that God must justly give grace.
The subject of prescience does bring out the tension between
eternity and time a little more but does not alter the picture.
One may pray for adding to present grace but not
49
for adding to the predestined. y In this context this
statement merely means that one may pray that predestination
may take effect; _ it does not say now that predestination is
formed or that the two "graces" are contrary. Once
4J. 42,p.118. 44. 43,p.119. 45. Disp.I.Memb.2,17,p.llO.
46. 18,p.110. 47. Disp.II,Memb.4,70,p.l26. 48. 71»PP*
126-127. 49. Disp. IV,Me tab. 6,116, p. 140.
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fore knowledge is allowed the inevitability of predestination
does not contradict the reality of present grace and freedom.
On the predestination of Christ the ^uaestiones
brings Christ far more into the centre of the picture as it
does with the doctrine of Christ as the Head as the source
to men of outflowing grace. The teaching on the predestination
of Christ is in Keeping with the doctrine of predestination.
Christ is the means or channel, in Keeping with his being
filled with grace, of the grace of predestination to man by
present grace. It should be noted, first, that it is the
Holy Spirit who is the predestiner because it is he with whom
50
the "voluntas" of God and grace are associated. ^ Christ
as man is predestined and as God he is "destinans". (This
51
has possibilities). Principally he was destined as "viator",
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but both as "viator" and "comprehensor" he was predestined. ^
It is pointed oub however in the actual question on the
predestination of Christ that it was as man that bhe Son of
God was predestined. ^ It is this fact that rnaKes the
doctrine of the predestination of Christ deficient because
Christ's complete centrality and necessity for predestination
is maintained only when the predestionation of men takes
place from eternity in the Son, that is, if it is understood
in a Trinitarian manner. If this is not so, men are not
predestined in Christ, but only through him. He is merely
the channel of grace for the Holy Spirit. Man's conversion
to God and his freedom then are not founded in Christ but
50. Disp.I.Memb.2,16,p.l09. 51 Memb.l,7»p.107.
52. Memb.6,31,p.ll4. 53* ^.XII,De Praedestinations
Christi, Memb.l,10,p.153*
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in man's own response to grace. Men are not predestined
then for Christ's sake bat because of the "voluntas" of
God and the "ratiol'^(or purely in the still moment of
eternity). Hence the hidden merits of Christ can be taken
into account in predestination "quia nostra merita non sunt
expedita sine suis". ^ This probably refers to the
satisfaction which Christ made which would expedite man's
predestination but would not be the reason for predestination;
it could also refer to the general merits of Christ which like
the merits of any man can be transferred to other men. The
fact that the enhypostatic element is lacking in
predestination as it is in the doctrine of grace in Christ
is seen by the following statement: "secundum quod
praedestinatio est 'praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et
gloriae in futuro', sicut gratia communis est Christo et
aliis hominibus, et similiter gloria, ita et praedestinatio.
Secundum vero quod praedestinatio est 'propositus! miserendi',
sicut miseria dicitur aaquivoce de Christo et de nobis, ita
a 55
et praedestinatio.
The view of Christ as a channel of grace is reasonably
well seen when it is stated that the grace by which Christ
is Head is not only uncreated grace, that is, the Holy Spirit,
but also created grace as a "donum" just as there is in us
love which is the Holy Spirit and grace which is a "donum"%
"unde praedestinatio respicit hanc triplicem gratiam in
54. Q.X.Disp.II,Memb.4,69»p*126. ^.XII,Memb.l.l6,p.l55«
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Ghristo, et haec gratia triplex creata est". ^ r^g
threefold grace is the grace as a single man, grace as head
57
of the Church, and the grace of union. " The grace which is
prior "ratione intelligendi" in regard to predestination is
the grace of the Head as Peter Lombard stated in his Glossa on
Ephesians 1:23 "Nullum maius donum posset JDe us praestare
hominibus, quam ut Verbum suum, per quod omnia condidit,
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faceret illis caput et ipsos tamquam membra illi coaptaret".
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The fact that the grace of union is not prior as suggested ' '
is significant, surely, because that, if any, is the
enhypostatic element. The grace of the Head looks beyond
this to the members; it points to the fact that grace flows
through Christ. It is in this way that Christ must be seen
as the cause and example, ^ that is, as a source of a channel
of grace; this is not to see the humanity of Christ as
enhypostatic. The assertion that Christ is a cause is made
in a statement on order in predestination. The order is in
the "connotatum" which is temporal and so order is in
predestination. "Secundum vero quod loquimur de
/praedestinatione in mente Dei/, simul natura et duratione
sunt omnes rationes aeternae. Ordo tamen est secundum quod
praedestinatio respicit praedestinaturn, quod est temporals,
ratione gratiae vel gloriae connotatae, secundum causalitatem
scilicet". This points up the lack of a real Trinitarian basis.
Christ, as Son of God and Son of Man, is cause only in time,
56. Memb.2,22,p.l56. 57. 17,p.155. 58. 23,p.156
59. 19,P.155. 60. Memb.3,29,p.l57.
that is, in act, not in the "being of God. Unless there is
an order in predestination in God, that is, unless there is
a Trinitarian "basis, there is no basis for the enhypostatic
I
causality of Christ in which Christ the man is mediator
between God and man. In a broader view, without predestination
being "earthed" from within the being of God, there can be no
real incarnation^, (ie. Christ would not be a cause). And
unless predestination is linked by means of the incarnation
to the Trinity, it cannot be founded in Christ; he can be
used only as a channel at the best. JSfo doubt the ^uaestiones
understood Christ as a real cause, but the doctrine given does
not insure this causality of Christ as the one in whom we are
predestined. This is made abundantly clear by the answer to
the question as to whether predestinations would be frustrated
if there were no incarnation; "dico quod non frustrarentur;
tamen non esset convenientissimus finis. Quicumque enim
esset modus liberationis, ille esset finis; sed non esset
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ita conveniens". Like the question as to whether there
could be another way of liberation, this is right in denying
the necessity of predestination if that were suggested,
wrong in stating that there could be another way besides
Christ. The knowledge and the fact of predestination depend
upon the fact that Christ is the Bon of God and we are
predestined in him. If they do not depend on this fact then
Christ is purely coincidental to predestination.
61. Memb.4,35,p.l59.
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The question "de Libro Vitae" assumes the same
position. The Book of Life is "praedestinatio praedestinantis
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tantum, et non praedestinati". It is the "notitia" of God,
and of the Son of God through appropriation. "Cognitio enim
est totius Trinitatis, sed sapientia est per appropriationsm
Filii". ^ Christ according to the Divine nature is the
Book of Life in as far as he is the highest wisdom in which
those to "be saved are written down: according to the human
nature "quia ex parte humanae naturae fuit forma vivendi
omnibus, perfectis et imperfect is; quia ad formam vitae
Christi potuit quilibet suam corrigere, sicut liber ad librum;
unde competenter dicitur sic liber". According to both natures
he is the Book of Life because in him was the separation of
the sheep from the goats. For all descended into the inferno
before the advent of Christ; but he was the "principium
distinguendi qua fuit ipse Deus et homo, / et qua Deus et homo /
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voluit pati pro nobis". This is significant in that a
necessary connection of the Son of God and the Son of Man is
made only in regard to satisfaction. The separation of
functions in the first two cases is equally significant in
that the former is not made through the latter. The "Son of
God" is little more than an attribute of "God". The human
nature is nothing more than an example here of perfection,
and it could as well have been Moses or another inspired by
the wisdom of God. The ^uaestiones further states that the
Book of Life as "liber" denotes precognition of merit or
62. 7,p.702. 63. 6,p.701. 64. 9,pp.702-703.
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demerit; as "vita" it denotes "notitia beneplaciti" /which
is causal/ not of the evil but of the good; as "Liber Vitae"
it denotes predestination. ^5 ^his is the same position as the
view of the i^uaestiones on the cause of predestination. Then,
the cause of life can be efficient, final, formal, and "quasi"
material. Predestination is the efficient cause, Christ in
his human nature is the formal cause "quia Christ us in. humana
natura fuit nobis forma vivendi iuste, forma dico exemplai'is",
the final cause is "ut 'liber vitae', id est ad vitam". The
"quasi" material cause is the fact that the Book "continet in
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se similitudines viventium secundum merita". This reflects
the same thinking as before and now the material cause adds
its contribution in that Christ is not the material cause
either. It is noted, however, that Christ is the "liber"
of himself, in human nature, and of others. He is predestined
to glory and others through him, and so he is "liber" first
in regard to himself and then in regard to those "qui
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salvandi sunt per ipsum". ' This is as far as the
Quaestiones will go. It is a pity this last topic was not
developed more. On the whole, however, predestination is
not "in Christ". In the one section in the Glossa where the
Book of Life is referred to its distinctive view is evident.
In the Book of Life, unless it is understood "simpliciter"
there is precognition of all "communicantium in gratia, sive
CO
transeunte sive permanente". Certain are written down
through predestination, certain through present justice.
63. 10,p.703. 66. Memb.4,20,p.707• 67. Memb.5,22,p.708.
68. Bk.I,d.XLI,20,a)p.424.
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The evil, as far as their punishment is concerned, also are
69
written down through Divine prescience. The Son of God
is the Book also. "Gonvenit autem ei librum vitae esse, qui
est Dei sapientia et per quem facta est redemptio et qui est
70
nobis forma vivendi". ' Deletions are on the part of those
who are written, not on the part of the Book for that is
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immutable. ' Whether foreknowledge or determinism is the
better is hard to tell; both have the same wrong pre¬
supposition. The ^uaestiones does, however, make an advance
in that, in so far as it has the doctrine of Christ as Head,
the connection made between predestinational grace and
present grace to work the free will, means that the grace
of predestination is channelled through Christ even if on
the whole he is only the channel and source of grace to men.
There was, moreover, one indication of something better but
that was not expanded.




A good example of the difficulty Alexander had in
relating time and eternity is found in his discussion of
God as "Dominus". The solutions he comes to are of no
particular interest for our purpose but the discussion
itself is in that it demonstrates Alexander's fear of any
suggestion that God could change or be caused. This fear is
very strong because he presupposes the basic incompatibility
of time and eternity, and because he does not begin from,
nor indeed, continue and end with Christ.
God began to be "Dominus" "cum tempore" because he
could not be understood as "Dominus" except in relation to
that over which he has dominion, namely every creature.
A creature necessarily josits change from non-being to being
which indicates time and so to be "servus" and time are
coeval. Thus with time there is also dominion. 1 This does
not mean that time is a cause of God as "Dominus" for
"causalitas non notatur respectu Domini, sed servi; ex
tempore enim habet quod sit servus, ad quod consequitur esse
2
Dominura". "Dominus" can be understood in two senses: as
the power to coerce a subject creature and thus God was
"Dominus" before time, or "pro eo qui dominatur" and in this
g
way he was not "Dominus" before time. ^
How much of the scope of the "Dominus" concept is
1. Bk.I,c.XXX,3,c)p.290. 2. e)p.291. 3. g)p.292.
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thought to be of the essence of God must be more exactly
determined, and this Alexander attempts to decide in the
question "quid praedicetur in hac 'Deus est Dominus'?" The
answer is:
"praedicatur essentia divina sub respectu in
dictione; non quod respectus sit in ipsa essentia
secundum esse, sed in creatura quae dependst ab
essentia divina. Quod est videre in ista 'Deus
est creator' si resolvatur. Est enim sensus: Deus
est essentia a qua est haec creatura vel ilia; nec
sequitur: si coepit esse Dominus, ergo aliqua forma
est in eo quae prius non fuit. Differt enim dicere
•formam' et •relationem'. Forma enim dicitur absolute;
cum autem dicitur relatio, cointelligitur creatura.
Propter quod est dicere quod coepit relatio esse et
non coepit forma". 4
A little latCar Alexander states that there are not two
predicates in the sentence "Deus est Dominus", namely, divine
essence, and a "compraedicaturn", the creature. ^ It is a
mark of Alexander's lack of Ghristocentricity, and his rigid
adherence to the presupposition of the unchangeability of God,
that the next question is aimed at making clear that this
"relatio" indicated by the word "Dominus" (which indicates
some sort of change) does not indicate a change in God, and
yet he does not attempt to show how God could relate.
Alexander states that, although relation does indicate
createdness, it is not "in rectitudine quoad esse, sed secundum
modum dicendi. Et ideo, licet ibi praedicatur relatio in
rectitudine, non ideo praedicatur creatura de Deo. Relatio
enim quae datur intelligi ex parte rei, ponitur in creatura
respectu Dei et non e converso". ^ The sentence "Deus est
4. 4,g)p.294. 5. d.XXXI,l,e)pp.296-29?. 6. d.XXX,4,h)
pp.294-295.
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Dominus" does not indicate a new composition in God "non
enim compositio est in Deo, sed compositiones accidunt
creaturae. Propter ergo respectum creaturae ad ipsum
coaccidit respectus quidam ipsias essentiae, non in se,
7
sed essentiae ut comprehenditur a nobis". ' To conclude
this distinction Alexander again emphasises that if "Dominus
dicatur ad servum" it does not follow "quod sit roi
dependentia, sed modi intelligendi; quae dependentia non
8
in ipso ponitur, sed in nobis".
At the beginning of the next distinction Alexander
again states that the power of dominion is in God from
9
eternity: "dominium non est creatura, sed ipsa Dei substantia".
To be sure, dominion is not eternal "ut creatura est habens
respectum ad ipsum, non autem ut Deo attribuitur. Unde ab
aeterno Deus esset Dominus, si non esset creatur^e defectus,
sicut sol semper illuminat, si sit res illuminabilis". ^
Alexander also states that the relation of creature to Creator
is not
"aluid secundum essentiam quain ipsa creatura. Ipsa
enim se ipsa dependent a Creatore, et non aliqua
proprietate accidentali; nam sic oportert in infinitum
abire... Per quod potest esse manifestum, si respectus
creaturae ad Creatorem sit substantialis creaturae, multo
fortius significatum in hoc nomine 'Dominus*, cum dicitur
*Deus est Dominus', est substantia divina, licet non
significetur; ut substantia enim absolute dicitur,
'Dominus1 autem ad aliquid". 11
The interesting element about this discussion is not so much
the fact that Alexander maintains the fact that the sentence
"Deus est Dominus" does not indicate a change in God, or a
7. i)p.295. 8. k)p.295. 9. d.XXXI,1,d)p.296. 10. e)
p.296. 11. f)p.297.
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causality on part of the creature, and that the power of
dominion is always with God, but it is the difficulty he has
in relating God's dominion to the creature. Indeed, there
are indications in distinction XXX that, in some way, the
relation is due to the creature, a position which he sets out
to reject in the next distinction when he states "dominium
accidit homini, non Deo; sed accidit creaturae ut ei
Dominus dominetur, in eo quod accidit earn esse. Don enim
primo est creatura et consequenter ei dominatur, sed simul
sunt tempore et necessario, licet non secundum rationem
12
intelligendi". This recalls much of Alexander's theology;
God puts something in man so that God can have a relationship
with man. Alexander has the problem of getting from a position
in which God has dominion and man is servant (considered
separately) to a position in which God is Lord of the servant
without positing a change in God (which the relationship
would indicate) and without positing causality in man.
iie cannot surely succeed so long as he has the
presupposition that God cannot relate himself to man without
changing, so long as he presupposes God as the "unchangeable
One". Even if, in becoming Lord and in becoming a creature
happens at the same point of time, and at the moment of
creation, it is still the creature, even in "ratio" only, who
has what is called "relationship" to God. It is the creature
who makes the relationship. If it is argued that it is God
who puts this "relationship" in man, that could be said of
12. d.XXXI,d)p.296.
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anything in man simply because he is created. Pelagians, for
instance, cannot deny that free will, as they see it, if they
believe in a Creator God, is ultimately from God, but that is
not the point at issue in Pelagianism. The point is whether
man, once created, has free will over against God which
inclines him towards God, and if he has it, he is considered
capable to a considerable extent of saving himself.
Similarly, if "x^elationship" is in man over against God,
making for the relation with God, even if it occurs at the
same moment as creation, then that relationship is man's
and the illation of God and man depends on man. Alexander
denies this but this ultimately must be his position if he
does not attribute the "becoming related" to God. This goes
beyond the power of dominion.
In the Christology proper the idea of God as the
"One" and not as the Trinity revealed in Jesus Christ meant
that God could not be understood as becoming fully man in
Jesus Christ because that would involve him in change.
Therefore a soul is posited in man which contains his
"godly" part, or in the doctrine of grace, grace becomes
created grace with which free will co-operates. Similarly,
in the discussion of "Dominus" it is the "servus" who is the
created element so that "the relation is placed in the
creature in regard to God and not vice versa". Just as God
makes grace available which man may use, so, in a similar
way, God, who in his dominion is "Dominus", creates the
servant in whom relationship is present. The inability of
this God to come into a relationship with time in any real
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sense, was demonstrated also in the doctrine of predestination.
In Alexander God is not really conceived as Lord of time and
be cannot be conceived as such for his presupposition at this
point is the changeless, timeless God and not God, the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, revealed in Jesus Christ. It
is only in Jesus Christ that God can be seen as Lord of time,
and not bound by timelessness, for it is only in Jesus Christ
that one can see that it is God who makes the relationship to
his creation through the Word. God is not bound by the
creation, not even by its concept of timelessness.
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CQBCLUGIUH
The aim of this thesis has been quite simple. It
has been to discover the role which Alexander of Hales assigns
to Jesus Christ in God's work of salvation. This has in fact
meant that the question constantly being asked was "how does
Alexander view the humanity of Christ?" It is in this aspect
of his Christology that most doubts are raised. If the
humanity of Christ is not seen as x>laying a unique role
then the place of the Church - the priesthood and sacraments
in particular - is enlarged to take on functions which in
the Bible are reserved purely for Christ and the doctrine
of the Trinity is considerably weakened; if the humanity
of Christ plays no role at all then the doctrine of the
Trinity ceases to be of real interest and in effect a
Unitarian position must be the end result. Then men apart
from Christ are exalted into the position of being their own
saviours to accept or not to accept substantial grace and with
it to gain one's own sanctification. It has been the contention
of this thesis that both in the work and in the person of
Christ Alexander has either failed to give a sufficient
place to the humanity of Christ or has eliminated it
completely or almost completely in some areas.
The one place where Alexander seems to give sufficient
place to the humanity of Christ is in his soteriology. In
his doctrine of penal satisfaction he follows Anselm insofar
as he gives a necessary and unique role to Christ, who is
fully man and fully God. Here Alexander takes up something
like a Biblical position when he sees Christ as the sole
satisfier for the temporal punishment of original sin.
However even here in regard to the eternal punishment of
temporal sin Christ as man and God has no role - this factor
however is not prominent.
However, very prominent is the fact that Jesus
Christ has no role in the forgiveness of sins as far as guilt
is concerned. To be sure it is of God to forgive sins but
in Alexander this forgiveness is not mediated through Jesus
Christ but through the grace which is called "gratia gratum
faciens". This grace also brings sanctification to man -
in which man plays his part - and again this grace can and
does work, according to Alexander, quite apart from the
sanctification in Christ. A modification of this position
is found in Alexander's doctrine of Christ as Head, but here
Jesus Christ is merely seen as the channel of grace and not in
any way as unique. Mary and the saints can avail themselves
of grace in the same way. Their merits, like Christ's, can be
transferred to the members of the Church. Of course, Christ
is completely sinless but this does not change the fact that,
even if Jesus was the sole source of grace (which he is not
according to Alexander), all members of the Church, all the
good, can sanctify themselves with the grace "gratia gratum
faciens". In other words grace brings God to man, and man
plays the role that Biblically is played solely by Christ.
In Alexander Christ is the first among many. As far as
sanctification is concerned, then, according to Alexander,
Jesus Christ has no essential or unique role to play in
his humanity, in the long run the doctrine of the grace
of the Head undermines all Christology. It should be noted,
however, that in the Glossa, at least, it would appear that
the coming of grace depends to some extent on the satisfaction
made by Christ, and that when grace comes to man through
the sacraments the effect of satisfaction and sanctifying
grace seem to be bound together in coming from Christ the
Head. However, within this grace it is only the satisfaction
made by Christ to which Alexander gives the humanity of
Christ any real role.
In regard to this satisfaction one must also have
hesitations about how man receives it through the sacrament
of Baptism according to Alexander. It seems probable that
the subjective acceptance of satisfaction is partly in the
Baptismal act whose power derives from the priestly power,
and partly in the acceptance by the person receiving
that
Baptism. There is no doubt, however, about the fact, the
priesthood has a power which it> demonstrates in the
sacraments, in particular in the Eucharist in which it
has the power of tranC^stantiation. To be sure, Liars is
a derivative power but it is a power that the priesthood
contains in itself. This power sets it on a level with
Christ and indeed seems to exclude the Holy bpirit, by and
large, from the sacraments so far as the peculiar work of
the sacraments is concerned. Thus it would appear that the
priesthood assumes the humanity of Christ and acts on behalf
of man to accept his power, and, towards man, acts in the
place of the Son of God - a place delegated to them by the
Son of God - in bringing his benefits to them. It is man
who then is the receiver, who takes the role which Christ
alone can have in his Spirit. This fact is demonstrated
particularly in the sacraments of the Lord's Supper and
Penance where the priest has a distinctive power in regard
to the satisfaction for actual sins.
It is in regard to actual sins that Alexander's
soteriology is again deficient. Three areas where Christ
has no unique role are fciiose q£ guilt, sanctification,
and now actual or personal sins, uere it is man with the
aid of "gratia gratum faciens" who has to make satisfaction
for his own personal sins. To be sure, the merits of
Christ can be an immense help and they are conveyed through
grace and the sacraments of the Church. But the merits of
the saints and the Church can also help and the most
important merits, of course, are found in the person of
the contrite penitent. In the doctrine of Penance we have
what can and must be described as serai-Pelagianism. Here
man with grace must save himself. Christ, man and God,
is really not necessary.
With guilt, sanctification, and the satisfaction
for actual sins (which is made by sanctified man and therefore
can be regarded as part of sanctification) being accomplished
apart from the unique Christ, it is evident that the doctrine
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of the person of Christ need not "be thorough-going in regard
to Christ's humanity. However, in the doctrine of the person
of Christ in Alexander's theology, other contributory factors
to a deficient doctrine become evident. These factors may
have contributed to a deficient soteriology or a deficient
sotericxLogy may have contributed to the acceptance of these
factors in regard to the person of Christ. The truth
probably lies in both.
Christ's humanity is established in regard to the
satisfaction for the temporal punishment of original sin.
Here too Alexander is with Anselm in asserting the absolute
necessity of the presence of God, or rather the bon of God.
However there are doubts about the person of Christ in
another direction, firstly the humanity of Christ in relation
to the sin of man, and secondly the humanity in relation to
more ontological problems.
Firstly, the humanity of Christ and sin. There
are grave doubts whether Alexander can really say that
Christ became "sin for us". This is particularly demonstrated
in the first chapter on "beginnings" where it is stated that
the new Adam took on the flesh of the old Adam in his
innocence. One again has doubts about Alexander's thinking
here in the doctrine of Christ as the Head - only of the
good, or of those descended from Abel. All proimess to sin
is eliminated from Christ and one feels that this man can
hardly stand in our place. Of course in Alexander's terms
he need not except to provide satisfaction for original sin;
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he does not sanctify man; grace and man do that and
therefore oar old Adam does not need to "be sanctified in
Christ. The sanctification of Mary and the saints amply
demonstrates that. Mary is made practically completely
sanctified by grace - and this fact further increases the
doubt as to Christ's participation in sinful humanity.
However, there is another factor at work: here and
it is seen in regard to the passions of Christ - or the lack
of passion. Passions are regarded as sinful essentially,
it would appear, because they indicate change. Pear is
included amongst the passions. In Christ passion is by
and large removed from the superior part of the soul.
Because passions are part of time it is very difficult for
Alexander to conceive how Christ the Son of God and Son
of Man could participate fully in humanity because by so
doing he would necessarily be involved in mutability and
passions and then he would be sinful himself. Alexander's
presuppositions that finite things like fear and change are
sinful and that God is immutable have made it difficult for
him to assert a full involvement of Christ in the fears
and tensions and temptations of man. Thus for Alexander
it is only Christ's body that is involved really and his
soul in its superior or spiritual part takes on the aspect
of God. This thinking is seen particularly in chapter 4 in
which the merits of Christ, his two wills (not of man and
God but of lower and superior reason), the passibility of
Christ, his humbling and exaltation, and the time "in triduo"
are discussed. Here Alexander avoids any suggestion that
Christ might have been involved in sin in the superior part
of the soul. This, surely, is basically because he has a
less than Biblical view of time coinciding with an
unBiblical view of God - not, to be sure, taken to extreme
but there all the same - as the "Unmoved Mover".
At this point it is convenient to discuss
Alexander's view of Christ's humanity in relation to
ontology. In chapter 2 it was seen that in the "uniting"
of God and man Alexander had no hesitations about asserting
the full deity of Christ but there were doubts about the
humanity especially when he discussed the fact that the Son
of God is of the essence of deity but the Son of man is not
of the essence of man. One can see what Alexander is trying
to avoid, namely Adoptionism or Kestorianism, but one cannot
be satisfied that he has given sufficient answers to these
heresies by failing to state that Jesus Christ was not only
a man but belonged to mankind as well. One feels that when
talking of the assumption Alexander keeps the Bon of God
one step removed, as it were, from mankind.
This is seen even more clearly when he discusses
the actual union of God and man in Christ. Whereas in
discussing the uniting and assumption Christ was kept near
to God and away from man, in the discussion of the hypostatic
union the Person of God is distinguished from the Godhead
to a greater extent so that God would not be involved in
that "created" thing which is the hypostatic union. Here
Alexander arrives at a rather extraordinary solution. He
does not base the union in a Trinitarian doctrine, that is,
that the possibility for onion existed in the Son of God
and that the man Jesos Christ is enhypostasised in the
person of the Son of God. If he had done this then Alexander
would have asserted completely the involvement of God in the
person of the Son (the nature of God would be involved) in
the union of the natures. Instead, Alexander seems to
establish the possibility of union in a created hypostasis
which is the subsistence of the person of God and the person
of man aacfthis is not meant to be JNestorian. Further, the way
he describes the manhood of Christ does not sufficiently
answer Kestorian charges of wbnophysitism for it would appear
that the attributes of the Son are also the attributes of the
man and one wonders whether Alexander has sufficiently
established the man in the union as full man as one wonders
whether in the union the Trinitarian God is involved in
his nature through the Son.
The mention of the attributes of the manhood of
Christ leads onto an extraordinarily difficult subject in
the history of Christology, the knowledge of Christ. Just as
the kenotic theory errs in taking too much away from the Son
of God, so it would seem Alexander errs, with much of
Christian history, in the opposite direction. Admitting
the great difficulty of the subject one cannot help thinking
that Alexander has practically eliminated man here (chapter 4).
It would seem that he does not begin at the place where a
solution if any will be found - at the incarnation itself.
What are the factors present in Alexander's deficient
view of Christ's person and work? One can list five. The
first is his view of God as the "One" and the "Unmoved Mover".
This of coarse is not hie only presupposition but it is there
and prevents him from assuming Biblical positions. Closely-
allied to this is the second factor, a suspicion that
Alexander regards time and finitude as such as sinful, or
at least, prone to sin. A third factor is Alexander's view
of man as a person with a divinely inclined soul and
therefore with a capacity for God. A fourth factor is his
doctrine of grace in which grace is seen as a substance (like
"medicine") which apax't from Christ can be absorbed by man
so that it becomes "created" grace and therefore to all
intents and purposes man. A corollary of this is his view
of man with a capacity for God. A fifth and vitally important
factor is his view of the priesthood and the sacraments and
in particular the doctrine of Penance. This last factor had
already had a long history in the Church.
The relationships of these factors and how they
arose is outside the scope of this thesis. One thing, however,
can be said. Ouch presuppositions creep in because of a
failure to centre on the revelation of God in Christ, to
begin one's theology from that, to continue on that, and to
end on that, and that alone. Perhaps this failure is best
demonstrated in Alexander's doctrine of predestination which,
at least in the Glossa, can be described as totally non-
Christological and which also demonstrates his inability to
view time and eternity together in such a way that time and
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creation remain time and creation. This trouble is seen
r
also when he discussed God as "Dominus". No where better
can bo seen the necessity to return to the incarnation.
Alexander, by and large, lacks a full doctrine of
the humanity of Christ and in many instances it is not unfair
to state that he holds an Apollinarian view of Christ. In
the doctrine of Christ as the Head, especially where the
grace of the Head and the grace of union were equated in
the Quaestiones, the humanity, one suspects, is not
essentially different from the humanity of other men in so
far as all man would have the same relationship to God as the
man. Christ. This factor would indicate that Alexander has not
sufficiently established the doctrine of the incarnation in
a Trinitarian view of God by which alone one can assert the
full participation of God through the Son of God in humanity,
and therefore also assert the full humanity of Christ as
both a man and a man among men in all respects like man except
without sin. And this Trinitarian view of God, in turn,
is established only by the fact of the incarnation, where it
is seen, in fact, that God did become man, and that that
man Jesus Christ, being Bon of God and Son of Man, was and
is the justification and sanetification of man. Here, it
can be seen that the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine
of the incarnation walk hand in hand. One begins with the
incarnation and in Christ one sees the Trinitarian God at
work uniting himself uniquely to man who is established as
man in the Person of the Son of God, the second person of
the Trinity. Because this man is enhypostasised in the Son
of God he is also unique and therefore our justification
and sanetification.
Alexander fails consistently to begin at the
incarnation and consequently created grace, the priesthood
and the sacraments, and man himself, provide the humanity
which can only be provided by Christ. Whether he did this
because he inherited a poor Cbristology or because other
factors made for a poor Christology is beyond the scope
of this thesis to answer. What can be said is that only
a Christology which was centred on the incarnation could
rescue him, or anyone, from the directions which were being
taken.
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